Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Babri Masjid--Ram Janambhumi Issue

eae
ANATOMY OF A
CONFRONTATION.

THE
BABRI MASJID-RAM JANMABHUMI
ISSUE

EDITED BY

SARVEPALLI. GOPAL |

PENGUIN BOOKS
ANATOMY OF A CONFRONTATION

Sarvepalli Gopal is Emeritus Professor of Contemporary History at the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

*
K.N. Panikkar is Professor of Cultural and Intellectual History at the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Sushil Srivastava is in the Department of Medieval and Modern History
of the University of Allahabad.

*

A.G. Noorani is a lawyer and a well-known writer on public affairs.

*
Mushirul Hasan is Professor of History at the Jamia Millia Islamia, New
Delhi.

*
Neeladri Bhattacharya is at the Centre for Historical Studies at the Jawa-
harlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

*

Romila Thapar is Professor of Ancient History at the Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.

*
Aditya Mukherjee is at the Centre fer Historical Studies at the Jawa-
harlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

*

Asghar Ali Engineer is the Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies,
Bombay.

*
Amiya Kumar Bagchi is the Director of the Centre for Studies in Social
Sciences, Calcutta.

Anatomy of a Confrontation

The Babri Masjid—Ramjanmabhumi Issue

Edited with an Introduction by
Sarvepalli Gopal

PENGUIN BOOKS

Penguin Books India (P) Ltd., B4/246 Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110.029, India.

Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England

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First published in Viking 1991
Published in Penguin Books 1991

Copyright © Penguin Books India (P) Ltd. 1990, 1991

Copyright in individual articles in Anatomy of a Confrontation is assigned as follows:
Introduction © S.Gopal, 1990; A Historical Overview © K.N.Panikkar, 1990; Hlow the
British Saw the Issue © Sushil Srivastava, 1990; Legal Aspects to the Issue © A.G.Noorani,
1990; Competing Symbols and Shared Codes: Inter-Community Relations in Modern India
© Mushirul Hasan, 1990; Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi © Neeladri
Bhattacharya, 1990; A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama © Romila Thapar, 1990;
Colonialism and Communalism © Aditya Mukherjee, 1990; Hlindu-Muslim Relations
Before and After 1947 © Asghar Ali Engineer, 1990; Predatory Commercialization and
Communalism in India© Amiya Kumar Bagchi, 1990

All rights reserved

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Made and printed in India by Ananda Offset Private Ltd, Calcutta

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Contents

Preface vii

Introduction Il
Sarvepalli Gopal

A Historical Overview 22
K.N. Panikkar

How the British Saw the Issue 38
Sushil Srivastava

Legal Aspects to the Issue 58

A.G, Noorani

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes: Inter-Community
Relations in Modern India 99

Mushirul Hasan

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi 122
Neeladri Bhattacharya

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama 14]
Romila Thapar

Colonialism and Communalism 164
Aditya Mukherjee

Hindu—Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 179
Asghar Ali Engineer

Predatory Commercialization and Communalism in India 193
Amiya Kumar Bagchi

Notes on the Authors 219
Chronology of Events 220
Appendix 223

Index 233

Preface

Differences between Hindus and Muslims have dominated public life in
India for about the last hundred years. Artificially contrived at the start
and drawing strength from divergence of social habit, these differences
have widened out to become the phenomenon of communalism, unknown
almost anywhere else in the world. A few Indians felt genuinely that their
religion was under threat; many more used their religious commitment to
battle for jobs, secure political concessions or strengthen their reactionary
interests. So widely did the virus spread in the penultimate years of the
Raj in India that, despite the efforts of staunch nationalists in the modern
sense, freedom came to India along with the partition of the country. The
areas where Muslims formed a majority of the population and wished to
secede were thrown together to form the new State of Pakistan.

The fact of division was monstrous enough; but it was accompanied by
the miseries of mass migrations and human beings slaughtering each other
in a mad frenzy. The crowning tragedy was the assassination of Mahatma
Gandhi by a Hindu fanatic. It was clearly a desperate situation and, if India
were to turn away from a steep descent into savagery, sound principles of
national cohesion had to be reasserted. Indian nationalism was still
obviously brittle and free India had to pick up broken pieces to put
together the jigsaw of nation-building in a fresh context. So in 1947 a
slow, at times faltering, but steady effort was set in motion seeking to
divorce religion from public life and to assure the minorities that the faiths
they professed would have no bearing on their civic rights. Secularism
would be the binding cement of Indian society.

The progress that the country was making in this respect has been
severely menaced in recent years by a sharp recrudescence of political
aggressiveness among diverse groups of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs,
claiming religious sanction. The focus of the belligerence of the Hindu
group, claiming to represent the majority community in the country, has
been the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Alleging that this

viii / Anatomy of a Confrontation

mosque had been built in the sixteenth century after destroying a Hindu
temple standing on the site of the birth of Rama—one of the avataras of
Hindu belief. The Hindu communal party, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), serving as its militant wing,
are set on destroying the mosque and replacing it with a temple. Bricks
have been transported from various parts of India and, with great fanfare,
large crowds converged on Ayodhya in October 1990. The result has been
clashes between Hindus and Muslims all over the country with over a
thousand deaths in the last few months. In Ayodhya itself law and order
were at a discount with police firing on Hindu volunteers. As a conse-
quence of the arrest of its President, the BJP withdrew its support to the
Union Government, which had to resign. And still the crisis is not over.
Urns alleged to contain the ashes of those killed in Ayodhya are being
carried to all the villages, and it is planned to recruit a million volunteers
and to demolish nearly 3,000 mosques in various parts of the country.
Hindu revivalism is sought to be dressed up as Indian nationalism and the
mosque at Ayodhya is denounced as a ‘symbol of national sharne’. Were
this movement to succeed, secularism would be strangled and India would
be heading for a Fascist take-over.

So the Babri Masjid—Ramjanmabhumi issue is no longer a matter of
academic debate. The problem, acute enough already, is gaining in
political urgency day by day and laying siege to the basic concepts on
which free India has striven to build herself. It, therefore, seemed
worthwhile to put together articles on various aspects of the problem
written by those who are specialists in their own fields and who have taken
into account the extant evidence. No attempt has been made to impose a
particular viewpoint and the reader will notice different shades and
nuances of opinion and approach. It is hoped that the whole will place the
problem in the right perspective and enable an understanding which is
free of the pressures of current politics.

ANATOMY OF A CONFRONTATION

Saryu

Treta ke Thokur

R eee ‘Aurongzeb’s Mosque)

Lf

ine r
Sumitra- 1

ae Bobur's Mosque ono

A Jonmophami To SHaKiRg Se He

angie ¢

oe

Al AYODHYA

°

Tkm

A TEMPLE O MOSQUE

Location of Sites and Places of
Pilgrimage at Present Day Ayodhya.

Introduction

Sarvepalli Gopal

The Ramjanmabhumi issue, the demand by a militant section of Hindu
opinion for the demolishing of a mosque in Ayodhya and the building of
a temple to Rama on that site, brings into sharper focus than at any time
since 1947 a sickness which free India has not been able to shake off and
demands reappraisal of many basic features of our society. But the issue
itself (as well as the atmosphere in which it thrives) has been, as the essays
in this collection show, contrived in recent times and with no historical
basis. If, even so, considerable attention is given in this book to claims
said to be groundedin history, it is because so muchis being made of them
in current propaganda. The identification of present-day Ayodhya with
Ramjanmabhumi is a matter of faith and not of evidence. There is again
no conclusive proof that the mosque, built at the time of Babur, was ona
temple site or that a temple had been destroyed to build it. It is true that
the mosque incorporates pillars which have non-Islamic motifs; but the
explanation for this may well lie in the employment of Hindu craftsmen
in the building of mosques or the incorporating of material from any
derelict building in the vicinity which could have had a non-religious
function or even have been associated with non-Hindu sects. In fact the
style of these pillars is thought by some to be more Jaina than Hindu, and
it is possible that parts of the mosque may have been picked up from Jaina
buildings. Ayodhya had been a Buddhist and then a Jaina centre before
followers of the Rama cult started settling there in large numbers in the
eighteenth century and building temples under the patronage of the
Muslim nawabs of Avadh.

Visitors to Ayodhya, such as Tieffenthaler in the late eighteenthcentury,
have recorded a rather garbled version of a local story that either Babur
or Aurangzeb destroyed atemple and constructed a mosque on its site and
that this temple had been at the birthplace of Rama—incidentally, one
among many with claims to have been located at his birthplace. But, as
can be seen from the essays of Sushil Srivastava and K.N. Panikkar, it

12 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

was only in the nineteenth century that British officials and writers began
to give wide circulation and lend authority to the story that on Babur’s
orders a temple had been destroyed and a mosque built on the site. This
fitted in with the British understanding of India. To cite the restrained
language of Judith Brown, the British tended to break up the Indian
population in terms of community and analysed Indian society as a plural
one of different peoples who needed special outlets in political life.! These
‘imagined religious communities’, in Romila Thapar’s phrase,” were also
seen as basically hostile to each other; and the assumption that in Ayodhya
a temple had been destroyed and replaced by a mosque was of a piece
with this hypothesis. That Muslim rulers in India often acted on non-
religious grounds and, like all rulers everywhere, were primarily inter-
ested in the maintenance of their political power, was ignored.

As Asghar Ali Engineer’s article establishes, no generalizations are
possible about Hindu—Muslim relations in our history. There was both
conflict and amity between these communities, just as there was hostility
between factions and groups within the communities. All such conflicts
were limited in their impact and were not, in contrast to today, organized
as confrontations between Hindus and Muslims, with repercussions en-
couraged in many distant parts of the country as well. Babur himself
patronized Hindu temples and individuals, and in Ayodhya itself he gave
arevenue-free grant of a large piece of land to a Hindu ascetic. Mushirul
Hasan outlines the dominant feature of cooperation between the Hindu
and Muslim elites as well as masses in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. With the coming of the British, regional imbalances in
economic and social development resulted in the classes who gained most
from British rule being drawn predominantly from among the Hindus;
and Amiya Bagchi’s paper shows clearly the economic basis of the
phenomenon of communalism. By the time the interior areas of India
caught up with Westernization, national consciousness, particularly in
Maharashtra but also in Bengal, had begun to speak increasingly in a
Hindu idiom. The British, as Aditya Mukherji traces, were not slow to
take advantage of the resulting increase in communal rioting. ‘One hardly
knows,’ wrote the Secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton, ‘what to
wish for. Unity of ideas and action would be very dangerois politically,
divergence of ideas and collision are administratively troublesome. Of the
two the latter is the least risky, though it throws anxiety and responsibility
upon those on the spot where the friction exists.’

The policy-makers of the Raj were aware that, despite the social
disharmony between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, the real rivalry

Introduction | 13

was economic and that this had been stretched, with their active con-
nivance, to the sphere of politics and public life. As late as 1946 the
Viceroy, Lord Wavell, who could sometimes in private slip into honesty,
acknowledged this. ‘Though I agree as to the contrast between the Muslim
and Hindu outlook on life and that the masses can be worked on mainly
by the appeal of religion, I think that the root of the political conflict, so
far as the leaders are concerned, lies in the fear of economic domination,
rather than difference of religion. It has been found that Hindus and
Muslims can live together without conflict where there is no fear of
economic and social domination, e.g. in the army.’4 But whatever their
inner views, the British continued to work on the assumption that India
was a plural society divided by religion. According to the imperialist
viewpoint, ‘the animosities of centuries are always smouldering beneath
the surface’.” The result was Partition and the formation of Pakistan on
the groundless basis that Hindus and Muslims formed two separate
nations.

In this setting the Muslims who preferred to remain in India rather than
migrate to Pakistan were, in Fernand Braudel’s words about Frenchmen
in 1940, like ‘dust blown by the wind from a heap of sand’.© The
Government of free India, which obviously rejected the two-nation
theory, had to strengthen civilized principles of national cohesion. The
logical attitude of getting rid of religion altogether was too utopian for
Indian society, where many religions were deeply entrenched. So the more
practical answer was not opposition to religion but the removal of religion
from public affairs, the separation of the State from all faiths, the insis-
tence on religion as a private matter for the individual with no bearing on
civic rights and duties, and freedom for the profession of diverse forms
of religious worship provided they did not come into conflict with each
other. These are all elements of a modern outlook anywhere as well as of,
in the third world, the most practical approach. Only secularism of this
type, not defined in any dictionary or in accordance with Western ex-
perience but adapted to the Indian context, can be the comerstone of an
egalitarian, forward-looking society with religious pluralism, full civil
liberties and equal opportunities. It is the only possible social cement for
a moder community und the only way of making certain that no one is
treated as a second-class citizen on the ground of religion.

These principles of secularism draw their strength from their own logic
and appropriateness and need no support from any religion, though it goes
without saying that the proclaimed aim of true religion is human fraternity.
Even in Islam, often regarded as exclusive, one finds in the Koran the

14 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

saying, ‘Your religion for you and mine for me.’ To the person moved by
the religious impulse, the ultimate truth is one, every religion shows some
traces of it and itis a matter of indifference to which religion one adheres.
Only to the person exploiting religion for political ends and using it in
various forms of mobilization, as in the case of fundamentalists of any
variety, Hindu, Muslim or Sikh, is religion seen essentially as a divisive
factor, and providing no meeting ground for followers of different faiths.
But, considering that the main attack on secular objectives in free India
has come from the ranks of Hindu bigotry, it is worth mentioning that the
teachings of Hinduism at their bestare in full accordance with such secular
practices. Hinduism, unlike the Semitic religions, lacks a structure, is not
linear, has no single sacred text and is not organized by a church. Even
the term Hinduism, although used in the sense of a religion in the fifteenth
century, came into common usage only in the nineteenth century. It is a
religion without circumference, an amalgamation. under the impact of
extraneous influences, of a large variety of religious beliefs with similar
structures into a religious system. But while there is no Hindu religion in
the sense in which that term is generally used, there is an atmosphere, a
structure of feeling, which governs the different sects and lifts them to
shigher levels. This common element in the faith which binds together
those who call themselves Hindus in the various parts of India is the
acceptance of religion as spiritual experience, as the direct apprehension
of the reality of the one supreme Universal Spirit. Devotion to truth and
respect for all human beings, a deepening of inner awareness and a
commitment to compassion, form the essence of the Hindu religion.

This lack of dogmatism rules out the certainty of unique revelation and
leads to an acceptance of a diversity of beliefs. By its emphasis not on a
specific creed but on a common quest for the truth which underlies ull
doctrines and denominations, Hinduism leaves no room for inter-religious
misunderstandings and opens the way for religious concord. Dispensing
withrule, ritual and ceremony and instead kindling the inner sense makes
possible an intelligent comprehension of the deeper unity of principle
among all religions and enables people to respect each other’s beliefs.
When Shelley wrote of ‘bloody Faith the foulest birth of time’ he had in
mind narrow, exclusive religions seeking domination. Buta religion shorn
of obscurantism and one which promotes human and ethical values can
have a place in a healthy human community.

Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest Hindu of our century. described this over
seventy years ago, “Let me explain what I mean by religion. It is not the
Hindu religion, which I certainly prize above all other religions, but the

Introduction | 15

religion which transcends Hinduism, which changes one’s very nature,
which binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which even purifies.
It is the permanent element in human nature which counts no cost too
great in order to find full expression and which leaves the soul utterly
restless until it has found itself, known its Maker and appreciated the true
correspondence between the Maker and itself.’” Itis asad irony that those
who claim to be followers of the same religion as Gandhi, should now,
forsaking the majesty of the faith proclaimed for all time in the
Unanishads and in the teachings of the bhaktas, be primarily concerned
with collecting and transporting bricks in order to construct a temple on
the site of a mosque which they plan to demolish. What even a few years
ago would have been laughed out as a sick joke on the eccentric fringe of
Indian public life has now become a pressing demand. Motivated defiance
of the ground rules of historical research and analysis, hijacks and distorts
the past to suit the needs of current politics and enrols it under the banner
of a narrow ideology.® Neeladri Bhattacharya establishes the dangers of
such an approach.

That such ideas are no longer a marginal aberration is in a sense
testimony to the weakness in practice of secularism in India. The Hindu
revivalism which followed the fact of Partition and the memories of
inter-religious conflicts could not be wished away by apapercommitment
to divorce religion from politics. “All of us,’ Nehru wrote sadly, ‘seem to
be getting infected with the refugee mentality or, worse still, the RSS
mentality. That is a curious finale to our careers.’~ But he realized that.
this communal feeling, if allowed to spread, would wreck India and
destroy its future, and combating it became his prime task. So when, on
the night of 22-23 December 1949, some rather primitive images of
deities were found in the mosque at Ayodhya, cbviously put together
hurriedly and proclaimed to be Rama manifesting himself, Nehru imme-
diately recognized the wider implications of this event. Because it would
be a dangerous example with bad consequences, he urged the then Chief
Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Govind Ballabh Pant, to interest himself
personally in the matter, !9 As A.G. Noorani points out in his article,
Serdar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, also wrote to Pant that such
un: lateral action, suggesting an attitude of aggression and coercion, could
not be countenanced. This factis worth stressing, because Patel is usually
depicted as a supporter of Hindu chauvinism; but actually his major
concern was national unity. Though Pant replied that efforts were being
made to set things right in a peaceful manner, nothing happened. Con-
cerned at this apathy in a matter of such grave importance with repercus-

16 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

sions on all-India affairs and more especially Kashmir, at a time when a
rapid increase of migration of Hindus from East Bengal was causing panic
among Muslims in Calcutta and a mounting war fever in Pakistan, Nehru
offered, if necessary, to go himself to Ayodhya. Pant, assuring the Prime
Minister that some local officials had been replaced and stating that he
was hopeful that a satisfactory solution could be found and the idols
removed peacefully, dissuaded Nehru from proceeding to Ayodhya. But
far from a solution being found to the problem in Ayodhya, the situation
in the whole province, as Nehru saw, deteriorated. ‘I have felt for a long
time that the whole atmosphere of the UP has been changing for the worse
from the communal point of view. Indeed, the UP is becoming almost a
foreign land for me. I do not fit in there. ... All that occurred in Ayodhya
in regard to the mosque and temples and the hotel in Fyzabad “ was bad
enough. But the worst feature of it was that such things should take place
and be approved by some of our own people and that they should
continue.’!”

So strongly did Nehru feel on this matter of the communal disease
spreading in UP and all over India that he considered at one stage leaving
all else and taking up with all his strength a crusade to combat com-
munalism. But at the time all he could do was to remind his colleagues of
their old ideals and urge them to act. Finding Pant immune to his
pleadings, he turned to Lal Bahadur Shastri, at that time Home Minister
in UP. The matter of the idols in the mosque had by now become a major
issue affecting India’s whole policy and prestige; and Nehru once more
reiterated his concern that conditions in Ayodhya were becoming steadily
worse and spreading to Mathura and other places, with the Congress
organization taking no interest and some prominent Congressmen being
openly communal. ‘I fear that we are heading again for some kind of
disaster.’ But still no action followed; and indeed the multifold and
intensifying consequences of official impassivity and weakness in Ayod-
hya are with us still. “The fact of the matter is that for all our boasts, we
have shown ourselves a backward people, totally lacking in the elements
of culture as any country understands them. It is only those who lack all
understanding of culture, who talk so much about it.”’~ A scathing
indictment which seems to gain validity as the years pass since Nehru first
made it over forty years ago. Our media today is replete with myth wearing
the mask of history and myth carefully chosen, as Romila Thapar shows,
to project particular obscurantist versions that help to glorify aggressive
fundamentalism. The television versions of the Ramayana and the
Mahabharata and, in sharp contrast, the failure to present a serious and

Introduction | 17

non-partisan discussion of the Ramjanmabhumi issue, have all con-
wibuted to the heightened excitement which has led to the recent increase
in communal rioting, with over a thousand Muslims killed in the last few
months.

Unqualifiedly committed as Nehru was to the principles of secularism,
a hesitancy on his own part in enforcing them has helped to weaken their
impact. In 1948 he committed the support of the Government to a
resolution of the Constituent Assembly calling for the ban of communal
political parties, but did not implement the resolution because of legal
difficulties. He, like Gandhi, was opposed to the banning of cow-slaughter
as an unnecessary and irrational concession to Hindu feeling but permitted
it to be included as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the
Constitution, while ensuring that nothing came of it in practice. Above
all, in his keenness to win the confidence of the Muslims whose feelings
were still raw after the events of Partition, Nehru failed to provide equality
before the law to all Indian women and to promulgate a common civil
law. But there is no room in a society which declares itself to be secular
for inequalities which claim religious sanction. Secularism is more than
a passive attitude of religious tolerance; it is a positive concept of equality
in all spheres. Religion has to be separated not only from politics but also
from the law. To deny rights to Muslim women which are available to
Indian women of other faiths is a violation of the provision in the
Constitution that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds of religion. Indeed the Constituent Assembly had, by a resolution
in 1948, refused to accept that Muslim personal law was an inseparable
part of the Islamic religion and rejected attempts to exempt it from the
Directive Principle regarding a uniform civil code.

All this was, of course, known to Nehru; but he felt that, at least in the
early years of free India, minorities required special consideration. There
might still be a few Muslims who were communal and any efforts of theirs
to make mischief would have to be dealt with sternly; but more attention
should be given to winning the Muslims over and making them feel at
home. He was throughout, before and after 1947, of the view that the
problem of minorities was basically one for the majority community to
handle. The test of success was not what the Hindus thought but how the
Muslims and other communities felt, just as, while minorities might turn
communal out of a sense of grievance, communalism of the majority
community was dangerous and, masquerading as nationalism, was in fact
a form of Fascism. There could sometimes be justification for the
minorities to be communal; there was none for the majority. ‘Honest

18 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

communalism is fear; false communalism is political reaction.”!® That
Nehru even in the thirties drew a distinction between shades of com-
munalism and considered one of it to be legitimate, weakened the logic
of his secularism and opened the door to explosive possibilities. But he
was right in the general drift of his thinking that the eradication of the
communal virus is a problem of social psychology. It is for the Hindus to
be secular and thereby help the minorities to become secular. For it is the
majority community alone that can provide the sense of security.

Whatever the innate tendencies of communities identifying themselves
as Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs and the natural drift of their religions,
extraneous influences have, in the years after Nehru and particularly in
recent times, sought to push the majority community in the reverse
direction. Successive governments, of whatever ideological complexion,
have helped in this. Even the Congress when in office has not been
consistent in its loyalty to Nehru’s principles. In its keenness to ensure
votes, it has been willing to compromise on secularism. This has some-
times brought short-term advantages, but in the long run has strengthened
communal forces. These have also gained from other developments;
Hindu chauvinism is an unsurprising counter to the Islamic fundamen-
talism that is spreading in India and various other parts of the world.
Seeking to confront throw-backs to medievalism by modem, secular
attitudes is a difficult endeavour; far easier to take up similar, backward-
looking postures in dealing with the menace. Also, just as the Jews were
denounced in Nazi Germany as a threat to the economic prosperity of the
nation as a whole, so in India Muslims are today being made the
scapegoats of impending decline, particularly of retail and small-scale
business, in the Indian countryside. In the riots in Kota in September 1989,
those killed were mostly the Muslims who had been once poor but now
roused envy because they had been enriched by money from the Gulf.
Tamil Nadu has been relatively free of antagonism between Hindus and
Muslims; but this record was tarnished by communal rioting in Madras
city in September 1990, and it is said that Marwari traders rewarded the
hooligans who burnt shops owned by Muslims. In the clashes in the
Bhagalpur area in October 1990, not a single Muslim weaver family was
spared in the Champanagar and Nathnagar localities, famous for their silk
textile production. Nor is it without significance that many of the disputed
religious sites constitute valuable urban property. The craving for plunder
has not departed with Mahmud of Ghazni.

Such economic greed, rivalry and exploitation draw sustenance from
other sources as well. Fundamentalism is an umbrella providing shade to

Introduction / 19

smuggling, drug-peddling and other dubious, anti-social activities. In-
dians settled abroad, clinging to obscurantist versions of their religion in
an effort to salvage their identity in an alien context, have thrown their
weight—and funds—on the side of reaction in their home country. The
latest instance is their massive vote for L.K. Advani, the leader of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in the poll conducted by the BBC in London
for selecting the Man of the Year.

All these trends have been assiduously exploited by the BJP and the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) in their campaign for political mobiliza-
tion of the masses. Active in this regard especially during the last two to
three years, their efforts acquired a note of urgency in recent months after
the National Front Government’s adoption of the report of the Mandal
Commission, recommending reservation of some official jobs for the
backward classes. The attention given to divisions of caste within the
Hindu fold threatened to weaken the objective of pitting the Hindus as a
bloc against the Muslims and led to an intensification of the mobilizing
campaign. Making the Ayodhya issue a hard and easily understandable
focus of their activity, calling on all devout Hindus to carry bricks from
various parts of India to Ayodhya for constructing a temple, recruiting the
services of sadhus and swamis, organizing a rath-yatra with fanfare
across the long stretches of northern India with violence and bloodshed
in its wake, carrying out periodic attacks on the mosque and parading
through the villages of India what are claimed to be the ashes of those
killed by the police—are methods of which Goebbels would have been
proud. And the results are plain to see. In the general elections of 1952
the Jan Sangh secured no more than three per cent ofthe vote andits lone
member in the Lok Sabha was Syama Prasad Mukherjee, a front-bench
parliamentarian who would have done credit to any party; in the elections
of 1989 the vote secured by the BJP is estimated to be anywhere between
eleven and fifteen per cent, and it has in the Lok Sabha eighty-six
members—which makes clear thatnumbers are now more important than
quality. Today the Party is mounting what it hopes will be the final assault,
leading to the acquisition of State power at the Centre. We are living in
times which may well witness secularism in its last throes.

Secularism is more than laws, concessions and special considerations.
It is a state of mind, almost an instinctive feeling, such as existed, by and
large, for many centuries in India, when Hindus, Muslims, Christians,
Parsis and followers of other faiths lived side by side in general harmony,
whatever the religions of their rulers, adhering to their own practices but
influencing each other in architecture, dress, music, food and even in their

20 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

religious evolution. During the last hundred to hundred-and-fifty years,
fissures, stress-cracks and structural fatigue have developed in the edifice
of Indian civilization; but these can be surmounted with the impetus of
democracy and the spread of education. A secular state can be strongly
grounded only in a secular society, and this implies leading the people out
of social backwardness into forward-looking egalitarianism. If secular
attitudes are confined to a few sophisticated elements in our society, then
even those few will feel, as they are beginning to do today, beleaguered,
with fundamentalism spawning round them and weakening the national
identity. Only by the strengthening of the human factor’at all levels in
India can the communalism both of fear and of reaction be overcome.
Only by not living in a world of self-created myth but by facing the past
with honesty, can we move beyond the tragedies which the corroding
disease of communalism brings and face the future with confidence. It is
the good fortune and not the curse of India that she is a land of many
religions with a complex and diverse culture. That culture can now, by
effort, understanding, and dedication, be expanded into a genuinely
democratic culture of an educated people. Such an invigorating process,
rather than the destruction of mosques and the construction of temples in
their place, would be more in line with the heritage of the Indian people
which always, over the centuries, flowed freely beyond its natural con-
fines, looked for wider connections and linked the apparently separate.

Basically, it is irrelevant whether a temple had or had not existed on
the site where the mosque now stands. India cannot revert to the ap-
proaches of medieval politics and set about destroying, under any cir-
cumstances, existing or erstwhile structures of worship. That such
demolitions had taken place in the past offers no justification for such
vandalism now. Today attention is centred on a mosque; tomorrow
agitation may develop over a temple. It is established that some Buddhist
and Jaina shrines were destroyed by Hindus. How far back in history does
one go, correcting the past as interpreted to one’s own liking?

It is pointless for religious leaders to exchange and assess what they
regard as evidence, as it is to make a reference to the Supreme Court to
pronounce on the validity of such data. But a correct understanding of the
present confrontation could help to clear the atmosphere and facilitate the
obvious solution of leaving things as they are. The essays in this volume
are intended as contributions towards such an understanding.

Introduction / 21
Notes

1. Judith M. Brown, Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope, Oxford University Press:
Delhi, 1990, p. 374.

2. Romila Thapar, ‘Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and
the Modern Search fora Hindu Identity’, Modern Asian Studies, May 1989,
pp. 209-31.

3. Lord George Hamilton to the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, Hamilton Correspon-
dence, India Office Library, C125/2, 7 May 1897, folios 185 ff.

4. Lord Wavell to Sir A. Clow, Transfer of Power, vol. 8, Document 414,
7 October 1946.

5. Francis Younghusband in 1930 quoted in, G. Pandey, The Construction
of Communalism in Colonial North India, Oxford University Press: Delhi,
1990, p. 44.

6. Fernand Braudel, The Identity of France, vol. 1, Collins: London, 1988,
p. 24.

7. Young India, 12 May 1920; Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol.
17, Publications Division: Delhi, 1965, p.406.

8. The latest example is Koenraad Elst’s Ram Janmabhoomi vs. Babri
Masjid, Delhi, 1990. Here a Catholic practitioner of polemics fights the
crusades all over again on the soil of India and the progress in rational
thought and logical analysis in historical debate during the eight hundred
years in between has obviously passed him by. It is difficult to take seriously
an author who draws his historical evidence from newspaper reports and
speaks of the centuries when there were Muslim rulers in India as ‘a blood-
soaked catastrophe’.

9. Nehru to Mohanlal Saxena, 10 September 1949, Nehru papers.

10. Nehru’s telegram to G.B. Pant, 26 December 1949.

11. Nehru to Pant, 5 February 1950, and Pant’s reply, 9 February 1950,
Nehru papers.

12. A Muslim owning a hotel in Faizabad was ordered to vacate it by the
local authorities and the next day some Hindus took possession of it. Later
the order was withdrawn but the Muslim owner did not get back his hotel;
he was allotted other premises.

13. Nehru to Pant, 17 April 1950, Nehru papers.

14, Nehru to Lal Bahadur Shastri, 9 July 1950, Nehru papers.

15. Nehru to Pant, 17 April 1950, Nehru papers.

16. 27 November 1933. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, first series,
vol. 6, Orient Longman: Delhi, 1974, p. 164.

A Historical Overview’

K.N. Panikkar

During the last few years some Hindu organizations, such as the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
have claimed that the Babri Masjid of Ayodhya is located at the Ramajan-
masthan, where a temple existed from the time of Maharaja Vikramaditya.
The mosque, it is alleged, was built in 1528 after demolishing the temple
and partially with the temple material. Referring to historical evidence to
substantiate these claims, Justice Deoki Nandan, Secretary of Sri Rama
Janma Bhumi Mukti Yagna Samiti, expresses this view:

That there was an ancient temp!e of Maharaja
Vikramaditya’s time at Sri Rama Janma Bhumiisa fact of
history, which is indisputable, although there is some
controversy as to which of the Vikramadityas resurrected
the place and built the magnificent temple, that it was with
84 pillars of Kasauti, a few of which still stand in the
mosque-like structure at Rama Janma Bhumi and tell their
own tale. That temple was desecrated and destroyed by
Mir Baqi, a commander of Babar’s hordes, after Babar
visited to (sic) Ayodhya, and a mosque was sought to be
raised thereat, in order to please Faqir Fazal Abbas
Qalander.” (emphasis mine)

Justice Deoki Nandan is not the only one to stake a claim to history,
for almost every one from the camp of the VHP, the organization
spearheading the agitation for the demolition of the mosque and the
construction of the temple at its site, has marshalled historical evidence
to support their viewpoint.” In fact, the memorandum presented by the
VHP to the Government of India on 6 October 1989 was largely an attempt
to argue from historical evidence and hardly raised the question of faith.
And it was precisely on historical grounds that the Babri Masjid Move-
ment Coordination Committee, supported by some Muslims, sought to

A Historical Overview / 23

refute the VHP claim.* Evidently history and historical evidence have
becomecrucial issues in the present controversy, although the controversy
itself is decidedly political.

An inquiry into the history of Ayodhya will therefore be helpful in
considering three important questions related to the dispute. First, is it
possible to identify the location of Babri Masjid as the Janmasthan of Sri
Rama? Second, was the Masjid constructed after demolishing an existing
temple? Third, was there a popular belief either about the existence of a
temple or its demolition? If so, were there attempts on the part of the
Hindus of the area to reclaim the site and convert it to a temple?

Ayodhya as the Ramjanmabhumi

Whether present-day Ayodhya is the birthplace of Rama, as described by
Valmiki, is not beyond doubt and uncertainty. The events of the story of
Rama, originally told in the Rama-katha which is no longer extant, were
rewritten in the form of a long epic poem, the Ramayana, by Valmiki.
Being a poem, much of it could have been fictional, including places,
characters and events.

According to tradition, Rama, the king of Ayodhya, was born in the
Treta Yuga, which would make it thousands of years before the Kali
Yuga—sometimes calculated to begin in 3102 BC. > The Ayodhya of the
Ramayana had an advanced and relatively luxurious material life. It was
an urban centre with splendid palaces and buildings and a pattern of life
commensurate with developed conditions.

The description of Ayodhya in the Ramayana does not correspond to
the archaeological evidence from this region. Two excavations were
conducted in the area: one by A.K. Narain and another by B.B. Lal. Both
these excavations revealed that habitation in Ayodhya begins with the
early phase of the Northern Black Polished Ware culture. Lal has reported
that ‘the excavation revealed a fairly compact and working sequence for
the antiquity of the place from its first settlement over its natural soil. This
began with the use of the well-known Northern Black Polished Ware in
all its shades’.~ ‘On the basis of the data available from other sites like
Mathura, Shravasti, Kausambi, etc.’, Lal has come to the conclusion that
‘it would seem reasonable to ascribe the first occupation of the Janma
Bhumi area to circa seventh century BC’.” The development of the area
as an urban settlement came much later, certainly not earlier than the end
of the sixth century or the first half of the fifth century, when several other
towns emerged in the Gangetic plains.

24 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

The material conditions during the early phase of the Northern Black
Polished Ware culture were fairly simple, certainly more primitive than
those described in Valmiki’s Ramayana. Since there was no settlement in
the region prior to the seventh century BC and urban development had not
taken place before the sixth to fifth century BC, Ayodhya as described by
Valmiki could not have existed at the present day site.

The dynastic history of the post-fifth century BC is fairly well docu-
mented. Among the rulers of this period the names of Dasharatha and
Rama do not figure. Therefore, if the events of the Ramayana are
historical, they should have occurred prior to the fifth century BC. Given
the archaeological evidence discussed above this is not possible either. In
the event there are three possible explanations which could account for
the description of Ayodhya in Valmiki’s Ramayana. First, that the Ayod-
hya of Valmiki is fictional; second, that the description of Ayodhya as an
urban centre was a later interpolation; and third, that the text of Valmiki
belongs to a much later period.

Even after the seventh century BC Ayodhya does not seem to have had
continuous occupation. After the Gupta period, of which archaeological
findings are not significant at this site, there is no evidence of a settlement
for many centuries. The re-occupation took place only in the eleven
century, as indicated by the floor levels of the medieval period.® The
archaeological evidence of the region, therefore, raises serious doubts
about the identity of present-day Ayodhya with the Ayodhya of Valmiki’s
Ramayana.

The literary evidence further reinforces this doubt. The major cities of
Koshala, according to Buddhist sources, were Shravasti and Saketa, the
latter situated on the river Saryu. Buddhist texts also refer to Ayodhya as
another town located on the river Ganga, and not, as is the site of the
present-day Ayodhya, on the river Saryu.” The association of the Buddha
with Ayodhya is also on record; he had visited Ayodhya on two occasions
and had preached two sermons—the phena and the darukkhandha.

Although Ayodhya was not as prominent as Saketa and Shravasti, it
was not altogether insignificant, as otherwise the Andhavenhuputtas
would not have attacked it.!° But from Ayodhya they went to Dvaravati
in Western India. This would suggest that Ayodhya might have been
located further west than its present location. Had Saketa and Ayodhya
been identical Buddhist texts would have mentioned it, as the former
was an important commercial and religious centre, often visited by the
Buddha.

The .own of Saketa appears to have been renamed Ayodhya by a

A Historical Overview / 25

Vikramaditya, possibly Skanda Gupta, in the late fifth century AD when
he is said to have moved his residence to Saketa.!! Thus, what may have
been the fictional Ayodhya of the epic poem was identified with Saketa
quite late. It is likely that in bestowing the name of Ayodhya on Saketa
the Gupta king was trying to gain prestige for himself by drawing on the
tradition of the Suryavamshi kings—a line to which Rama is said to have
belonged. Kalidasa’s identification of Saketa with Ayodhya is consistent
with the possibility of Skanda Gupta taking up residence at Saketa and
calling it Ayodhya.

Complementary to this is the present day local tradition about the
‘rediscovery’ of Ayodhya by Vikramaditya, it having been lost after the
Treta Yuga which goes into mythical time. While searching for the lost
Ayodhya, Vikramaditya met Prayaga, the king of tirthas, who knew about
Ayodhya and showed him where it was. Vikramaditya marked the place
but could not find it later. He then met a yogi who told him that he should
let loose acow and acalf to roam. The location of the Janmabhumi would
be indicated by the flow of milk from the udders of the calf. The king
followed the yogi’s advice. When, at a certain point, the calf’s udders
began to flow, the king identified that as the site of the ancient Ayodhya.

The change of name from Saketa to Ayodhya is also reflected in the
account of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims who visited India. Fa Hsien who
came in the early fifth century, refers to a place Sha-ki, which has been
generally identified with Saketa.!° Hsuan Tsang who was in India in the
seventh century AD describes a place called Ayodhya which was then a
major centre of Buddhism with many monasteries and stupas. He refers
to about three hundred monks of both the Great and Little Vehicle—
namely, the Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism—who studied in Ayod-
hya.!4 He also mentions that the city is said to have been the seat of
government of a more or less mythical line of kings.

Thus the existing archaeological and literary evidence indicate that the
present-day Ayodhya was known as Saketa before the fifth century AD.
The Ayodhya of Valmiki’s Ramayana, even if it did exist, was possibly
not the same as the Ayodhya that was historically identifiable later.

Ayodhya as a Religious Centre

Ayodhya has been the focal point of many religions, with various forms
of religious worship fleurishing concurrently. It was an important
religious centre for all three religions of early India—Buddhism, Jainism
and Hinduism. Among the Hindus, however, Vaishanavism and Shaivism

26 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

were more popular during the early phase. Its development as a major
centre of Rama worship is relatively recent.

From about the fifth century BC a fairly large Buddhist community was
present in Ayodhya. Apart from several visits by the Buddha, the city is
said to have had many other associations with Buddhism. Although
Buddhism suffered a decline during the first millennium AD several
vestiges of its early influence survived in Ayodhyaas isreported by Hsuan
Tsang.

The Jaina tradition associates Ayodhya with the birthplace of the first
and fourth Jaina Tirthankaras. One of the earliest Jaina figures found so
far in excavations—a figure in grey terracotta and of the third to fourth
century—is from this region. According to the Jaina canon, Ayodhya
was visited by the two presumably historical founders of Jainism—
Parshvanatha and Mahavira. The canon also mentions that several
householders, merchants and a nobleman of Saketa were converted to
Jainism by Mahavira.!’ Such associations indicate that present-day
Ayodhya was also an important centre of Jaina pilgrimage.

The early places of Hindu worship in Ayodhya were either of Vaish-
nava or Shaiva provenance. The specific worship of Rama even as an
avatara of Vishnu is a much later development. References to the image
of Rama appear only in sixth century texts like the Brihatsamhita of
Varahamihira.

At the present site of Ayodhya there is no evidence of the worship of
Rama until the second millennium AD. Even the inscriptions from the
fifth to the eighth centuries AD do not associate Ayodhya with the
worship of Rama.!® Hsuan Tsang also does not mention any place of
Rama worship, even though he has recorded the existence of ‘ten Deva
temples’ (Vaishnava temples?) in Ayodhya in the seventh century Ap.!?

Based ona detailed survey of the literary, epigraphic and archaeologi-
cal sources, Hans Bakker has come to the conclusion that ‘the cult in
which Rama was worshipped as the supreme form and main manifesta-
tion of Vishnu did not rise into prominence before the eleventh and
twelfth centuries AD’. His study also indicates that there were very few
temples dedicated to Rama in the twelfth century and these were in
places other than Ayodhya.”?

The cult of Rama seems to have become popular only from the twelfth
century. Yet even in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Ramanandis had
not settled in Ayodhya on a significant scale. It became a centre of the
Ramacult, as controlled by the Ramanandi order, only from the eighteenth
century.” Most of the Rama temples came into being only after that.

A Historical Overview | 27

Babri Masjid: Did it Replace a Temple at the Janmasthan?

The mosque at Ayodhya, popularly known as the Babri Masjid, was
constructed by Mir Baqi, anobleman of Emperor Babur’s court in 1528.
The verses inscribed inside the mosque record that it was built at the
command of Babur, which may or may not be true, as it was common in
medieval times for the nobles to attribute all their good deeds to their
masters.” These verses, written in Persian, read as follows:

By the command of Emperor Babur, whose Justice is an
edifice reaching upto the very height of the heavens; the
good hearted Mir Baqi built this alighting place of angels;
Buwad Khair Baqi (may this goodness last forever). The
year of building it was made clear likewise when I said,
Buwad K hair Baqi. (935 A.H.)°°

Apart from these there are three more verses inscribed on the outside
of the mosque gate. They are:

In the name of one who is the wisest of all, who is the
creator of the universe, but Himself has no abode; in
thanksgiving to the Prophet of all prophets in the two
worlds; in celebration of the glory of Babur galandar (the
recluse) who has achieved great success in the world.

After the battle of Panipat Babur had visited the Avadh region ‘to settle
the affairs of Aud’,~ although there is some doubt whether he had actually
gone to Ayodhya.” The details of his activities during his stay in this
region are not available in the Baburnama, as the pages covering this
period are missing. Therefore, in the absence of any other contemporary
accounts describing his activities during this period, the verses inscribed
on the walls of the mosque form the only contemporary evidence indicat-
ing the circumstances in which the mosque was constructed. While the
religious fervour of Mir Baqi is clear from these verses, particularly from
the reference to the Prophet, it is important to underline the fact that there
is nO mention that the mosque was erected by demolishing a place of idol
worship. No such reference is available in contemporary Persian
chronicles also.

Given the absence of any such evidence it would be useful to refer to
the attitude of Babur to other religions and places of Hindu worship. In
the memoirs of Babur which contain very frank opinions on almost
everything he had encountered in India, there are hardly any hostile or

28 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

contemptuous references to other religious faiths. More importantly, his
reign is not marked by any acts of bigotry or discriminatory treatment of
his subjects on account of their religious faith. On the contrary, his general
demeanour underlined his tolerance of other religions.

During his journey through different parts of the country he had come
across several ‘idol houses’ and Hindu pilgrimage centres. He had neither
tried to defile or destroy them nor interfered with the religious practices
followed there: the Gur-Khattri shrine in Peshawar where Hindus offered
their hair as an offering; Kachwa where a Muslim lived among Hindu
yogis as their disciple and indulged in un-Islamic practices; and Gwalior
where a ‘lofty idol house’ stood by a mosque, are examples.” The only
exception was the destruction of Jaina idols at Urwa Valley near Gwalior,
not because they were idols, but because they were ‘shown naked without
covering for their privates’.

To a devout Muslim the construction otf a mosque is an act of religious
virtue; and so is the demolition of a place of idol worship. Those who
undertake such religious acts receive adulatory mention in contemporary
chronicles, of which examples abound in medieval India. Yet, there is no
reference to the Babri Masjid in any account during the sixteenth to
eighteenth centuries. A chronicler like Abdul Qadir Badauni of the six-
teenth century, who wrote his books with the professed objective of
demonstrating how the glory of Islam was declining during the liberal
rule of Akbar, was unlikely to have remained silent about the construction
of a mosque at the site of a temple of major significance, if such an event
had taken place.

A medieval Persian chronicle which contains a description of Ayodhya
is the Ain-i-Akbari, written in the seventeenth century by Abul Fazal. It
refers to Ayodhya as ‘one of the holiest places of antiquity’ and ‘the
residence of Ramachandra, who in the Treta Age combined in his person
both the spiritual supremacy and the kingly office’.? Abul Fazal does not
mention the existence of a temple dedicated to a person with spiritual and
temporal power and its replacement by a mosque. Nor does he record any
religious strife in the area.

If Persian chronicles of this period do not refer to the destruction of a
temple at Ayodhya, the texts by Hindus are also silent about it. The most
significant silence is that of Goswami Tulsidas, a great devotee of Rama
and author of the Ramacharitamanas. Judging from his description of
Ayodhya, an intimate knowledge of the area cannot be doubted. Yet he
does not mention the existence of a temple at the Ramajanmasthan and
its destruction by Muslims. Since he was greatly concerned with the rise

A Historical Overview | 29

of the mlecchas he could not have overlooked it.

Tulsidas’ text is not an isolated example. Aeleventhcentury inscription
of a Gahadvala ruler records his pilgrimage to Ayodhya and lists the sites
at which he performed rituals and offered worship. Ramjanmabhumi is
not one of them.” Also in alarge number of Sanskrit texts of this period
such as those of Lakshmidhara, Mitra Mishra, Jinaprabhasuri or the
Bhushundi Ramayana and the Puranas, which refer to major places of
pilgrimage, including Ayodhya, there is no mention of the Ramjanmab-
humi. The most important pilgrimage spot at Ayodhya was the Gopratara
Tirtha. It appears that the Ayodhya Mahatmya (fourteenth to sixteenth
centuries) was the first text which demarcated the Janmasthan and indi-
cated it as an important place of pilgrimage. Yet, even in this text, the
detailed instructions to pilgrims regarding worship and offerings at the
Janmasthan do not have any reference to a temple. :

That the Babri Masjid was constructed at the site of a temple is a
relatively recent belief. It had its origin in the nineteenth century
reconstruction of the history of the subcontinent by the colonial rulers. In
this reconstruction the history of religious communities and their mutual
antagonism held centre stage. The history of Faizabad was no exception.

The first official publication dealing with the history of the region was
A Historical Sketch of Tahsil Fyzabad; Zilla Fyzabad by P. Carnegy in
1870. Camegy asserted, on the basis of ‘locally affirmed’ information,
that three temples in Ayodhya were destroyed and mosques were con-
structed at their sites by the Mughals, ‘according to the well-known
Mahomedan principle of enforcing their religion on all those whom they
conquered’.? Carnegy’s account was reproduced almost verbatim by
H.R. Neville in the Gazetteer of Faizabad published in 1905.33 Neither
Carnegy nor Neville had anything but ‘local affirmation’ and their belief
in the well-known ‘Mahomedan principle’ to support their contention.
However, their opinion seems to have become an accepted fact. A.S.
Beveridge most possibly relied on these accounts to assert that ‘the
substitution of a temple by a mosque’ was done by Babur, even if there
was no mention of it in the Baburnama which she translated into English.
She suggests that Babur being a Muslim, and ‘inspired by the dignity and
sanctity of the ancient Hindu shrine’ would have displaced ‘at least in
part’ the temple to erect the mosque. Her logic is a good example of the
colonial view of Indian history ‘... like the obedient follower of Muham-
mad he was in intolerance of another Faith, (thus he) would regard the
substitution of a temple by a mosque as dutiful and worthy’.
Beveridge, like the British officials earlier, appears to base her view on

30 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

the religious attitudes of the Muslims. She does not provide any evidence
to support her view. It is even doubtful that she had visited Ayodhya, for
she mentions that the Persian verses from the wal of the mosque were
obtained through the courtesy of local officials. > This was an unfortunate
slip, particularly by an erudite scholar like Beveridge, since her opinion
has come to be accepted rather uncritically. Modern researchers tend to
lean heavily on her authority and Hindu communal organizations use her
authority to substantiate their viewpoint.

For instance, Hans Bakker, contrary to the evidence in the early part of
his excellently researched work, accepts Beveridge’s authority to assert
that the ‘temple was destroyed by the first Mo logul prince Babar in AD 1528
and replaced by a mosque which still exists’.~~ Van der Veer, on the other
hand, draws upon local belief. He not only affirms the view, but also refers
to the miracles which followed the destruction of the temple, ‘Mir Baqi
destroyed the temple, but his efforts to build a mosque failed because each
night everything that had been built during the day fell down again. This
continued until Mir Baqi grew desperate and proposed to give up. Then
the Faqir Khwaja dreamt that the mosque should not be built right over
the garbha (sanctum) of the temple, but somewhat behind it. Thus the
mosque was built in such a way that the garbha of the temple remained
open to the Hindus for centuries in the form of a pit into which they could
throw flowers.’

Religious Conflict and Local Tradition

In all likelihood the local tradition, to which British officials and modern
scholars refer, came to be accepted only in the second half of the
nineteenth century. It was not unrelated to the Hindu—Muslim strife of
1855 over the Hanumangarhi temple, situated near the Babri Masjid.

At the time of the Muslim conquest, Ayodhya, according to local
tradition, was ‘little other than a wilderness’, with very few devotees
attached to Hindu shrines.°® By the middle of the nineteenth century it
had become a popular centre of Rama worship. An important factor
facilitating this transformation was the liberal religious atmosphere that
prevailed in Avadh during the Nawabi rule. The Nawab’s attitude, how-
ever, had a political dimension. During the period of political anomie in
the eighteenth century, Avadh had broken away from the Mughal empire
and was struggling to consolidate its power in a region with a large Hindu
population. The Nawabi rule, therefore, sought the collaboration of Hin-
dus, particularly the Kayasthas and Rajput zamindars both in administra-

AHistorical Overview / 31

tion and military affairs, > That the Nawabs and their officials contributed
to the development of Hindu places of worship is, therefore, not surpris-
ing; it was, in fact, integral to the manner in which power was exercised
in Avadh. Not only did the Hindu officials build and support temples but
Muslim officials also patronized Hindu institutions and priests.

By the middle of the nineteenth century a large number of devotees and
ascetics had congregated at Ayodhya. The main centre of this assemblage
was the temple of Hanumangarhi, over which a dispute developed into an
armed conflict between the Hindus and Muslims in 1855. The emergence
of Ayodhya as a prominent place of Hindu worship under the liberal Shia
rulers, which enraged certain orthodox sections of the Muslims, was the
context of the dispute.

The dispute over the Hanumangarhi temple has a close parallel with
the present-day dispute over the Babri Masjid. A group of orthodox Sunni
Muslims, under the leadership of Shah Gulam Hussain, claimed that the
temple ce Hanumangarhi had supplanted a mosque which existed there
earlier."! In July 1855 Gulam Hussain led a party of his followers,
numbering about 500, to oust the Hindus from the temple. The Bairagis,
the occupants of the temple, had the support of about 8,000 people, among
whom were some large landholders and their retainers from the neigh-
bouring countryside. In the ensuing conflict a large number of Muslims
were ‘soon laid prostrate, the remainder returned and gained the Masjid
(Babri Masjid) where they were soon surrounded and cut to pieces’.
Although the Bairagis defeated the Muslims and entered the mosque, they
did not occupy it; they ‘returned to the Ghurrie and other abodes’.

The defeat of Gulam Hussain and his followers at the hands of the
Hindu Bairagis created considerable consternation among the Muslims
of Avadh, both Sunni and Shia. Several fatwas were issued against the
Hindus and the Nawab was urged to punish the ‘wickedness’ and
‘enormities’ of the infidels.“~ As further breach of peace appeared im-
minent, the Nawab appointed a committee of inquiry, consisting of a
Muslim, a Hindu and a representative of the British, in order to defuse the
Situation. After very detailed investigations the committee came to the
conclusion that there was no masjid at the Hanumangarhi, at least in the
past twenty-five to thirty years, and most probably there never had been
one. The Muslims resented this decision and Maulvi Amir Ali
Amethavi started organizing a movement to reclaim the masjid. The
Nawab toyed with the idea of constructing a mosque adjacent to the
temple to assuage the feelings of the Muslims, but this was strongly
opposed by the Hindus. A serious communal clash appeared to be brew-

32 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

ing, but was averted by the timely and decisive intervention of the British
Resident.

The Hanumangarhi episode of 1855 has been mistaken by many as a
dispute over the Babri mosque and Ramajanmasthan. Surprisingly,
Michael Fisher who has consulted the voluminous records of the British
Government regarding the dispute of 1855 mistook the Hanumangarhi

46 : ‘ :
temple for that of the Janmasthan."" Many others, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, have maintained this confusion.*” Some of them have used
this event to argue that the Hindus claimed the Babri Masjid as the
Janmasthan for a long time. It is needless to emphasize that this is a
misreading of the events of 1855—the dispute was about the Hanuman-
garhi temple and not about the Babri Masjid. ~ Summing up the dispute
a British official wrote:

... the cause of misunderstanding between the two sects
was, that the Shah and his followers pretended that a
masjid formerly existed in the immediate vicinity of
Hanumangarhi and that the Byragie Fakirs have either
destroyed it, or by defacing and building upon it have
converted it into a part and portion of their own buildings,
whilst the Byragies strenuously deny the existence of any
such masjid either now or in preceding years.

An important dimension of the Hanumangarhi episode is that it indi-
cated the absence at that time of any linkage between the Babri Masjid
and the Janmasthan in Hindu consciousness. Although the Bairagis cap-
tured the masjid in which the Muslims had taken shelter they did not
occupy it or advance aclaim to it. Instead they retreated to the Hanuman-
garhi almost instantaneously. It is also important that during the course
of the inquiry no Hindu had mentioned the earlier existence of a temple
at the site of the Masjid, even as a counter to the Muslim claims to the
Hanumangarhi temple. The local tradition about the Janmasthan temple
to which the British officials have referred, does not appear to be current
in 1855.

The Hanumangarhi episode, however, contributed to the construction
and dissemination of such a tradition. How it actually came into being is
not certain, but it originated, most probably, as an attempt to checkmate
the Muslim claims on the Hanumangarhi temple. The Mahant of
Hanumangarhi was quick to realize the implication of the proceedings
initiated by Gulam Hussain and Amir Ali. The proposal of the Nawab to
build a mosque adjoining the temple was quite alarming to him.°° He

A Historical Overview | 33

apprehended that the decision of the Government need not necessarily go
in favour of the Hindus if the agitation were to be renewed in future. A
counter-claim on the areas controlled by the Muslims could be an effective
move to foil the designs of orthodox Muslims to gain possession of the
temple. The demand for the Janmasthan thus originated as a defensive
ploy.

Soon after the Revolt of 1857 the Mahant took over a part of the Babri
Masjid compound and constructed a chabutra (raised platform). This
attempt of the Mahant was opposed by the local Muslims. On 30 Novem-
ber 1858 Maulvi Muhammad Asghar, khatib and muazzin of Babri Masjid,
submitted a petition to the magistrate complaining that the Bairagis had
built a chabutra close to the mosque and that they had written ‘Rama,
Rama’ on the walls of the mosque. Similar complaints were made in 1860,
1877, 1883 and 1884. 51 In 1885 the Mahant filed a suit to gain legal title
to the land and for permission to construct a temple on the chabutra. His
suit and appeals were dismissed. His claim for the proprietorship of the
land in the compound of the masjid was also dismissed by the judicial
commissioner.“ Yet the idea that the masjid was constructed at a holy
place oe the Hindus and that it was a disputed area was firmly estab-
lished.

A local tradition which has developed rather recently is now sought to
be made into a matter of national faith. It is argued that the site oF the
Babri Masjid being the Janmabhumi of Rama is a matter of faith.** Just
as the Christians believe that Jesus Christ was the Son of God and the
Muslims believe that Mohammad was the Prophet of Allah, the Hindus
believe that Rama was the avatara of Vishnu. These are matters of faith.
But not so the birth of Mohammad at Mecca or of Rama at Ayodhya. They
are questions of fact. The known history of Ayodhya does not indicate
that what is claimed as the Janmasthan was in fact the birthplace of Rama
or that a temple existed at the site of the Babri Mosque.

Notes

1. In preparing this essay I have drawn upon the notes provided by my
colleagues at the Centre for Historical Studies: Romila Thapar, Harbans
Mukhia, Muzaffar Alam and Neeladri Bhattacharya. I am thankful to them
for their help. I would also like to thank my other colleagues at the Centre
who had earlier published a pamphlet entitled, The Political Abuse of
History: Babri Masjid~Rama Janma Bhumi Dispute from which I have
borrowed facts and arguments.

2. Justice Deoki Nandan, Sri Rama Janma Bhumi: A Historical and Legal

34 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Perspective, Lucknow, n.d., p. 2.

3. See, for instance, S.P. Gupta, ‘Ram Janmabhumi Controversy: What
History and Archaeology Say’, Organiser, Republic Day Issue, 1990; ‘Sri
Rama Janmabhoomi or Babri Masjid’, Organiser, 29 March 1987; Dr
Harish Narain, ‘Muslim Testimony’, /ndian Express, 26 Feb 1990.

4. Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.), Babri Masjid-Ramjanma Bhoomi Con-
troversy, Delhi, 1990, pp. 218-29.

5. According to Aihole inscription. Epigraphia Indica, vol. VI, 1900-1,
New Delhi, 1981, p. 1 ff.

6. Indian Archaeology—A Review, 1976-77, p. 52.

7. ibid.

8. ibid., p. 53. S.P. Gupta claims in newspaper articles that he was present
when a part of the site referred to as the Ramjanmabhumi was being
excavated. He maintains that he saw the pillar-bases of foundation pillars,
which would have been part of the architecture of the tempie and would
date to approximately the eleventh century AD. It is curious, however, that
such important evidence, if it actually existed, is not mentioned in the
excavation reports published by the director of the excavation, Prof. B.B.
Lal, in Indian Archaeology —A Review. The excavator states that floor
levels of the medieval period were found but makes no reference to
pillar-bases. It is unlikely that he would have omitted such important
evidence.

As for the pillars incorporated into the mosque, they do not in themselves
indicate the presence of a temple of Rama. There is no certainty either that
they belong to the site itself and were not brought there from the neighbour-
hood. There were, as reported by British officials in the nineteenth century,
similar pillars lying scattered in the region.

9. B.C. Law, Geography of Early Buddhism, Londoi:, 1932, pp. 5 and 23;
G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, vol. 1, London, 1960,
p. 165.

10. Ghata Jataka, no. 454, book 10, 82, vol. IV, p. 53.

11.S.R.Goyal, A History of Imperial Guptas, Allahabad, 1967, pp. 211 and
215.

12. Peter Van Der Veer, Gods on Earth, London, 1988, p. 20.

13. J. Legge, The Travels of Fa Hien, Oxford, 1886, p. 54.

14. Hans Bakker, Ayodhva, Grasingen, 1986, p. 38.

15. T. Walters, On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India, London, 1904, p. 354.
16. Hans Bakker, op. cit., p. 38.

17. ibid.

18. Epigraphia Indica, vol.2, p.344; vol.15, pp. 115 and 142-44; vol. I,
p. 15, refers toan Ayodhya which, it has been suggested, was a village in
Uttara Kashi.

19. Hans Bakker, op.cit., p. 42.

20. ibid., pp. 64-65.

21. Peter Van Der Veer, op.cit., p. 11.

22. There is no other contemporary evidence to suggest that Babur had
ordered the construction of the mosque. While farmans exist for the

A Historical Overview / 35

construction of other buildings by Babur, for this mosque no farman was
issued.

23. A.S. Beveridge (trans.), Baburnama,1922, Reprint, Delhi, 1970, II, pp.
LXXVIL

24. A.S. Beveridge, who has appended these verses to her translation states
as follows, ‘Thanks to the kind response made by the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Fyzabad to my husband’s inquiry about two inscriptions men-
tioned by several gazetteers as still existing on “Babur’s mosque” in Oudh,
I am able to quote copies of both.’ Baburnama, p. 656, p.n.1.

25. Baburnama, p. 602.

26. For this argument see Sushil Srivastava, ‘ Ayodhya Controversy: Where
Lies the Truth’, Asghar Ali Engineer, op.cit., pp. 29-33.

27. Baburnama, pp. 230, 394 and 613. Also see Mohibbul Hasan, Babar:
Founder of the Mughal Empire in India, Delhi, 1985, pp. 190-91.

28. Baburnama, pp. 611-12.

29. Abul Fazal, Ain-i-Akbari, li. Translated into English by H.S. Jarrett,
Reprint, Delhi, 1978, p. 182.

30. Hans Bakker, op.cit., p. 51.

31. ibid., pp. 125-29. It has been argued that pillar-bases found in the
excavations at Ayodhya are proof of the existence of a temple. This question
needs to be looked at more closely. In arecentarticle in the RSS magazine,
Manthan, the Director of the Ramayana Archaeology project, Prof. B.B.
Lal, has made the following statement:

In the Janmabhumi area, the uppermost levels of a trench that lay
immediately to the south of the Babri Masjid brought to light a
series of brick-built bases which evidently carried pillars thereon.
In the construction of the Babri Masjid afew stone pillars had been
used, which may have come from this preceding structure. How-
ever in order to confirm this and to obtain a full plan and other
details of this earlier structure, it would be necessary to carry out
further excavation in the area.

This statement differs from his official reports on his excavations of this
site published in the journal of the Archaeological Survey of India (Indian
Archaeology-A Review, 1976-77, 1979-80) and his many papers on the
archaeology of Ayodhya, in which he nowhere mentions such pillar-bases
and in fact says that nothing of significance was found at the Janmabhumi
site at Ayodhya from the Gupta period upto the medieval floor levels. Was
the evidence regarding pillar-bases deliberately concealed at that time or
has it now been thought up to suit the theories of the RSS?

The above statement is curious because it contradicts itself. If the
pillar-bases were found at the uppermost level they should be quite recent.
How then could they have been the bases for a pre-sixteenth century
temple? Professor Lal does not seem to want to commit himself to any
date for the so-called pillar-bases. Nor does he tell us why he regards them
as pillar-bases. It is unlikely that brick-built pillar-bases would be used for
supporting heavy stone columns. It would have been constructionally more

36 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

logical to use stone pillar-bases. The present bases, if that is what they are,
could equally well have been the bases of brick arches or some other brick
structure, possibly a hall or rooms adjoining the site of the mosque. The use
of brick in the medieval period was fairly common. Even if pillar-bases
were to be found indicating the existence of a structure preceding the
mosque, a co-relation between that structure and the pillars in the mosque
is not necessarily established nor need the preceding structure necessarily
be regarded as a temple.

It is interesting that Martin writing about the Janmabhumi and the Babri
Masjid at Ayodhya in 1838 has this to say:

It is possible that these pillars have belonged to a temple built by
Vikrama; but I think the existence of such temples doubtful; and,
if they did not exist, it is probable that the pillars were taken from
the ruins of the palace. They are only six feet high. There is a
Sivalinga called Nageshwara, which is called on by all the pilgrims
to witness their faith, when they have performed the usual
ceremonies; and this is supposed to be the oldest image of this place.

Montgomery Martin, History, Antiquities, Topography and Statistics of
Eastern India, vols. I-III, London, 1838, vol. II, pp. 336-37.

32. P. Camegy, A Historical Sketch of Tahsil Fyzabad Zillah F yzabad,
Lucknow, 1870, p. 21.

33. H.R. Neville, Fyzabad—A Gazetteer, Allahabad, 1905, pp. 173~74.
34. Baburnama, Appendix, LX XVII.

35. ibid.

36. Hans Bakker, op.cit., p. 44.

37. Peter Van Der Veer, op.cit., p. 21.

38. P. Carnegy, op.cit., p. 21.

39. Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh
and the Punjab, Delhi, 1986, pp. 212-42; Michael H. Fisher, A Clash of
Cultures: Awadh, The British, and the Mughals, Delhi, 1987.

40. ibid.

41. J.R.I. Cole, Roots of North Indian Shiism in Iran and/raq, Delhi, 1989,
p. 244.

42. Foreign Political Consultation, no. 34, 28 December 1855.

43. Michael H. Fisher, op.cit., pp. 229-30.

44, Foreign Political Consultation, no. 356, 28 December 1855.

45. J.R.I. Cole, op.cit., pp. 244-49.

46. Michael H. Fisher, op.cit., p. 227.

47. Justice Deoki Nandan, op.cit., p. 3; Rajendra Prasad Jaina, op.cit. A
good account of the incident is available in G.D. Bhatnagar, Awadh Under
Wayid Ali Shah, Varanasi, 1968, pp. 117-40.

48. Apart from the British records the details of this event are available in
Urdu and Persian accounts which also make it clear that the dispute was
over the Hanumangarhi temple and not about the Babri Masjid. See Kamal-
ud-din Haider, Qaisar-ut-Tawarikh, vol. II], Lucknow, 1879; and Saiyed
flahi Baksh al-Husaini, Kurshid-i-Jahan Nama, Persian, Ms. Buhar 102,

A Historical Overview | 37

National Library, Calcutta.

49. Foreign Political Consultation, no. 356, 28 Dec. 1955.

50. Foreign Political Consultation, no. 360, 28 Dec. 1955.

51. ‘Papers Relating to the Dispute About the Ramchabootra’, Records of
the Faizabad Collectorate (copies), Institute of Objective Studies, Jamia
Nagar.

52. S.K. Tripathi, ‘One Hundred Years of Litigation’, Asghar Ali Engineer
(ed.), op.cit., pp. 17-19.

53. Joseph Tieffenthaler who toured Ayodhya between 1766 and 1771 has
stated that the Emperor Aurangzeb destroyed the fortress called the
Ramakota, and built at the same place a Mohammedan temple with three
domes. Others say that it has been built by Babur. Tieffenthaler has
obviously confused the mosque built by Aurangzeb at the east of the
Svargadvara with the Babri mosque. In this context it is necessary to make
a distinction between the Janmasthan and Janmabhumi (location of birth
and place of birth). For Tieffenthaler’s account see Abhas Kumar Chatter-
jee, ‘Ram Janmabhumi: More Evidence’, /ndian Express, 26 March 1990.
54. ‘In religion, it is a matter of faith and not of proof. ... So by faith alone
Christians embrace Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, by faith and faith
alone Muslims believe Muhammad to be the Prophet of Allah, and by faith
and faith alone Hindus believe Ramjanmabhumi in Ayodhya to be the
birthplace of Lord Rama, K.S. Lal, ‘Ramjanmabhumi—Some Issues’,
Organiser, October 1989.

How the British Saw the Issue

Sushil Srivastava

The city of Ayodhya stands on the right bank of the river Ghagra, or Saryu,
as it is called within the sacred precincts, on latitude 26° 48' north and
longitude 82° 13° east, at a distance of about ten kilometres from the city
of Faizabad. According to the traditions of the orthodox Hindus, it was
founded for additional security not on the transitory earth but on the
chariot wheel of the Great Creator himself.

Ayodhya is pre-eminently a city of temples but all the places of worship
there are not connected with the Hindu religion. In fact, till the close of
the nineteenth century there were six Jaina temples, some mosques and
tombs and several Hindu temples in the city.” A. Cunningham, Ar-
chaeological Surveyor to the Government of India, was convinced that
some importa Buddhist traces were hidden under the great mounds in
Ayodhya. The city had always had a cosmopolitan attitude towards
religion and culture. Remnants of Buddhism, Jainism, Brahminism—Hin-
duism and Islam can still be found in Ayodhya. It is certain that in this
city several religions have grown and prospered either at different or
simultaneous periods of time in the past.

It is therefore surprising that some British officials insist on referring
to Ayodhya as the Hindu city.” Montgomery Martin, who was assigned
the task of compiling historical and topographical data on eastern India
by the English East India Company, observed that Ayodhya was a Hindu
city and the adjacent Faizabad was a Muhammadan city.” He published
his report in 1838. Martin provides us information regarding several cities
and districts adjoining Gorakhpur, but he does not distinguish the other
cities by the nomenclature ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muhammadan’. He describes the
cities of Prayag (Allahabad), Kasi (Varanasi), Haridwar (Hardwar), Dadri
or Dardara Kshatra and the district of Benares, but does not call them
Hindu cities.

The attempt to classify Ayodhya in religious terms could not have been
made according to the religious distribution of the local population. In

How the British Saw the Issue | 39

both Ayodhya and Faizabad, the Hindus were in majority. In 1869, when
the First Census Report was compiled, it was found that in Ayodhya the
Hindus constituted 66.4 per cent of the total population and in Faizabad
they numbered a little over sixty per cent of the total population.” It must
be added that in both cities there was a complete absence of the Wahabi
Muslims, and the Shia Muslims were more in number than the Sunni
Muslims. In Faizabad the Shias were 67.4 per cent of the total number of
Muslims and in Ayodhya they were 64.7 per cent of the Muslim population.
British officials apparently justified the demarcation of the cities on the
basis of religion because of local political developments. Patrick Carnegy
wrote that when the seat of government was shifted by Nawab Safdarjang
from Ayodhya to Faizabad in AD 1740 Ayodhya started growing as a Hindu
city. He argued that in the absence of the Muslim court from Ayodhya,
Hindu elements now had the freedom to involve themselves in religious
activities. However, Camegy and other British officers did not extend this
theory beyond Ayodhya. In AD 1775 Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah shifted the
capital of his kingdom from Faizabad to Lucknow but this did not enable
Faizabad to grow as a Hindu city. In 1877 W.C. Benet gave another
justification for classifying Ayodhya as a Hindu city. He wrote: /

About a hundred and fifty years ago there was a revival.
Whether a national feeling was aroused by the tyranny of
Aurangzeb, or by the success of the Marathas, or by the
translation into popular language of the Ramayana, some-
how or other Ayodhya became again esteemed as a holy
place; it grew in favour each year, and now in all India,
perhaps except the Jaggannath festival and that at
Hardwar, there is none to equal the Ramnaumi celebration
at Ayodhya.”

British observers of Ayodhya in the nineteenth century generally agree
that the Hindu revival of Ayodhya was a phenomenon of modern times.
P. Camegy writes that in AD 1720 when Nawab Saadat Khan was
appointed the Mughal Viceroy in Avadh, Hindu activity inthe city gained
ground. It seems he intended to differentiate the attitudes of the Shia and
the Sunni Muslim governors towards their Hindu subjects. He probably
wanted to ustify the establishment of the Ramanandi akharas (sects) after
that time." He added that when the second Nawab Safdarjang shifted the
seat of government from Ayodhya to Faizabad, Raja Naval Rai, a minister
at the court of the Nawab, encouraged the construction of Hindu temples
in Ayodhya.!*

40 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Raja Naval Rai was a Hindu Kayastha and was said to have been a
staunch devotee of Shri Rama. Local traditions relate that Raja Naval
Rai supported and extended Vaishnava activity in Ayodhya. However, it
is clear from a reading of the Tarikh Farah Baksh that in number the
Vaishnava Hindus were very small in comparison to the Shaiva Hindus
in Ayodhya. By 1869 the Vaishnavas were only forty-four per cent of
the total Hindu population in Ayodhya.! We can assume that their
number must have been less in the beginning of the nineteenth century.
Raja Naval Rai is credited with having constructed some temples along
the Svargadwar. It is said that because of his efforts several temples and
settlements of sadhus and people learned in the Shastras came up.
Carnegy provides us a list of 209 such institutions and temples in
Ayodhya in 1870.!4

The British, who have written the history of the province of Avadh, and
with it the city of Ayodhya, unanimously agree that in the absence of
reliable historical evidence it is difficult to relate with certainty the
developments in the city until the tenth century AD. The developments in
Ayodhya after the advent of the Turks are inferred from the general
contemporary account of developments in North India. H.C. Irwin,
lamenting the dearth of evidence, wrote:

It is asomewhat humiliating confession, but it is probably
a true one, that of the history of Oudh, from the time of
Syed Salar’s expedition to the appointment of Saadat
Khan as Subahdar of the province in AD 1720, a period of
nearly seven hundred years, we have next to no real
information. Written Hindu records there are almost none,
and from Muhammadan chronicles little can be gleaned
beyond such unfruitful items as this governor was
suspended by that, or that the infidels of such a place
revolted, and were put down with great slaughter. Local
Hindu traditions there are in abundance, but it seems
almost impossible to connect them with any degree of
certainty with such facts as are to be gathered from the
Muhammadan historians.

The British writers on Ayodhya begin by recounting the state of affairs
in Ayodhya after the advent of the Turks in Avadh. On the basis of
Mirat-i-Masudi they accept that Syed Salar Masud led an expedition into
Avadh in AD 1030. He was successful in controlling the area and was
stationed in Bahraich, a place north of Ayodhya. After him Turkish

How the British Saw the Issue | 41

influence in the area waned but rose again in the twelfth century. In AD
1194 an expedition was led by Shahab-ud-din Ghori and Avadh was
conquered. Avadh became a province of the Sultanate in Delhi and
Nasir-ud-din Mahmud was appointed its governor. Between AD 1226 and
1720, the province of Avadh with its capital in Ayodhya (except for a few
years) remained an important part of the empire in Delhi. After AD 1720
the history of Ayodhya has been inferred fromthe memoirs of Mohammad
Faiz Baksh. !?

Official British writing on Ayodhya asserts that before the annexation
of the kingdom of Avadh on 13 February 1856, an incident of great
importance took place in Ayodhya. W.H. Sleeman, who was assigned the
task of preparing a report on the state of affairs in Avadh, wrote that Hindus
and Muslims of Ayodhya fought against each other and the troops of the
Nawab did not interfere. ~ This prompted him to comment that in Avadh
during the period of the Nawabs there was no security to life and the law
and order machinery had completely collapsed. Sleeman dates this inci-
dent as having occurred in 1853. He submitted his report in 1855.
However, both Carnegy and Benet wrote that the great Hindu-Muslim
conflict in Ayodhya took place in 1855. Benet writes:

In 1855, when a great rupture took place between the
Hindus and Muhammadans, the former occupied the
Hanuman Garhi in force, while the Musalmans took pos-
session of the Janamasthan. The Muhammadans on that
occasion actually charged up the steps of the Hanuman
Garhi, but were driven back with considerable loss. The
Hindus then followed up this success, and at the third
attempt took the Janamasthan, at the gate of which seven-
ty-five Muhammadans were buried in the martyrs’ grave
(Ganj-i-Shahidan),!®

At another place in the Gazetteer, Benet refers again to the same
incident. ‘The last occasion, and almost the only one in modern times,
when the Hindus ventured to shed the blood of their Moslem masters in
areligious war, was in defence of Hanuman,” wrote Camegy and Benet
before 1880. In 1905, H.R. Neville alsoreported theincident. He observed
that ‘the desecration of the sacred spots of the Hindus by the Muslim rulers
caused great bitterness between Hindus and Musalmans’. He added, ‘On
many occasions the feeling led to bloodshed and in 1855 an open fight
occurred, the Musalmans occupied the Janamasthan in force and thence
making a desperate assault on the Hanuman Garhi. They charged up the

42 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

steps of the temple, but were driven back with considerable loss. The
Hindus then made a counter attack and stormed the Janamasthan, at the
gate of which seventy-five Musalmans were buried, the spot being known
as the Ganj Shahidan or the martyrs’ resting place.’

These accounts of the British officials, describing the religious conflict
in Ayodhya before the annexation of Avadh, reflect the changing attitude
of the British towards the religious issue. Sleeman gives us the correct
year of the beginning of the confliet- Sleeman’s basic intention was to
highlight the collapse of the law and order machinery in Avadh during the
rule of the Nawabs. British officers who wrote after the annexation were
apparently more concerned to show that the Hindus entered the conflict
to defend their places of worship. They do not relate the happenings
between 1853 and 1858. In fact, Benet is determined to show that the
reaction of the Hindus was in the defence of their god Hanuman. The
British writers had not adopted an impartial position in the recounting of
the events in Ayodhya. They insisted on calling the Babri Masjid the
Janmasthan.

The actual facts regarding the religious conflict in Ayodhya in the
pre-annexation days were made public in 1902. 2 Between 1865 and 1900
some Indians published their views on the Babri Masjid issue aug oe
of them even recounted the events of the years 1853 and 1855.23 For
instance, the account of the events provided by H.J. Boas which was
confirmed by Rai Mahadeo Bali of Rampur in Pargana Daryabad. *4 The
incident occurred in 1853 and the cause of the occurrence was one of the
numerous disputes that have sprung up from time to time between the
Hindu priests and the Muslims of Ayodhya ‘with regard to the ground on
which formerly stood the Janamasthan temple’. It was said that the temple
had been destroyed by Babur and replaced by a mosque. The ground had
become peculiarly sacred to the Hindus and therefore was seized by the
Bairagis (Hindu ascetics) and others. This action became ‘a fertile source
of friction’. The account goes on to relate that one of the Mahants (priests)
was expelled by his brethren, and in revenge, he proceeded to Lucknow
and became a Muslim. He spread the news that the Hindus had destroyed
the mosque. The Mahant came in contact with Maulvi Amir Ali, a resident
of Amethi and a well-known fakir.

Maulvi Amir Ali was a descendant of the famous Sufi saint, Sheikh
Bandagi Mian.~ The saint was stationed in Amethi and his fame had
reached the Mughal emperor Akbar.2° He had visited the saint in Amethi
while on his way from Ayodhya. Akbar was quite impressed by Bandagi
Mian and had granted him a few rent-free villages.

How the British Saw the Issue | 43

Maulvi Amir Ali was in Lucknow when the ousted Mahant was
spreading the tale that the mosque in Ayodhya had been destroyed. Amir
Ali had not been able to seek an audience with Nawab Wajid Ali Shah?
and it is probable that he exploited the news of the destruction of the
mosque for his advantage. In Lucknow, he immediately proclaimed a
jehad (holy war) in the city. Nawab Wajid Ali Shah was disturbed to hear
about the jehad to liberate the mosque. He immediately sent orders to
Faizabad to enquire into the matter but the mosque was not released by
the Bairagis. :

The Maulvi was adamant on continuing the war and therefore returned
to his native place, Amethi. Here he amassed a large and well-armed force
of Muslims. When the Nawab heard of this development, he ordered
Badrir-ud-daulah of Amethi to summon the Maulvi to Lucknow. In the
meantime the Nawab asked the people not to use force in the religious
conflict and ordered that the mosque in question be restored.“” Maulvi
Amir Ali was not impressed by the actions of the Nawab and therefore
decided to march with his force to Bansa, a village about three miles to
the north of Safdarjung in the district of Bara Banki. In Bansa several
more men joined Amir Ali. This time a large number of people from the
lower castes among the Hindus and Muslims also joined the forces of the
Maulvi.2?

Nawab Wajid Ali Shah was quite disturbed by the turn of events. He
realized the futility of his orders and, therefore, approached the British
Resident in Lucknow to help resolve the situation in Ayodhya. Nawab
Wajid Ali Shah now had adopted the right course to resolve the crisis, for
the mahal of Haveli Avadh, which included Ayodhya, had been put under
the care of the British Resident by the terms of the agreement of 1816.
(In the Treaty of 1816 between the Bahu Begam and the British Resident
in the Kingdom of Avadh, the territories of Haveli Avadh were placed
under the direct administration of the Resident, therefore it was necessary
to ask for the Resident’s interference in any law and order problem that
arose in the area of Ayodhya.)

It is clear that when Nawab Wajid Ali Shah realized the implications
of the agreement he ‘left it to the Resident to put a stop to the movement
of the Moulvi in any way he (the Resident) could’. 2 But the British
Resident, on instructions from his superiors in Calcutta, refused to take
any action and allowed the situation to take its course.

The Nawab was concemed about these developments and decided to
intervene directly. He ordered the Nazim (the administrative and revenue
official of the State) of Faizabad to despatch a strong force to stop the

44 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Maulvi. The Nasim went to Bansa and met Amir Ali who said that he
would give up the march if the mosque at Hanumangarhi was restored to
the Muslims. Maulvi Amir Ali stayed in Bansa for a month, and when he
heard that nothing had been done regarding the restoration of the
Hanumangarhi mosque he marched ahead to Daryabad and remained
there for twenty days. Nawab Wajid Ali Shah immediately ordered four
muftis (divisions) to move to Daryabad ‘to preach obedience to the Maulvi
and his forces’.~~ As a result of this action the contingent of Maulvi Amir
Ali was reduced by half. The remainder, however, stood by their leader
and persisted in their intention of marching to Ayodhya and destroying
the Hanumangarhi.

The Nawab had despatched his soldiers under the command of Colonel
Barlow, who commanded the First Regiment of the Avadh Irregular
Infantry. 4 Colonel Barlow was ordered to arrest the progress of the
Maulvi and his forces. In this mission the Colonel was assisted by Rai
Abhairam Bali of Rampur. Colonel Barlow and his forces met the
Maulvi’s army at Shujagunj, a large market on the old high road, and a
hamlet of Phugauli, close to Hayatnagar. The insurgent force was said to
have numbered about 2,000 men and the Nawab’s troops consisted of one
regiment and two guns. On coming up with the rebels, Colonel Barlow
gave orders to fire and the Maulvi’s forces started retreating. The en-
counter was said to have been a desperate one, and fierce hand-to-hand
combat took place for three hours. The day was decided by flanking
movements on the part of Colonel Barlow; the rebels were surrounded by
Sher Bahadur Singh of Kamiar, Thakur Singh and the sepoys of Rai
Abhairam Bali. The insurgents broke and fled, but not before a large
number of them were killed. Their estimated loss was between 120 to 700
men, while the First Infantry was almost destroyed. Maulvi Amir Ali was
killed in the act of prayer and his head was sent to the Nawab in
Lucknow.~~ It is presumed that the defeat of the Maulvi was completed
by 1855.°°

For several people in Rudauli, a place in Bara Banki district, the death
of the Maulvi apparently meant that he had attained martyrdom. His
headless body was buried at Rahimgunj in Rudauli, and from 1856 an
annual fair was held there. It started on 27(Safar) February and lasted for
three days.>” However, by 1905 the memory of the Maul vi probably faded
and the fair came to an end.

Thereafter, an attempt was made to resolve the religious situation in
Ayodhya.~* The elders of both the communities worked out a com-
promise by which the Hindus were tooffer prayers at the chabutra outside

How the British Saw the Issue | 45

the mosque in the east, and the Muslims were to pray inside the Babri
Masjid. Benet observed, ‘It is said that up to that time (before the Revolt
of 1857) the Hindus and the Muhammadans alike used to worship in the
mosque—temple.’" The situation changed after 1859. The Government
contended that as the question of the Babri Masjid could lead to an
escalation of conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims, it was
necessary to adopt preventive measures. As such a fence was erected to
physically separate the places of worship of the Hindus and the Muslims.
In the new set-up the Hindus were to make their offerings at the raised
platform outside the mosque in the east. The Hindus wouldenter from the
east gate and were not allowed access into the mosque. The Muslims were
to pray inside the mosque and their entry was to be from the north gate.
The Muslims were not to enter from the east.

The attempt of the Government to separate the places of worship of the
Hindus and Muslims by the erection of a fence did not have any basis.
During and after the Revolt of 1857 the controversial issue of the Babri
Masjid was not raised by either community. However, the attitude of the
British observers regarding the erection of the fence assumes a stricter
tone with the passage of time.

British writing on the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi issue in the
nineteenth century is not above suspicion. In writing about the controver-
sy in Ayodhya they have made no distinction between local myths and
historical evidence and have utilized local myths as dependable sources.
This is clear from their attitude towards the rediscovery of Ayodhya by
Vikramaditya of Ujjain inthe fourth century AD. Montgomery Martin was
the first British observer who related the myth of Vikrama,~ but he was
convinced that the story was myth and no more. Yet in 1860, Sir H.M.
Elliot wrote confidently that Vikramaditya, also known as Bikramajit,
came to Ayodhya and erected temples in 360 places rendered sacred by
their association with Rama. °* After Ellioteveryone came to consider the
rediscovery of Ayodhya a historical fact. However, Benet expressed
surprise at the erection of 360 temples and observed in 1877 that at that
time there were only forty-two such temples in Ayodhya.”~ In 1905
Neville saw only eighty-three temples dedicated to Rama within the limits
of Ayodhya.”” Most of the British writers of the nineteenth century
observed that all the 360 temples were destroyed by Muslim zealots and
new temples were raised after the period of Aurangzeb on the ruins of the
old temples."" They do not mention anything about the old fort that had
been constructed in Ayodhya in the thirteenth century.

The English traveller William Finch (1608-11), wrote that there was a

46 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

castle of a Muslim ruler in Ayodhya. He observed, ‘citie of ancient note,
and seate of a Potanking, now much ruined; the castle built foure hundred
yeers agoe’.*8 It is clear that the buildings erected in AD 1200 had fallen
into ruin by the seventeenth century. It is probable that several temples
had been raised on such ruins after the rise of the Ramanandi sects.

The Ramanandisects were said to have been in conflict with the Shaiva
Sanyasins throughout the eighteenth century. Gradually the Bairagis
gained the upper hand and occupied several places of Shaiva worship in
Ayodhya. The Bairagis also received royal patronage and their influence,
along with their temples, grew innumbers. It is clear that the ministers of
the Nawabs of Oudh helped in extending the activity of the religious
orders to which they belonged. Raja Naval Rai, a devotee of Rama,
encouraged the construction of temples whose chief deity was Rama.
Similarly, Kesari Singh pelea in the construction of Jaina temples
dedicated to the Tirthankars.°” We are also informed by British writers
that, after the suppression of the Revolt of 1857, Hindu activity in
Ayodhya was allowed to grow. It is reported that during the Revolt, British
life and property in Ayodhya and Faizabad were endangered and some
landlords offered help to the British and ‘a similar offer was made by the
Mahants of the Hanuman Garhi’.°° It is therefore certain that after the
successful suppression of the Revolt, all those who had helped the British
were to be suitably rewarded. All landin Ayodhya was nazul(government
land) and therefore it was easy for the Government to distribute land as
reward for services rendered during the Revolt. The Bairagis received
land in Ayodhya and its adjoining areas.-" Land belonging to Muslim
institutions was confiscated. The former royal gardens Hayat Baksh and
Farhat Baksh passed into Hindu hands. The former was assigned to Pandit
Uma Datta by the British Government and the latter was partly owned by
the Raja of Jaipur and partly by the Digambara sect.

It is quite clear that before and after the Revolt of 1857 the British
Government encouraged Hindu activity. But it cannot be overlooked that
Hindu revivalism had started spreading in Ayodhya much before the
arrival of the British in Avadh. British writers accept that the emergence
of Ayodhya as an important religious place among the Hindus was a
modern phenomenon.-~ We can agree that the rendering of the Ramayana
in the local dialect in the form of Ramacharitamanas helped in projecting
Rama as the most popular avatara of Vishnu and a deity in North India.
As such sects associated with the bhakti of Rama emerged and Ayodhya
naturally became the main centre of their activity. In the early part of the
eighteenth century the Shaiva Sanyasins controlled several places of

How the British Saw the Issue | 47

Hindu worship in Ayodhya. But gradually a struggle ensued between the
Sanyasins and the Vaishnava Bairagis for the several places of worship.
This is evident from contemporary writings on Faizabad and Ayodhya. 4
However, the Bairagis continued to gain in strength because of royal
patronage. The Shia Nawabs and their ministers were more inclined to
support the Bairagis. As such the domination of the Vaishnavas became
complete by the end of the eighteenth century.

From all this it is apparent that the clash in Ayodhya was between
Bairagis and Sanyasins rather than Hindus and Muslims. The first bloody
conflict between Hindus and Muslims occurred between 1853 and 1856.
It seems probable that in the nineteenth century the idea started develop-
ing in Avadh that Babur had destroyed the Ramjanmabhumi temple and
erected a mosque in its place. In 1838, Montgomery Martin wrote that the
people of Ayodhya maintained that a mosque had been raised by Babur. 5
Martin added that as in other parts of North India, in Ayodhya too,
Aurangzeb was blamed for the destruction of several Hindu temples.
However, it was Babur’s mosque that attracted Martin’s attention most.
He wrote thatin the construction of the mosque, carved black stone-pillars
had been used and as they were un-Islamic they confirm the destruction
of temples by Muslim zealots.." However, Martin felt that the Babri
Masjid had not been built from the debris of the temple said to have been
erected by Vikrama of Ujjain.

The story of Babur and his mosque started gaining significance in the
nineteenthcentury. In 1819, John Leyden translated the memoirs of Babur
and he wrote that Babur had encamped near Ayodhya on 28 March
1528.°? In 1826 Erskine remarked that he had found a document that
confirmed that Babur had remained in Ayodhya for a fortnight and was
involved in building activities.” The remarks by these two scholars
confirmed the local myth that Babur had destroyed the Ramjanmabhumi
temple during his stay in Ayodhya. In 1866, H.M. Elliot asserted that
Babur came to Ayodhya and destroyed the famous temple. He added that
the mosque was constructed about the time of his expedition to Bihar.

It was on the basis of these writings that the idea gained popularity. Most
of the British officials and scholars who tried to put together a history of
Ayodhya highlighted the desecration of the temple commemorating the
birthplace of Rama.°~ This idea became so strongly entrenched in the
psyche of the British officials and the local people that it was difficult to
dislodge it. In 1923, A.S. Beveridge published her translation of the
memoirs of Babur. She said that Babur was encamped seventy-two miles
northof Ayodhya on 28 March 1528, but she did not revise the theory that

48 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Babur destroyed the famous Ramjanmabhumi temple. However, her
translation does not include the issue of the desecration of the temple and
the construction of a mosque in the main body of the book.

The treatment of the issue of the Babri Masjid andthe Ram janmabhumi
temple becomes questionable when we realize that no claims had ever
been raised regarding the two ruined mosques in Ayodhya. These mosques
are said to have been constructed by Aurangzeb. However, we do not have
any evidence to support the fact of Aurangzeb’s visit to Ayodhya. The
local stories relate that two important temples had been destroyed by
Aurangzeb and the mosques were raised on their ruins. The two temples
are said to have been extremely important. One was the Svargadwar
temple, the temple commemorating the occasion when Rama left for
heaven; the other is called the Treta-ke-Thakur, or the temple where Rama
organized a sacrificial yagya. Both the temples naturally signify important
events in the life of Rama. But no Hindu seems to be concerned about
them. These mosques, also known as the mosques of Naurang Shah, have
been mentioned by Martin and it seems from his account that in 1838 the
two buildings had not been reduced to ruins. Be After the Revolt of 1857
Naurang Shah’s mosques were in ruins. At one time claims about one
of theseruins were strengthened when the rumour was circulated that an
inscription had been found near themosqueatthe Treta-ke-Thakur. It was
said that the inscription indicated that a temple had been raised there by
Raja Jai Chand. It is surprising that the inscription is not to be found
anywhere today. The only person who claimed to have seen it was unable
to say where he saw it. A. Fuhrer reported in 1898 that there was a
fragment of the said inscription but he was also unable to say where he
saw it..- However, despite such claims over the mosque no one seems
concerned either to preserve the ruins or to claim the site of the ruins.

It is quite evident that no temple—mosque controversy was known in
Ayodhya till the nineteenth century. Local stories were put into circulation
and claims were raised over the places of worship in Ayodhya. The British
played a significant role in strengthening the claim by providing the local
stories with a historical basis. The British in Faizabad and Ayodhya had
come to stay after AD 1816. The developments in Ayodhya were an
extension of whatever was happening in the adjoining district of Benares,
where a great riot had occurred in 1809. By then the British had been in
the area for over twenty-five years. It is therefore certain that the attempt
of the British writers to provide a historical basis to the circulating local
myths, fostered the Babri Masjid—Ramjanmabhumi issue in Ayodhya.

The British administrators and scholars did so with a purpose. Most of

How the British Saw the Issue | 49

the British civil servants and observers of British—Indian affairs perceived
India and Indian history according to the views of James Stuart Mill that
were included in his book, The History of British India. Mill saw Indian
society as divided into two strict compartments of Hindus and Muslims.
He was convinced that the two were diametrically opposed to each other
and peaceful co-existence was impossible between the two. The Muslims
had lived in India as rulers and as such had oppressed and persecuted the
Hindus. Mill saw both Hindus and Muslims as obsessed with religion,
and while the Hindus were subservient by nature, Islam madethe Muslims
intolerant. According to him, Islam and Hinduism were opposed to each
other because while the Hindus worshipped idols the Muslims were
idol-breakers. Mill rationalized that British rule was a boon for the Hindus
because it liberated them fromthe intolerant rule of the Muslims. He made
the point indirectly that the British Empire was better than the earlier
Mughal Empire. British officials and writers influenced by Mill saw
themselves as the liberators of the Hindu spirit. For them the justification
of the British Empire necessarily meant the undermining of everything
that had anything to do with the Mughal Empire.

In the context of Ayodhya the same attitude of the British was evident.
It was this influence that led them to suppose that Ayodhya was a Hindu
city. Their conviction that the two religious communities could not live
in peace made them separate physically the places of worship of the
Hindus and Muslims. The British continued to extend their support to the
local Hindus not only by providing a historical basis to the circulating
beliefs but also by helping them to strengthen their claims. In 1902, the
District Magistrate of Faizabad formed a local committee to mark the
religious places of only the Hindus. Hindu claims over the Babri Masjid
were strengthened by the erection of a marker in front of the mosque.°”
This stone marker read “No. 1—Ramjanambhoomi’.

The annexation of the kingdom of Avadh and the Revolt of 1857 seem to
have decided the stand of the British in the religious controversy raging
in Ayodhya. In the pre-annexation period the British demonstrated a
neutrality in religious issues that arose in states notruled by the East India
Company; however, they never forgot to point out the ineffectiveness of
the rule of the Indian princes. Martin, the first British officer who gave a
detailed account of Ayodhya, refused to accept the circulating local myths
as facts of history. He expressed his doubts without reservations towards
the local beliefs. Although he was critical of the Islamic intolerance for

50 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

other religions, he expressed his appreciation of the rule of the
“Muhammadans’ in India. Comparing Muslim rule with the preceding
Hindu rule and the succeeding British rule, he wrote that Muslim rule
alone preserved the social fabric in India. ~” In the post-annexation years
British officer and scholars clearly adopted a biased stand towards the
Hindus on the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi issue in Ayodhya. They
began by providing a historical basis to the circulating local myths. Elliot
went to the extent of asserting that Chandragupta Vikramaditya had raised
360 temples venerating Rama in Ayodhya. Camegy and others with him
concluded on the basis of the local stories that Babur had come to Ayodhya
and had brought downthe Rama temple. The British attempt at mythif ying
history was deliberate. They wanted to project the view to the people that
the earlier Mughal Empire was oppressive and intolerant towards religion.

Notes

1. WC. Benet (ed.), Gazetteer of the Province of Oudh, 3 volumes, vol.
II, Lucknow, 1877, p. 2.

2. H.R. Neville, Fyzabad: A Gazetteer Being Volume XLII] of the District
Gazetteer of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Allahabad, 1905,
p.173.

3. A. Cunningham, Report of the Archaeological Survey of Northern India,
vol. I, Allahabad, 1865, p. 293.

4. Several British officials had published their observation on the city of
Ayodhya in the nineteenth century. The majority of such works started
appearing after the annexation of the Kingdom of Avadh in February 1856.
Before the annexation of the kingdom some British cfficials and other
private persons wrote about the general state of affairs in Avadh but among
them only two mentioned anything about Ayodhya. These were
Montgomery Martin who was commissioned by the East India Company
to compile historical and topographical statistics of eastern India. His
observations were published as The History, Antiquities, Topography, and
Statistics ofEasternIndia, 6 volumes, London, 1838. The other was a report
on the state of affairs in Avadh compiled by Colonel W.H. Sleeman, the
British Resident in Lucknow. His report was published as Journey Through
the Kingdom of Oude, 2 volumes, London, 1856. All the British writers tend
to refer to Ayodhya as the ‘Hindu’ city.

5. Montgomery Martin, op. cit., vol. III, Bhagulpoor, Gorakhpoor, p. 305.
6. ibid., pp. 291-345.

How the British Saw the Issue | 51

7. W.C. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p.453. The distribution of the population as
given in the Census Report of 1869 was as follows:

City Muslims
Shias Sunnis Wahabis
Ayodhya 1,630 889 —
Faizabad 9,868 4,752 —
City Hindus
Shaiva Shakti Vaishnava Nanak Shahi Other Sects
Ayodhya 975 1,100 2,222 100 602

Faizabad 7,000 7,620 3,655 3,655 —

8. P. Camegy, Historical Sketch of F yzabad Tahsil Including the Former
Capitals of Ayodhya and F yzabad, Lucknow, 1870.

9. W.C. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 452.

10. ibid. Also see P. Carnegy, op. cit.; and H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India,
London, 1880, pp. 62-70.

11. Carnegy was probably not aware of the developments in Rama bhakti.
The Ramanandi sect started developing in the late seventeenth century. In
Ayodhya also their activity started after this time. However, in Ayodhya
these sects came into conflict to the Shaiva and Shakti strongholds in the
city. (See Srimaharajacaritra of Raghunathaprasada, pp. 42ff.) The dis-
tribution of population among Hindus in 1869 clearly indicates the rising
domination of the Vaishnavas. In 1869 the Shaivas numbered 975, the
Shaktis were 1,100 and the Vaishnavas were 2,222.

12. P. Carnegy, op. cit., p. 9.

13. W.C. Benet, op. cit., p. 453.

14. P. Carnegy, op. cit., Appendices I-XI.

15. W.W. Hunter, The Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. II], London, 1851,
p. 232.

16. H.C. Irwin, The Garden of India, London, 1880, p. 75.

17. Mohammad Faiz Baksh had been commissioned by Darab Ali Khan,
an officer attached to the Bahu Begam, to compile the history of the
Kingdom of Avadh. He completed writing the history in 1818 and gave it
the title Tarikh Farah Baksh. The work is in two parts: the first part deals
with the history of Delhi and Faizabad, and the second part is devoted
entirely to the history of Faizabad. This work has been translated by W.
Hoey, Memoirs of Delhi and Faizabad, Allahabad, 1881.

18. W.H. Sleeman, Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude, vol.1,p. 145.
19. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 7.

20. ibid., p. 452.

21. Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad, p. 174.

22. Thomas Catania, ‘An Episode in Oude History’, Pioneer, 20 June
1902.

23. We have reference to the events of 1853-85 in some of the written
works by Indians. We have taken into account the work of Raja Durga

52 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Parshad, Bostan-i-Avadh. Originally printed at Queen Press, Sandhila,
1888; but later reprinted in 1892 at Ahmadi Press, Lucknow. We have also
taken into account the work of Kamal-ud-din Haider, Swainhat-i-Salatin-i-
Avadh, Lucknow, 1889. In both these works it is held that the idea had
become popular that Hanumangarhi had been raised on the foundations of
a mosque said to have been constructed by Aurangzeb. The Muslims
therefore charged the steps of the Hanumangarhi and occupied it but soon
they were driven out and afightensued for the possession of the spot of the
Babri Masjid.

24. There appears to be a discrepancy with regard to the year of occurrence
of the event and the cause of conflict. British officials writing on this conflict
between the Hindus and Muslims generally contend that the event occurred
just before the annexation. See Benet, op. cit., vol.II, p.7 and p.452; and
Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad, p. 174. The conflict occurred in 1853
because Sleeman records it. Some of the British officers hold the opinion
that Maulvi Amir Ali raised the banner of revolt in 1856. In case 1856 be
taken as the year of occurrence then the event must have taken place either
in January or in February 1856, i.e. before the annexation of Avadh on 13
February 1856. The British officers also contend that the conflict arose with
regard to the Hanumangarhi. However, their account cannot be taken as
true. We have from Sleeman’s account that a religious conflict arose in
Ayodhya. He was in Faizabad in 1853. As such we can take the account of
H.J. Boas as authentic. This account was confirmed by Rai Mahadeo Bali
of Rampur in Pargana Daryabad. The same account has also been confirmed
by Neville’s District Gazetteer of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh,
Bara Banki, being vol. XLVIII, Allahabad, 1904, p. 168.

25. Benet, op. cit., vol. III, p. 43.

26. Pioneer, 20 June 1902.

27. Benet, op. cit., vol. III, p. 43.

28. Neville, District Gazetteer of Bara Banki. op. cit., p. 169.

29. ibid., p. 169.

30. Pioneer, 20 June 1902.

31. Bahu Begam, the wife of Nawab Shuja-ud-daulah and the mother of
Nawab Asaf-ud-daulah, refused to leave Faizabad when Nawab Azaf-ud-
daulah transferred the capital to Lucknow. She was disappointed with her
son, Asaf-ud-daulah, and was suspicious of his designs on her wealth. She
had been provided for by her husband and had been granted several mahals,
the profits of which she could use to maintain herself. She was afraid that
after her death the Nawabs would neither care for her husband’s mausoleum
nor for her servants. As such, to secure everything dear to her, she entered
into an agreement with the British. The agreement was drawn up in 1816.
In return for assurances from the British Resident that after her death the
mausoleum would be cared for and her servants would receive pension, she
transferred her possessions and her wealth to the British Resident. As such
after 1816, although the mahal of Haveli Avadh was apart of the kingdom,
these areas were under the control of the Resident. The Resident was to look
after revenue and police affairs. See, Mohammad Faiz Baksh’s Tarik Farah

How the British Saw the Issue | 53

Baksh; C.U. Aitchison’s Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnads,
Calcutta, 1909; and Benet, op. cit., vol., II, pp. 12-13.

32. Neville, District Gazetteer of Bara Banki, op. cit., p. 170.

33. ibid.

34. HJ. Boas in his account says that Colonel Barlow was made the
officer-in-charge to crush the rebels. Neville also calls the officer Barlow
(Neville, District Gazetteer of Bara Banki, p. 170). Benet writes that the
officer was Colonel Boileau (Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 274).

35. Neville, District Gazetteer of Bara Banki, p. 170.

36. It would seem that the death of the Maulvi took place in 1855 because
the compromise between the Hindus and Muslims had been worked out in
Ayodhya before the annexation.

37. Benet, op. cit., vol.II, p. 274.

38. Neville, District Gazetteer of Bara Banki, p. 170. Neville writes that
some years back an annual fair was held in the memory of the Maulvi.
Neville’s gazetteer was published in 1904.

39. Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad, p.174.

40. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p.7.

41. ibid., also see Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad, p. 174.

42. Changing British attitudes towards the issue of the Babri Masjid—
Ramjanmabhumi dispute can be discerned from the nature of their writings.
In 1877 Benet wrote, ‘Since British rule, a railing has been put up to prevent
disputes, within which, in the mosque the Muhammadans pray while
outside the fence the Hindus have raised a platform on which they make
their offerings.’ (Benet, op. cit., vol. IT, p. 7.) Neville relates the same thing
in 1905, ‘Since the mutiny an outer enclosure has been put up in front of
the mosque and the Hindus who are forbidden access to the inner yards,
make their offerings on a platform which they have raised in the outer one.’
Neville, District Gazetteer af Fyzabad, p. 174. Neville’s writing clearly
indicates the helpless state of the Hindus by pointing to a strict demarcation
whereby Hindus are not allowed to enter the mosque.

43. Montgomery Martin, op. cit., vol. III, p. 333. He writes, ‘The people
of Ayodhya imagine that, after the death of Vrihadbala, their city was
deserted, and continued so until the time of Vikrama of Ujjain, who came
in search of the holy city, erected a fort called Ramgar, cut down the forest
by which the ruins were covered, and erected 360 temples on the places
sanctified by the actions of Rama, of his wife Sita, of his brother Lakshmana,
and of his general Mahavira.’

44. H.M. Elliot, History of India as Told by its Own Historians, vol. I,
London, 1866.

45. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p.4.

46. Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad, p. 177.

47. Benet, op. cit.; P. Carmmegy, op. cit.; A. Cunningham, op.cit.; A. Fuhrer,
Report of the Archaeological Survey of India (new series), vol. II, Al-
lahabad, 1891, pp. 295-300; H.R. Neville, District Gazetteer of F yzabad.
All these observers blame the Muslim rulers for having destroyed the
temples of Ayodhya.

54 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

48. William Foster (ed.), Early Travels in India, London, 1921, p. 176. This
has the record of the travels of William Finch who came to India during the
years 1608 to 1611. Finch writes that during that period it was believed that
the city enclosed the ruins of the fort of Rama. He adds about Ayodhya,
‘The Indians acknowledge for the great God, saying that he tooke flesh upon
him to see the tamasha of the world.’ However, Finch wrote that the
religious places of the Brahmins were limited to the bathing ghats on the
banks of the river.

49. Benet, op.cit., vol. II, p. 9.

50. Neville, District Gazetteer of Fyzabad, p. 163.

51. ibid., pp. 61-64.

52. ibid., p. 175.

53. Nearly all British writers on Ayodhya believe that long before the
penetration of the Islamic forces in Ayodhya the place was covered by a
thick jungle. At that time Ayodhya, at best, was known as a famous hunting
ground. They are therefore surprised at the emergence of Ayodhya as an
important centre of Hindu pilgrimage. Benet writes, ‘It may, however, be
remarked here that Hindu revival at Ayodhya is one of the most remarkable
things in modem India.’ Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 452.

54. Mohamed Faiz Baksh’s Tarikh Farah Baksh relates that after the
signing of the treaty of 1765 the influence of the Mughals in Ayodhya started
declining. The Mewati soldiers who represented the Mughals were
withdrawn. The absence of the Mewatis provided freedom of movement to
the spear-wielding Sanyasins. The Sanyasins were well known for disturb-
ing the peace of Ayodhya and after 1765 the law and order situation in
Ayodhya deteriorated. Raghunathaprasada wrote that in the eighteenth
century in Ayodhya, the Bairagis and the Sanyasins were involved in a fight
for domination in the area. He describes an incident, ‘At that time. . . when
the occasions of Rama’s birth came people went to Kosalapur and as-
sembled there—who can describe the enormous crowd? At that place there
was unlimited (number of) strong warriors in Sanyasins garb, carrying
weapons with matted hair and ashes smeared on every limb—an unlimited
army of soldiers taking pleasure in battle. Fighting with the Bairagis broke
out. This fight was of no avail (to the Bairagis), owing to lack of strategy. . .
They made a mistake of going towards them; the Bairagi garb became a
source of misery. All people dressed in the Bairagi garb fled—through fear
of them Sanyasins. Avadhpur was abandoned. Wherever they happened to
find people in Bairagi garb there they struck fear into them. Through fear
of them everyone was frightened, and wherever they could they took shelter
in a secret place and hid themselves. They changed their dress and hid their
sectarian markings. No one showed his proper identity.’

55. In the nineteenth century the domination of the Vaisnavas in Ayodhya
had becomecomplete. All festivals and fairs connected with the life of Rama
attracted Hindus, irrespective of the sects to which they belonged, to
Ayodhya. The Hindus of the Shaiva and Shakti sects came together to
celebrate occasions associated with Rama. The place had emerged as the
main point of congregation for the Hindus in the nineteenth century. Benet
writes, ‘Ayodhya, as is related in the account of this town, is the great centre

How the British Saw the Issue | 55

of the hero worship which has selected the ancient king Ram Chandar as
the object of its adoration. At the Ramnaumi festival 5,00,000 people
assemble in honour of that potent monarch and innumerable shrines have
been erected to Rama Chandra, his brother Bharat, his wife, Sita and his
ally in the great Dekkan war, Hanoman the monkey. This saint worship at
the same time does not seem to interfere with the more spiritual theology
which concerns itself with the most unearthly beings—Vishnu, Mahadeo,
and Bhawani or Debi.’ Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 451.

56. Montgomery Martin, op.cit., vol. III, p.335.

57. ibid., p. 336.

58. ibid., p. 337.

59. John Leyden, Memoirs of Zehir-ed-din Muhammad Baber, Emperor of
Hindustan, London, 1819. It is quite clear that Leyden had no idea of the
geography of the area around Ayodhya and Faizabad. Babur writes in his
‘memoirs’ (folio 338-A) that on 28 March 1528 he was stationed 7 or 8
kurohs above Aud—this clearly means north of Aud. Leyden confused Aud
with Ayodhya and fixed the ferry port of Serwa (in the south of Ayodhya)
as the place where Babur encamped on 28 March 1528.

60. William Erskine, A History of India under the Two First Sovereigns of
the House of Taimur, Baber and Humayun, 2 volumes, London, 1854.
Erskine claims to have come across a page in the memoirs of Babur in 1826
which according to him related the activities of Babur in Ayodhya. It read,
‘After spending several days pleasantly in that place where there are
gardens, running waters, well-designed buildings, trees particularly mango
trees and various kind of coloured plumage, I ordered the march towards
Ghazipur.’

Beveridge, commenting on this page of the manuscript, wrute that she
found it in the memoirs (p. 420) and in Erskine’s own codex of the
Wagqiat-i-Babri (f-371) where, however, several circumstances isolated it
from the context. She wrote that this particular place can be distinctly
disassociated from Abdur-rahim’s text. She adds that Babur did not march
to Ghazipur in 935 A.H. (See A.S. Beveridge, Baburnama, p. 680.)

61. H.M. Elliot, History of India as Toldby Her Historians, Calcutta, 1872,
vol. IV, p. 283. Elliot agreed with the earlier translations of the memoirs of
Babur and was convinced that the Mughal Emperor was stationed south of
Ayodhya. He, like Leyden and Erskine, made the mistake of reading daal
for ‘wao’.

62. See the writings of Benet, Carnegy, Cunningham, Irwin, Furher and
Neville.

63. A.S. Beveridge, Baburnama (Memoirs of Baber), 1921, p. 602.
Beveridge stayed in Faizabad for two months while translating the memoirs.
She acquainted herself with the local geography and therefore was able to
point to the spot where Babur had encamped on 28 March 1526. While in
Faizabad she heard several local stories and was led to believe that Babur
had destroyed the famous temple of Rama. She seemed to have been so
impressed with the local stories that while translating the inscriptions she
drew the conclusion that as the Muslims believed that it was the birthplace

56 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

of Rama therefore they were convinced that the angels descended there.
However, she does not put her ideas on this issue in the main body of the
translation of the memoirs. This is contained in the appendix.

64. Montgomery Martin, op. cit., vol. III, p. 334.

65. P. Carnegy, op. cit.; W.C. Benet, op. cit., vol. II, p. 6.

66. Only A. Fuhrer records the discovery of the fragmentary inscriptions.
He writes, ‘A fragmentary inscription of Jaya Chandra of Kanaujdated 1241
and recording the erection of a temple of Vishnu was rescued from the ruins
of Aurangzeb’s mosque, known as Treta-ke-Thakur, and is now in the
Fyzabad Museum.’ Fuhrer, op. cit., vol. II, p. 297. This inscription cannot
be traced anywhere. However, we do have a copper-plate grant which
recorded the grant made by Jai Chandin AD 1187. He gave away Komali
to Alenga of the Bhardwaj line. The copper-plate grant records Vishnu and
Lachhmi as the gods. It is difficult to support Fuhrer’s interpretation.

Regarding the temples destroyed by the Mughal rulers in Ayodhya, Benet
writes, ‘It is locally affirmed that at the time of Muhammadan conquest
there were three important Hindu shrines, with but few devotees attached,
at Ayodhya, which was then little other than wilderness. These were the
Janamasthan, the Swargaddwar Mandir also known as Ram Darbar, Treta-
ke-Thakur.

‘On the first of these the Emperor Babur built the mosque, which still
bears his name AD 1528. On the second Aurangzeb did the same AD 1658
to 1707; and on the third that sovereign or his predecessors built a mosque,
according to the well-known principles of enforcing their religion on all
those whom they conquered.

‘The Janamasthan marks the place where Rama Chandar was born. The
Swargaddwar is the gate through which he passed into paradise, possibly
the spot where he was burned. The Treta-ke-Thakur was famous as the place
where Rama performed a great sacrifice, and which he commemorated by
setting up there images of himself and Sita.

‘The two other old mosques to which allusion has been made (known by
the common people by the name of Naurang Shah by whom they mean
Aurangzeb) are now mere picturesque ruins. Nothing had been done by the
Hindus to restore the old mandir of Ram Darbar. The Treta-ke-Thakur was
reproduced near the old ruin by the Raja of Kulu, whose estate is said to be
in the Panjab, more than two centuries ago; and it was improved upon
afterwards by Aholya Bai, Marathin, who also built the adjoining ghat, AD
1784. She was the widow of Jaswant Rao Holkar of Indore, from which
family Rs 231 are still received annually at the shrine.’ Benet, op. cit., vol.
II, pp.6—7. However, he does not mention anywhere about the fragmentary
inscription that is mentioned by Fuhrer.

67. H.R. Neville, District Gazetteer of Fyzabad, p. 176. ‘In 1902 a local
committee was formed with the object of commemorating the coronation
of His Imperial Majesty King Edward VII, and a sum of over Rs 1,000 was
collected and expended on the erection of stone pillars marking the sacred
spots in Ayodhya and its neighbourhood. This work has been carried out
and no fewer than 145 such stones have been erected; their ostensible

How the British Saw the Issue | 57

purpose being to preserve the memory of the various holy spots and to serve
as a guide to pilgrims and others interested in the place.’ This committee
marked only the Hindu places of worship and one Sikh gurdwara in
Ayodhya.

68. Montgomery Martin, op. cit., vol. III, p. 344. ‘It must be observed,
notwithstanding the ferocity usually attributed to the Muhammedan con-
querors of India, that scarcely any family of note among the native chiefs,
who possessed the country before the conquest, had become extinct, or been
deprived of its lands during the long period which followed under Muham-
medan control. But that, during the Hindu government, each change had
been followed by the complete destruction or banishment of the family that
was subdued. Although many of the chiefs pretend to be descended of the
family of the sun, none of these allege, that their ancestors have retained
uninterrupted possession; on the contrary they all admit, that their ancestors
had retired to the west, from which they again returmed, after an interval of
many ages. ... It is also to be observed, and I think to be much regretted,
that the operations of our systems of finance and law have done more in
twelve years to impoverish and degrade the native chiefs, who succeeded
the impure tribes, than the whole course of the Muhammedan government.’

Legal Aspects to the Issue
A.G. Noorani

The strength and quality of a Constitution which establishes a democratic
order governed by the rule of law are put to the test when popular passions
are aroused to stifle therights which the Constitution guarantees or violate
the norms on which it rests. The quality of the country’s political process
is also tested on such occasions. It must seek to resolve such issues
expeditiously when they arise before they put the legal and constitutional
system under strain. Failing that, of course, the law must be allowed to
take its course and the rights must prevail.

On neither count can India derive much satisfaction. It is four decades
now since a mosque was forcibly occupied and converted into a temple
and the country’s legal system has completely failed to redress the wrong.
This is an understatement. The record reveals some graver lapses than
those of mere omission. That the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, in the Faizabad
district of Uttar Pradesh, was converted into a Ramjanmabhumi Mandir
on the night of 22-23 December 1949 is an outrage in itself. That this
was, and yet remains, part of a movement which seeks likewise to occupy
and convert the mosques at Mathura (adjoining the Krishna Janmasthan)
and Varanasi (at Kashi Vishwanath Mandir) makes it sinister.

Even that is not all. The movement is aimed at avenging perceived
historical wrongs by converting India’s secular, democratic system into a
Hindu State.

Justice Deoki Nandan Agarwal, a former judge of the Allahabad High
Court and one of the leading figures in the movement, has expounded
its outlook in a booklet. (Sri Rama Janma Bhumi, Sri Rama Janma
Bhumi Mukti Yagna Samiti, Lucknow) It is also reproduced substantial-
ly in the periodical Parlance. (January-February 1990, Calcutta, pp.
6-18.) He wrote:

Maryada Purushottam Bhagwan Sri Rama, Bhagwan Sri
Krishna and Shiva Shanker Mahadeva are the three deities
worshipped by the Hindus all over the world. They sym-

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 59

bolize the rule of Dharma and suppression of Adharma
among the mankind. They are the epitomes of our national
aspiration of establishing Rama Rajya, which Mahatma
Gandhi gave to us during our struggle for freedom from
the British yoke. The three places where the three first
manifested themselves, namely, Sri Rama Janma Bhumi
at Ayodhya, Sri Krishna Janmasthan at Mathura, and the
Gyanvapi at Varanasi, are all of them situated within Uttar
Pradesh, the very heartland of Bharatvarsha; and all the
three received the special attention of Muslim vandalism.

And with the attainment of independence from foreign
rule, it became the bounden duty of every citizen of India
that is Bharat, to remove the mosque-like structures raised
by Muslim marauders after destroying and desecrating
ancient Hindu temples situated there, and to restore them
to their pristine glory, as the continued existence of such
mosque-like structures is galling to the Hindu psyche and
a matter of National shame.

Agarwal professes to offer ‘a legal and historical perspective’. He adds
in the same breath, ‘That there was an ancient temple of Maharaja
Vikramaditya’s time at Sri Rama Janma Bhum1i is a fact of history, which
is indisputable, although there is some controversy as to which of the
Vikramadityas resurrected the place and built the magnificent
temple. ...’

There are, in fact, at least two other places in Ayodhya besides the
mosque proper which are claimed as the ‘exact spots’ where Sri Rama
was born. There is a Rama chabutra outside the mosque, but within its
compound, which has been worshipped as the Ram Janmasthan since the
mid-nineteenth century. It is a raised platform, 17x21 feet in area, about
a hundred paces away from the mosque proper. A railing was constructed
to separate the chabutra from the masjid. Till 22 December 1949, the
Hindus worshipped at the chabutra and the Muslims in the mosque. There
is, besides, a most impressive Ram Janmasthan Mandir which is close to
the Babri Masjid. Between the two lies the famous Sita-ki-Rasoi, itself
claimed by some to be Sri Rama’s birthplace.

Altogether different from these is the Hanumangarhi Mandirconstructed
by Mansoor Ali, the Nawab of Avadh. About 200 yards from the mosque
is Kaushalya Bhawan and 500 yards away from it is the Dasharatha
Bhawan. Ina sense, the whole of Ayodhya is Ramjanmabhumi; but, not

60 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

surprisingly, none can identify with certainty the birthplace as, among
others, Satyapal Dang, the Communist Party of India leader, discovered
on a visit to Ayodhya on 3 October 1989. (‘Ayodhya Visit—an
Experience’, New Age, 15 October 1989; vide also D.R. Goyal’s impres-
sions, ‘At Peace with Themselves’, /ndian Post, 12 October 1989.) The
historian, Prof. R.S. Sharma, said in an interview with Janashakti of
Patna, ‘I have been there (in Ayodhya). There are at least 1S—16 mandirs,
the pujaris of which claim that their temple is the real birthplace of Rama.’
(‘Dr Ram Sharan Sharma on Ram Janam Bhoomi’, New Age, 8 October
1989.)

These facts must be appreciated in the historical context. In the entire
country there is no temple at all built before the seventeenth century with
Sri Rama as the presiding deity. The oldest one is at Allahabad and the
second oldest is the Ram Janmasthan Mandir at Ayodhya, to the north of
the Babri Masjid.

The whole issue brings to mind Macaulay’s words in the context of the
seizing of Silesia by Frederick the Great on the plea that it had belonged
to Germany two centuries earlier. Khushwant Singh quoted the following
excerpt in his column in the Hindustan Times of 16 December 1989:

Is itnot perfectly clear that, if antiquated claims are to be
set up against recent treaties and long possession, the
world can never be at peace for a day? The laws of all
nations have wisely established a time of limitation, after
which titles, however illegitimate in their origin, cannot
be questioned. It is felt by everybody, that to eject a person
from his estate on the ground of some injustice committed
in the time of the Tudors would produce all the evils which
result from arbitrary confiscation, and would make all
property insecure. It concerns the Commonwealth—so
runs the legal maxim—that there be an end of litigation.
And surely this maxim is at least equally applicable to the
great commonwealth of states; for in that commonwealth
litigation means the devastation of provinces, the suspen-
sion of trade and industry, sieges like those of Badajoz and
St Sebastian, pitched feuds like those of Eylau and
Borodino. We hold that the transfer of Norway from
Denmark to Sweden was an unjustifiable proceeding; but
would the King of Denmark be therefore justified in
landing, without any new provocation, in Norway, and

Legal Aspects to the Issue / 61

commencing military operation there? The King of Hol-
land thinks, no doubt, that he was unjustly deprived of the
Belgian provinces. Grant that it were so. Would he, there-
fore, be justified in marching with an army on Brussels?
The case against Frederick was still stronger, inasmuch as
the injustice of which he complained had been committed
more than a century before. Nor must it be forgotten that
he owed the highest personal obligations to the House of
Austria. It may be doubted whether his life had not been
preserved by the intercession of the prince whose daughter
he was about to plunder.

Two features of the controversy are highly significant. One is the
relative indifference of the local populace (vide, Dang and Goyal). Sanjay
Suri, a correspondent with the /ndian Express, reported that ‘the disputed
place is not believed even by pandits to be the birthspot of the legendary
God Ram. The pandits, who have not timed the birth within thousands of
years, have pinpointed the “Janam Sthan” as Ram chabutra. This
chabutra, marked by a platform under a tree, is outside the disputed area.
The Janam Sthan is not claimed by Muslims’. (/ndian Express, 11
February 1987.)

Ayodhya has become important. The Kartika Purnima attracts lakhs of
people for performing the ceremonies. ‘Now those coming to Ayodhya
for such occasions also visit the Ramjanmabhumi which attracted least
attention before the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in cooperation with the Ram
Janmabhoomi Mukti Yagya Samiti launched the liberation movement.’
(Indian Express, 13 May 1990.)

The other feature is not the mere fact of the arousal of passions by the
movement launched by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the
Samiti. It is their profound disdain for evidence itself and, as a logical
consequence, a total rejection of the relevance of the legal processes to
aresolution of this issue. Alone among the political parties, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) shares this outlook with the VHP and the Samiti.

In his reply to Prof. Hiren Mukherji’s letter of 5 June 1989, Atal Behari
Vajpayee wrote, ‘It is not possible to pinpoint the exact spot where Ram
was born. But it is known that Ram, the King of Ayodhya, whom vast
masses of Hindus regard as the incarnation of God, was born in that
historical city and a temple dedicated to him had been in existence since
long. This temple was built and rebuilt over the ages.’ (Organiser, 24
September 1989.) He, for one, was prepared to delink Ayodhya from

62 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Mathura and Varanasi because ‘we cannot go on fighting against history
as such’. But he refused to apply this salutary principle to Ayodhya.
Uncertainty about ‘the exact spot where Ram was born’ did not deter him
from joining the demand for legalizing the takeover of the mosque.
Assertion was readily substituted for argument.

On6 April 1989, Vajpayee asserted in Bombay that the issue could not
be solved by the courts. The Muslims should be persuaded to give up their
claim to the mosque. It should be handed over to the Hindus uncondition-
ally. He rejected the proposal to declare the mosque a national monument,
saying it belonged to the Hindus as a part of their cultural heritage. (Indian
Post, 7 April 1989.) The speech is most instructive for an understanding
of the stakes involved. Vajpayee is reputed to be a ‘moderate’, and not
without reason either. He said that the need of the hour was to revive the
Hindu nationalist spirit to fight fissiparous tendencies. ‘Being secular
does not mean that we disown our religion.’ Yet, even a person of his high
intelligence could see no contradiction between asking the Muslims to
deliver the historic mosque to the Hindus, while rejecting the proposal to
declare it a national monument on the one hand and asserting, on the other,
that Hinduism was a geo-cultural concept. Ergo, all those who are on this
side of the Sindhu river are Hindus.

AS against such mumbo-jumbo and arrogant disdain for evidence and
for the legal process is the stark reality that what is at issue is the forcible
conversion of the house of worship of one religious denomination into
one of another religious denomination. An incident of this kind anywhere
in the world would arouse shock and revulsion. That these reactions have
been voiced in India testifies to its vitality and its innate sanity and
decency, the frailties of the constitutional system and the political process
notwithstanding.

At stake is nothing less than religious freedom. The United Nations
General Assembly adopted without a vote on 25 November 1981, a
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief (Resolution 36/55). Article I (1)
says that ‘every one shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion. .. .’ Para 3 refers to ‘limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others’.

Article VI is important. It spells out the contents of the right. It says,
‘In accordance with Article I, and subject to the provisions of paragraph
3 of Article I, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or
belief shall include, inter alia, the following freedoms: (a) to worship or

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 63

assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes. . .’ Denial of the right to ‘maintain’ a
house of worship of a religious denomination is as much a denial of
religious freedom as arefusal of the right to establish it in the first instance.

Article VII enjoins the states to accord the rights embodied in the
Declaration; it says there should be recognition in ‘national legislation in
such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail themselves of such
rights and freedoms in practice’.

The General Assembly has since been reminding the states of these
international legal obligations. The last such, Resolution (44/131), also
adopted without a vote on 15 December 19839, recalled the Declaration as
well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

India ratified the Convenant on 10 April 1979 and is obligated to report
to the Human Rights Committee established by the Covenant (Article 28)
on its observance of the rights mentioned in the Covenant; including, of
course, Article 18 which guarantees religious freedom.

But then this ethos is no different from that which inspired the founding
fathers of the Indian Constitution. Part III of the Constitution embodies
the Fundamental Rights. They are judicially enforceable. Let alone ex-
ecutive action, any law which ‘takes away or abridges’ the rights shall be
void. Article 25 embodies the guarantee of ‘freedom of conscience and
the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion’. Article 26 is
pertinent. It reads thus, ‘Subject to public order, morality and health, every
religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right: (a) to
establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire
movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in
accordance with law.’

If this be the law, domestic and international rejection of the legal
processes and of the relevance of objective evidence itself, as distinct from
one’s own religious beliefs, is a tacit assertion of validity of brute force
of the majority in defiance of the law and of the values of civilized society.
History does not support the claims of the VHP, the Samiti and the BJP.
There is no evidence at all on any of the three propositions asserted by
these groups. There is no evidence, historical or archaeological, that: (a)
the site on which the Babri Masjid was constructed in 1528 by Baqi Bag
Tashkandi, known as Mir Baqi who was appointed Govemor of Avadh by
Babur, was the birthplace of Sri Rama; (b) that on this site a temple was
built in honour of Sri Rama; and (c) that this temple was demolished and

64 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

a mosque was built thereon in 1528.

In fact, the claim to the mosque itself is recent. Originally only the
chabutra was claimed . This becomes all too clear from the records to the
litigation a century ago. The proceedings are very relevant to the present
controversy.

On 29 January 1885, Raghubar Das, who claimed to be the Mahant of
the Janam Asthan Ayodhya, filed a civil suit against the Secretary of State
for India in Council for ‘a decree for awarding permission to construct a
temple over the Chabutra Janam Asthan situated in Ayodhya and restrain-
ing the defendant from prohibiting or obstructing the plaintiff in the
construction of the temple’. The dimensions of the chabutra were
specified.

Para 2 of the plaint read thus, ‘The Chabutra of Janam Asthan is 21 feet
towards East and West and 17 feet towards North and South, and therein
Charan Punya lies and there also a small temple over it, which is
worshipped.’ If in his view the sanctum sanctorum of the temple lay in
the mosque, the Mahant would surely have claimed it or at least mentioned
it. No reference was made to the mosque.

This was a suit filed by a Mahant who surely knew tradition. It was this
Janam Asthan, the chabutra he so precisely defined, which he described
as ‘an old and sacred place of worship of Hindus and the Plaintiff is the
Mahant of the place of worship’.

The Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad had prohibited the construction
of the temple ‘on account of the objections raised by some Muslims’ in
March—April 1883. The suit was keenly contested. The plaintiff, the
Government pleader, one Mohammed Asghar and his pleader were fully
heard. The Mahant argued that ‘if atemple is constructed no harm is done
to any one and the worship which is done at present will continue in the
same manner in future also’. That was at the chabutra.

The Sub Judge of Faizabad, Pandit Hari Kishan Singh, however,
dismissed the suit by a judgment dated 24 December 1885. The parties
had adduced extensive documentary evidence. The plaintiff had cited the
Gazetteer of Oudh, vol. 7 of which much is made today. Oral evidence
was recorded and ‘an inquiry on the spot was made in the presence of the
parties’ and their pleaders.

The Judge found that the plaintiff was, indeed, in possession of the
chabutra and collected the offerings made there, ‘In 1855 after the fight
amongst Hindus and Muslims, a boundary wall was constructed to avoid
future disputes, so that the Muslims should worship inside that wall and
the Hindus shouid worship outside that wall, hence the chabutra and the

Legal Aspects tothe Issue 165

land which situate (sic) outside the boundary wall, belong to Hindus and
the Plaintiff.’

He explained why he declined to decree the suit, ‘This place is not like
other places where the owner has got the right to construct any building
he likes. On perusal of the plan it can be found the situation is as such.
The prayer for permission to construct the temple is (sic) at such a place
where there is only one passage for the temple as well as for the mosque.
The place where the Hindus worship is in their possession from of old
and their ownership cannot be questioned and around it there is the wall
of the mosque and the world Allah is inscribed on it. If a temple is
constructed on the chabutra at such a place then there will be sound of
bells of the temple and sankh when both Hindus and Muslims pass from
the same way and if permission is given to Hindus for constructing a
temple then one day or the other a criminal case will be started and
thousands of people will be killed.’ A century later the prophecy came
true, albeit for other reasons.

The plaintiff appealed to the District Court. The judgement of the
District Judge, Col. FE.A. Chamier, in Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1885 dated
18 March 1886 is as instructive. He had read the Gazetteer of Oudh, as
had Pandit Hari Kishan; but was more impressed. The errors in the
Gazetteer and in English writings on Babur and Ayodhya have been fully
exposed by now; most notably by Sushil Srivastava of the Department
of Medieval and Modern History, University of Allahabad in Probe India
(January 1988) and in his article in this volume. (See also the letter by
Indrajit Datta and nine others in The Statesman, 22 October 1989.)

The District Judge remarked, ‘I visited the land in dispute yesterday in
the presence of all parties. I found that the masjid built by the Emperor
Babur stands on the border of the town of Ayodhya, that is to say to the
west and south itis clear of habitations. It is most unfortunate that a masjid
should have been built on land specially held sacred by the Hindus, but
as that event occurred 356 years ago it is too late now to remedy the
grievance, all that can be done is to maintain the parties in status quo. In
such a case as the present one any innovation could cause more harm and
derangement of order than benefit.’

He added, ‘This chabutra is said to indicate the birthplace of Ram
Chandra. In front of the gateway is the entry to the masonry platform of
the masjid. A wall pierced here and there with railways divides the
platform of the masjid from the enclosure on which stands the chabutra.’
(italics mine)

The Judge noted, ‘The true object of the suit was disclosed by B. Kuccu

66 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Mal (the plaintiff’s pleader) yesterday when we were standing near the
Mas jid—namely that the British Government as no respecter of persons
was asked through its courts to remedy an injustice committed by a
Mohammedan Emperor.’ Even so, the claim was to the chabutra, not the
mosque. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that ‘there is no
“injuria”, nothing which would give a right of action to the plaintiff’.
(vide, Muslim India, March 1986, pp. 105-8 for the texts.)

The Mahant appealed, once again, on 25 May 1886 tothe highest court
in the province. He contended that the District Judge was wrong in
cancelling the findings of the Sub Judge, ‘declaring the right of property
to rest in the plaintiff’, and that the District Judge was wrong in stating
that the Masjid was built by Emperor Babur.

The Judicial Commissioner, W. Young, also dismissed the appeal by
his judgement dated 1 November 1886 and observed:

This spot is situated within the precinct of the grounds
surrounding a mosque erected some 350 years ago owing
to the bigotry and tyranny of the emperor who purposely
chose this holy spot, according to Hindu legend, as the site
of his mosque. The Hindus seem to have got very limited
rights of access to certain spots within the precinct adjoin-
ing the mosque and they have for a series of years been
persistently trying to increase those rights and to erect
buildings on two spots in the enclosure namely: (1) Sita-
ki-Rasoi (kitchen of Sita) and (2) Ram-Chander-ki-Jan-
mabhoomi (birthplace of Lord Rama). The executive
authorities have persistently refused these encroachments
and absolutely forbid any alteration of the status quo.

The Judicial Commissioner added:

I think this is a very wise and proper procedure on their part
and I am further of the opinion that the civil courts have
properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The pleas on ap-
peals to this court are wholly unsupported by facts in the
case or by any argument that appears to be weighty. I see
no reason to interfere with the order modifying the wording
of the part of the judgement of the Court of first instance.
There is nothing whatever on the record to show that the
plaintiff is in any sense the proprietor of the land in question.
This appeal is dismissed with costs of all courts.

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 67

In a thoroughly documented article entitled ‘The Ayodhya Controver-
sy: One Hundred Years of Litigation’, published in the /ndian Express on
30 March 1986, from which the Judicial Commissioner’s remarks are
reproduced, S.K. Tripathi wrote, ‘Nothing significant is reported to have
occurred between 1886 and 1934. The Babri Masjid suffered damage
during communal riots in 1934 which were triggered off by the slaughter
of a cow in the village of Shahjahanpur near Ayodhya on 27 March that
year. According to available documents, Hindus demolished the domes,
one of which had a large hole. However, the mosque was rebuilt and
reconditioned at the cost of the government through a Muslim contractor.’

An inquiry was conducted in 1936 by the then Commissioner of Wagqfs
under the UP Muslims Waafs Act, and it was held that the Babri Masjid
was built by Babur who was a Sunni Muslim. The report was published
in the official gazette dated 20 February 1944. This was found in the 1945
litigation between the Shia Central Board of Wagqfs and the Sunni Central
Board of Waqdfs in the court of the Civil Judge, Faizabad. The Civil Judge,
S.A. Ahsan, in his judgement dated 23 March 1946, held that the mosque
was founded by Babur Shah and that evidence showed that the mosque
has been used by the members of both sects.

The mosque and its appurtenant land, a graveyard known as Ganj-e-
Shaheedan Qabrastan, were registered as Waaf no. 26 Faizabad with the
UP Sunni Central Board of Wagfs under the Act of 1936. The Shias
contended that Mir Baqi was a Shia and the Mutawalliship devolved on
his descendants. However, both sects prayed in the mosque. The last
Imam of Babri Masjid (Maulana Haji Abdul Gaffar), who led the last
namaz on 22 December 1949 is a Sunni. He is ninety-three years old
now. The Civil Judge, S.A. Ahsan, delivered the Judgement in suit no.29
of 1945 on 23 March 1946, not 30 March, while the Report of the
Commissioner was gazetted on 26 February and not on 20 February as
Tripathi wrote. (Muslim India, 1986, p.112; Parlance, p.14.) These
proceedings are relevant. They show that Muslims exercised their rights
in respect of the mosque till partition; their two sects litigated over it
openly; and, there was no challenge to Muslims’ rights in any legal
proceedings by Hindus.

This situation was altered forcibly in the changed communal climate
in the wake of the Partition. What exactly happened on 22—23 December
1949? The RSS journal, Organiser, of 29 March 1987 will have us believe
that ‘on the historic moming of 23 December 1949 the idols of Sri
Ramachandra and Sita Devi miraculously appeared in the Janmasthan. As
the Hindu devotees rejoiced over the miracle and thronged in their

68 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

thousands’, the Government proclaimed the premises a disputed area and
locked the gates.

It is a patently absurd explanation. The truth about the take-over of the
mosque is too shocking to be admitted. Justice Deoki Nandan Agarwal
has also to take cover under this ‘miracle’. (Parlance, 1986, p.10.)

In truth, the ‘miracle’ was the climax to a nine-day, non-stop recitation
of the Ramacharitamanas just outside the mosque organized by the Akhil
Bharatiya Ramayana Mahasabha. There was one man who had the moral
courage to speak up against the outrage and continues still to denounce
it—Akshay Brahmachari (see his interview in Sunday Mail, 2 July 1989).
He was then Secretary of the Faizabad District Congress. He wrote to Lal
Bahadur Shastri, then a Minister in the UP Government, and went on
hunger strike twice in 1950.

Akshay Brahmachari’s memorandum to Shastri is a truly historic
document. He wrote:

In November 1949, I was told that the Muslim graves near
the Babri Mosque were being dug out en masse. I personal-
ly went and saw that it was actually so....

In front of the Babri Masjid, where the graves were dug
out, there was a nine-day continuous reading from the
Ramayana, and for many more days there was public feasting
and all that. Mass meetings were held. Loudspeakers fitted
in tongas and cars kept on screaming day in and day out
calling upon the people to come for Darshan in the Mosque
where Yajna was taking place, as the place of Ram’s birth
was being reclaimed. People began coming in thousands
also from outside the town in cars sent by the organisers of
the show. Inflammatory speeches were made and it was
openly announced that the Babri Mosque had to be con-
verted into a Sri Ram Temple. Mahatma Gandhi, Congress
and Congressmen were openly abused. .. .

Thus communal poison was spread in an organised
manner and the attitude of the officials gave the idea to the
people that either the Government wanted all that to hap-
pen, or they had completely given in to the communalists.
On the 23rd moming the District Magistrate told me at
about 9 a.m. that the image of Rama Chandraji was im-
planted in the Rabri Masjid the preceding night, and that
he had learnt of the incident at 6 a.m. from Sri Bhai Lal

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 69

and that he had gone to see it... .

I went to the Babri Mosque with the District Magistrate
at about 12 noon. The image was kept there. Some people
had gathered near the Mosque. At that moment the
Mosque could have been easily saved and the image
removed, but the District Magistrate did not think it
proper. From that very moming loudspeakers started
announcing the appearance of Bhagwan, exhorting all
Hindus to come to Darshan. I pointed out this hectic
propaganda to the District Magistrate both in Faizabad
and Ayodhya while going with him to Ayodhya in his car.
Tension went on increasing. Notices and handbills con-
tinued to be distributed. Thousands of people started
pouring in for Darshan into the city in cars and public
carriers sent out from Faizabad. In the Babri Mosque
itself, even after the Government took possession of it
under Section 145 IPC, Hindu worship remaining un-
checked, only the Muslims could not say their namaz
there. ...

There is terror in the hearts of the Muslims of Faizabad,
and most of them have sent their families away to relations
living elsewhere. And some of them have left with all their
belongings for good. I tried to draw the attention of the
Government to all this but failed. It has been recently
reported that pressure is being brought upon Ayodhya
Muslims to declare that the Babri Mosque was in fact a
Hindu temple. They arethreatened with dire consequences
if they will not do so. Muslims shopkeepers are being
forced to vacate their shops. The boycott of Muslim shops
is openly encouraged. ...

I do not view this question as one of saving the Mosque
or Muslims. I view it as saving the great ideals of the
Congress and Mahatma for which we have been struggling
all these days. If we do not resist these reactionary ideas
with all the forces at our command, the ideals of the
Congress will become extinct and reactionary forces will
sweep the country.

(Muslim India, June 1988, pp. 252-54.)

The background has been recorded intworeports by the Waaf inspector
Muhammad Ibrahim dated 10 and 23 December 1949 respectively to the

70 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Secretary of the Waqf Board. Interestingly, these two reports figure among
the thirteen ‘legal/historical documents’ submitted by the VHP to former
Union Home Minister Buta Singh on 6 October 1988.(Muslim India, July
1989, pp. 305-6.) It must be assumed, therefore, that their contents are
accepted. They certainly ring true.

The first report complained that ‘any Muslim going towards the Masjid
is accosted and called names, etc. ... People there told me that there is a
danger to the Masjid from the Hindus. . . .” The second report recorded
the inspector’s impressions on 22 December 1949 the last day before the
take-over of the mosque. It is relied on by the VHP presumably because
at one place it complained that namaz (prayers) and azan (the call for
prayers) were not being said. But it did record that the Friday prayers were
being said and ‘Subhe (dawn) namaz is also done (sic). Thenit is locked.’
He recorded also that ‘the keys of the lock of the masjid are with the
Muslims’.

The abnormalities are all faithfully recorded. ‘When the namazies
(worshippers) leave, from the surrounding houses shoes and stones are
hurled towards the namazies. Muslims out of fear do not utter a word.
Lohia also visited Ayodhya after Raghodas and gave a lecture. . . don’t
harm the graves. . . The Bairagis said Masjid is Janmabhoomi and so give
ittous. .. I spent the night in Ayodhya and the Bairagis are forcibly taking
possession of the Masjid. .. ’

Both these witnesses are fully corroborated by two incontrovertible and
uncontroverted documents—a radio message sent at 10.30 a.m. on 23
December 1949 by the District Magistrate K.K. Nayar to the Chief
Minister Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, the Chief Secretary and the Home
Secretary. It read thus, ‘A few Hindus entered Babri Masjid at night when
the Masjid was deserted and installed a deity there. DM and SP and force
at spot. Situation under control. Police picket of 15 persons was on duty
at night but did not apparently act.’

This message was based on police constable Mata Prasad’s report to
the Ayodhya police station earlier. Here is a translation of the FIR lodged
by Sub Inspector Ram Dube, police station Ayodhya, on 23 December
1949, as certified by the office of the city magistrate on 11 February 1986:

According to Mata Prasad (paper no.7), when I reached to
(sic) Janam Bhumi around 8 o’clock in the morning, I
came to know that a group of 50-60 persons had entered
Babri Mosque after breaking the compound gate lock of
the mosque or through jumping across the walls (of the

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 71

compound) with a stair and established therein, an idol of
Shri Bhagwan and painted Sita Ram, etc., on the outer and
inner walls with geru (red loam). Hans Raj on duty asked
them to defer but they did not. These persons have already
entered the mosque before the available PAC (Provincial
Armed Corps) guards could be commanded. Officials of
the district administration came at the site and involved
themselves in necessary arrangements. Afterwards, a
crowd of 5-6 thousand persons gathered around and while
chanting bhajans and raising religious slogans tried to
enter the mosque but were deferred and nothing untoward
happened thereon because of proper arrangements. Ram
Das, Ram Shakti Das and 50-60 unidentified others
entered the mosque surreptitiously and spoiled its sanctity.
Government servants on duty and several others are wit-
ness to it. Therefore it is written and filed.

The acts constituting offences under Sections 295 and 297 of the Penal
Code read thus:

295. Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to
insult the religion of any class. Whoever destroys,
damages, or defiles any place of worship, or any object
held sacred by any class of persons with the intention of
thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or
with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to
consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an
insult to their religion, shall be punished with imprison-
ment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both.

297. Trespassing on burial places, etc. Whoever, with the
intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or of
insulting the religion of any person, or with the knowledge
that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded,
or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted
thereby,

commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any
place of sculpture or any place set apart for the perfor-
mance of funeral rites or as a depository for the remains
of the dead, or offers any indignity to any human

72 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

corpse, or causes disturbance to any persons assembled
for the performance of funeral ceremonies,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either descrip-
tion for a term which may extend to one year, or with
fine, or with both.

To this day the spoiled sanctity has not been rectified. It is a standing
blot on our legal and political system, amockery of secularism, acontempt
for elementary minority rights and, indeed, the rule of law. In the States-
man of 26 October 1986, Chandan Mitra quoted a Faizabad official as
saying, ‘obviously the guard had been bribed heavily’. It is by such sordid
means that a house of worship was taken over. (vide, Muslim India, June
1986, p. 248 for the text of the FIR; and Tripathi, op. cit., for the text of
the radio message.)

S.K. Tripathi reported that ‘the then Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
was furious and ordered the then Chief Minister, Govind Ballabh Pant, to
undo the harm done. The Deputy Prime Minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, wrote
to Pant that any unilateral action based on an attitude of aggression or
coersion could not be countenanced; and Pant replied that efforts were
continuing to set things right in a peaceful manner. ’(see note | at the end
of this essay.) The Chief Secretary, Bhagwan Sahay, and the Inspector
General of Police, V.N. Lahiri, had been sending frantic messages to
Faizabad for the removal of the idols. However, Nayar was not prepared
to carry out their instructions because of fear of ‘bloodshed and
manslaughter’.

Nayar wrote two detailed letters to Chief Secretary Bhagwan Sahay in
quick succession. In his letter dated 27 December 1949, Nayar, after
explaining the pros and cons of removing the idols, concluded, ‘I would,
if the Government decided to remove the idols at any cost, request that I
be relieved and replaced by an officer who may be able to see in that
solution a merit which I cannot discern. For my part I cannot in my
discretion, which is the only legal sanction behind my action in this matter,
essay to enforce such a solution as I am fully aware of the widespread
suffering which it will entail to many innocent lives.’ Nayar was removed
eventually. He later served aterm as a Jan Sangh MP and his portrait was
placed in the mosque after the take-over. (Satyapal Dang, New Age, 15
October 1989.)

The law is not inadequate to deal with such situations. The criminal

law provides a summary remedy against forcible dispossession leaving
the claimant free to prove title in a regular civil suit against the party

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 73

originally in possession. But possession is first speedily restored to the
dispossessed.

The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, then in force, contained an
entire chapter on ‘disputes as to immovable property’. So does Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973, with substantially similar provisions.

Section 145 of the Code of 1898 reads:

(1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from
a police-report or other information that a dispute likely to
cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or
water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of
his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating
the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the
parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in
person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such
Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respec-
tive claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the
subject of dispute, and further requiring them to putin such
documents, or to adduce, by putting in affidavits, the
evidence of such persons, as they rely upon in support of
such claims.

(2) For the purposes of this section the expression ‘land or
water’ includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or
other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such
property.

(3) Acopy of the order shall be served in manner provided
by this Code for the service of a summons upon such
person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least
one copy shall be published by being affixed to some
conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute.

(4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the
merits or the claims of any of such parties to a right to
possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements, docu-
ments and affidavits, if any, so put in, hear the parties and
conclude the inquiry, as far as may be practicable, within
a period of two months from the date of appearance of the
parties before him, if possible, decide the question whether
any and which of the parties was at the date of the order
before mentioned in such possession of the said subject.

74 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Provided that the Magistrate may, if he so thinks fit,
summon and examine any person whose affidavit has been
put in as the facts contained therein:

Provided further that, if it appears to the Magistrate that
any party has within two months next before the date of
such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he
may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in
possession at such date.

Provided also that, if the Magistrate considers the case
one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject
of dispute, pending his decision under this section.

(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so
required to attend, or any other person interested, from
showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has
existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his
said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be
stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the
Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final.

(6) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or
should under the second proviso to sub-section (4) be
treated as being in such possession of the said subject he
shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to
possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course
of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession
until such eviction and when he proceeds under the second
proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the
party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed.

Sub-sections (7) to (10) are not relevant.

This section was, however, invoked and perverted to sanctify the
dispossession. Markanday Singh, Magistrate, first class, and Additional
City Magistrate Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya after being ‘fully satisfied from
information received from police sources and from other credible sources
that a dispute between Hindus and Muslims of Ayodhya over the question
of rights of proprietorship and worship in the building claimed variously
as Babri Masjid and Janmabhoomi Mandir, Mohalla Ram Kot, within the
local limits of my jurisdiction, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace’,
ordered the attachment of the ‘said buildings’ under Section 145 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and appointed Priya Dutt Ram, Chair-
man, Municipal Board, Faizabad-cum-Ayodhya, as receiver to arrange

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 75

for the care of the property in dispute on 29 December 1949. The Receiver
took charge of the disputed property on 5 January 1950 and submitted a
scheme as was desired in the Additional City magistrate’s order. (Tripathi,
Indian Express, 30 March 1986.)

The crucial issue of dispossession was deliberately ignored. ‘A dispute’
existed which was likely to ‘lead to a breach of the peace’. The property
was attached. The party in possession which was dispossessed on 22-23
December 1949 was completely excluded. Muslims were forbidden to
enter the mosque. The organized mobs which took over the mosque
acquired access to it. In 1986 the limitations on access were removed.

Contrast this with the Order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parlia-
ment Street, New Delhi, A.G. Cutting, of 7 February 1972 in The State
vs. Sadiq Ali and Others. and S.D. Sharma & Others under Section 145.
He ordered restoration of possession of 7, Jantar Mantar Road (Congress
House) in New Delhi to Congress(O). Not because it was the ‘real’
Congress, but because it had been forcibly dispossessed by Congress (R)
on 13 November 1971. That order was also made under Section 145 of
the CrPC. A similar order should have been made in the Babri Masjid case
in 1949, Thecontrast is glaring. As Magistrate Cutting said, the Congress
(O)’s men ‘were dispossessed. They are therefore entitled to be put back
into possession until they are evicted from the said premises by an order
of a competent court’ (in a regular civil suit on title).

In the Ayodhya case, the Receiver’s scheme, predictably, said ‘the most
important item of management is the maintenance of Bhog and Puja in
the condition in which it was carried on when I took over charge’. There
were to be at least three pujaris who ‘should be allowed free access’ to
the installed idols. (Muslim India, May 1987, see p. 208 for the text of the
scheme.) Under the scheme Muslims were altogether forbidden to pray
in the mosque, Hindus were permitted to offer puja and have darshan of
the idols from a side gate and make offerings through four pujaris
employed by the Receiver who was appointed by the Magistrate.

Next, acivil suit no. 2 of 1950, was filed on 16 January 1950, by Gopal
Singh Visharad in the Court of the Civil Judge, Faizabad, praying for a
declaration that he was entitled ‘to worship and visit without obstruction
or disturbance, Shri Bhagwan Ram Chandra and others installed at Asthan
Janmabhoomi’, and a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from
removing these idols. Amongst eight defendants were five Muslims, the
State of Utter Pradesh, the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent
of Police of Faizabad.

The Civil Judge, N.N. Chadha, granted an interim injunction as prayed

76 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

for on 16 January 1950. The District Magistrate, Faizabad, thereupon
instructed the District Government Counsel to move for modification of
the order on the ground that the site in dispute is claimed both by Hindus
and Muslims and unrestricted admission of the public has been allowed
and that if the public is freely allowed for puja and darshan, it would
amount to allowing one party the exercise of rights which are in dispute.
Accordingly, an application was moved and the order dated 16 January
1950 was modified on 19 January 1950 as follows, ‘The parties are hereby
restrained by means of the temporary injunction to refrain from removing
the idols in question from the site in dispute and from interfering with the
puja, etc., as atpresent carried on. The order dated 16 January 1950 stands
modified accordingly.’

The interim injunction was later confirmed by the Civil Judge in his
order dated 3 March 1951 with the observation, ‘The undisputed fact
remains that on the date of this suit the idols of Shri Bhagwan Ram
Chandra and others did exist on the site and that worship was being
performed by the Hindus including the plaintiff, though under some
restrictions put by the executive authorities.’ (Tripathi, op. cit.) That the
‘undisputed fact’ of the presence of the idols was created by force and
sheer justice required restoration of the status quo ante evidently did not
weigh with the judge even in a civil proceeding where both title and
possession are relevant. (vide, Muslim India, March 1986, pp. 108-9 for
the text of the judgment of 3 March 1951.) ‘There are several other
mosques in the mohalla in question,’ the Judge said as if there were no
other temples there as well. Thus, for the second time the forcible
dispossession of 22-23 December 1949, recorded in two official docu-
ments, was sanctified in a judicial pronouncement marked by pathetically
tortuous reasoning. The High Courtconfirmed this order on 26 April 1955.

The Deputy Commissioner of Faizabad, J.N. Ugra, filed a written
statement in the Court on 24 April 1950. /t is of cardinal importance not
least because it was filed ‘on behalf of Defendant No. 6, the State of Uttar
Pradesh’. Paras 14,15 and 16 are relevant. ‘The property in suit is known
as Babri Masjid and it has been for a long period in use as a mosque for
the purpose of worship of the Muslims. /t has not been in use as a temple
of Shri Ram Chandraji.’

In para 15 he stated that, ‘On the night of December 12, 1949 the idols
of Shri Ram Chandraji were surreptitiously and wrongly put inside it.’

Para 16 added, ‘That as a result of the said wrongful act a situation
imperilling public peace and tranquillity was created and the public
authorities had to intervene in order to prevent breach of peace and

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 77

tranquillity.’

This statement was filed in another civil suit no. 25 of 1950 by Shri
Param Hans Ram Chandra Dass vs. Zahoor Ahmad and Others. Apparent-
ly a similar statement had been filed in the earlier suit no. 2 of 1950 as
well. (Muslim India, March 1986, p. 112.)

Ugra’s authoritative statement totally belies the BJP President L.K.
Advani’s assertion on 19 September 1989 that no prayers were said in the
mosque since 1936.

Two more civil suits were filed in addition to suit nos. 2 and 25 of 1950.
One was by Nirmohi Akhara in 1959 for the discharge of the Receiver
appointed under Section 145 and delivery of possession of the mosque to
them. (Suit no. 26 of 1959, Nirmohi Akhara vs. Babu Priya Dutta Ram and
others.)

On 18 December 1961 the first civil suit by Muslims was filed—suit
no. 12 of 1961 Sunni Cental Waqf Board vs. Gopal Singh Visharad &
Others. The first relief sought in suit no. 12 of 1961 was for a ‘declaration
that the property indicated by letters ABCD is a mosque commonly known
as Babri Masjid and the land shown in the sketchmap by the letters EFGH
is a public Muslim graveyard commonly known as “Ganjshahidan”.’ The
second relief sought was for delivery of possession of the mosque and
graveyard in suit by removal of the idols and other articles which the
Hindus had placed in the mosque as objects of their worship. This suit
came to be treated as the leading suit.

The VHP owed its existence to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS) Chief M.S. Golwalkar and Swami Chinmayananda’s deliberations
in Bombay on 19 August 1964, though its first session was held at the
1966 Kumbh Mela in Allahabad. (/ndian Post quoted in Muslim India,
April 1990, p. 164.)

Agarwal recalls:

Atits session held at Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi, on 7 and
8 April 1984 the Dharma Sansad of the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad gave a call for the removal of the three mosque-
like structures raised by Muslim marauders after destroy-
ing the ancient Hindu temples at Sri Rama Janma Bhumi,
Ayodhya, and Sri Krishna Janmasthan, Mathura and of
Kashi Vishwanath at Gyanvapi, Varanasi. The so-called
Babari Masjid at Ayodhya was taken up first. Sri Rama
Janma Bhumi Mukti Yagna Samiti was formed with Sri
Dau Dayal Khanna as its convenor and Gorak-

78 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

shapeethadishwar Mahant Sri Aveda Nathji as its Presi-
dent. In order to create national awareness and arouse
public opinion in support of the cause of liberation of Sri
Ram Janma Bhumi, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad organised
a Ratha-yatra of Sri RamaJ anakji Virajman ona motorised
chariot, which started from Sitamarhi in Bihar on 25
September 1984. The Ratha passed through important
towns of Bihar and reached Ayodhya on 6 October 1984.

(Parlance, Jan—Feb 1990, p. 16.)

Indira Gandhi’s assassination led to the suspension of the rath-yatra.
But it was revived from twenty-five places on 23 October 1985. The VHP
spearheaded the move. The ninth of March 1986 was fixed as D-day. Its
leaders met Chief Minister Vir Bahadur Singh and the District Magistrate,
I.K. Pandey. Neerja Chowdhury reported the disclosure in The Statesman
(20 April 1986) by ‘a senior Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader’ that ‘Rajiv
Gandhi had indicated in no uncertain terms that all the gates of the edifice
must open to the devotees’ before Shivratri on 8 March 1986.

Agarwal himself admits that, ‘On December 19, 1985 Sri Veer Bahadur
Singh, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh visited Ayodhya on the
occasion of the Ramayana Mela sponsored by government agencies. A
few of us headed by our President Justice Shiva Nath Katju, had as-
sembled at Ayodhya.’ They met V.B. Singh. (Parlance, pp. 16-17.)

A twenty-eight-year-old local lawyer Umesh Chandra Pandey filed an
application on 25 January 1986 in the court of the munsif seeking removal
of the restrictions on the puja. It was an application in the civil cases to
which he was not party and he did not implead the Muslims who were
parties to the suit either. The munsif declined, judiciously enough, to pass
orders since the file in the main case of 1961 was in the High Court and
orders could be made only in that suit. An appeal was filed on 31 January
and heard on 1 February 1986. An application by Mohammed Hashim,
who came to know of the proceedings for being impleaded, was rejected.
K.M. Pandey, the District Judge of Faizabad, recorded the statements of
the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police on the issue of
law and order and in forty minutes ordered the opening of the locks. He
observed, ‘It is clear that it is not necessary to keep the locks at the gates
for the purpose of maintaining law and order or the safety of the idols.
This appears to be an unnecessary irritant to the applicant and other
members of the community.’

Having refused to hear the Muslims altogether, the Judge said, ‘A fter

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 79

having heard the parties it is clear that the members of the other com-
munity, namely, the Muslims, are not going to be affected by any stretch
of imagination if the locks of the gates were opened and the idols inside
the premises are allowed to be seen and worshipped by the pilgrims and
devotees. It is undisputed that the premisés are presently in the court’s
possession and that for the last 35 years Hindus have had an unrestricted
right of worship as a result of the court’s order of 1950 and 1951. If the
Hindus are offering prayers and worshipping the idols, though in a
restricted way for the last 35 years, then the heavens are not going to fall
if the locks of the gates are removed. The district magistrate has stated
before me today that the members of the Muslim community are not
allowed to offer any prayers at the disputed site. They are not allowed to
go there.’

The Order was palpably bad in law. The munsif’s order could not be
appealed. Pandey was not party to suit no. 2 of 1950 in which he made
the application nor did he apply to be impleaded as party either. The
plaintiff in the suit, Gopal Singh Visharad, had died years earlier and his
suit had abated since no one else had been substituted as plaintiff in his
place. All the four suits had been consolidated and suit no. 21 of 1961 was
made the leading case. Yet, Muslims were not heard because in District
Judge K.M. Pandey’s opinion, since Muslims were ‘not allowed to go
there. . . there is no occasion for law and order problem arising as a result
of the removal of locks. /t is absolutely an affair inside the premises.’ He
meant inside the community, evidently. (vide, Muslim India, March 1986,
pp. 110-11 for the text.)

On 3 February 1986 Mohammed Hashim applied for quashing of the
Order before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court in writ petition 746
of 1986. The Court ordered the same day that ‘until further orders of the
Court the nature of the property in dispute as existing today shall not be
changed’.

The Sunni Central Waqf Board also filed writ petition no. 3106 of 1986
on 12 May 1986 against the District Judge’s Order of 1 February 1986.
On 11 December 1987 the State of Uttar Pradesh applied to the Allahabad
High Court that the hearing of the two writ petitions be deferred and the
four civil suits be withdrawn from the Court of Munsif Sadar, Faizabad
and tried by the High Court. The curieus thing is that to this day the State
itself has notfiled any written statement declaring its stand. Sheer honesty
required it to do so promptly and to reaffirm its earlier statement made
through J.N. Ugra. No less curious is the stand of the VHP. It has profited
by successive interim orders of the courts endorsing the altered status quo

80 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

in 1949 and 1986. It, nonetheless, refuses to go to trial on the merits of
its claim.

Some idea of the contours of the litigation and the hurdles it will have
to surmount is afforded by the issues framed in the case by the special
bench of the Allahabad High Court on 26 May 1990.

Counsel for the All India Hindu Mahasabha had proposed
the framing of eight issues including the question of
revaluation. But the court, after going through the same,
filed only one which asked whether the suit was liable to
be dismissed with special costs.

Some other issues are as follows:

Whether the building described is a mosque as claimed
by the plaintiff. If so, whether it was built by Babar as
alleged by the plaintiff or by Meer Baqi as alleged by
defendant no. 13;

Whether the plaintiff (issue no. 10) or the Hindus in
general (issue no. 4) have perfected their right of adverse
possession as alleged by them respectively;

Whether the plaintiff had no right to maintain the
present suit since no valid notification under section 5(1)
ofthe Muslim Wagqf Act (No. XIII of 1936) was ever made
in respect of the property in the dispute;

Whether the suit is barred by limitation as it was filed
after the commencement of the UP Muslim Waqf Act, 1960;

Whether the present suit is a representative suit, the
plaintiffs representing the Muslims and the defendants
representing the interest of Hindus;

Whether the idols of worship were placed inside the
building in the night intervening 22/23 December, 1949,
as alleged in the plaint or had they been in existence there
since before, in either case its effect;

Whether the pillars inside and outside the building in
question contain images of Hindu gods and goddesses and
so the building in question could not have the character of
a mosque under the tenets of Islam;

Whether the waaqf in question cannot be a Sunni waqf as
the building was not allegedly constructed by a Sunni
Mohammedan but was allegedly constructed by Meer Baqi
who was allegedly a Shia Muslim and the alleged Mutawal-

Legal Aspects to theIssue / 81
lis were allegedly Shia Mohammedan; if so its effects.

The court had earlier ordered the execution of the survey
by the commissioner to be appointed by the registrar-
secretary of the board of revenue not below the rank of a
PCS officer having knowledge of surveys. Photography,
video recording and carbon-dating was also directed to be
performed by the director, archaeological department, UP.

(The Times of India, 27 May 1990.)

Manoj Mitta, a Lucknow correspondent of the Times of India reported
in the issue of 25 June 1990, on the unique course which the litigation had
taken. He doubted whether it would lead to a solution of the tangle. He
wrote:

Several of the 43 issues framed by the court on May 25
pertain neither to law nor any verifiable fact. Rather, those
issues fall in the grey areas of history, mythology and
religion.

Hereis a sample: ‘Is the property in suitthe site of Janam
Bhumi of Sri Ram Chandraji?

“Whether the building and the graveyard stand dedi-
cated to almighty God, as alleged by the plaintiffs (Sunni
Wakf board)?

“Have the Muslims been in possession of the property
in suit from 1528 AD continuously, openly and to the
knowledge of the defendants and Hindus in general? If so,
its effect?

“Whether the building has been used by the members of
the Muslim community for offering prayers from times
(sic) immemorial? If so, its effect?

“Have the Hindus been worshipping the place in dispute
as Sri Ram Janam Bhoomi or Janamasthan and have been
visiting it as a sacred place of pilgrimage as or right since
times (sic) immemorial? If so, its effect?

“Whether any portion of the property in suit was used
as a place of worship by the Hindus immediately prior to
the construction of the building in question?

“Whether the building has been constructed on the site
of an alleged Hindu temple after demolishing the same? If
So, its effect?

82 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

“Whether even after the construction of the building
deities of Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman and the Asthan Sri
Ram Janambhoomi continued to exist on the property. . .
and the said places continued to be visited by devotees for
purposes of worship? If so, whether the property in dis-
pute continued to vest in the said deities?’

The judges—Justice S.C. Mathur, Justice Brijesh
Kumar and Justice S.H.A. Raza—had to frame such in-
tractable issues because of the constraints of the judicial
process. Before the trial begins, the judges have to frame
the issues on the basis of the written statement filed by all
the parties to the suit.

But, while framing the issues, the judges do have some
discretion to reject points which are extraneous to the
dispute. And, in the Ayodhya case, the judges used their
discretion to reject some contentions which would have
had absurd political ramifications.

For instance, one of the parties, the Hindu Mahasabha,
had proposed the following issue, ‘Whether the division
of India was unauthorised and unconstitutional and
whether the UP Wakf Act was adopted by any lawfully
constituted government of India?’ The judges, while
declining to frame that issue, noted in their order that it
was ‘political’ and, therefore, ‘beyond the purview of
courts’.

But, as the issues enlisted earlier show, they had framed
some that are purely matters of faith. The nature of the four
suits that had been consolidated from the Faizabad district
courts and placed before this special bench of the high
court had apparently made such issues unavoidable. . . .

When the special bench had been set up, the VHP had no
option but to stand by the various Hindu parties embroiled
in the suit. In a bid to redeem its position, the VHP had
suggested in vain to the special bench to drop altogether one
‘unprovable’ issue framed in the district court.

The issue was whether the disputed site was really the
birthplace of Ram. The high court’s order dated May 25
records: ‘Learned counsel, Sri (V.K.S.) Chaudhary has
objected to the above issue. According to him, this issue
is not based on the pleading of any of the defendants. We

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 83

are unable to agree with the submission of the learned
counsel as the pleading is contained in paragraph 27 of the
written statement filed on behalf of defendants 3 and 4
(Nirmohi Akhara and another Hindu party). Accordingly,
the issue is retained.’

But Chaudhary subsequently tured the tables on the
votaries of Babri Masjid by getting the High Court to
frame issues conceming Islamic scriptures as well. Some
of these altogether new issues, which form part of the 43
framed last month are:

‘If a portion of the disputed site was used as a place of
worship by the Hindus immediately prior to the construc-
tion of the building in question, whether no mosque could
come into existence in view of the Islamic tenets at the
place in disputes?

“Whether the building in question cannot be a mosque
under the Islamic laws in view of the admitted position
that it does not have minarets?

“Whether the building in question cannot legally be a
mosque as it is admittedly surrounded by a graveyard on
three sides?

“Whether the pillars inside and outside the building in
the question contain images of Hindu gods and goddesses?
If the finding is in the affirmative, whether on that account
the building in question cannot have the character of
mosque under the tenets of Islam?’

These and other contentious issues framed in the Ayod-
hya case have never been decided before in judicial his-
tory. It remains to be seen how the bitter claimants of the
Ayodhya property, will produce evidence for or against
such issues. More importantly, how will the special bench
pronounce a reasoned verdict on them?

The first step taken was in December 1949, to oust Muslims from the
Babri Masjid and convert it into a mandir with limited rights of access to
the lay public. The next step had been taken in February 1986, to remove
the restrictions. The last step contemplated is the demolition of the
mosque and the construction of a temple on its site.

It is not exactly a matter for celebration that India’s political system
was just barely able to halt the last step. Satyapal Dang exposed a pact

84 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

between the VHP and the Union Home Minister, Buta Singh, on 27
September 1989 which would have enabled the VHP to initiate its plans
of constructing the temple on the site of the mosque.

Quoting a report inthe Navbharat Times of 29 September 1989, he said,
“According to the agreement the government would allow Ram Shila
Pooja functions to go on all over the country, the VHP would take to
Ayodhya alimited number of Ram Shilas on November 9.’ The foundation
stone of the new temple would be laid some distance away from the
mosque. But ‘there is no undertaking that the Babri Masjid would not be
sought to be demolished subsequently’. (New Age, 15 October 1989.)

On 18 October 1990 the Government of India published the text of the
VHP-Buta Singh accord which, to a certain extent, confirmed the press
reports. The Shilas procession was allowed on condition of good be-
haviour. However, unknown to the public and to its own followers, the
VHP had agreed to abide by the Court's order of 14 August 1989. The
agreement is set out in full (in note 2 at the end of this essay.)

Under the VHP’s ground plan, as revealed by its Secretary General,
Ashok Singhal, ‘The sanctum sanctorum or the garbha griha of the
proposed temple will remain at the same place where at present worship
is being made of the idol.’ (Organiser, 27 September 1989.) That is, right
inside the sanctum sanctorum of the mosque. Interestingly, while Muslim
leaders were banned from entering Ayodhya, the VHP leaders stayed there
for months.

The Buta Singh-VHP pact came shortly after the Lucknow Bench of
the Allahabad High Court passed an order on 14 August 1989 accepting
the application by the UP Government’s standing counsel, R.N. Trivedi,
to restrain all ‘parties, groups and persons represented by them from
interfering in any manner with the site in dispute, to disturb the status quo.
and further to organise or extend threats of interference by organising any
activity which may bring about confrontation between two major rival
communities, which is bound to threaten public peace and public order’.
The application referred specifically to the Shila Puja. Earlier, on 12 July
the bench had summoned all the five pending cases relating to the dispute
for trial by a full bench of the High Court. The fifth case (suit no. 236 of
1989) was filed by Agarwal with Sri Ram as plaintiff no. 1.

Mohan Sahay reported in the Statesman of 26 October 1989:

Highly placed sources claim that the green signal was
given by Mr Buta Singh to the secretary-general of the
VHP, Mr Ashok Singhal, at a meeting in Lucknow on 27

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 85

September. The home minister had instructed all the offi-
cials concerned to make efforts so that the Ram Shila
bricks were transported to and the Shilanyas completed
without hindrance. This is acknowledged in the house
journal of Shree Ram Shila Pujan Samiti quoting Mr Ashok
Singhal.

After Buta Singh’s approval on 27 September 1989, the Shila Puja
began three days later. The Lucknow correspondent of the /ndian Express
reported (3 October 1989) that the VHP leaders ‘bluntly told the Home
Minister that the sanctum sanctorum of their temple would be the same
place where the idol of Lord Rama is presently placed and worshipped.
The size of the proposed temple would be over 34,000 square feet besides
appurternances. It would be 270 feet long, 126 feet wide and 132 feet
high. It is so designed as to absorb the disputed structure standing on an
area of about 6,000 feet. The foundation for the Singhdwar would be laid
about 270 feet away from the garbha griha which would be retained as a
sanctum sanctorum of the new temple’.

The judiciary could have prevented the Shilanyas. But once again the
judiciary proved ineffective and for palpably wrong reasons.

On 27 October 1989, the Manan Ekta Edyan petitioned to the Supreme
Court to ban the Ram Shila Pooja processions and also the Shilanyas on
9 November. The Court refused. One of the judges, Justice B.C. Ray,
asked counsel in the course of the hearing, ‘Is it your proposition that all
religious processions in the country should be banned?’ (Hindustan
Times, 28 October 1989.) V.M. Tarkunde’s counsel for the petitioners
pointed out that the object of the procession was to construct a Ramjan-
mabhumi temple which in itself was a provocation.

The Fundamental Rights to freedom of speech and expression and to
freedom of assembly embodied in Article 19(1) of the Constitution are
subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’ under clause (2) inter alia in the
interests of public order. What is more, clause (2) of Article 25 explicitly
says that the right to religious freedom guaranteed by Article 25 (1), will
not prevent the State from regulating any secular activity associated with
the practice of religion. The Court simply directed the authorities to take
action ‘against those spreading communal rancour’.

On 3 November 1989 the Bihar Government did what the UP Govern-
ment did not. It banned all religious processions. (The Telegraph, 4
November 1989.)

A sad feature of the whole episode since 1949 has been the failure of

86 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

the judiciary to provide reliefs which the law empowers and the people
expect it to provide. Hopes for judicial redress were not exactly raised
when the Special Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, trying
the Babri Masjid case, remarked in its order of 7 November 1989, ‘It is
doubtful that some of the questions involved in the suit are soluble by
judicial process.’ (The Hindu, 8 November 1990.)

Addressing a seminar in New Delhion 10 November on ‘The Constitu-
tion and Growing Communalism’, a former judge of the Supreme Court,
V.R. Krishna Iyer, angrily remarked, ‘The judiciary will be described as
the villain of the piece.’ In his view it lacked the guts to face the issue.
(The Times of India, 11 November 1989.)

The Shilanyas was eventually held at Ayodhya. On 9 November 1989
the plinth for a massive fifty-five crore rupees temple was dug 192 feet
away from the mosque. The next day the foundation of the temple was
laid. (The Telegraph, 10 and 11 November 1989.)

This was in clear breach of the High Court’s stay order and of therules.
They required the Collector’s permission for any construction on state-
owned land. Most of the land around the Mosque belongs to the State.
(P.K. Roy, Frontline, 28 October 1989.)

Only a day earlier, on 7 November, the Allahabad High Court had, on
the request of the State, issued a clarificatory order which said that ‘the
order of injunction dated 14 August 1989 was in respect of the entire
property mentioned in the suit, including plot no. 586, in so far included
within the boundary described by letters E, F, G, H, in the site plan’. The
site plan is part of the court record in the plaint of the suit 12 of 1961 filed
by the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, UP and others.

But on 8 November Buta Singh told the Lok Sabha that ‘the site of the
Shilanyas is clearly outside the limits of EFGH in the site plan. This
position was explained by the Advocate General of UP at a meeting in
Lucknow earlier that day’. (See India Today, 15 December 1989, p. 159,
for a sketch map of the site.) The Shilanyas was held on the disputed plot
no. 586.

On 28 December 1989, after assumption of office at the Centre by the
National Front, Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed said in the Lok
Sabha, in answer to starred question no. 79, that ‘the State Government
has identified the concerned plot as Nazul Plot No. 586’. In its view, based
on legal advice and that of the District Magistrate, ‘the whole of it cannot
fall within the limits spelled out by the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad
High court in its clarificatory order dated November 7, 1989’.

On 11 November the VHP leaders took everyone by surprise by

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 87

declaring that the construction of the temple was being deferred and
would be decided at a meeting of Hindu leaders in Allahabad on 27 and
28 January 1990. By then the National Front Government had come to
power. Its election manifesto said that ‘the controversy can be settled
through negotiations, based on mutual understanding. The National Front
feels that the Babri Masjid should not be demolished. At the same time,
the Hindu sentiments to have atemple dedicated to Lord Rama should be
respected’.

On 15 February 1990 the National Front Government constituted ‘a
Committee which will talk with various groups to find an amicable
solution to this issue’. It consisted of Madhu Dandavate, George Fernan-
des and Mukhtar Anis. Neither the Committee’s deliberations nor the
VHP’s deferrals need detain us.

What is more to the point is that the Government’s electoral pledge
records a clear national consensus which is not shared by the BJP—RSS—
VHP combine alone.

Several formulae have been suggested. The most remarkable feature
of all the solutions proposed is their implicit acceptance of the fundamen-
tal principle that the Babri Masjid be declared a national, protected
monument under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and
Remains Act, 1958, just like those built by other rulers of India. Under
Section 4 (1) of the Act, ‘where the central government is of the opinion
that any ancient monument. . . is of national importance, it may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, give two months notice of its intention
to declare such monuments. . . to be of national importance’. Objections
are heard and the site is purchased or agreement entered into with the
owner. The monument acquires a nationally protected character under the
law of the land.

A devout Hindu like the late Kamlapati Tripathi had no hesitation in
proposing, ina letter to the Prime Minister dated 24 March 1989, that the
‘Babri Masjid—Ram Janmabhoomi complex may be declared a national
monument’. This would be a fitting, tangible expression of the ideal of
communal harmony and the co-existence of diverse faiths. (Muslim India,
July 1989, p. 209.) Bombay justly boasts a traffic island which has housed
a temple, a church and a mosque. In this spirit the basic principle can be
amplified by building on the chabutra a magnificent temple in honour of
Shri Ramachandraji.

Karan Singh’s solution, proposed on 15 January 1987, is along the same
lines: ‘It is not befitting that at this sacred place Sri Ram should be
worshipped in an unsuitable setting. What is needed is the construction

88 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

of a new temple at the Janmabhoomi which would be areally fitting tribute
to Lord Rama. There seems to be no controversy regarding the chabutra
where in fact worship has been carried on for many years. | suggest that
a National Committee be formed to draw up plans for the construction of
a magnificent temple on the site, where really beautiful statues of Sri
Rama, Sita and Lakhman can be installed and which can become a focus
of worship and devotion for the Hindus of the world.’ Karan Singh
offered to make, ‘a token donation of a lakh of rupees on behalf of the
Dharmarath Trust’. (Muslim India, February 1987, p. 63.)

In a public appeal to the Prime Minister on 10 May 1986, S.
Shahabuddin, then a Member of Parliament, also proposed a solution
‘based on the separate existence of the two structures known as Babri
Masjid and Ram Chabutra, separated by a wall. Ram Chabutra marks
the Janmasthan of Shri Ramachandraji’. He suggested, ‘First, let the
Status quo ante be restored in the Babri Masjid as on 22 December 1949.
Second, leta magnificent temple dedicated to ShriRamachandraji be built
on Ram Chabutra. Thirdly, let the Babri Masjid be notified as a Protected
National Monument of historic importance and taken under the care of
the central government.’ (Muslim India, June 1986, p. 249.)

Indeed, in 1891 a noted writer on the monuments and antiquities of the
region, A. Fuhrer, classified the Babri mosque as a monument in the
possession of private persons but which should be protected. A bill,
broadly on these lines, was moved in the Rajya Sabha last year by a
member of the Communist Party of India (CPI) to declare the whole Babri
Masjid—Ram Janmabhumi complex a national monument under the Act.
This was in keeping with the CPI National Council’s Resolution of 1 April
1987. In 1989 a large number of public figures issued a call for a
settlement on these lines. Among them were Rajni Kothari, Ram Vilas
Paswan, and George Fernandes. (Muslim India, March 1989, p. 110.)
According tothe Press Trust of India (PTI), the conversion of the complex
into a national monument was also suggested at a meeting of the leaders
of recognized political parties in Parliament with Buta Singh on 29 March
1989. Satya Prakash Malaviya of the Janata Dal endorsed the suggestion
on 27 May 1989 and so did the Bharat Kisan Union (BKU) leader
Mahendra Singh Tikait on 12 December 1988—restore the mosque, he
said, and allow the Hindus to renovate the ancient temple there.

The solitary note of dissent from this truly national consensus is struck
by the BJP. Atal Behari Vajpayee’s proposal on 1 October 1989 to relocate
the mosque is preposterous and the BJP, the RSS and the VHP’s pronoun-
cements are nothing if not arrogant.

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 89

The judicial process is rejected in terms which reflect a contempt for
evidence and a dangerous recourse to demagogy. If the BJP president,
L.K. Advani says that ‘the controversy is about accepting rashtra purush
Ram against a foreign invader Babur’ (The Telegraph, 17 May 1990) the
VHP leader Ashok Singhal asserts that ‘the Constitution does not rest
powers in the Court to question the divine factor of the people’. (The
Telegraph, 6 October 1989.) The RSS leader Ra jendra Singh wrote to the
then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on 12 April 1987, ‘All Hindus are
convinced it is the Ram Janmabhoomi and they do not need the proofs
from Baburnamas and your white-washing historians.’ (Muslim India,
June 1987, p. 249.)

The RSS chief Babasaheb Deoras said, “This is not acase on which the
judiciary can pass a judgement. What type of evidence are the Hindus
expected to produce? That Rama was born and that his birthplace is
Ayodhya?’ (Organiser, 12 March 1989.)

The BJP National Executive’s resolution at Palanpur on 11 June 1989
said, ‘The BJPholds that the nature of this controversy is such that it just
cannot be sorted out by a court of law.’ Having ruled out adjudication it
went on to propose that the sentiments of the people must be respected,
and Ram Janmasthan handed over to the Hindus if possible through a
negotiated settlement or also by legislation. ‘Litigation certainly is no
answer.’ But nor is legislation, for the statute will be patently unconstitu-
tional. A law or a notification under the Act which declares the mosque a
national monument will be perfectly justified. But one which hands it to
a particular community will be discriminatory and will violate of the
Fundamental Rights. It will be a legislative verdict on a civil suit,
moreover, and bad on that ground as well.

Against this background the existence of a consensus in support of a
compromise is a priceless asset. It achieves that remarkable feat of recon-
ciliation of morality with expediency and of sentiment with reality. Vaj-
payee once came a little closer to it. In a speech at Bombay on 15 February
1987, he urged the Muslims to give up their claim to the Babri mosque and
hand it over the Hindus as a gesture of goodwill and respect for their
sentiments while the Hindus should reciprocate by allowing the present
structure of the masjid to stand as it is while constructing a temple adjoining
it befitting Ramjanmabhumi. (/ndian Express, 16 February 1987.)

He said it represented his personal view. Sadly, his plea of respect for
feelings was unevenly balanced. As the Hindustan Times of 13 April 1987
pointed out, ‘Vajpayee is silent on whether the mosque should be used for
prayers and without this assurance it is difficult to see even enlightened

90 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Muslim leaders accepting his proposal.’ Evidently, the only concession
which Vajpayee was prepared to make, with self-conscious magnanimity,
was not to demolish a mosque built in 1528 in which Muslims prayed for
four centuries. The newspaper cited an apt parallel—the agreement signed
on 8 October 1968 by the Shahi Idgah Trust and Shri Krishna Asthar Sewa
Sangh on the Mathura temple—mosque controversy. Under it the mosque
and the temple co-exist side by side.(See note 3 at the end of this essay.)

The core of the matter surely is: Who is entitled to the ownership and
possession of the premises known as Babri Masjid by law? The proceed-
ings which followed the attack by the mob in December 1949 were in the
nature of summary proceedings under the CrPC and not a regular civil
suit for title. Precisely such a suit on title is now pending before the special
bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow. Even L.K. Advani has
affirmed repeatedly that matters of title are justiciable and courts of law
can decide them. It is therefore misleading to say that issues of faith are
before the Lucknow bench of the High Court.

Under the Civil Procedure Code it says the civil courts can only decide
issues of a civil nature. As we have seen, such a case involving title is
before the Lucknow bench of the Allahabad High Court and it alone has
the right and jurisdiction to decide it. Neither the Executive nor the
Commission of Enquiry suggested by Rajiv Gandhi can usurp that Court’s
authority.

Under the national consensus, instead of relinquishing the mosque to
the Hindus, the Muslims as a community should give it to the nation at
large under the law of the land as a historic monument worthy of national
protection. Such a compromise solution will be a truly national achieve-
ment. Only the VHP and the BJP reject this consensus. On 9 January 1950,
Sardar Patel characterized the surreptitious planting of the idols in the
Babri Masjid as a ‘unilateral action based on an attitude of aggression or
coercion’. It is unlikely that he would have regarded the BJP President
L.K. Advani’s attempt to resolve the issue by use of force through his
rath-yatra other than ‘an attitude of aggression or coercion’.

Legal Aspects tothe Issue /91
Notes

NOTE 1
New Delhi

9 January 1950
My dear Pantji,
The Prime Minister has already sent to you a telegram expressing his
concern over the developments in Ayodhya. I spoke to you about it in
Lucknow. I feel that the controversy has been raised at a most inopportune
time both from the point of view of the country at large and of your own
province in particular. The wider communal issues have only been recently
resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the various communities. So far as
Muslims are concerned, they are just settling down to their new loyalties.
We can reasonably say that the first shock of partition and the resultant
uncertainties are just beginning to be over and that it is unlikely that there
would be any transfer of loyalties on a mass scale. In your own province,
the communal! problem has always been a difficult one. I think it has been
one of the outstanding achievements of your administration that, despite
many upsetting factors, communal relations have generally improved very
considerably since 1946. We have our own difficulties in the UP organisa-
tionally and administratively as a result of group formations. It would be
most unfortunate if we allowed any group advantage to be made on this
issue. On all these grounds, therefore, I feel that the issue is one which
should be resolved amicably in a spirit of mutual toleration and goodwill
between the two communities. I realise there is a great deal of sentiment
behind the move which has taken place. At the same time, such matters can
only be resolved peacefully if we take the willing consent of the Muslim
community with us. There can be no question of resolving such disputes by
force. In that case, the forces of law and order will have to maintain peace
at all costs. If, therefore, peaceful and persuasive methods are to be
followed, any unilateral action based on an attitude of aggression or
coercion cannot be countenanced. | am therefore quite convinced that the
matter should not be made such a live issue and that the present inopportune
controversies should be resolved by peaceful (methods) and accomplished
facts should not be allowed to stand in the way of an amicable settlement.
I hope your efforts in this direction will meet with success.

Yours sincerely,
Vallabhbhai Patel

The Hon’ble Pandit G.B. Pant
Premier of United Provinces
Lucknow

92 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Lucknow
13 January 1950

My dear Sardar Sahib,

I do not know how to thank you for all the trouble you took in coming over
to Lucknow almost immediately after your return from Bombay in response
to my request without any previous notice. I was reluctant to approach you,
especially because of the strain which you had already undergone in the
course of your recent trip to Bombay. But { felt somewhat worried over the
situation as I sensed it. Whenever in difficulty I look up to you. You are
always so kind and generous and an unfailing source of strength and light
in moments of gloom and depression. When I recall all that had happened
here in your presence I feel deeply mortified. It may have given you an idea
of the agony that I have to undergo a!most from day to day. There has been
hardly any improvement since. We are, however, discharging our duties as
best as we can.

The Selection Committee has completed its labours and the following
candidates (see enclosure) will I trust be finally and formally elected today.
The list has, I am told, on the whole been well received. Many have,
however, been disappointed and some have not been able to suppress their
feelings. Ihave received a letterfrom Shri Kala Venkata Rao which indicates
that he was not quite happy over the selection of three erstwhile members
of the Provincial Legislature. The reasons were in each case quite adequate
and convincing, but they have probably not been brought to his notice. I
shall be writing to him in this connection shortly. The executive committee
of our party has asked some of the signatories who have made wild
allegations against the Government and some of its members in their letter
to the President to explain their position. They were present at the meeting
at my house that day but did not in spite of my enquiry state any facts. Even
at our meeting yesterday they were not able to do so. They have been given
further time. Their replies will be reaching today or tomorrow. That letter
seems to have been signed also by a Deputy Minister. If it were a purely
local or provincial affair it would not have been very difficult to tackle, but
because of other currents and forces the difficulties are considerably ag-
gravated. I need not say more as I expect to be in Delhi soon after your
return from Calcutta. I wonder if you will be able to find any rest there. I
only hope and pray that your frail health will be able to stand all this strain;
still great care has to be taken and I trust that Behn (Maniben) will do the
needful and regulate things in the desired manner.

I have to thank you for your letter about the Ayodhya affair. It will be of
great help to us. Efforts to set matters right in a peaceful manner are still
continuing and there is a reasonable chance of success, but things are still
in a fluid state and it will be hazardous to say more at this stage.

With best regards,
Yours sincerely,
G.B. Pant

Legal Aspects to the Issue / 93

The Hon’ble Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
Deputy Prime Minister

Government of India

New Delhi

NOTE 2

The following is the text of the agreement reached on 27 September 1989
at a meeting held in Lucknow convened by the Chief Minister of Uttar
Pradesh with representatives of the VHP in which the Union Home Minister
was also present. The agreement was signed by Shri Ashok Singhal, Shri
Dau Dyal Khanna, Mahant Avaidnath and Shri Nrityagopal Das.

A meeting was held in Lucknow by the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh on
27 September 1989 with the representatives of Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP) during which the Union Home Minister was also present.

In this meeting all aspects of the situation arising in the wake of VHP’s
programme to perform Shila Poojan in different parts of the country and
carry the ‘sanctified’ bricks to Ayodhya for laying the foundation-stone of
Rama Temple on 9 November 1989, were discussed.

Formulations

As a result of these discussions, the following were agreed:

a) The VHP will give prior intimation to the concemed District authorities
of the Shila Procession route and agree to change in routes in case the
District authorities so desire in public interest.

b) The VHP and its followers would not raise any provocative slogans which
may endanger communal harmony.

c) As far as possible the ‘sanctified’ bricks will be carried in trucks on the
routes determined before-hand in consultation with the concerned District
authorities.

d) Senior and responsible VHP functionaries would take the responsibility
of guiding the procession and will extend full cooperation to the District
authorities.

e) The spot in Ayodhya where the sanctified bricks will be collected, will
be decided in consultation with the District authorities.

f) The VHP undertakes to abide by the directive of the Lucknow Bench of
Allahabad High Court given on 14.8.1989 to the effect that the Parties to
the Suits shall maintain the status quo and shall not change the nature of
the property in question and ensure that the peace and communal harmony
are maintained.

Following representatives of VHP will cooperate/coordinate with UP
Government. .

94 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

1. Sh.Dau Dyal Khanna

2. Sh.Dixit, Ex-DGP (UP)

3, Sh.Onkar Bhave

4. Sh.Suresh Gupta, Ex-Vice-Chancellor
5. Sh.Mahesh Narain Singh, Ayodhya

Signed
Sh. Ashok Singhal
Sh. Mahant Avaidnath
Sh. Nrityagopal Das
Sh. Dan Dyal Khanna
(Statesman, 18 October 1990)

THE DISPUTED SHRINE AT AYODHYA

CHABUTRA

GATE
RAM

te >
es $s CHABUTRA ©

12- BHAGWAN MAIN
ENTRANCE

The above is a sketch of the disputed shrine at Ayodhya. The dispute is over the
Shaded area. The idols are placed under the central dome which was kept locked
in the past. Pujaris and other visitors used the gate to the right. Ram Chabutra
is a platform under a tree in the outer enclosure. To the right of the main entrance
is a tin shed the pujaris use as an office. Sita Ki Rasoi is a small platform to the
right. Singhdwar is not in use. The chabutra on the left is raised space. There are
several little idols in the outer enclosure where devotees make offerings. The main
entrance faces east.

Legal Aspects to the Issue 195

ENTRANCE GATE
MOSQUE TO MOSQUE PROPER

GATE GATE
RAM CHABUTRA

; LI

RAM JANMASTHAN ( | |
CHABUTRA th POOUARI’S OFFICE

MAIN ENTRANCE
TO THE COMPLEX

COMPOUND

East

A rough sketch of the mosque andthe Ram Chabutra in its compound. The idols
were placed on 22-23 December 1949 under the central dome of the mosque.

NOTE 3

Translation of the Agreement between the Shahildgah Trust and Sri Krishna
Janmasthan Seva Sangh, Mathura.

We, Shri Deodhar Shastri, U.P. Manstri Authorised by the Shri Krishna
Janamasthan Seva Sangh, Mathura, As First Party and Shri Shah Mir Malih
and Shri Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate, the Representative of the Shahi Masjid,
Idgah Trust, Mathura, As the Second Party.

Under the Trust’s Resolution No. 2 Dated 8.10.1968.

In order to settle the longstanding disputes between the Shri Krishna
Janamasthan Sangh and the Shahi Masjid Idgah Trust and the so-called
Ghosi tenants and licencees of the second party, we, under the suggestion
of the members of both Hindu and Muslim communities, have reached an
agreement, henceforth, to settle our bilateral disputes and avoid cases
against each other.

The following agreement agreed to by the Second Party i.e. Shahi Masjid
Idgah Trust has the permission of the Uttar Pradesh Central Wakf Board
vide their express letter no. 2876, 43 CIR dated 9.9.1968 and Shri Shah Mir
Malih and Shri Abdul Ghaffar, Advocate have been authorised to get the
Agreement implemented. Under their resolution No.2 in the meeting of
8.10.1968.

Similarly the first Party i.e. the Shri Krishna Janamasthan Seva Sangh
has also accepted the agreement at its meeting of 25.8.1968 and authorised
Shri Deodhar Shastri to get the Agreement implemented.

96 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Since the following agreement shall take some time for its full implemen-
tation we are therefore getting a written ‘Ikrarmama’ registered. Hence, we
the representatives of both the parties concerned, freely and after a full-
decision as well as by the Consensus of both the parties i.e. The Shri Krishna
Janamasthan Seva Sangh and the Shahi Masjid Idgah Trust, are getting the
‘Ikrarnama’ registered. Henceforth, we will have to abide by the following
agreement and it will be our duty to implement the agreement.

1. The Northern and Southern walls of Idgah’s ‘kuchchi kurshi’
shall be extended towards the eastern side, upto the Railway ladan.
The expenses shall be borne by the Masjid Trust.

2. Outside the northern and southern walls the area occupied by
Muslim ghosis shall be evacuated on behalf of the Trust and handed
over to the Janamsthan Seva Sangh. Thereafter, the Trust or the
ghosis shall not be entitled to claim the above-mentioned portion
of the land.

Similarly, the portion of land lying inside the nor.hern and southern walls
_ Shall be the Trust’s property. Hence there shall be no cjaim on this land on
the part of the Seva Sangh.

3. In the west-northern corner of Idgah kuchchi kursi a portion of
land is occupied by the Seva Sangh (shown in the map ABCD). The
Trust shall acquire the kuchchikursi and it shall become the Trust’s
property.

4. The controversial debris of the stairs on the southern side, for
which there are cases filed in the court, shall be cleared by the Trust
by 15 October, 1968. Thereafter the portion shall be the Seva
Sangh’s property.

5. The houses built by Muslim ghosis out of the northern and
southern walls under settlement with the Trust shall be evacuated
on behalf of the Trust and handed over to the Seva Sangh. Only
after the completion of evacuation, the Trust shall be entitled to get
the walls constructed.

The Trust, moreover, shall not open doors, windows, pinjars etc. nor any
water outlets (drains) in the proposed wall, towards the Seva Sangh. The
Seva Sangh too shall not do any such thing against the Idgah.

6. The outlets (parnalas) of Idgah flowing already westward of the
Janamasthan shall be removed and turned towards Idgah by piping.
The expenses shall be borne by the Seva Sangh. During the laying
of the pipe, a representative of the Janamasthan shall be present.
7. A portion of the railway land in front of Idgah’s northern and
southern walls which is going to be acquired by the Janamasthan
Seva Sangh, after acquiring the land, the Janamasthan Seva Sangh
shall transfer that portion to the Trust which falls inside the north
and south walls of the Idgah.

8. The portion of land in front of kuchchi kurshi towards the Eastern
side (shown in the map EFGHIJKL) and in the west-northern corner

Legal Aspects to the Issue | 97

(shown in the map ABCD) which is left by the Seva Sangh in favour
of the Trust is shown in oblique line in the map.

9. The cases against each other shall be withdrawn according to
the above agreement.

10. Both the parties shall have the right to appeal to the court for
having the agreement implemented if either party deviate from the
agreement.

Hence this agreement reached in writing by the consent of both the parties.
Date of writing: 12 October 1968

Boundary of Masjid Idgah Shahi
East—Railway line
West—Chabutra Janamasthan
North—Ground Janamasthan
South—Ground Janamasthan
banke katra, Keshaw—deve Mathura ton

Writer: Navnit Lal Sharma Shastri
Deodhar Shastri

Signature: Abdul Ghaffar: In English
Signature: Md. Shah Mir Malih

NOTE 4

Relevant extracts from the Ancient Monuments and Archaelogical Sites and
Remains Act 1958, (Act 24 of 1985)

Suggestions have been made that to resolve the Ayodhya Controversy, the
Babri Masjid complex may be cleclared a Protected Monument. Extracts
from Act 24 of 1958 under which an ancient monument can be so declared
follow:

Section 2 (a): Ancient monuments mean any structure, erection or monu-
ment. . . which is of historical, archaeological or artistic interest and which
has been in existence for not less than 100 years. . .

2 (j): ‘Protected monuments’ mean an ancient monument which is

declared to be of national importance by or under this Act. . . .
Section 4 (1): Where the Central Government is of the opinion that any
ancient monument. . . is of national importance, it may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, give two months’ notice of its intention to declare such
ancient monument. . . to be of national importance.

4(2): Any person interested in such ancient monument. .. may, within
two months, after the issue of the notification, object to the declaration. . .

4(3): On the expiry of the said period of 2 months, the Central Govern-
ment, may, after considering the objections, if any, received by it, declare
by notification in the Official Gazette, the ancient monument. . . to be of

98 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

national importance.

Section 5(1): The Director General may, with the sanction of the Cenaral
Government, purchase or take a lease of or accept a gift or bequest of any
protected monument.

5(6): Nothing in this section shall affect the use of any protected monu-
ment for customary religious observances.

Section 6(1): The Collector, when so directed by the Central Government,
shall propose to the owner of a protected monument to enter into an
agreement with the Central Government within a specified period for the
maintenance of the monument.

Section 13: If the Central Government apprehends that a protected
monument is in danger of being destroyed, injured, misused, or allowed to
fall into decay, it may acquire the protected monument under the provision
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as if the maintenance of the protected
monument were the public purpose within the meaning of that Act.

Section 16(1): A protected monument maintained by the Central Govern-
ment under this Act which is a place of worship or shrine shall not be used
for any purpose inconsistent with its character.

16(2): Where the Central Government has acquired a protected monu-
ment under Section 13 or where the Director-General has pur-
chased. . . under Section 5 and such monument or any part thereof is used
for religious pur pose or observances by any community, the Collector shall
make due provision for the protection of such monument or part thereof
from pollution or desecration—{a) by prohibiting the entry therein, except
in accordance with the conditions prescribed. . . of any person not entitled
so to enter by the religious usages of the community by which the monument
or part thereof is used; or (b) by taking such other action as he may think
necessary. ...

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes:
Inter-Community Relations in
Modern India

Mushirul Hasan

I shall tell the truth,O Brahmin, but take it not as an offence:
The idols in thy temple have decayed.
Thou hast learnt from these images to bear ill-will to thine own people.
And God has taught the (Muslim) preacher the ways of strife.
My heart was sick: I turned away both from the temple and the Ka’abah,
From the sermons of the preacher and from thy fairy tales, O Brahmin
To thee images of stone embody the divine—
For me, every particle of my country’s dust is a deity.
Come, let us remove all that causes estrangement
Let us reconcile those that have turned away from each other, remove all
signs of division.
Desolation has reigned for long in the habitation of my heart—
Come, let us build a new temple in our land.
Let our holy places be higher than any on the earth,
Let us raise its pinnacle till it touches the lapel of the sky;
Let us awake every morning to sing the sweetest songs;
And give all worshippers the wine of love to drink.
There is power, there is peace in the songs of devotees—
The salvation of all dwellers on the earth is love.
Mohammad Iqbal

The controversy over the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi issue has not
just aroused deep religious passions but has raised the fundamental issue
of how best to allow competing religious symbols to co-exist in a society
committed to the secular ideal. Admittedly, the pressing need is to resolve
conflicting claims over the mosque at Ayodhya. But, in the long run, all
concemed citizens will need to marshal their intellectual resources so as
to evolve a mechanism and, at the same time, define social codes for
resolving controversies of this nature. Otherwise, the initiative, as always,
will rest with those who manipulate both political institutions and proces-
ses to create and widen arenas of conflict.

It is not surprising that the flare-up, centred around the mosque in

100 i Anatomy of a Confrontation

Ayodhya, should cause such deep concern. After all, no other issue since
India’s independence has generated such violent passions, led to such
widespread riots” (see table), gripped the people with panic, fear and
anger, and threatened to destroy the democratic, secular consensus en-
visaged by the architects of the Indian Constitution. Sentiments have been
polarized to such an extent that two successive governments have fallen
in the course of just a year, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
succeeding in placing the mandir issue on the national agenda.” As the
Times of India commented on 17 October 1989, ‘Jettisoning once and for
all its mumbo-jumbo about Gandhian values, the BJP, under Mr L.K.
Advani’s spirited leadership, has gone on the offensive with a strategy
clearly designed to polarise life in the country along antagonistic religious
lines.’

State No. of Places No. of Deaths
Andhra Pradesh 4 27
Assam ] 7
Bihar 8 19
New Delhi = 8
Gujarat 26 99
Karnataka 22 88
Kerala 2 3
Madhya Pradesh 5 21
Maharashtra 3 4
Rajasthan , 13 $2
Tamil Nadu 1 6
Tripura l _
Uttar Pradesh 28 227
West Bengal 2 6
Total 116 567

Communal Riots from I September to 20 November 1990

This is not all. For the first time, religious zealots, bolstered by
politically articulate groups, found both a cause and an opportunity to
create a bond of fraternal unity among their divided and stratified con-
stituency. In the Shilanyas ceremonies, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), backed by the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
found a unifying symbol and a cementing bond which had, for centuries,
eluded Hindu reformers and preachers.* Through flamboyant demonstra-
tions of religious worship and through mindless retaliatory acts, these

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes / 101

groups have clearly succeeded in stoking the fires of communal unrest.

On the other side of the spectrum, members of the Babri Masjid Action
Committee (BMAC), acquired much political legitimacy and support.
Some of its members, having tasted success over the Shah Bano case,
began to make strident claims on behalf of theircommunity. They reached
out to the Muslim population, aired their long-standing grievances and
extracted concessions from political parties on the eve of the 1989 general
elections and their aftermath. Given their capacity to mobilize Muslim
opinion, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, it was neither possible nor
expedient to ignore the powerful Imam of the Shahi Jama Masjid in Delhi
or the renowned head of the prestigious Nadwat-al-ulama, a theological
seminary at Lucknow. They represented a Muslim consensus which had
been achieved only once in the history of Indian Islam, i.e., during the
Khilafat movement in the early 1920s.

Many contemporary aspects of the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi
dispute remain shrouded in mystery. For example, why was a district
judge in Ayodhya allowed to disturb the status quo and pass a verdict
which brought alive an issue that was dormant for nearly four decades
after independence? To court the so-called Hindu constituency? Or, to
mollify enraged feelings over the Government’s ‘surrender’ over the Shah
Bano case? Even if these explanations are seemingly valid, it is still not
clear why the VHP and their allies enjoyed the freedom to make political
capital out of the judgement and launch a massive countrywide agitation
which, in an extremely surcharged atmosphere, could only exacerbate
tensions among the rival contestants? It would appear that the ruling party,
already riven with dissensions over the handling of the Shilanyas
ceremonies, slowly but steadily lost the initiative to the VHP and was
unable to keep its leaders on a tightleash. Soon, the concern was not just
confined to Rama’s birthplace in Ayodhya. Amid the chanting of Vedic
hymns and the ringing of temple bells, a general clamour was raised fc
‘recovering’ other mosques, such as the ones in Varanasi and Mathura.
Today, such demands are being unabashedly voiced on public platforms
and expressed in ominous terms.” They are contested with equal vigour
and fervour by the hot-headed members of the BMAC and their
vociferous supporters.

It is not uncommon to find scapegoats in history—to place the blame on
the medieval Sultans of Delhi who defiled and destroyed temples—and
to attribute Muslim intransigence to the policies of the British Govern-

102 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

ment and its successor, the Congress party.° It is pointed out that the
colonial rulers courted the Muslims by granting them privileges and
special concessions in order to create their separate and distinct identity
in Indian politics. It is also argued that the Congress fared no better: it
succumbed to the pressures of the Muslim League in agreeing to the
partition of the country. After independence, the Congress leadership
continued to placate the Muslims and pandered to their ‘separatist’
sentiments forelectoral reasons. In this way, secularism has merely served
the interests of the minorities, especially the Muslims. The Hindus, on the
other hand, have been at the receiving end. While their co-religionists in
neighbouring Pakistan and Bangladesh have been relegated to the status
of second-class citizens, Indian Muslims have received more than their
due share. They have been allowed to retain their personal law, conduct
their proselytizing activities and preach and practise their religion without
inhibition.’ This was the essence of the BJP’s advertisements published
in the national newspapers from 30 October to 1 November 1991.

Such generalized and simplistic formulations are backed by perspec-
tives which dwell on the separateness and inherently contradictory nature
of the Hindu and Muslim traditions and their estrangement both in
colonial and pre-colonial days. Thus the contest over the Babri Masjid—
Ram janmabhumi issue is seen as part of arecurring theme of conflict and
tension in Indian history.

This is not the place to refute such ill-conceived theories. My main aim
is to highlight certain broad aspects of Hindu—Muslim relations during
the last decade of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth
centuries. In the final section, the focus of analysis is shifted from the
national and provincial arenas to Faizabad/Ayodhya—a district with a
long and chequered history. The attempt is to outline the broad contours
of local politics and to see if political linkages and socio-economic
relations were able to transcend religious cleavages. The Babri Masjid—
Ram janmabhumi issue is drawn in to illustrate, rather than to illuminate,
the more general argument of this essay.

Both as an ideology and as a movement, communalism derives ideologi-
cal sustenance from the view, which was popularized by Henry Elliot and
other colonial writers, that Islam and Hinduism, as indeed their followers,
co-existed uneasily in India and that religious conflicts rather than har-
monious living was the hallmark of the medieval Indian ethos. In fact, the
dominant images of the Muslim presence, nurtured by publicists and

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 103

major literary writers, were concerned with the degradation of the Hindus
through forcible conversions, imposition of the jaziya (tax levied on
non-Muslims to guarantee their safety and protection), strict application
of the shariat (Islamic Law) and the desecration of the places of worship.

Such distorted images do not portray the true and real nature of
medieval society: they merely serve to reinforce latter-day prejudices.
Admittedly, there existed a fragmented and differentiated form of
religious consciousness, which may have led the Sultans and their
ideologues to offend religious sensibilities. But religious solidarity was
not the basis of collective socio-economic experiences. The ideology of
the State, trimmed to suit the interests of the ruling elites, accommodated
religious concerns. Yet, it did not rest on the notion of a unified
‘community’, with identifiable interests, which forms the main pillar of
modern day “‘communalism’. Moreover, while there were stray, localized
and sporadic incidents of conflicts over religious symbols, the integrative
and syncretic forces were at work amongst the elites as well as the
common people. The dominant picture of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries is not of the Hindus and the Muslims forming exclusive and
antagonistic categories but of their cooperating in cultural life and social
affairs.

This scenario, however, underwent a change with the coming of the
British. For the first time, signs of Hindu—Muslim friction surfaced in
some areas and amongst certain groups. Now, the terms of dispute were
articulated differently. The language and vocabulary of discourse
changed. Muted expressions were replaced with angry exchanges. Mild
protests took the form of violent outbursts. The reasons for this were quite
numerous, ranging from the introduction of western-style institutions to
the emergence of religio-revivalist trends, stimulated by powerful socio-
religious reform movements in Bengal, Punjab and Maharashtra.

No summing up of late nineteenth century trends can be complete
without reference to the activities of the Arya Samaj, the spurt in cow-
protection activity and the vigorous campaign in support of the Nagri
Script and its use in government and law courts. These were not isolated
assertions of militant, religio-revivalist tendencies. They were manifesta-
tions of the new and burgeoning Hindu consciousness.

There were similar trends among the Muslims. The Greco-Turkish War
of 1897 stimulated pan-Islamic feelings. Islamization in Bengal and parts
of northern India, inspired by Shah Waliullah (1702-63) and his succes-
sors and bolstered by the Faraizis in Bengal, was an equally potent force.
Insistence on a revitalized consciousness and identity, with its cor-

104 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

responding denigration of Islam’s local roots, began to erode syncretistic
traditions and undermine religious peace and understanding. ! The mas-
sive communal rioting in 1893, preceded by sporadic but violent alterca-
tions, was a grim reminder to the nationalists that the fabric of
Hindu—Muslim unity was too fragile to withstand the onslaught of various
revitalization movements. ‘If the smouldering fire of religious enmity is
not put out,’ warned an observer, ‘it will before long be kindled into a
mighty flame and destroy the noble edifice which the Congress has built
with so much pains.’!

The prophecy did not come true. Though relations between certain
sections of Hindus and Muslims were sometimes strained, their deteriora-
tion was neither deep nor irreversible. ‘Nothing strikes the intelligent
traveller in India more forcibly,’ observed a senior police official in 1894,
‘than the friendly peacable attitude of all castes and classes towards each
other’.!> He was right. Friction between religious groups was not or-
dinarily a major source of disturbance in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. i During 1889-94, there was no violence in Bengal, except once
in Calcutta and its suburbs.

Such sporadic outbursts did not signify, as some writers are wont to
suggest, the fragmentation of society along communal lines. Intercam-
munity tensions and disputes were counterbalanced by the quiet, com-
monplace routines in which Hindus and Muslims intermingled without
notice or incident and they could still be found involved in a range of
‘religiously promiscuous’ practices. In 1909, the Jmperial Gazetteer of
India stated that it was the regular practice of ‘low-class Muhammadans’
to join in the Durga Puja and other Hindu festivals; it mentioned Muslim
consultation of Hindu almanacs, worship of Sithala and Manasa, use of
vermilion and joint offerings to village deities before the sowing or
transplanting of rice seedlings.! © Another i inspiring legitimation of the
more mundane expressions of peaceful co-existence came daily in the
sounds of Muslim shehnai players joining in the arti at Hindu temples,
including the arti of the Vishwanath temple in Benares. 17 Two America-
based scholars—Sandria Frietag and Nita Kumar—have recently shown
how in this holy city of the Hindus, Muslim weavers actively participated
in public ceremonials expressing a shared Benarasi culture, including ‘the
marriage of the Laut’ (Bhairava), Bharat Milap and the day-to-day obser-
vances related to particular figures and shrines.

Contemporary writings took note of cordial Hindu—Muslim relations
and projected the ongoing process of social and cultural fusion. The poet
Mohammad Iqbal (1876-1938) shared the vision of a united India-—one

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes / 105

that was free of both alien domination and inner dissensions. He called
his land of birth a garden where the people inhabiting it were members
of a gaum (nation), with the two circles of Islam and watan intersecting
and at several places coalescing into a coherent whole. Himala, the first
poem in Baang-i-Dara, was inspired by the beauty of his land of birth.
Hindustani Bachhon ka Qaumi Geet (National Anthem of Indian
Children) and the Tarana-i-Hindi (The Song of India) were refined,
buoyant and non-communal expressions of patriotic sentiments. In Naya
Shiwala (New Temple), Iqbal chided both Hindus and Muslims for their
narrow mentality and appealed to the keepers of the temple and the
mosque to foster mutual goodwill and understanding.

Akbar Allahabadi (1846-1921), a merciless satirist equipped with an
irrepressible sense of humour, had similar concerns. He subjected to
ridicule, to scathing criticism or damning exposure the social and political
Strategy of imperialism and Syed Ahmad Khan’s (1817-98) policy of
loyal cooperation with the Government. And, like Iqbal, he championed
Hindu—Muslim unity. Both Hindus and Muslims, he wrote, have to bear
the blows of those who wield the rod of worldly power, but they should
respond by being like water on which the blows of a rod have only a
momentary effect.

Iqbal and Akbar were stating the obvious. They recognized, as indeed
did the others, that the direction in which patronage, economic welfare
and authority flowed in everyday life indicated the continuing importance
of cross-communal networks.” Syed Ahmad Khan’s Aligarh project was
backed by the Hindus and Muslims alike. He encouraged, despite his
misgivings over the Nagri resolution of 1900 (which sparked off a
Hindi-Urdu controversy), a Hindu—Muslim entente in cultural and
religious matters. His contemporary, Ajudhia Nath Kunzru, owed his
fortunes as much to the wealthy Muslim landholders as to his extensive
banking and commission agencies.” In east UP and Avadh generally, the
dominant factor in the politics of the towns tended to be an Urdu-speaking
elite connection based on landed interests. Communal considerations did
not always foul the path of politics.

The competing units in early municipal politics, as in the case of
Faizabad, were multi-factions, not antagonistic groups. In the composi-
tion of early municipal factions, caste and communal considerations
played a secondary role to personal rivalries, family linkages and
economic ties. The lawyer, Maulvi Sirajul Islam, was elected from
Chittagong to the Bengal legislative council, largely on the strength of the
‘Hindu vote’. Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1925), on the other hand, was

106 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

backed by Muslims for a seat in the prestigious Calcutta Corporation.
Around the same time, a similar move was afoot in UP, where the
Congress backed Hamid Ali Khan for a seat in the council.

Nor did communal divisions last long after they had been politicized.
Soon after the violent eruptions in 1893, tempers began to cool
everywhere and there was much display of ‘mutual love and affection’ in
the riot-tom cities of UP.~" Public statements and newspaper editorials
on national unity and the commonality of Hindu-Muslim interests were
matched by strenuous efforts of local reconciliation committees to resolve
and defuse tensions.” When asked how the ‘upper classes’ of the two
communities behaved when the riots occurred, the Assistant Magistrate
of Gorakhpur replied:

By taking leading Hindus and Muslims into confidence,
matters are satisfactorily arranged. .. . In Aligarh, we left
the whole matter to leading Hindus and Mussalmans and
everything went off without hitch.

Such was the pattern everywhere, reinforcing the argument that, by the
end of the nineteenth century, there was no sign of the Hindus and the
Muslims going their separate ways. If anything, the lines of cleavages in
north India were more sharply drawn between the Shias and the Sunnis
rather than the Hindus and the Muslims.~’ Though expresséd in exag-
gerated terms, there is merit in the observations of W.S.Blunt and Henry
Cotton that the Hindu-Muslim animus was accentuated only after the
Government translated the principle of divide and rule into formal con-
Stitutional arrangements.

With the onset of the twentiethcentury, there was a tendency towards the
use of religious solidarity as a basis of political action. It started with the
Nagri resolution of April 1900 which created fissures among the profes-
sional classes in UP. The prospect of reforms and of a greater share in the
expanding administrative and bureaucratic machinery triggered off the
Shimla deputation and the establishment of the All India Muslim League
in December 1906, while widespread religio-revivalist movements aided
the mushrooming growth of Defence Leagues, Anjumans and Sabhas. The
Turko-Italian War of 1911 fanned pan-Islamic passions leading to intense
religious activity among Muslims.

Many of the controversies, both political and religious, subsided during
the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements when Mahatma Gandhi

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes / 107

was able to cement an extraordinary alliance between different segments
of Indian society.2” But not long afterwards, the edifice of inter-com-
munal unity, so passionately built by the Mahatma, began to crumble. The
Khilafat movement itself got bogged down in religious issues instead of
concentrating on the consolidation and integration of anti-colonial forces.
Consequently, a popular political movement, a gift of history. was a great
opportunity absurdly wasted.

Still, it would be wrong to either conclude that the gulf separating the
Hindus and Muslims was unbridgeable or that they were hopelessly
polarized after Gandhi had called off the Non-cooperation campaign in
February 1922. Most people, especially in the countryside, were unruffled
by communal controversies and continued to live, as they had done in the
past, in peace and harmony. This was so because bonds of socio-economic
interests, centuries of common experiences and shared memories were
strong enough to withstand the onslaught of religious fundamentalists and
political propagandists. The Governor of Bengal commented on how the
‘rank and file’ of the two major communities in his province cooperated
with each other in all ‘daily business of life’; it was ‘only at rare intervals,
when religious feelings become inflamed, that they treat each other as
enemies and clashes occur’. O.M. Martin, who served in the same
province from 1915 to 1926, made similar observations. Hindu—Muslim
unity, he added, was not a temporary occurrence but an old and cherished
tradition.

The pan-Islamic euphoria, which had caused so much excitement in
the subcontinent, did not take much time to disappear as the Turkish
nationalists began to rewrite their political agenda without a Khalifa/Sul-
tan. Faced with this reality, unpleasant though it was to committed
pan-Islamists, there was an unmistakable reordering of priorities.” From
then onwards, Islam was once more firmly rooted in the Indian subcon-
tinent and the interests of its followers were much more closely linked
with their country and their countrymen. That is why the udama, based at
the Deoband seminary in the Muzzaffamagar district of UP and connected
with the Jamiyat-al-ulama, emerged as powerful advocates of composite
nationalism and rejected the two-nation theory. Their arguments in
defence of their position was backed by the theological weight of Islam.

It is assumed that the perspective of the Deobandi ulama, with its
emphasis on composite nationhood, was rejected by large sections of the
Muslim community and that the creation of Pakistan was a testimony to
the validity of M.A. Jinnah’s two-nation theory.

These are questionable assumptions. The Muslim League’s success

108 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

neither vindicates nor legitimizes the ideological underpinnings of the
two-nation theory, for the birth of Pakistan in that summer of discontent
in August 1947 was neither imminent nor historically inevitable. It
symbolized, more than anything else, Jinnah’s personal triumph, his
answer to the obdurate Gandhi—-Nehru-—Patel leadership which had per-
sistently refused to treat him on equal terms or discuss the blueprint of a
free and united India. In the end, the creation of a new nation seemed more
of an aberration, a historical accident, caused by a complex configuration
of forces at a particular juncture. Sadly, Indian nationalists of all shades,
including the socialists and communists, failed to grasp this reality. As a
result, they bowed to the mounting pressure of the League and acquiesced
in India’s partition, though for different reasons.

This is not all. In the behind-the-scenes negotiations that took place
on the eve of the Independence and the Partition, nobody tried to
ascertain the views or the wishes of the people—both Hindus and
Muslims. The predictable collapse of the interim ministry and the fire
of violence in Bihar and Bengal, which so few tried to extinguish,
offered the Congress and League leaders the opportunity and an excuse
to hammer out the modalities of transferring power to two separate
nations. Lord Mountbatten, the impetuous representative of the Crown,
was anxious to hasten the process and preside over the liquidation of an
Empire which had lost its raison d’etre. Asking the people to sit in
judgement on an issue that was virtually settled during the prolonged
confabulations at the Viceregal Lodge was an act of deception, a
monumental fraud. Those privileged to vote in the 1946 elections did so
in an atmosphere vitiated by communal rancour and strife. The die was
cast and they could not, even if they wanted to, reverse a process that was
well underway. Never before in South-Asian history did so few decide
the fate of so many. And never before did so few ignore the wishes and
sentiments of so many in the subcontinent.

One final point. In the debates that preceded and followed the birth of
Pakistan, communal rivalries alone were projected as the stark Indian
reality. It is necessary to provide a corrective to this approach, for there
still existed, despite the trauma and agony that accompanied the vivisec-
tion of the country, large areas of Hindu—Muslim cooperation and tangible
expressions of cultural fusion and religious syncretism.

Most people, Hindus and Muslims alike, clung to their inherited ideas,
traditions and customs. This was so in the case of, for example, the Meos,
the Malkana Rajputs, the Khojas, Bohras and Memons in western India
and the Mappilas in Malabar.** Given their long, uninterrupted history of

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 109

social mingling and cultural fusion, it is hard to conceive of a different
scenario. Similar trends, syncretic and composite, were at work else-
where. Islam in Punjab provided a repertoire of concepts and styles in
authority which had served to encompass potentially competing values
including the values of tribal kinship, within a common Islamic idiom. 33
Islam in Bengal took many forms and assimilated values and symbols not
always in conformity with Koranic ideals and precepts. Cultural idioms
of Islam underwent arapid transformation, giving birth to a set of popular
beliefs and practices which, in essence, represented the popular culture
of rural Bengal rooted in the pre-Islamic past.” © Finally, Islam in South
India evolved a tradition of worship which was marked by a striking
capacity to accommodate itself to indigenous patterns of faith and wor-
ship. It gained a foothold in the region because of its capacity to forge
links with the religions and peoples of the wider society, to offer a form
of access to the divine which could be grasped and built upon through
means which were already present within these societies.

True, the rise of communal and ‘separatist’ politics diminished the
importance of certain religio-cultural symbols which had, in the past,
transcended caste and community distinctions. Yet, one could still find
Hindus observing Muharram—which marks the martyrdom of Prophet
Mohammad’s grandson and his seventy-two companions.» Thousands
continued to gather around shrines of the Sufis and other venerated men
and sought their intercession to avert calamities, cure diseases, procure
ehildisn for the childless, or even improve the circumstances of the
dead.’ Frederick Graham Cracknell, Magistrate and Collector of Etawah
and Kanpur, reported that the mela commemorating Shah Madaar, who
settled at Makanpur in Bilaur tahsil in the fifteenth century, was attended
by 50,000 people, mostly Hindus. Unmoved by a Hindu—Muslim fracas
in the area in 1931, Hindus and Muslims flocked to his shrine in equal
numbers. The pattern was largely the same elsewhere. 8 Even when
Hindu—Muslim relations had reached their lowest watermark in 1946-47,
Mohammad Mtujeeb, Vice Chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia, noticed in
the course of his travels:

I remember that shortly after the orgy of violence in Bihar
I visited the grave of a Sufi on the banks of the Ganges.
The Muslims living in the dargah had fled and the place
looked desolate. But soon a group of Hindu women ap-
peared. They performed circumambulations and prostra-
tions, as if nothing had happened that affected their

110 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

sentiments of veneration for the tomb of a Muslim saint.>”

The extent to which narrow religious barriers were transcended and
Strict codes of behaviour transgressed is evident from Bahraich in eastern
UP, where an outbreak of cholera in 1930 prompted Muslims to join the
Hindus in great force to worship the goddess Bhawani to induce her to
remove the pestilence.” In the Bengal countryside, pre-Islamic
ceremonies relating to birth, marriage and death continued to be observed.
AS a concession to the ‘reformist’ movements, the ‘outer labels’ were
discarded to make the rituals and practices look ‘Islamic’.*! The Census
of India report of 1921 summed up the situation as:

There are. .. communities among the Muslim population,
chiefly among converts from Hinduism, whose religious
ritual and exercises have a very strong tinge of Hinduism
and who retain caste and observe Hindu festivals and
ceremonies along with those of their religion. . . . The
rigidity of intolerance of view, which is a marked feature
of the religion of Islam in its purer form, does not extend
to the masses, who are quite willing to recognize and assist
the efforts of their neighbours to keep on peaceful terms
with the unknown powers.

It is not intended to portray an idyllic picture as such but to highlight
an aspect of contemporary Indian history which is largely unexplored on
account of stark and irrefutable evidence marshalled to detail the history
of Hindu—Muslim animosity. Harping on antagonisms alone and turning
a blind eye to areas of inter-community cooperation and fraternization,
has distorted perspectives. deepened prejudices and, as in the case of the
Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi issue, strained India’s fragile social
fabric. To discover the roots of religious conflicts and comment on its
intensity, even if one is thrown back into India’s colonial past, is a
legitimate historical exercise in so far as it does not offer a one-sided view.

Faizabad district in UP. once the capital of the Avadh Nawabs and an
important Musiim centre, mirrored national and provincial trends in large
measure. The Muslim population was relatively small—11.11 per cent in
1901. Most of them belonged to the weaving community, followed by the
Sheikhs who held considerable land in Mangalsi, Haveli, Avadh and
Khandansa, and the Syeds whose vast estates lay in Pirpur, Samanpur and
Bhadarsa. In fact, Faizabad was among those districts of UP where a large
proportion of land was held by Muslims. There were 2,051 separate

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 11]

estates at the beginning of 1905. Of these, 1,115 were owned by Rajputs,
366 by Brahmins and 286 by Muslims.

In general, Faizabad and its adjoining areas, including Ayodhya, was
not different from otherplaces in UP: it was equally affected by religious
and revivalist currents. The militancy of the cow-protection agitation,
which led to widespread rioting in 1893 in Azamgarh and the neighbour-
ing districts of Bihar, caused much excitement in Faizabad. Yet there was
no outbreak of violence. When the ‘cow-question’ surfaced in 1906 it was
amicably settled by local leaders. During 1910-12, however, the consen-
sus broke down largely in reaction to extensive cow-riots in certain areas
of eastern and western UP.”~ A ‘snowball plan’, based on the ‘heavenly
voice’ heard at Hanumangarhi in Ayodhya, was in circulation in Faizabad
district.” “ But its impact was blunted by alert district officials. Backed by
the UP Government, local and provincial leaders, including the Raja of
Mahmudabad (1889-1931), were able to soothe frayed tempers. By
September—October 1915, the Provincial Government, headed by James
Meston (1865-1943), evolved a compromise formula acceptable to
various contending groups.

Hindu—Muslim relations in Faizabad were only marginally soured by
the cow-protection movement and the great ‘communal’ debates, which
Started with Syed Ahmad Khan’s crusade against the Congress and
culminated in the Lahore Resolution of 1940. A major source of irritation
was the mosque at Ayodhya which was allegedly built on the site of an
ancient temple raised on the actual spot of Rama’s birth. Evidence on the
destruction of the temple is disputed. ~ Most historians at the Centre for
Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, point out that neither
Abul Faz], the sixteenth century author of Ain-i-Akbari, nor Tulsidas, a
celebrated devotee of Rama, mention the demolition of a temple at the
site of Rama’s birthplace. They conclude, ‘It is in the nineteenth century
that the story circulates and enters official records. These records were
then cited by others as valid historical evidence on the issue.”
H.R.Neville, who compiled the District Gazetteer of Fyzabad, recorded
a view that was widely shared by British civil servants. He observed:

The materials of the old structure were largely employed,
and many of the columns are in good preservation; they
are of close-grained black stone, called. . .basauti, and
carved with various devices. Their length is from seven to
eight feet, and the shape square at the base, centre and
capital, the rest being round or octagonal. The mosque has

112 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

two inscriptions, one on the outside and the other on the
pulpit; both are in Persian and bear the date 935 Hijri. Of
the authenticity of the inscription there can be no doubt,
but no record of (Babur’s) visit to Ajodhya is to be found
in the Musalman historians.

What is perhaps not in dispute is that Ayodhya was, well before the
sixteenth century, a centre of pilgrimage for the Buddhists, the Jains and
Hindus. It is known that Hindu worship remained possible in the com-
pound of the Babri mosque and the activities of the Brahmin pandas of
Ayodhya are recorded by the first European visitor to the place, William
Finch, between 1608 and 1611 ig When Ayodhya first became an impor-
tant pilgrimage centre in the eighteenth century it was as much due to the
activities of the Ramanandi sadhus as to the patronage of the Nawabi
court. The Diwan of Nawab Safdar jang, Raja Naval Rai, built andrepaired
several temples in Ayodhya, while Safdarjang himself gave land for
building a temple on what is known as Hanuman’s hill. Asaf-ud-daula’s
Diwan, Tikayat Ray, supported the building of the important temple-
fortress Hanumangarhi on this land. Peter Van Der Veer refers to docu-
ments which indicate that Muslim officials of the Nawabi court gave away
gifts for rituals performed by the pandas, ~ i.e., Hindu priests on the site
of pilgrimage centres.

Peter Van Der Veer also makes the important observation that when the
power of the Nawabs gradually eroded due to the influence of the British
in Avadh politics the peaceful o -existence of Hindus and Muslims in
Ayodhya came to be threatened.” > He, along with Michael H. Fisher and
J.R.1. Cole, have shown how the changes i in the configuration of forces
under Wajid Ali Shah deepened religious conflicts and, in 1833 and 1855,
nearly exploded into civil war.~~ Though the last Nawab of Avadh dealt
with the recalcitrant forces, headed by Amir Ali, he did not emerge
unscathed from the incident. His power and authority, already clipped by
the British, waned as the firebrand agitators chose the reckless course of
waging a holy war against each other. The British intervention in the Man-
dir—Masjid fracas was decisive. Its immediate effect was that an ambivalent
Nawab was goaded into taking action. At the same time, it sealed his fate and
gave the British an excuse to annex the kingdom of Avadh.

The confrontation in 1855 was serious, bitter and violent. But it did not
take long for the wounds to be healed. Apart from litigation between 1883
and 1886,> 4 the Mas jid—’Mandir dispute remained dormant until 1934
when a communal riot near Ayodhya, triggered off by cow-slaughter,

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 113

inflamed passions in the area. Again, between 1950 and 1984 there was
no movement to demand occupation of Rama’s birthplace, except for
legal actions destined to remain endlessly unfruitful.

There can beno doubt that the Ayodhya mosque was a powerful symbol
of communal mobilization in UP. Yet, it was not strong enough to polarize
sentiments to a degree where Hindus and Muslims in the province or in
the locality would be arrayed against each other. Even when religious
sentiments ran amok in the towns of UP from 1 February 1986 onwards,
Ayodhya remained unaffected by communal frenzy. ‘It is remarkable,’
reported a newspaper correspondent, ‘that while the controversy sur-
rounding the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi has aroused religious pas-
sions elsewhere, Ayodhya and its surrounding areas have been able to
maintain communal peace.’

This was not an uncommon feature in Ayodhya. For nearly a century,
most Hindus and Muslims in the area did not allow their daily lives to be
influenced by the Masjid—Mandir controversy. They conducted their
affairs and performed their usual chores without being swayed by
religious passions. Their political life was not moulded by religious
considerations alone. In the 1989 elections, for example, most people in
a predominantly ‘Hindu’ constituency voted for the candidates of the
Communist Party of India (CPI) who had stood for Hindu—Muslim amity
and opposed the communalization of Faizabad polity and society by
‘outside’ forces. In this way communal groups and parties were humbled
soon after the Shilanyas ceremony. This was an extraordinary develop-
ment, especially in the light of the factthat the then ruling party capitulated
on the occasion and legitimized the activities of the Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (VHP), the RSS and the Shiva Sena.

It was, however, not a surprising occurrence. Generally speaking,
political affairs in Faizabad were conducted on a supra-communal net-
work. Before independence, this process was aided by professional ties,
cultural links and common landed interests which bound the Urdu-speak-
ing elites and helped to create a strong and powerful composite cultural
tradition. More often, caste loyalties rather than religious affiliation
moulded public life. This is illustrated by the strong links between the
Kayasthas, who occupied one-quarter, and the Muslims, who held two-
fifths, of the municipal board seats in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.” Between 1905 and 1911, Muslims, in general, were attracted
to Balak Ram and his Kayastha party whose taluqdari links gave itaclass
dimension, a more cosmopolitan, cross-communal image.’ Until after
the first general elections in 1952, municipal bodies in Faizabad-cum-

114 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Ayodhya remained in control of the Kayastha party and its Muslim
allies.

In the late 1930s and 1940s, however, there were visible strains in such
cross-communal alliances. This was largely due to the failure of the
Congress to thwart the communal forces. It allowed the Muslim League
to wrest the initiative, as in the 1937 elections to the Faizabad—Sitapur—
Bahraich urban constituency, when the Congress did not press its claim
and literally surrendered the seat to the Muslim League. What happened
in the 1946 elections is a different story altogether. Like the rest of the
country, Faizabad district was communally polarized. Here, as elsewhere,
the success of the League candidates was a foregone conclusion.

In the aftermath of Independence and Partition, the Congress made no
effort to strengthen secular forces in Faizabad. On the contrary, it seized
on purely religious issues and exploited religious sensibilities to secure
electoral gains. Harold Gould has shown how the Faizabad district
became the focal point of a political showdown between Acharya
Narendra Deva, the fiery socialist leader, and his Congress rival Baba
Raghava Das. In the course of the by-election campaign in 1948, Pandit
Govind Ballabh Pant visited Ayodhya and declared that the Acharya did
not believe in the divinity of Rama as proven by the fact that he did not
wear the chhot, or tuft of hair at the back of the head, displayed by all
devout, genuine Hindus. Baba Raghava Das, for his part, moved among
his followers distributing tulsileaves to emphasize the spiritual difference
between him and his socialist adversary. Ayodhya voted overwhelmingly
for the Baba. This is how, concludes Gould, the ‘Ayodhya strategy’ had
worked to perfection.”

It is easy to establish the connection between this election campaign
and the event on the night of 22 and 23 December 1949 when an idol of
Rama suddenly appeared in the Babri mosque, which had been guarded
by a posse of policemen. Baba Raghava Das and his Congress patrons in
Lucknow not only revived but exploited the Masjid—Mandir issue which
had remained dormant for decades. They pressed into service the Bairagis
and the Mahants who, in subsequent years, were at the head of a vigorous
movement to ‘liberate’ the mosque at Ayodhya. In this way, the Congress
introduced a discordant note in an otherwise harmonious society of
Faizabad.

The ‘Ayodhya strategy’ was also used in a different context but with
similar results. In May 1986, the Rajiv Gandhi Government capitulated
to the strident clamourings of some Muslim groups by introducing the
retrograde Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill. The

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 115

motive was simple: the rising tide of anger over the Shah Bano verdict
had to be stemmed if the Congress was to retain its Muslim votes which,
in the wake of the momentous Supreme Court judgement, had tipped the
balance in favour of the opposition parties.“ At the same time, the
growing Hindu sentiment over the Ayodhya mosque, voiced by the VHP,
the Bajrang Dal, the Shiva Sena and the RSS, had to be assuaged. Rajiv
Gandhi’s former associate and ministerial colleague, whose own conduct
in the murky happenings on 1 February 1986 is not beyond reproach, is
reported to have stated the following:

Inearly 1986 the Muslim Women’s Bill was passed to play
the Muslim card; and then came the decision on Ayodhya
to play the Hindu card. It was supposed to be a package
deal. I knew it was a dangerous thing to do and I did not
agree. ... When I asked Mr Rajiv Gandhi who is showing
the worship in the disputed shrine at Ayodhya on Doordar-
shan two days after it was unlocked, he did not reply; he
merely smiled and observed it was tit for tat for the Muslim
Women’s Bill.°

The ‘Ayodhya strategy’ worked in 1948 but not in 1989. The Congress
gained a prestigious seat in a constituency then but was thrown out of
office in 1989. The goodwill of the Muslims, achieved in 1986 through
cynical means, was frittered away by areckless act. “The alienation of the
Muslims,’ commented a newspaper editorial, ‘will undoubtedly rank as
the most grievous lapse of the Rajiv Gandhi government.’ The paper
added:

In retrospect the laying of the foundation stone of the
Rama temple in Ayodhya on November 9 can be seen to
be a dangerous turning point in the history of independent
India. The seeds for a disintegration of the secular vision
ofthecountry were sown onthatday. History cannoteasily
pardon the Congress for its direct and indirect contribution
to the spectacular growth of Hindu chauvinist forces today
and for the tightening hold of the fundamentalists on the
Muslim community.

The use of the ‘Hindu card’ by a party that laid claims to the secular
legacy of Gandhi and Nehru proved counterproductive. The BJP rather
than the Congress was the beneficiary of an ill-conceived and ill-advised
electoral plan.” " Communal mobilization not only divides people but

116 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

often devours its own protagonists.

Competing symbols are supposed to cause friction and create
cleavages. Not so in Faizabad, where the people, with some exceptions,
have withstood the communal onslaught for well over a century. There is
much room for optimism that they will be able to weather the present
crisis, which has been deliberately created to serve short-term political
interests. The people of Faizabad have done so in the not so distant past.
There is no reason why they cannot do so now.

The real issue is not the future of the Babri mosque or of Rama’s
birthplace; in fact the seemingly endless debate among scholars over the
existence of a temple on the present site of the mosque or the actual
birthplace of Ramais of academic interest. The main concern of the people
of Faizabad and their brethren in other parts of the country must be to
create an ethos and a social order in which competing symbols can be
blended into a harmonious whole. Individuals and groups have quite
successfully done so in the past and there is no reason why it cannot be
done in our times.

In the ultimate analysis, India’s hope lies in areas like Faizabad where
shared memories and common historical experiences should slowly but
steadily swengthen bonds of unity and promote consensus and accom-
modation between different segments of society. > Even though strewn
with obstacles and difficulties, it is worth fighting for the realization of
such an ideal.

Notes

1. Mohammad Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims, George Allen and Unwin
Ltd.: London, 1967, p. 485.

2. The official count of the deaths due to communal riots in 1990 put the
number at 831. A report compiled by the Delhi unit of People’s Unit for
Democratic Rights (PUDR) lists 116 places where riots took place in the
wake of the rath-yatra. An agonized journalist commented, ‘The 831 or
1,662 or more deaths due to the mandir—masjid row were not due to material
causes, and the dead did not belong to an alien land. Think in the way poets
think, and you are hit by the indicting realization that Indians as a nation
are not growing, but diminishing. .. The only way we can grow, individual-
ly and nationally, is by struggling to stop this tandava nritya (devil’s dance)
of communal violence.’

Sudheendra Kulkarni, ‘India Brutalised’, Sunday Observer, New Delhi,
30 December 1990, Also, see editorial comments, ‘Bestiality in Bhagalpur’
Sunday Observer, 5 November 1989; ‘Stop the Carnage’; Times of India,
New Delhi, 17 October 1989; ‘Anguished India’; Times of India,; 31
October 1990.

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 117

3. Rajiv Gandhi conceded that ‘shilanyas played a crucial role in the
(Congress) debacle’ Times of India, 30 November 1989 and 15 December
1989 for analysis of the UP elections where seven of the nine Muslim
candidates elected to the Lok Sabha belonged to the Janata Dal. Also, Zafar
Agha, ‘UP Muslims Desert Congress-I’, ibid., 26 November 1989.

4. This view has found much support and is echoed in the writings of
leading journalists like Chandan Mitra, editor of the Sunday Observer, and
Swapan Dasgupta, assistant editor of the Times of India. Dasgupta has
argued that the fragmentation of India can only be arrested by creating
alternative focal points of national consolidation. For this reason, he backs
the ‘movement in Ayodhya’, pointing out that the defeat of the BJP
(Bharatiya Janata Party) on this issue ‘will, in one important sense only
aggravate the crisis of Indian nationalism’. ‘Nationalist Disarray: Renewed
Importance of Ayodhya’, Times of India, 10 September 1990. Also, ‘Journey
to Ayodhya: Hindu Nationalism Comes of Age’, ibid., 23 October 1989.
However, the views of Swapan Dasgupta have been effectively challenged
in the columns of the Times of India itself. For example, Arvind N. Das,
‘Pathology of Uncivil Society: Ritualism United Mandal—Mandir Moves’,
5 October 1990; Praful Bidwai, ‘BJP in a Clef Stick: Yatra’s Success is a
Liability’, 12 October 1990; Harish Khare, ‘Sparring with Communalism:
Why Sadhus are Setting National Agenda’, 20 October 1990; H.M. Seervai,
‘NF-BJP Divorce: Hinduism Not Above the Constitution’, 2 November
1990.

5. The Jagatguru Shankaracharya of Dwarka Peeth announced that ‘as long
as the three sacred places, which the Muslims had destroyed to build
mosques, are not restored to the Hindus, no peace or communal harmony
is possible’. Times of India, New Delhi, 9 September 1990.

L.K.Advani, President of the BJP, and his colleagues have also made
similar statements. While announcing his plan of undertaking the rath-yatra
from the Somnath temple to Ayodhya, the BJP President declared, ‘So far
as the question of the birthplace of Lord Ram in Ayodhya and Lord Krishna
in Mathura and the Kashi Vishwanath temple is concerned, the Hindu
community cannot compromise.’ ibid., 13 September 1990.

6. See the collection of essays in Hindu Temples: What Happened to Them,
Delhi, 1990.

7. Balraj Madhok, ‘Persecuted or Pampered’, /Ilustrated Weekly of India,
9 January 1983. The thrust of this article is that Indian Muslims ‘have no
legal or moral claim or right on (sic) this country’.

8. Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885-
1930, Manohar: Delhi, 1991, ch. 8.

9. Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court 1707-1740,
People’s Publishing House: Delhi, 1972, pp. 261-66.

10. John R. McLane, /ndian Nationalism and the Early Congress, Prin-
ceton University Press: New Jersey, 1977, pp. 271~331 (for an insightful
account of the cow-protection movement). See Francis Robinson,
Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’
Muslims, 1860-1923, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1974, pp.

118 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

66-78, for a sensitive analysis of revivalist tendencies, including the

development of the Hindi-Urdu conflict and the campaign for Hindi.

11. Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal, Princeton

University Press: New Jersey, 1983, p. 251; and Rafiuddin Ahmad, Bengal

Muslims, 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity , Oxford University Press: New
Delhi, 1981, p. 184.

12. Al Waqt, Gorakhpur, 21/26 February 1894, Selections from Native

Newspapers, UP.

13. T.C. Arthur, Reminiscences of an Indian Police Official, London, 1894,

p. 145. Both British and Indian witnesses before the Public Service Com-

mission testified to the harmonious relations between the Hindus and

Muslims and took note of the cross-communal links. See Public Service

Commission, NWP & O Sub-Commission, Calcutta, 1888, pp. 15, 23, 26.

14. McLane, op. cit., p. 318.

1S. Rajat Kanta Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal

1875~1927, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1984, p. 121. The Com-

missioner of Dacca noted the ‘extraordinary fact’ that in five years ‘not a

single riot of any description should have occurred’.

16. Imperial Gazetteer of India, pp. 48-9.

17. Judy F. Pugh, ‘Divination and Ideology in the Banaras Muslim

Community’, K.P. Ewing (ed.), Shariat and Ambiquity in SouthAsianIslam,

Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1988, p. 289.

18. Sandria B. Frietag (ed.), Culture and Power in Banaras: Community,

Performance, and Environment, 1800-1980, Oxford University Press:

New Delhi, 1989, pp. 13-14, 168-69.

19. See the collection of essays in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Iqbal: Poet-

Philosopher of Pakistan, Columbia University Press, 1971.

20. Ralph Russell and Khurshidul Islam, ‘The Satirical Verse of Akbar

Allahabadi (1846-1921)’, Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge, 1974, vol. 8,

1, pp. 44-6.

21. Notice the comment on Benares: ‘It should be explained that in Benaras

the Mahomedan population is nearly entirely dependent upon the Hindus.

With the exception of a few members of the old Mahomedan aristocracy,

who are now in straitened circumstances, the entire community lives a hand

to mouth existence. .. The weavers are without exception dependent on the

goodwill of their Hindu employers. The two communities are therefore

closely bound to each other by economic ties.’ Quoted in Sandria B. Frietag,

Culture and Power in Banaras, p. 13. Nita Kumar has argued that what

seems more influential in promoting harmony is the fact that Hindus and

Muslims of ‘lower classes’ share a similar lifestyle and ideology of work,

leisure and public activity. ‘Work and Leisure in the Formation of Identity:

Muslim Weavers in a Hindu City’, in Frietag, op.cit., p. 169.

22. Henry Sender, The Kashmiri Pandits: A Study of Cultural Choice in

North India, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1988, p. 244.

23. Robinson, Separatism, p. 79.

24. Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics, p. 50.

25. ibid., pp. 50-1.

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes | 119

26, Public Service Commission, NWP & O, Evidence, p. 158.

27. Mushirul Hasan, ‘Sectarianism in Indian Islam: The Shia--Sunni Divide
in the United Provinces’, The Indian Ecanomic and SocialHistory Review,
vol. 27, no. 2, April-June 1990,

28. Henry Cotton, /ndia and Home Memoirs, London, 1911; W.S. Blunt,
India Under Ripon: A Private Diary, London, 1909, p. 94.

29. See the collection of essays in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), Communal and
Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, Manohar: New Delhi, 1985.

30. Earl of Lytton, Pundits and Elephants: Being the Experiences of Five
Years as Governor of an Indian Province, London, 1942, p. 172; ‘Memoirs
of O.M. Martin’ (Typescript), Centre for South Asian Studies, Cambridge.
31. Mushirul Hasan, A Nationalist Conscience: M.A. Ansari, the Congress
and the Raj, Manohar: New Delhi, 1987, ch. 6.

32. Mujeeb, /ndian Muslims, pp. 10-20; and the collection of essays in
Imtiaz Ahmad (ed.), Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims,
Manohar: New Delhi, 1984.

33. David Gilmartin, ‘Customary Law and Shariat in Punjab’, in Ewing
(ed.), op cit., p. 44.

34. Rafiuddin Ahmad, ‘Conflicts and Contradictions in Bengali Islam:
Problems of Change and Adjustment’, ibid., p. 115.

35. Susan Bayly, Saints, Goddesses and Kings: Muslims and Christians in
South Indian Society 1700-1900, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
1990, pp 13-14.

36. Census of India, 1931, UP of Agra and Awadh, vol. 1, Appendix E, p.
515.

37. See, for example, P.M. Currie, The Shrine and Cult of Muin-al-din
Chishti of Ajmer, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1989.

38. Cracknell Papers, Centre for South-Asian Studies, Cambridge.

39. ‘The Partition of India in Retrospect’, C.H. Philips and D.A. Wainright
(eds.), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, George Allen and
Unwin Ltd.: London, 1970, p. 407.

40. Census of India, 1931, p. 515.

41. Rafiuddin Ahmad, op.cit., p. 134.

42. Census of India, 1921, vol. 1, p. 115.

43. Home (Political), B, File No. 109-14, April 1913, National Archives
of India (NAIJ), Delhi.

44. Home (Political), A, File No. 14, December 1913, NAT.

45. Home (Political), A, File No. 258-259, October 1915, NAI.

46. R.S. Sharma, Communal History and Rama's Ayodhya, People’s
Publishing House: Delhi, 1990. Andthecollection of articles in Asghar Ali
Engineer (ed.), Babri-Masjid—Ramjanmabhoomi Controversy, Delhi,
1990.

47. The document was generally appreciated. ‘All those,’ wrote a leading
journalist, ‘who have given up neither their belief in secularism nor the hope
that Indians will one day stop killing one another should be grateful to
Professors S. Gopal, Romila Thapar, Bipan Chandra and other historians of
Jawaharlal Nehru University’. Praful Bidwai, ‘Appeasing Hindu Bigotry’,

120 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Times of India, 20 November 1989. But there was adverse criticism as well,
much of which, quite predictably, came fromthe ideologues of the BJP and
the RSS. The debate was conducted in the letters to the editor column of
the Times of India (15,21,23 December 1989) as well as in the /ndian
Express. Within the Centre for Historial Studies, Majid H. Siddiqi alone
struck a discordant note with the view that ‘it is not for historians to “prove”
or “disprove” as right or wrong every instance of an assertion made by a
political or cultural group as social winds blow this way or that’. Siddiqi,
who was not a signatory to the document, concluded with the exhortation:
‘Historians must discard their personae as historians if they are to intervene
in the dispute without at the same time endangering the very basis of their
intellectual stand. They must exhibit intellectual self-confidence in their
discipline and determine their own agenda in terms of their own questions
and not allow the existence of communalism in this society. . . to force its
agenda upon them.’ ‘Ramjanmabhoomi-—Babri Masjid Dispute: The Ques-
tion of History’, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 13 January 1990.
48. District Gazetteer of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh,
Fyzabad, vol. XLIII, Allahabad, 1905, pp. 173-74.

49. Peter Van Deer Veer, ‘God must be Liberated! A Hindu Liberation
Movement in Ayodhya’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, Cambridge,
1987, p. 287.

50. For their importance in Ayodhya, see Peter Van Deer Veer, “The
Concept of the Ideal Brahmin as an Ideological Construct’, Gunter D.
Southeimer and Herman Kulke (eds.), Hinduism Reconsidered, Manohar:
Delhi, 1989, pp. 71-7.

51. Peter Van Deer Veer, ‘God must be Liberated’, p. 288.

52. ibid.

53. Michael H. Fisher, A Clash of Two Cultures: Awadh, the British and
the Mughals, Manohar: Delhi, 1987, pp. 228-36; J.R.I. Cole, Roots of
North Indian Shiism: Religion and State in Awadh, 1772-1859 , Oxford
University Press: New Delhi, 1989, pp. 244-49.

54. S.K. Tripati, ‘One Hundred Years of Litigation’, in Engineer (ed.),
op.cit., pp. 15-27.

56. Kuldip Kumar, ‘Ayodhya Ready for Compromise’, ibid., p. 106.
Likewise, several neighbouring areas, such as Akbarpur in Sultanpur dis-
trict, remained undisturbed. Suneet Chopra, ‘Akbarpur: An Island of Com-
munal Unity’, Times of India, New Delhi, 3 November 1989.

56. Robinson, Separatism, p. 64.

57. Harold A. Gould, Politics and Caste, vol. 3, Chanakya: Delhi, 1990,
p. 49.

58. ibid., pp. 48-49.

59. ibid., pp. 76-77.

60. See Zoya Hasan, ‘Minority Identity, Muslim Women Bill Campaign
and the Political Process’, Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 7
January 1989.

61. See Mushirul Hasan, ‘Indian Muslims Since Independence: In Search
of Integration and Identity’, Third World Quarterly, London, vol. 10, no. 2,

Competing Symbols and Shared Codes / 121

April 1988.

62. ArunNehru quoted in A.B. Noorani, ‘The Babri Masjid—Ramjanamab-
hoomi Question’, in Engineer (ed.), p. 57.

63. Times of India, New Delhi, 28 November 1989.

64. Harish Khare, ‘Rise of the BJP: Reemergence of the Right’, Times of
India, New Delhi, 6 December 1989. Notice that in Maharashtra the
BJP-Shiva Sena won fourteen seats and emerged as the only credible
opposition to the Congress. Sunday Observer, New Delhi, 3 December
1989.

65. I agree with R.S. Sharma that ‘patient and sustained efforts of right
thinking writers, researchers and educators can foil the communalist at-
tempt to use the past as a wedge to divide the people into warring camps’.
‘Communal History and Rama’s Ayodhya’, op.cit., p. 32.

Myth, History and the
Politics of Ramjanmabhumi’

Neeladri Bhattacharya

Crucial to the controversy over Ramjanmabhumi are differing notions of
myth and history and their relation to social practices. Historians have
shown that the claims of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) are based on
questionable historical evidence.” The historicity of present-day Ayodhya
is debatable, no historical record notes the exact spot of Rama’s birth, nor
is there any evidence that the Babri Masjid was built on the ruins of a
Rama temple.

Yet this critique of the VHP claims may not convince many. And the
sceptics are not all Hindu zealots, ardent supporters of the VHP. Popular
conceptions of the past are often informed and structured by myths. In
these conceptions, myths are true histories; desacralized, demythicized
histories based on historical records are false.

Wecannotdismiss suchmyths. We cannot counterpoise history to myth
as truth to falsehood. These are different modes of knowledge, varying
ways of understanding the world, ordering one’s life and defining one’s
actions. If myths convince people, we must understand why they do so.
If fabulous stories circulate and light up the popular imagination, we
cannot merely demonstrate the fabulous character of such stories; we must
know why they circulate, why they play on popular imagination.

The facts, the events, and the social actors referred to in myths often
have no ‘real’ historical existence. Yet myths do refer to reality. They talk
about the world symbolically, metaphorically. The effort to read tradition-
al myths to discover the historicity of events may not be too meaningful.
But they reveal a lot about the mind of those who produced those myths,
the values of the society which believed in the myths. Since myths are
constituted and reconstituted within society through social processes,
different versions of the same myth exist. The meaning of each version is
different: the symbolic representations of good and evil differ, the same
characters embody different qualities. By comparing the different ver-

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 123

sions, by analysing the alterations and reinterpretations within them, we
can understand the societies which sustained those versions, and the
function that a myth played in a particular society.

Reinterpretations are often contestations. Within a traditional society,
which is ordered through myths, social reordering occurs through a
questioning of the dominant myths. Existing myths are not always dis-
missed—their internal structure is changed. The different layers of mean-
ing in each myth allow a range of possible appropriations. Old myths are
sedimented with new meanings, counter-myths are produced, and the
hierarchy of values reflected in the myths are altered. All this occurs
within the structure of mythic discourse, not outside it. Reinterpretations
are not always recognized as such. Myths and counter-myths can reach
out only when they share with the audience a repertoire of what is familiar.
Structured within the archetypal mythical narratives and hidden behind
familiar stories and characters, innovations have asurreptitious existence.
Through this familiarization the mythical narrative wins the confidence
of the audience and weaves in new stories into the text. Once the audience
identifies with some of the stories, they are persuaded by the narrative; ~
all the stories appear plausible, believable. A myth is thus transformed
through the introduction of new ideas, new values, new stories; it no
longer expresses and reconfimms the values of the people, it modifies
them.

The process of. mythification has to be understood. We need to study
the relation between the production of the modem political myths and the
social and political practices within which this takes place—which in turn
the myths seek to sanction. By demonstrating the constituted character of
myths, we can question the effort to present them as ‘eternal’ and unchang-
ing, and we can contest the sanction which politics seeks from them.

The Rhetoric of History

The VHP claims about the Ramjanmasthan, however, are not sustained
by references to myths and beliefs alone. Integral to their whole argument
is the rhetoric of history. Myths and stories about the Janmasthan are
persistently presented as ‘history’ whose facts could be established
through historical records and evidence.

In the debate over the issue, conviction in history and the sanctity of
historical evidence has been repeatedly emphasized by the BJP and the
VHP:

124 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

The facts of history appear fiction only to a person suffer-
ing from Historologia and not to a balanced mind who is
not afraid of any unpalatable fact whether it is for or
against.

Facts of history cannot be wished away; they must be
realised and imbibed, instead of closing eyes to them.

The popular accounts about the Janmasthan, which would appear
incredible to most historians, claim to be ‘true histories’. ‘In this book
historical facts have been presented exactly as they were’ says the preface
to a booklet which becourits an imaginary story of Ayodhya through the
voice of river Saryu.* Other accounts like Sri Ramjanmabhumi ka Rak-
taranjit Itihas by Ramgopal Pandey and Ayodhya ka Prachin Itihas by
Acharya Gudunji Sharma may violate all canons of the historian’s craft,
but are stated to be ‘authoritative history’.

Sri Ramajanmabhumi Mukti Yagya Samiti has collated its own version
of historical and archaeological evidence, and Justice Deoki Nandan
has produced an influential historical pamphlet for this Samiti.© The
Organiser, which has been relentlessly campaigning for the construction
of a Rama temple in Ayodhya, has published, on several occasions, what
it claims to be vaurnenuic! historical facts about the Ramjanmabhumi and
the Babri Mas jid.?

Thus in both the propaganda pamphlets and popular ‘histories’, there
is a recurrent reference to ‘true history’ and ‘authentic account’. History
is called upon as a witness to the events recounted. ‘/tihas sakshi hai’, is
a phrase often used. ‘History speaks’ ,® we are told, in support of the
account produced by the VHP; as if we need only listen to this voice of
history to know the truth.

These accounts seemingly conform to the eiactice of historians; they
quote historical records. Here the procedure of citation is considered more
important than the nature of records cited; when necessary records are
imagined into existence, they are concocted. It is easy to demonstrate that
many of the records referred to do not exist. Yet the fact that citations are
seen as essential to justify claims to truth is significant.

. These narratives appeal to two distinct audiences. On the one hand they
appeal to those who will be persuaded by the validity of mythical truth
and will allow myths and beliefs to be the basis of action; on the other
they appeal to those who would doubt the basis of myths, seek a different
form of historical knowledge and argue for a different order of democratic
practice. So these narratives seek the sanction of myths and beliefs on the

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi / 125

onehandand ‘history’ onthe other. It is a strategy necessary in the modern
age when all types of minds have to be united.

What characterizes this mode of argument, therefore, is an ambivalent -
and sceptical attitude towards myths, beliefs and history. The persistent
reference to ‘true’ history shows a lack of conviction in the power of myths
and beliefs in legitimating action, and in their claims to truth. But when
the authenticity of historical facts cited in these texts are criticized, then
legitimacy for action is sought in myths and beliefs.” When there was a
proposal to set up a historians’ committee to investigate the history of
Babri Masjid to help the Court in its decision, the Organiser reacted
typically, ‘With the Hindus it is a matter of faith that Bhagwan Rama was
born where the Babri Mosque is. No government or court can sit on
judgment over it.’ 10 When the historians of the Jawaharlal Nehru Univer-
sity produced a critique of the VHP claims, K.R. Malkani, a VHP
historian, again fell back on the same argument. If indeed ‘history’ and
myth were no different, then why does the VHP use the language of the
historian’s discourse?

If reference to historical documents are so important in the campaign
for the Ramjanmabhumi, then adebate over the authenticity of the records
and the evidence contained within them is essential.!! This has been
attempted elsewhere.!? But we also need to go beyond this debate over
‘historical’ evidence to understand the meaning and structure of the myths
and stories which circulate at a popular level, as well as the political
context within which they are structured.

The Politics of Ramjanmabhumi

The battle for the Ramjanmabhumi is part of a wider political struggle for
aconstitution of ‘Hindu’ consciousness and identity, for the construction
of a unified Hindu tradition, and for the assertion of ‘Hindu’ power over
all the other communities in India. The VHP activities acquire their
meaning within this broader context.

One major objective of the VHP is to forge a national and international
unity amongst all those it defines as Hindu."~ Hindus, they feel, have been
fragmented and divided into groups and castes—in conflict with each
other. This weakness has allowed foreigners to invade and rule over India,
and the minority communities to become defiant. To reassert their power,
the Hindus have to. become conscious of their underlying common iden-
tity, rediscover and forge the unity which lies submerged. It is essential
for all Hindus to realize that ‘they respond to the same historical

126 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

memories. Their hearts beat to the same spiritual tune. They are bound by
the same ties of blood’.!4

This project of forming a Hindu Community, united at the national and
international levels, marks a major effort at restructuring religious tradi-
tions within India. The diversity and differences within religious tradi-
tions, considered by religious reformers a sign of the strength and vitality
of tradition, now acquires anew meaning: it becomes a sign of weakness
of the community. To overcome the weakness the Hindus must unite, they
must act together, they must speak with one voice.!>

But to what purpose?

All forms of unity are not the same. Their objectives may differ, the
basis on which they are forged may vary. So it is important to understand
the politics of unification.

Unification is essential, according to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and the VHP, not merely to bring the Hindus together, but to arouse
them—to awaken the Hindu spirit. The struggle forthe Ramjanmabhumi
has an important part to play in this process. “The present agitation to
liberate the Sri Rama Janmabhumi,’ we are told, ‘is no less than a battle
for national self assertion.’ It is, in fact, ‘nothing short of a phase of
struggle for the liberation of the National Soul’.”” Rajmata Scindia has
repeatedly defined the politics behind the struggle for the Ramjanmab-
humi, ‘Our target is jagriti, awakening and unity among Hindus.’!7
Hindus have to come out of their stupor, overcome their inertia, and regain
their swabhiman (self-respect). They need.to rise and act.

This is not a movement for an awakening of the ‘old’ Hindu spirit. It
seeks toredefine the spirit of Hinduism and the identity of a ‘good’ Hindu.
Underlying the plea for self-assertion is a specific notion of self and an
effort to develop an authoritarian Hindu personality.

The need for aggression is a theme which recurs insistently in the
speeches and writings of the VHP and the BJP. 18 it is powerfully ex-
pressed in a polemic against secularism which first appeared in the pages
of the Organiser and was then reprinted in a pamphlet for popular
circulation.!? The author, speaking through the voice of an ‘Angry
Hindu’, attempts to explain the reasons and justifications for the Hindu
anger:

Yes, certainly I am angry. And I have every reason to be
angry. And it is also right for me to be so. Otherwise I
would be no man.

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 127

Yes for too long I have suffered affronts in silence. For
ever so long I have been at the receiving end. .. My people
have been kidnapped by the hostiles. My numbers have
dwindled. . . my adored motherland has been torn
asunder. . .

And still you tell me I should not get angry? That I should
not stand up and shout ‘enough’?

My temples have been desecrated, destroyed. Their sacred
stones are being trampled under the aggressor’s feet. My
gods are crying. They are demanding. . .reinstatement in
all their original glory. When I speak out my agony, you
of the secular tribe condemn me as a threat to our ‘secular
peace’. You add insult to my injury. You rub salt into my
wounded heart. ...

For you, our national life minus every bit of Hindu is
secularism. In short, you want me to cease to be myself.

Should I, tell me frankly, continue to sit silent in face of
all such indignities and exploitations? And do you dare to
tell me thatI have no right to be angry? Even a worm turns,
they say. Do you think I am worse than a worm?

You have derided me as an ‘Angry Hindu’. On the con-
trary, I take it as a compliment. For so long—for too
long—I was lost in a deep coma. I saw nothing, I heard
nothing, felt nothing—even when my motherland was cut
off. But all such incessant blows have at last awakened me.
Now I have begun to see, I have begun to hear, I have
begun to understand, and I have begun to feel—what
tragedies have overtaken me. ... Hereafter I will sleep no
more. I will not remain dumb; I will speak out. I will not
remain inert; I will begin to act. I will not run away from
challenges; I will face them. . .

I now realise I had been too good for this world of ‘hard
reality’. I believed that others would respect my gods and
temples as I respected other’s. . . I believed generosity
begets generosity. . . . But alas, again and again I was
deceived. I was betrayed, I was stabbed in the back. ...
My goodness has been turned upon me. I know now a bit

128 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

of the ways of the world. And I have decided to speak to
others in the language they understand. . .

And finally, I have come to know the value of my anger
itself.

Patience, tolerance, generosity are first claimed as innate qualities of
the Hindus—virtues which differentiate them from others. Then the same
qualities are identified as signs of weakness, the basis of inertia, apathy
and passivity, the cause of all their present problems. To face contem-
porary challenges, new values had to be developed. The value of aggres-
sion and anger had to be realized.

This framework of discourse idealizes masculinity—a specific form of
masculinity. Anger and aggression are identified as the qualities of
manhood, tolerance and patience are feminine. Manliness symbolizes
strength and feminity is a sign of weakness. To overcome their weakness
Hindus had to give up their feminity and assert their masculinity.

Beyond anger and aggression, is the politics of vengeance and retribu-
tion. Other communities, it is argued, have subjected the Hindus to
innumerable indignities and oppressions in the past. The Hindus have
foolishly and silently tolerated all this for too long. Now is the time to
avenge past injustice: ‘For centuries the injustice to the Hindu community
by Babur’s hordes cannot be allowed to perpetuate.’

The struggle for Ramjanmabhumi is fed by this ideology of retribution.
The logic is simple: if Muslim rulers inflicted their tyranny on Hindus,
all Muslims today have to bear the burden of this guilt. It is as if the guilt
of an individual can be transferred to the entire community to which the
individual belongs, and as if guilt is passed down the generations over
centuries. If Hindu temples have been destroyed in the past, mosques will
be destroyed today.

This is a demand for a re-enactment of medieval politics. Since sacred
and temporal authority was closely connected in the past, religious
institutions were also symbols of political power. Conquerors often
asserted their power by destroying sacred places. This medieval logic is
at work behind the struggle for the Ramjanmabhumi. Mosques, like the
Babri Masjid, are seen as symbols of Hindu subjection; and their destruc-
tion, a necessary part of the liberation movement of the Hindus.

Destruction is not always the inevitable logic of this politics. Institu-
tions and buildings can be appropriated without being destroyed. The
Strategy here is to deny creativity to the Muslims. Muslims only pillage,
not create, ‘Islam only destroyed. It never built anything on its own. It

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 129

captured temples and palaces and advertised them as mosques and
tombs.’22 P.N. Oak has not tired of arguing that Fatehpur Sikri, Buland
Darwaza, Taj Mahal were all built by Rajputs.2> The claim that the Babri
Masjid is a Hindu temple is nothing unique.

The new Hindu spirit requires its own popular imagery and symbolic
representation. Traditionally, Rama was represented as powerful but
restrained; he is Maryada Purushottam (Supreme Man) but tenderhearted.
This image of Rama is being transformed into that of an aggressive,
masculine, warrior God. Yet, in the present context, Ramacannot provide
the symbol of desired aggressive values. Popular communal literature
often represents Shiva as the personification of the new ideals. The
imagery of death, destruction and fiery anger, and its association with
Shankar and Chandi, is emphatically expressed in the followed passage
from a poem which attempts to define the identity of a Hindu:

Hindu tan-man, hindu jeevan, rag-rag hindu mera
parichay

Main shankar ka wah krodhanal, kar sakta jagti kshar-
kshar

Main damru ki pralaydhwani hun jismain nachta
bheeshan sanhar

Ranachandi ki atripta pyas, main durga ka unmatta has,
Main yam ki pralayankar pukar, jalte marghat ka
dhuandhar

Phir antartam ki jwala se jagti me ag laga dun main,
Yadi dhadhak uthe jal-thal-ambar-jar-chetan phir kaisa
vismay?

Hindu tan-man Hindu jeevan, rag-rag Hindu mera
parichay.

Here we have a specific interpretation of Shiva. Within Indian tradition
Shiva has more than one image. According to one tradition, Shiva, like
many other deities, embodies the tension between the opposing principles
of chaos and order, of asat and sat, of violence and creation. The Shaivas
in South India erased the violent and destructive side and presented god
as nirmala—one without taint. Now there is an opposing effort: to idealize
the violent and destructive principle. The attributes which are celebrated
in the present political context are discovered in and sanctified through
the divine figure of Shiva.

If Shiva expresses the new militant, aggressive spirit of Hindutva,
Rama is projected as the symbol of the Hindu unity. Here again the

130 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

symbolism of Rama is being subjected to a new political interpretation.
Traditionally, the Ramayana has been an open text which has been
adapted to local contexts and read in different ways.“~ In some versions,
Rama is the personification of the ideal Kshatriya, the perfect man; in
others he is also the embodiment of evil—a man who wreacherously kills
Bali Raja in an unethical combat.” In some versions Ravana is a ten-
headed monster; in others he is a learned sage, or a hero. Heterocoxical
sects like Buddhism and Jainism have their own versions of the
Ramayana. The Dalits in South India venerate Bali Raja, and contest the
representation of Rama as the virtuous king. The efforts by the BJP and
the VHP to unify the Hindus around the image of Rama is an attempt to
erase the diversity and conflict within a catholic Indian tradition, to
repress contestatory voices which question dominant myths, and produce
a homogeneous, universalist Hindu tradition conducive to communal
politics.

The formation of a new identity and new collectivity also requires the
invention of new rituals and practices. In India, rituals and practices are
usually specific to sects and castes. Their collective performance binds
the members of a sect or a caste together, and separates different sects and
castes from each other. To transcend these differences and build a larger
‘Hindu’ unity, the VHP and the BJP have invented new rituals. These are
not traditional religious rituals. They are desacralized, in the sense that
their objective is solely political. Through these rituals the VHP and the
BJP seek to mobilize the people, instil an aggressive sense of Hindutva,
and generate a communal consciousness.

The early 1980s saw the beginnings of a new phase of intensive
communal mobilization.2’ The first Hindu Samajotsav (Hindu Unity
Conference) was held at Shimoga in Kamataka in January 1981. Since
then the VHP has organized similar Hindu Samajotsavs all over the
country. In October 1981 a Virat Hindu Sammelan was held in Delhi; in
March 1983 a three-day Vishal Hindu Sammelan was organized in
Jammu; in January 1982 there was a Hindu Jagriti Ekta Sammelan ‘in
Kanyakumari. Subsequent sammelans have been held in Ranchi (1987),
Tirupati (1988), and Alandi in Maharashtra (1987). Processions and
rath-yatras have been a regular part of the rituals of communal propagan-
da: Jana Jagarani Abhiyans, Vishal Hindi Aikya Yasras, Ekatmata Yatras,
Rama Ratha Yatras. New bonds of unity are being cemented through earth
(consecrated bricks), water (ganga-jal), fire (torch-lights), blood, and
ashes of the dead.

These rituals of communal mobilization are rituals of confrontation.

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 131

Mobilizations are essentially against other communities. The crude
demonstration of ‘Hindu’ power through the practice of these rituals is
meant to intimidate others, and to defy and provoke them. These yatras
have been invariably accompanied by violent rioting, bloodshed and
death. The experience and memories of such hostilities have deepened
the divide between Hindus and Muslims and created in tum a further
context for confrontations.

‘Other’ faiths do not provide the only targets of political aggression.
The new face of Hindu communalism is characterized by its violent
opposition to secularists—to all those who are opposed to the politics of
religious intolerance. Such an opposition has always been a part of
communal politics, but now it is one of its defining features. The com-
munal argument is simple: experiments in modernity have failed;
rationalism and secularism has led to a civilizational crisis in India;
assertive Hindutva alone can provide the possibility of the nation’s
survival. Secularism, we are are told, ‘is draining away the nation’s “elan
vital” of Hindu spirit’. Secularists are identified as ‘Hindu baiters’,
traitors, Muslim communalists. They are ‘trojan horses’ who ‘weaken
Hindu strength from within’.2? These ‘traitors’ have to be attacked to
defend the Hindu nation.

The politics of Ramjanmabhumi is thus part of a wider communal
politics which seeks to forge a combative unity amongst Hindus. It seeks
to reconstitute Hindu identity as an aggressjve, masculine identity. It
speaks the language of vengeance and retributive justice.

This effort at a redefinition of the Hindu identity leads to a series of
conflicting arguments. The discourse of communalism criticizes other
religions for being monolithic, but aspires to build a monolithic unity. It
glorifies diversity within Hinduism as a mark of its superiority over
Semitic religions, but seeks to repress this diversity. It identifies aggres-
Siveness as an evil intrinsic to other religions, but attempts to instil the
same quality in all Hindus. It talks of patience and tolerance as innate
virtues of Hindus, yet sees these traits as the basis of Hindu weakness. It
condemns other religions for their politics of religious repression and
temple destruction, but organizes itself around the same politics.

The politics of Ramjanmabhumiy, therefore, does not seek to defend
Hindu tradition, religion, myths, practices, values and norms. It
legitimates its communal politics through the discourse of tradition, it
appropriates tradition in communal ways. In the process it transforms,
politicizes, and communalizes tradition and religion. It demeans both
religion and ‘tradition’?

132 / Anatomy of a Confrontation
Mythic History and Communal Politics

Myth, history and the politics of Ramjanmabhumi interrelate in complex
ways. Specific appropriations of myths and history give meaning to
present communal politics, govern the nature of social action; the specific
form of politics in turn is articulated in myths and history, it defines the
way myths and histories are constructed.

There are many versions of the history of Ramjanmabhumi which are
being popularly circulated.” Their details differ in important ways, but
in broad outline they are similar. The story inevitably begins in the Treta
Yuga when Rama was said to be born in Ayodhya. Here he spent his
childhood, and part of his life. After Rama moved his capital to Saketa,
Ayodhya went into decline. Despite the desolation of the city, Ramjan-
mabhumi survived. But it survived in anonymity: its location was lost.
Vikramaditya miraculously rediscovered Ayodhya, and built a temple at
the Janmasthan. After Vikramaditya, Ayodhya again went into decline but
the temple and the place at the Janmasthan survived. When Babur came
to India he pillaged and plundered like all Muslims. He destroyed the
temple at the Janmasthan and built a masjid. Subsequently Hindus made
repeated efforts to recover control over the Janmasthan. But the Janmas-
than could not be liberated even after British rule. In 1949 a Ramamurti
was miraculously discovered in the masjid: Rama, it was said, had himself
appeared toremind the Hindus of the sacred history of the place and their
duty to liberate it.

The story thus revolves around several myths: the myth of ancient
Ayodhya, the myths of its loss and rediscovery, the myth of the destruction
of the temple and the construction of the mosque, the myth of the popular
movement for the recovery of the Janmasthan, the myth of the miraculous
appearance of Rama’s idol. The politics of Ramjanmabhumi flows from
this mythic history.

Mythic narratives provide the structure within which these popular
histories are framed. Within myths personages appear as archetypes as
villains or heroes. The struggle between heroes and villains represent the
deeper conflict between the forces of truth and falsehood, justice and
injustice, dharma and adharma, order and disorder, creativity and
destructiveness, good and evil. The struggle between gods and demons,
between devas and asuras, express the conflict between these opposing
principles.

The popular communal histories are cast within this frame. But in the
process the mythic structure is filled with acommunal meaning. Muslim

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 133

rulers are transformed into archetypal villains, and Hindus who fought
the Muslim rulers or suffered under their rule become the heroes. Muslim
rulers are shown as representing the forces of evil: tyranny, injustice,
oppression, destruction, repression, disorder. By opposing these forces,
Hindus fought forthe principle of order, justice, and dharma. The struggle
around Ramjanmabhumi is depicted as a long struggle between these
forces.

Once historical personages are transformed into personifications of
archetypal models, all sorts of acts are attributed to them. Events and
actions described in the narrative may not have ever actually occurred.
They are ‘invented’ to build up the picture of the archetypal villain or
hero. The popular communal histories of Ayodhya produce long lists of
misdeeds of all Muslim rulers to demonstrate how cruel and oppressive
they were. Having painted this picture, readers are persuaded to believe
that such rulers were capable of all heinous crimes, like the destruction
of the Ramjanmabhumi temple by Babur and the subsequent ruthless
repression of the Hindus whostruggled to liberate the Janmabhumi. These
stories have no support in any historical evidence. Yet they appear
believable to those who are persuaded by the archetypes, those who accept
the representation of Muslims as villains and Hindus as heroes.

The demonology of Muslim rulers in the popular communal histories
of Ramjanmabhumi goes along with a particular communal repre-
sentation of the past. Consider the set of articles on temple destruction
published in the Organiser.“ Here the story of the destruction of the
Ramjanmabhumi temple dissolves into a more general narrative of temple
destruction by Muslim rulers, and the mythic story of the decline of India
from the age of civilization to the age of barbarism. Each of these articles
on different provinces of India is framed within a similar narrative
structure. They all begin with the pre-Muslim period. It was an age when
India was studded with temples. It was a time of growth and development,
atime of progress, of high levels of cultural and intellectual achievements.
Then came the Muslims. Death, destruction and decline followed. It was
now a time of invasions, cruelty, forcible conversions, religious repres-
sion, cultural disintegration, and economic collapse. Destruction of
temples epitomized this general phenomenon of decline. Regeneration
could only be through a return to the origins, a recovery of the original
glory. In a way, the obsessive concern with the place of Rama’s birth
reveals this vision of a mythic return to the Yuga of Rama, from which
India had apparently descended to barbarism.

The popular communal histories of Ayodhya persistently play on the

134 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

theme that Ayodhya and the Janmasthan are profoundly sacred to the
Hindus and that their sanctity has been defiled by Muslims.

One of these histories, Ayodhyaji ka Prachin Itihas is presented as the
Ayodhya Guide. It tells the reader about the sacred history as well as the
sacred geography of the place. Ayodhya, we are told, existed before the
profane world came into being. To create the cosmos, Manu needed a
place to work. He brought Ayodhya from heaven and placed it on earth.
After creating the world from his base in Ayodhya, Manu gave Ayodhya
away to Ikshvaku. Ayodhya derives its sanctity from being present at the
sacred time of creation, from being the centre from which the cosmos was
created.

To further emphasize its sacred character, several other mythic marks
of sacredness are attributed to Ayodhya. Ayodhya, we are informed, was
more sacred than all the other sacred places in India. This is expressed by
symbolically associating different sacred centres with different parts of
the divine figure of Vishnu. Ujjain was the feet of Vishnu, Dwaraka was
the navel, Haridwar was the heart, Mathura was the neck, Kashi was the
nose, Ayodhya was the head. Ayodhya is the source of origin of all the
worlds: Brahmalok, Indralok, Vishnulok, Golok. It was the original nature
from which the human world was created. After enumerating these myths
of Ayodhya’s ancient origin, the Ayodhya Guide proceeds to substantiate
the myths through historical evidence.

In a world that believes in myths, the sanctity of a place is often attested
by its association with the miraculous, that which does not occur within
the sphere of profane experience. The sacred, as it were, reveals itself
through the extraordinary, the mysterious, the miraculous. This link with
the miraculous is established in the myths of the loss and the rediscovery
of Ayodhya.>3 After the Treta Yuga, Ayodhya was lost. Vikramaditya set
out to rediscover it. One day atired Vikramaditya was sitting on the banks
of ariver. He saw a dark man taking a bath. When the man re-emerged
from the river he was no longer dark. Vikramaditya asked the person who
he was and how he was miraculously transformed. The man said that he
was tirtharaj Prayag. When he could no longer bear the burden of other
people’s sin he came for a bath in the Saryu which flowed next to the
sacred city of Ayodhya. The myth again attempts to reaffirm the sanctity
of Ayodhya. Saryu was purer than Prayag; Prayag who had the power to
cleanse the sin of humanity, came to purify himself in the water of Saryu.
And Saryu derived its purity from its association with Ayodhya.

The miraculous reappears in the second myth about the discovery of
Ayodhya. Prayag tells Vikramaditya to allow a cow and a calf to roam.

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi / 135

When the calf reached Ayodhya, milk would secrete from its udder.
Vikramaditya follows Prayag’s instructions and thus rediscovers the exact
location of ancient Ayodhya. Location of a sacred place, evocation of its
sacred signs, through the help of an animal is commen in the world of
myths.>4 The secretion of milk is a reference to unilateral creation, to
androgynous birth, again common in the sacred myths of India, but not
in everyday life. >The above myth re-emphasizes the divine character of
the place where the unilateral creation occurred.

The miraculous surfaces yet again in other myths. Sri Ramajanmab-
humi ka Raktaranjit Itihas tells us that Babur confronted an extraordinary
problem when he destroyed the Ramjanmabhumi temple and proceeded
to build the Babri Masjid. He found it impossible to construct the Masjid.
The walls which were built in the day inevitably collapsed at night (p.
16). Babur was told by Hindu mahatmas that Hanuman would never allow
a masjid to be built in Ramjanmabhumi, unless the structure of the masjid
was changed, Hindu features were incorporated, the place was called
Sitapak, and Hindus were allowed to worship in it (p. 17). Babur had to
listen to the advice of the mahatmas. The myth asserts the sanctity of the
Hindu claim over Babri Masjid and the sacred power of the Rama temple.
The divine could not be easily destroyed. It had the power toresist human
and natural forces of destruction. Even earlier, we are told, the Ramjan-
mabhumihad miraculously survived amidst general desolation, first after
the Treta Yuga and then after the age of Vikramaditya. The story of the
miraculous appearance of the Rama idol within the Babri Masjid in 1949
sought to reconfirm both the sacredness of the place and the Hindu claims
over it.

The politics of Ramjanmabhumi derives its sanction from a mythic
history of a long heroic struggle for the recovery of the Janmasthan. ‘For
centuries we have been fighting for Ramjanmabhumii. It’s not anew thing
of today. Not thousands, but lakhs have perished for the sake of Ramjan-
mabhumi,’ says Rajmata Scindia.*© All the popular communal histories
attempt to describe this long struggle that Hindus have waged over
centuries.” ’ This unfinished struggle, they urge, has to be carried on.

This is an effort to legitimize the present action by tracing its ancient
lineage, to deny the communal character of the present movement by the
construction of a mythic sacred history. The recovery of Janmasthan was,
in this logic, both a sacred duty and an inherited obligation of all Hindus.
The blood the ancestors shed had sanctified their cause and imposed an
obligation. Their blood has to be honoured, their goals have to be realized,
their martyrdom has to be avenged. And for this the Hindus have to be

136 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

ready to sacrifice their blood as well as their lives.

This myth of past struggles for the recovery of Janmasthan seeks to
authorize the politics of Ramjanmabhumi in yet another way. Therefore
a mythological explanation of the present action is not seen as novel: it is
a repetition of what has gone on before. The nature of action is governed
by archetypal models, and these models are provided by past heroes. The
present generation of Hindus have not begun the struggle for Ram janmab-
humi, they need only carry on and complete a struggle begun in the past.
The ancestors, through their sacrifices, their struggle against the evil,
injustice and oppression associated with Muslim rule, set the example
which the descendants must follow.

The use of mythic forms and mythic themes makes these communal
histories familiar to their audience. The myths appeal because they appear
to be part of the known, accepted tradition. Yet the stories which are cast
within the traditional mythic forms are invented. This invention often
takes place in the course of struggles between communities, and it is the
politics of these struggles that are expressed through the myths. The myths
about the Janmasthan were invented sometime in the third quarter of the
nineteenth century. In the mid-1850s a conflict occurred over the
Hanumangarhi temple.°° Reacting to the tolerant policies of the Nawab,
a group of Sunni Muslims claimed that the Hanumangarhi temple was
built at a place where a mosque stood earlier. Dispute around the claim
led to violent confrontations and bloody fights between the Sunnis and
the Bairagi sadhus. Retaliating against the Sunni claim over Hanuman-
garhi, a section of Hindus produced a counter myth. They retained the
structure of the argument put forward by the Sunnis, but reversed the
claim. They now asserted that the Babri Masjid was, in fact, built after
destroying a Hindu temple. This claim was raised not during the
Hanumangarhi episode, but after it. The focus of dispute thus shifted from
Hanumangarhi to Babri Masjid. Myths about the Babri Masjid which were
now invented in the course of the conflict became part of the local tradition
and were reported in British official accounts written after this period.??

The mythic histories we have been discussing seek to authenticate
themselves through a set of narrative strategies. There is a process of
concretization. A mass of concocted figures, dates, names are quoted to
create an illusion of concreteness.*? We are told that there were seventy-
six attempts to liberate the Janmasthan: twenty during the reign of Akbar,
and thirty-six at the time of Aurangzeb. During the reign of Humayun the
Hindus did not remain silent. Three thousand women fought along with
Jayrajkumari and 24,000 soldiers were mobilized by Maheshwaranand.

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi | 137

There is actually no historical evidence for any of these struggles. But
invented sources are continuously cited to establish the factual authen-
ticity of the text.

Concretization goes along with a method of familiarization. The mythic
histories recount some familiar details about the reigns of Humayun,
Akbar and Aurangzeb, and cite a few well-known sources. Once the
reader is made to identify with such familiar facts, he is persuaded to
believe in the authenticity of the narrative. Through this process of
familiarization invented details are sought to be authenticated. An oc-
casional criticism of the sources, a discussion of their limitations, makes
the texts appear all the more self-critical and convincing.

Myth, history and the politics of Ramjanmabhumi are thus closely
linked. Mythic history draws upon a stock of familiar stories and myths.
Myths provide open forms which are filled with communal meaning.
Through them the struggle for Ramjanmaabhumi is charged with a
symbolic, historic and a deeply communal significance. These popular
mythic histories structure people’s consciousness and beliefs. They pro-
vide the frame through which people begin to perceive other communities
and conceive of the world. They provide a rationale for communal action.
Mythic history appeals to people’s emotions and plays upontheirreligious
feelings. It seeks to mobilize people’s anger, hatred and aggression and
provides them with a target. The struggle for Ramjanmabhumi becomes
a metaphor for a war against Muslims.

The politics of Ramjanmabhumi and its effort to legitimize itself
through mythic history raises a deeper question about the principles which
can govern our actions. We need to demarcate our principles from those
that lay behind the actions of individuals in the past. If intolerance,
religious repression, and violence have characterized the politics of earlier
times, in India and in other countries, we need to distance ourselves from:
that politics. If other nations and other societies continue to practice such
politics, we need not emulate them. The politics of Ramjanmabhumi seeks
to reassert the principles of medieval politics. It aspires to re-enact in the
present the politics of violence, repression and revenge. This is a politics
which negates not only the secular character of the Indian Constitution
but the democratic principle of equal citizenship and the rule of law which
the Constitution upholds. It is a politics whose profoundly dangerous
implications only the future will unfold.

138 / Anatomy of a Confrontation
Notes

1. I would like to thank Romila Thapar, K.N. Panikkar and Chitra Joshi
for comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

2. K.N. Panikkar, ‘Ramjanmabhumi and Babri Masjid:A Historical
Overview’, The Political Abuse of History: Babri Masjid~Rama Janma
Bhumi Dispute, Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, 1989.

3. Organiser, 20 July 1986.

4, Pratap Narain Misra, Kya Kahati Hai Saryu Dhara? : Sri Ramjanmab-
humi ki Kahani, Lucknow, 1986, p. 5.

5. SriRamjanmabhumi Mukti Yagya Samiti, ‘Sri Ramjanmabhumi ke Bare
me Tathya’, Ham Mandir Wahin Banayenge, Suruchi Prakashan: New
Delhi, 1989, p. 17.

6. Justice Deoki Nandan, Sri Ramjanmabhumi: Itihasik and Vidik Samik-
sha, Suruchi Printers: Allahabad, n.d. Deoki Nandan. in fact, wishes away
all disputes regarding the historical facts over the Ramjanmabhumi/Babri
Masjid issue. ‘It is an undisputed historical fact that at Ramjanmabhumi
there was an ancient mandir since the time of Maharaja Vikramaditya,’ he
writes. Ham Mandir Wahir Banayenge, Suruchi Prakashan: New Delhi,
1989, p. 17.

7. Weare told in one article on the subject, ‘There is no room for any doubt
that the Babri Masjid was constructed after demolishing Shri Ramjanmab-
humi temple and on the very spot. This fact has been clearly recorded in
many authentic history books.’ (emphasis mine.) P. Parameswaran, Direc-
tor, Bharatiya Vichar Kendra, Trivandrum, Organiser, 15 February 1987.
See also S.P. Gupta, ‘Kam Janmabhoomi Controversy: What History and
Archaeology Say’, Organiser, 29 March 1987.

8. Bharatiya Vichar Kendra, ‘Sri Ramjanmabhumi or Babri Masjid?’,
Organiser, 29 March 1987.

9. ‘The belief of billions in such matters is enough to bestow upon them
the sanctity more than History can... The very fact that Ram is worshipped
from far east to Arabian sea, from Himalayas to Kanyakumari, and tradition
passing from father to son believes him to be a living person of a prehistoric
era is proof enough that a person of that name existed and was born in a city
called Ayodhya.’ Organiser, 5 April 1987. See also M.V. Kamath, ‘Myth
and Reality’, Organiser, 13 December 1987.

10. Organiser, 5 April 1987.

11. Those who feel that a historian’s critique of the VHP claims is il-
legitimate and misplaced, fail to understand the nature of the present
political debate on the issue. The VHP rhetoric uses both the language of
History and the language of myth; it seeks to authenticate its account by
presenting it as ‘history’.
-12. Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, The Politi-
cal Abuse of History: Babri Masjid-Rama Janma Bhumi Dispute, New
Delhi, 1989; K.N. Panikkar, ‘“Ramjanmabhumi and Babri Masjid: A His-
torical Overview’, in this volume.

Myth, History and the Politics of Ramjanmabhumi / 139

13. Raghanandan Prashad Sharma, Vishwa Hindu Parishad ke Uddeshya,
Karya tatha Upalabhdhiyan, New Delhi, n.d.; Ashok Singhal, Vishwa
Hindu Pariskad Ke Pachis Varsha, New Delhi, n.d.; A. Shankar, Hindu
Jago Desh Bachao, VHP pamphlet, New Delhi, n.d. See also the WHP
pamphlet series, Ekatmata Pustak Mala.
14. H.V. Seshadri, Organiser, April 1982, reproduced in Seshadri, Hindu
Renaissance Underway, Bangalore, 1984.
15. A. Shankar, Chetawani: Desh ko Khatra, VHP pamphlet, New Delhi
n.d.; Sitaram Goyal, Hindu Samaj Sankat ke Ghere Me, Lokhit Prakashan:
Lucknow; Seshadri, ‘Now is the Time for Hindus to Act’, Organiser, 19
July 1987.
16. H.V. Seshadri, ‘Wiping out the Blot of Foreign Slavery’, Organiser, 5
January 1986. See also Bhanu Pratap Shukla, Shilanyas se Shikhar ki Or,
Suruchi Prakashan: New Delhi.
17. Organiser, 6 July 1986.
18. M. Verma, ‘The Beleaguered Hindu’, Organiser, 24 April 1988;
‘Angry Hindu! Yes, Why Not?’, Organiser, 14 February 1988.
19. ‘Angry Hindu!’ Yes, Why Not? , Suruchi Prakashan: New Delhi, 1988.
20. Interview with Rajmata Scindia, Organiser, 6 July 1986.
21. H.V. Seshadri, ‘Wiping out the Blot of Foreign Slavery’, Organiser, 5
January 1986. ‘How can Babri Masjid be a National Monument? It is a
symbol of foreign Turkish attack, of cruelty and bestiality, of Muslim
barbarism. It can only be a symbol of Indian subjection.’ Pratap Narain
Misra, K ya Kahati Hai Suryu Dhara, p. 139.
22. Organiser, 14 July 1985.
23. P.N. Oak, ‘Akbar was only the captor, not the builder of Fatehpur Sikri’,
Organiser, 14 July 1985.
24. ‘My mind and heart is that of a Hindu, my life itself is Hindu; I am
Hindu to my very core. I am Shankar’s fiery anger, I can bum the world to
ashes. I am the drum which ushers destruction. I am the unsatiated thirst of
Ranachandi (the Goddess of war), I am the wild laughter of Durga. I am the
death-call of Yama (the Lord of death), I am the smoke that emits from the
cremation ground. The anger which bums deep within me will set the world
ablaze. I am in essence a Hindu.” ‘Angry Hindu!’ Yes, Why Not?, p.17. On
the iconography of Rama see Anuradha Kapur, ‘Militant images of a
Tranquil God’, Times of India, 10 January 1989.
25. On the many versions of Ramayana see Romila Thapar, ‘Epic and
History: Tradition, Dissent and Politics in India’, Past and Present, Novem-
ber 1989; and ‘The Many Faces of the Ramakatha: A Historical Perspective
on the Story of Rama’ in this volume; J.L. Brockington, Righteous Rama:
The Evolution of an Epic, New Delhi, 1984.
26. David Shulman, ‘Divine Order and Divine Evil in the Tamil Tale of
Rama’, Journal of Asian Studies, August 1979.
27. On the activities of the VHP, the BJP and the RSS, see Seshadri, ‘The
Country-wide Hindu Resurgence: A Bird’s-eye View’, ‘A Yatra for National
.-Union of Hearts’, ‘Ekatmata Yatra: Setting National Vision Right’, Hindu
Renaissance Underway, Indraprastha Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Sri Ramjan-

140 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

mabhumi Mandir Mahabhiyan mein Kiye Gaye Mahatwa Purna Karyak-
ram, New Delhi, n.d.

28. Organiser, January 1988.

29. P.C. Asdhir, ‘Do not push the Hindu Psyche too Hard’, Organiser, 6
September 1987.

30. See also Sudipto Kaviraj, ‘On the Discourse of Communalism’
(mimeo). Ashis Nandy has written entensively on this theme of transforma-
tion of Hinduism.

31. Pratap Narain Misra, Kya Kahati Hai Saryu Dhara?; Ram Gopal
Pandey, Ramjanmabhumi ka Raktaranjit Itihas; Acharya Gudunji Sharma,
Ayodhyaji ka Prachin Itihas: Ayodhya Guide; Gumanmal Lodha, Ayodhya
Mein Sri Ram ka Apaman Kah Tak Hoga?, VHP, n.d.; Raghunandan Prasad
Sharma, Sri Ramjanmabhumi ki Balidangatha, New Delhi, 1989. I would
like to thank Urvashi Butalia for giving me access to two of the above
booklets.

32. Organiser, 21 Oct 1984; 12 May 1985; 23 June 1985; 18 Aug 1985; 22
Dec 1985; 27 April 1986; 4 May 1986; 7 Dec 1986; 24 Aug 1986.

33. Myths of discovery are important for the consecration of sacred spaces.
For, a sacred space is not supposed to be chosen by man, it is discovered
by him. Sacredness manifests itself through appropriate signs. See Mircea
Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, New York, t959.

34. ibid.

35. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, Sexual Metaphors and Animal Symbolism
in Indian Mythology, Delhi, 1981.

36. Organiser, 6 July 1986.

37. This claim has no real historical basis. My concern here is not to
disprove the claim, which can too easily be done, but to understand it.

38. British official reports on the incident are extremely detailed and
interesting. See in particular Forcign Political Consultations, 28 December
1855. For a discussion of the incident see Panikkar, ‘Ramjanmabhumi and
Babri Masjid: A Historical Overview’ in this volume; G.D. Bhatnagar,
Awadh Under Wajid Ali Shah, Varanasi, 1968.

39. P. Carnegy, Historical Sketches of Tahsil Faizabad, Zillah Faizabad,
Lucknow, 1870; H.R. Neville, Faizabad District Gazetteer, Allahabad,
1905.

40. See in particular, Misra, Kya Kahati Hai Saryu Dhara?; Pandey,
Ramjanmabhumi ka Raktaranjit Itihas,; Sharma, Ayodhyaji ka Prachin
Itihas; Sharma, Sri Ramjanmabhumi ki Balidangatha.

A Historical Perspective on
the Story of Rama’

Romila Thapar

It is popularly believed today, especially in northern India, that there have
been only twoimportant versions of the Rama-katha or the story of Rama
in Indian civilization: the earliest being the Sanskrit version of Valmiki,
the Ramayana, and the Hindi version of Tulsidas, the Ramacharitamanas.
However, historically, what is of the greatest interest about the Rama-
katha is its multiple versions. Each major version reflects a substantial
change both in how the role of the story was perceived, and in the
acceptance of each of these different versions by their audience as the
authentic one. This places the Valmiki and the Tulsi texts in a broader
civilizational context rather than solely in a religious one—a context
which I hope to explore in this essay.

As each of these many different versions makes a particular statement
as part of an ongoing dialogue over time, some versions contradict the
others in both narrative and intent. As the same story or a relatively similar
story is treated variously in terms of ethics, values, social and political
norms and religious identities, the purpose and function of each version
are significant and they cannotall be labelled as manifestations of a single
religious expression. Even an overview of these variants provides rich
material for the historical and cultural understanding of the role of the
story. The variations introduced into the story by specific authors are for
specific reasons and constitute a debate whose parameters change with
historical change. It becomes necessary then to make a distinction be-
tween versions which are cultural idioms and those which are essentially
propagating a religious sectarian point of view. Historically, the sig-
nificance of the cultural idiom is in many ways richer, with many more
levels of symbolic meaning, than the more narrowly religious, sectarian
form. However even among the latter, the contradictions and deviations
are in themselves very valuable pointers to the cultural idiom.

The Valmiki Ramayana, in its original form, was not a ‘sacred book’

142 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

as we understand sacred books today. It was a narrative, a story, cast in
an epic mould. It was not even described as a text on dharma. Nor is it
generally classified as an itihasa—that which was believed to have
happened in the past. It is more frequently referred to as a Kavya or an
adikavya, a poetic composition. Unlike sacred books which are rarely
questioned or altered (and if they are, the change is marginal) the
Ramayana was refashioned time and again, sometimes to convert it into
a religious text and sometimes for other purposes.

That the Valmiki Ramayana was not originally treated as a sacred book
becomes apparent from the difference between its recording, orally at first
and later in writing, and the recording of the Vedic corpus. The hymns of
the Vedas were meticulously memorized using a range of mnemonic
devices taught to and restricted to Brahmins performing priestly func-
tions—as they still are. This ensured a remarkable reproduction of the
original composition;~ and the hymns being regarded as sacred, such
correct recitation was a precondition to their effectiveness. By contrast,
texts such as the Ramayana had a much more open method of preserva-
tion. Its oral memorization did not preclude changes and later interpola-
tions such as perorations on good government and the observance of the
rules of dharma. In fact that very act of converting the text from an epic
poem to the story of Rama as an avatara of Vishnu, required that there be
substantial additions.

Literature which is recorded orally in a fashion as free as that of the
epics of early India cannot be dated to any one time period as it has
constantly undergone change. It can only be precisely dated from the time
when the earliest manuscripts of the textsurvive. In the case of the Valmiki
Ramayana this would be quite late. However, othertexts of earlier periods
refer to the Ramayana and we know that at least the oral form was current
in earlier centuries. As to when even this originally oral form was
composed, remains uncertain and has its own history.

Epics do not date to a particular period for they are in essence the
literature of a later age looking back on an earlier one. Events and
characters are fictionalized to such a degree that even if there is a kernel
of history embedded in them, it is often not in conformity with the
narrative. The importance of the epic for the historian lies not in the
narrating of events which may be believed to have happened, but in the
perception of the past which is encapsulated in the text, a vision which
portrays a society of earlier times and thereby also provides acommentary
on the social assumptions of the age when the epic was composed.

Some decades ago historians using the data from the two epics, the

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 143

Mahabharata and the Ramayana, argued for what was termed ‘the epic
age’ in Indian history.” This age has now been eroded from historical
periodization for the original epics are embedded in the versions which
have survived. Attempts to find a solution to the date of the Valmiki
Ramayana, by excavating sites mentioned in the text, have been disap-
pointing for those who believe in the great antiquity of these places. Thus
excavations in and around Ayodhya do not take the settlement back to
earlier than the seventh century BC. The artefacts of this period suggest a
very simple way of life, which in no way can be regarded as urban living;
norcan it be regarded as the archaeological counterpart to the descriptions
in the text.

There have been many interpolations over the millennium from 500 BC
to AD 500, and therefore only episodes can perhaps be dated on compara-
tive evidence.” This would imply that the epics do not belong to a specific
period because they are part of an ongoing tradition and that the epic itself
is made to change its function over time when it is converted from bardic
to religious literature.

Poems as literary forms, even if they should be dealing with historical
themes, cannot in themselves be regarded as historical texts. They can at
best provide clues to the ways in which people perceived the past or their
own times. Such clues are important to the historical reconstruction of
ideologies and attitudes, but are not evidence of historical events unless
proven to be so from other contemporary historical sources.

Epics are not religious documents in origin. But some versions of an
epic story can be transformed into religious statements, as was done in
the rewriting of the Valmiki Ramayana. The emphasis on the sacred has
tended to make this text the preserve of specialists in religion. Some
analyses of its religious concepts and philosophical ideas are valuable to
the study of Hinduism, as is also the unravelling of its mythology. What
has however been neglected is the comparative study of the large range
of substantially variant versions. Frequently intended for a popular
audience, they incorporate changes which have a significance other than
just a sectarian religious statement or a deviation in mythology. The
change of function is in itself of historical importance and the range of
variations suggests that the historian should view the variants as recount-
ing historical change. I hope to show that this is pertinent even to the
contemporary use of the epic, both in defining social attitudes and in
manipulating political conflicts.

Epics are frequently an amalgam emerging out of a number of ballads,
folk tales and myths. Stories are threaded together by a bardic poet and

144 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

these linkages give a different form to a literary genre. The Rama-katha,
put together from a number of floating, bardic compositions, is believed
to be the first form of the epic and it no longer exists in its original form.
Even the earliest surviving versions, dating in their present forms to the
turn of the Christian era, have each been worked over from particular
perspectives. Among the early versions was the literary epic composed
by the poet Valmiki, the Ramayana, which has come to be popularly
accepted as the standard version. The story incorporates the usual raw
material and stereotypes of epic tales: the changing fortunes of the hero,
the kidnapping of the princess, the quest for rescuing her, the heroic battle
interspersed with flying monkeys, demons and an aerial chariot.

The hero, Rama, is the eldest son of king Dasharatha, who rules from
the city of Ayodhya over the kingdom of Koshala situated in the middle
Ganges plain, and claims descent from the Suryavamsha or solar line. The
neighbouring forests are the haunt of demons, the rakshasas, who con-
tinually interfere with the sacrificial rituals in the forest hermitages of the
ascetics. Rama and his younger brother, Lakshmana, are called upon to
rid the forest of the demons. This they do and then proceed to the court
of king Janaka in the foothills of the Himalayas. The daughter of Janaka,
Sita, is to be wed. The choice of her husband is dependent on which of
the heroes gathered at the court can lift and bend a massive bow. The
young Rama alone succeeds, and Sita becomes his bride. On theif return
to Ayodhya, Dasharatha announces the installation of Rama as the future
king. But Rama’s stepmother, prodded by her hunchbacked maid, reminds
her husband of a promise which he had made to her earlier. She demands
that her son succeed Dasharatha and that Rama be exiled to the forest for
fourteen years. Dasharatha, true to his word, sadly gives in. Rama, Sita
and Lakshmana, the latter two voluntarily, go into exile, wandering in the
forests of the Vindhya hills to the south of the Ganges plain. Here the
inevitable happens. Sita is kidnapped by the powerful demon Ravana,
who takes her away in his aerial chariot to his home in Lanka. Rama and
Lakshmana discover the whereabouts of Sita with the help of the chief of
the monkeys, Hanuman. Rama in order to recover Sita, goes into battle
against Ravana. Ravana is eventually defeated. Sita is rescued but has to
undergo a fire ordeal to prove her chastity. The three then return to
Ayodhya where, the period of exile being completed, they are warmly
welcomed. Dasharatha having died meanwhile, Rama is crowned and his
reign is symbolic in social memory with a mythologized utopian period
of prosperity and well-being, reflected in the phrase Rama-rajya.

The original epic, composed by bards as part of the oral tradition, was

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama / 145

recited at sacrificial rituals, at feasts and at the courts of the rajas—the
chiefs and kings. Its origin could be seen as a eulogy to a patron or else
the eulogistic functions could be seen as a simile. The story involved the
families of the Kshatriyas, chiefs and warriors, with other social groups
playing lesser roles. The hero had often to be distinguished by a special
birth. Thus, Rama and his brothers were born only after the performance
of a sacrificial ritual by a particular sage.© Exile was a useful device. It
gave the bard occasions for fresh incidents if the narrative was wearing
thin. Time was not rigid. It could move back and forth with a continuum
between mythic, heroic and historical time. Narrating the previous incar-
nations of various persons was a way of playing with time. The conflict
between Rama and Ravana has been described as a prototype myth
echoing the earlier conflict describedin Vedic sources between Indra and
Vritra, and exalting the heroic ideal. Rama is the personification of the
ideal Kshatriya. He is referred to as a human hero and in these references
there is no question of his being identified with Vishnu.’ He is however
the perfect man.®

That the story gained popularity is evident from its inclusion among
the narratives, the akhyanas, of the sixteen great heroes as given in the
Mahabharata. The ‘Ramopakhyana’ as it is called is not just a summary
of the Valmiki text as is often assumed, but a rendering of the story with
distinct changes. Whether it preceded the Valmiki version or was com-
posed later remains controversial. The popularity of the story has been
attributed to various factors such as that it was a compendium of nature
myths with Sita as a fertility goddess and Rama as the solar deity, given
his descent from the solar line. Perhaps it was because of this increasing
popularity that the Valmiki Ramayana was now converted into a religious
text” through a new edition which was arefashioning by Brahmin authors.
Appropriate changes were made in the text and two further books were
added at the beginning and the end, the ‘Balakanda’ and the

‘Uttarakanda’. ~ The pre-eminence given to the Bhargava Brahmins is
noticeable in both these additions.

The hero Rama was now said to be an avatara or incarnation of Vishnu,
one of the two major deities of the emerging Puranic Hinduism. The
Ramayana therefore becomes a text for the propagation of the worship of
Vishnu with the suggestion that the reading of the story might free one
from sin. The additional book at the beginning and end of the text gathered
to it a variety of myths, legends, genealogies and changes in the narrative
which drew on features of the religious sects of the Bhagavatas. Further-
more, an elaboration on the character of the protagonists led to an

146 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

exaggeration of their earlier depiction. Thus Ravana emerges as a ten-
headed monster, and so much the personification of evil as to be almost
a caricature. Yet at the same time, in a lengthy interpolation at the end we
are told that Ravana was descended from a line of Brahmin seers and was
himself an ascetic whose power had to be broken because of his turning
to evil actions. ! Many see it as a battle between good and evil where the
narrative encapsulates a theory of ethics. One of the explanations for its
popularity originated from a nineteenth century Indologist, Christian
Lassen, who argued that the story describes the Aryan invasion of the
non-Aryan south, and the conflict is between Aryan and Dravidian
culture. !3

Substantial changes introduced into the story have their own interest,
such as those referring to the birth of Sita. Further, when Rama and Sita
retum to Ayodhya after the exile, Sita’s chastity is again questioned and
on this occasion she is banished and goes to live in the hermitage of the
sage Valmiki. Here twin sons are bom to her and named Kusha and Lava,
a curious choice because kushilavahcame to be used as the technical term
for a bard.!* It is said that Valmiki composed the Ramayana and taught
it to the sons of Sita, directing them to recite it on appropriate occasions.
This is a curious turn to the story. The main thrust of the Brahminized
version which continued to be referred to as the Valmiki Ramayana was
of course the glorification of Vishnu incamated as Rama.

The arena was that of clans in conflict, in a situation of new settlements
encroaching on forests and the migrations of peoples.!> The Valmiki
Ramayana has obscured the identity of the rakshasas by describing them
as demons, where the fantasy of the poet has had full play. Nevertheless
it is evident that these were not demons but a people with ways of life
different from those of Ayodhya and into whose territory the hermits and
the exiled heroes were intruding. The original Rama-katha probably
attempted to describe a conflict between chiefdoms prior to the rise of
monarchies. Subsequent rewriting changes the focus to a strong endorse-
ment of the monarchical state. Monarchy is now regarded as the ideal
political form and there is an implied disapproval of pre-monarchical or
of variant systems such as among the rakshasas.

The Ramayana repeatedly states that a people without a king is con-
ducive to generalanarchy. Ayodhya is the capital of a monarchicalstate,
Ramaendorses the duties of aking, primogeniture becomes acrucial issue
when the eldest son is exiled and debarred from kingship, contrary to the
norm. Society in Ayodhya is ordered according to the rules of caste. 8 Its
citizens count their wealth in grain and in valuables which they exchange

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 147

even over long distances. !? The rakshasa territory by contrast has no
boundaries, lacks the authority of a state and its society is not ordered
according to caste. Decisions are taken by Ravana the rakshasa chief and
his kinsmen for there is neitherconsultation with ministers nor a hierarchy
of status. Lanka, his island stronghold, is described as a city of gold, gems
and untold riches but there is no obvious source of wealth.” The luxury
may well be an example of extravagant poetic imagination. The rakshasas
are unfamiliar with agriculture and know no trade. The hermits are the
vanguard, as it were, of encroachment into the hunting grounds and forests
of the rakshasas, for they are, in effect, also the precursors of an agricul-
tural society which would clear and settle the forested areas. This may
well have occasioned the need for the rakshasas to disturb the rituals of
the hermits. The rakshasas were looked down upon. Yet they are also said
to have access to magical powers and objects among which the most
impressive was the aerial chariot of Ravana. The demonizing, as it were,
of the rakshasas, could be the projection of a feared enemy. There is both
a putting down as well as a looking up to Ravana in the Brahmanical
version.

The lesser persons who became the allies of Rama in exile, such as the
Nishada chief and the kinsmen of Hanuman, have been viewed as possible
hunting and gathering tribes of the forests, who in early myths were
expelled to less accessible areas.”! These were people bound by elaborate
rules of gift-giving and reciprocal obligations, more so than in the
monarchy. The text therefore might seem to incorporate a continuum of
social and economic forms, moving from hunting and gathering peoples
to chiefdoms, and reserving the accolades for the monarchical State. With
each major version of the text, there is an increasing emphasis on the
monarchy as the model, but some of the non-monarchical forms are
retained for contrast or else manage to slip through.

The Rama-katha was part of a floating tradition of bardic stories which
were picked up and reworked into variant versions. This is confirmed also
by versions which occur in the literature of what are generally regarded
as the heterodox religions, Buddhism and Jainism, the heterodoxy being
opposition to Brahmanism. From the Buddhist sources comes the story
as narrated in the Dasaratha Jataka” dating to anywhere between the
fourth and the second centuries BC and which is in effect the briefest of
summaries of part of the Rama-katha. Some scholars have argued that
this version of the Rama-katha predates Valmiki whereas others maintain
that it is later.?° There is a significant change in the story, for here Sita is
not the wife but the sister of Rama. At the end of the exile when Rama

148 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

returns to Ayodhya, Sita is made the queen-consort of Rama and they rule
jointly for sixteen thousand years. This version may reflect the tradition
of brother-sister marriages in Buddhist origin myths, including that of the
Buddha himself. It can be interpreted in many ways: as a symbol of the
purity of blood or, possibly, a demarcation of a distinctive status. A
comparison with Buddhist origin myths suggests that Rama and Sita may
have been seen as the originators of a royal clan and therefore placed in
this particular relationship for the ancestry of Rama is traced back to the
eponymous ancestor Ikshvaku, from whom incidentally the clan of the
Buddha also claimed descent.”+ Sibling incest is not to be taken literally
but seen as a cultural signal. Written in Pali for the edification of Buddhist
audiences, the function of the story was different from other versions of
the Rama-katha. The Buddhist ethic is underlined in the consolation
which Rama offers to his brother Lakshmana on the death of their father.
The Jaina version of the Rama-katha, the Paumacharyam, is aggres-
sively different from the others and sets itself up as the counter epic.~
Composed by Vimalasuri in about the third century AD or a little later, it
was written in the popularly used language, Prakrit. It contradicted the
Ramayana as reworked by Brahmin authors and which it describes as part
of the false tradition propagated by Brahmin heretics, the Brahmins being
. : : | 26 : : ‘
heretical from the Jaina point of view.” The Jaina version, framed in the
perspective of the Jaina ethic and doctrine, was in a way the mirror image
of the Valmiki version as revised by the Brahmins. Vimalasuri naturally
claims veracity for his narrative but also introduces a new dimension of
historicity in arguing that his version conformed to what actually hap-
pened. Historicity is not one of the claims of the Valmiki Ramayana.

The Jaina version starts by giving the genealogy and background not
of Rama, as in the Valmiki version, but of Ravana and then of Hanuman.”
We are told that the rakshasas were not demons but normal humans.
Ravana was not a ten-headed monster but was described as such because
he wore a necklace of nine large gem-stones which reflected his face.
Similarly Hanuman was not a monkey but the leader of a clan with a
monkey emblem on its standard. His role as mediator rather than one who
loyally serves Rama, is more pronounced in this version. Ravana, we are
told, belongs to the Meghavahana lineage, the word literally meaning that
he was ‘cloud-bome’, which also links him to his other epithet, akasha-
mar gi, he who travels through the sky—both epithets are suggestive of
aerial chariots.

At the time when the Jaina version was written the Vindhyan region
had witnessed earlier settlements growing into trading centres, cities and

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama / 149

the nuclei of small kingdoms. Patronage to Jainism came to be associated
with some of these. Not unexpectedly, Ravana in the Jaina version far
from being a villain, is a devoted Jaina who practised all the required
religious precepts and austerities and acquired considerable ascetic
power. At the end of the story, Dasharatha, Rama and Lakshmana, all
become Jaina ascetics and Sita takes herself off to anunnery. The question
of self-perception therefore takes on a different definition. The ethic of
the warrior so evident in the Valmiki version now changes to that of the
Jaina ascetic. At the same time the Jaina epic is a powerful contradiction
of the Brahmanic version.

There now begins a tradition of a series of Jaina versions of the
Rama-katha.2® These coincide with the period when Rama as anavatara
of Vishnu begins to gain popularity, although an increase in the number
of Jaina versions dates to the later time when Rama emerges as the focus
of bhakti worship. The Jaina texts are composed in various languages:
Prakrit, Apabhramsha and Sanskrit. The characters are all human heroes
but placed ina setting of Jaina ethics. Even within the Jaina tradition there
are variations in the story for in some texts Sita is the daughter of Ravana
but is brought up by Janaka, a theme which was to be popular in other
late versions. This makes the abduction doubly heinous but adds a further
layer to the symbolic meaning. The accusation that the Brahmanical
version of the story was incorrect continues to be made. What the Jaina
and Buddhist versions point to is that the Rama-katha was a popular story
which was picked up by a range of sectarian interests for a variety of
purposes and at the same time, there was a continuing controversy as to
the authenticity of event and character. The historically interesting ques-
tion is whether Vimalasuri’s version draws from anearlier tradition which
might explain the contradiction in the treatment of the story, or does it
reflect an increasing confrontation between Jainas and Brahmins.

The Rama-katha provided familiar stories to many different audiences.
These themes found their way into yet another and entirely separate genre,
namely, plays and poems written for the royal courts and the literati. They
were reworked into the classics of creative literature in Sanskrit and many
underwent major changes conforming to the requirements of courtly
literature. Among the better known and more frequently quoted are the
narrative poem of Kalidasa, Raghuvamsham, the play of Bhasa, Pratima-
nataka and Bhavabhuti’s Uttararamacharita. Some compositions even
took the form of a literary tour de force as in the ninth century biography
of a contemporary east Indian king, Ramapala, where the Ramacharitam
of Sandhyakaranandin can be read equally easily as the story of Rama or

150 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

as the biography of the king. Such compositions were not treating the
Rama-katha as sacred literature but as a source for literary themes and
demonstrations of poetic virtuosity.

The emergent regional languages also produced at different times their
own versions of the Rama-katha, such as the Tamil epic of Kamban,
Tramavataram or the Telugu, Ranganatharamayana, or the Kannada
Pampa Ramayana, or the later Bengali, Krittibasa Ramayan, or that of
Ekanatha in Marathi, the Bhavartha Ramayana. ” The writing of the
Rama-katha in regional languages has been a continuing process and
many of these versions introduced innovations in response to changes in
Indian society and regional perspectives. The innovations were both of
event and of character. Thus the treatment of Ravana in many of these
versions is that of a hero in decline rather than a villain and is distinctly
different from that of Valmiki. The Tamil poem draws a little more heavily
on the Bhakti tradition of devotion to a deity.

By the early second millennium AD there had been an enormous
geographical spread of the Rama story. This had less to do with Rama-
bhakti as such and more with the fact that in its variant forms, local
traditions were expressing themselves in acommon cultural idiom which
was widely dispersed and understood. A distinction therefore has to be
made between the story as a cultural metaphor and as sacred literature. In
the reworked Valmiki text it remained the sacred literature of the Vaish-
navas, but many other variants were treating it as acultural metaphor. The
latter were popular in central Asia, China and Tibet,~ sometimes drawing
on the Buddhist originals, although these versions had their own variants
reflecting the social and cultural norms of the society from which they
arose. In south-east Asia there was an avid appropriation of the story
frequently drawing on Indian folk and regional versions, with clear
variants deriving inspiration from local geography, tradition and events.
In one version the area of north Vietnam (Annam) is identified as the
Ayodhya of the text and that to the south of it (Champa) as Lanka, a
considerable shift in geographical identification. In some versions Sita
appears, unknown to him, as the daughter of Ravana. The more up-to-date
versions in south-east Asia incorporate Islamic legends, some even featur-
ing the prophet, Adam.*! In the Malayan version of the legend, Ravana
is exiled to Serendib, where Adam sees him and pleads for him before
Allah, who grants him a kingdom. * Ithas been argued that the sculptured
reliefs at major sites in Indonesia are more likely based on folk versions
of the story than on any text.”

Narrative art in painting and sculpture had also begun to draw on the

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama / 151

local version of the story from the middle of the first millennium AD.
Gupta period sculpture at the temples of Nachna Kuthara and Deogadh
have been interpreted as depicting scenes from the Rama-katha. The
depiction of the Rama-katha was part of the general theme included
among the avataras of Vishnu. The treatment of Rama as an individual
deity in his own right, with temples dedicated specifically to him is,
however, a much later development.

When we ask why there was this mushrooming of the story in India,
the notion of cultural idiom appears to take precedence over the religious
text. One obvious reason was that it was a tale well told, personifying the
conflict between good and evil with the virtuous eventually triumphant.
Equally obvious was the use of the text for the propagation of the cult of
Vishnu. Specialists in the history of Indian literature have argued thatthe
spread of Sanskrit to new areas which were until then using their own
local language, was facilitated by the use of the simple Sanskrit of the
Valmiki epic. This became the model for epic genres in the new regional
languages although the narrative was changed in accordance with the
demands of popular culture and local tradition. Such explanations are
entirely feasible, but perhaps not sufficient. An investigation of the
historical background may further fill out the picture.

If the Rama-katha was also seen as acharter of validation for monarchy
then it was an appropriate text for historical changes taking place from
about the eighth century AD. There was a noticeable growth of a large
number of small kingdoms. Barring a few major dynasties, these were
generally short-lived kingdoms of no great pretension to extensive ter-
ritory but each claiming and indulging in the full panoply of monarchical
status. Minor rulers rushed to take grandiloquent titles and did not hesitate
to call themselves Maharajadhiraja, great king of kings. Local courts
boasted iarge retinues of retainers whose code of behaviour laid emphasis
on heroic chivalry combined with blinkered devotion and loyalty to the
king. The subsistence of these kingdoms came in large part from the
steady encroachment of the agrarian economy into erstwhile forested
regions. Waste land was brought under cultivation, not necessarily by the
State directly but also through a system of granting land to learned
Brahmins and those holding high administrative office. The ancestors of
many of the lesser kings were such grantees in origin and the more
ambitious among them aspired to the monarchical model. Some came
from families of tribal chiefs who through administrative office had
moved into the hierarchy of the State. In this situation access to economic
resources implied increasing the land under cultivation. Foresttribes were

152 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

under all circumstances to be subjugated, a strategy which has continued
through the ceaturies. The triumph of Rama over Ravana therefore
provided a powerful metaphor for a process which was actually taking
place.

Where royal courts came into existence, there the Brahmins legitimized
the king by providing him with a genealogy and by performing rituals
through which his divine status was proclaimed." There is a frequency
in this period to claims to ancestry in the two royal lineages—the
Suryavamsha and the Chandravamsha. By means of the genealogy the
status of Kshatriya, now seen as that of the landed aristocracy was
bestowed on the family irrespective of its actual origins. Those who
claimed descent from the Suryavamsha had Rama as a distant ancestor.
The Ramayana would then become the story of the royal ancestor. That
the ancestor was an incarnation of the god Vishnu, helped underline the
divinity of kingship which by this period was more generally asserted
than in earlier times.

The settling of Branmins inareaspreviously unfamiliar with Brahmani-
cal culture brought about an acculturation through which a familiarity
with the Sanskritic tradition was introduced to these areas. But such
acculturation increasingly required that the Sanskritic tradition incor-
porate manifestations of the local culture. Thus new versions of the
Rama-katha were composed in wuich the ingredients of local culture
predominated.

One form taken by these manifestations was the use of historical
geography. The geography of the earlier Valmiki Ramayana remained
confused. Thus, the location of Lanka, never made precise, may have
moved from the Vindhyan region south-eastward following aknown route
of migration and trade. 2 According to popular belief today it could even
be the island of Ceylon or Sri Lanka. This geographical flexibility could
be put to good use. The theme of exile came in very handy. Originally a
bardic device used in virtually all epics to stretch the story or incorporate
other fragments, it became, in this case, part of the process of accultura-
tion. Local opinion could claim that exile had actually brought Rama to
that area. Topographical features and local cults were gradually linked to
the story. This enhanced the cultural prestige of the site, assisted in the
proselytizing of people to the religious cults of Vishnu and his incarna-
tions and incidentally also helped to strengthen the theory of the
genealogical links of the local ruling family where it claimed descent from
Rama. In asixteenth century version of the Rama-katha from Orissa, the
exiles are depicted as travelling through the then contemporary

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama / 153

kingdoms.°©

Parallel with these developments but of a qualitatively different kind
was the emergence of a specific sect focussing on the worship of Rama
and dating to the early second millennium AD. This was the influential
sect of Ramanandins. For them the worship of Rama or Rama-bhakti was
the most effectual form of devotional worship and ensured the salvation
of the individual. Rama-bhakti was of course part of the Vaishnava
Bhagavata tradition evenearlier, but the focus which the Ramanandin sect
provided was new. They drew on those versions of the story which
emphasized Rama-bhakti and the texts associated withthem were distinct.
The focus shifts somewhat from Vishnu to more specifically Rama, but
the concem of these texts was not so much the activities of Rama as the
prescription for the attaining of moksha (release from the cycle of birth
and death).

Among these texts the Adhyatma-Ramayana, dating to about the fif-
teenth century AD~‘ carries the notion of maya or illusion to its logical
conclusion, when it argues that the very story of Rama is an illusion and
that the importance of the text is less the story and more what the text has
to say about devotional worship. The Rama-katha is set in the frame of
Shiva telling the story to Parvati for the salvation of all. This is yet another
idea which changes the function of the story. There is also a listing of
benefits derived from the recitation of the Adhyatma-Ramayana. This
points to a move in the direction of making the text into a sacred book for
the Rama-bhaktas, even though at many crucial points there are differen-
ces with the Valmiki Ramayana. Echoes of the Krishna legend are
introduced from time to time as in the description of the childhood of
Rama.~” The legend of how Valmiki took to the ways of a low caste thief
but eventually came to compose the Ramayana, is also related. ” We are
told that Rama being in fact Vishnu, knew that Ravana would kidnap Sita,
and therefore places her in the safe-keeping of Agni by making her enter
the fire and she is replaced by the shadow or chaya Sita.4 The real Sita
returns to Rama after the fire ordeal. Ravana in turn knows that Sita is in
fact Lakshmi, therefore, although he kidnaps her, he treats her like his
mother.*! Ravana also knows that Rama is an incarnation of Vishnu, so,
by kidnapping Sita and being therefore killed by Rama, he ensures that
he will go to heaven. When Sita is banished for the second time, the author
does leave us with the question of how could Rama, knowing Sita to be
his own Shri, have banished her? Yet Rama tells Sita of his plan to banish
her, so that she can return to heaven and he will follow later."~ This
altogether changes the ethical implications of the banishment. The ob-

154 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

vious logical inconsistencies in this version of the story are subordinated
to the text being sacred and devoted to the worship of Rama. The problem
for the author was to reconcile the story with the necessary religious
explanations. Hence the deviations. The importance given to the Rama-
gita recited by Rama towards the end of the story,” would seem to point
to parallels with Krishna-bhakti. Many of these features derived from the
differing versions related in the major Puranas, which either refer to the
story or carry a summary of it. The influence of the Bhagavata Purana is
particularly noticeable in the Bhushundi Ramayana, where the treatment
of Rama’s early life is modelled on that of Krishna, and Sita is surrounded
by gopis.

The notion of a shadow Sita or even a substitute Sita, was to become
extremely popular in the later versions. Sita’s fire ordeal in these is less a
test of Sita’s chastity and more a mechanism by which the real Sita is
reunited with Rama. This idea, apart from its link with the philosophical
notion of maya or illusion, was perhaps also a concession to the popular
goddess cults of this time which not only insisted on the power and
presence of the female principle, but also may not have allowed a goddess
of fertility to be subjected to such ordeals.

The influence of the now powerful Shakta tradition on the Rama-katha
is clear from further changes in the narrative and treatment of the story in
other texts. Shiva had already been introduced as the narrator of the story.
More interesting is the change in the role of Sita, where she, whether the
shadow or the actual Sita, goes into action single-handed against Ravana
and finally kills him, episodes narrated in the Sanskrit Adbhuta and
Ananada Ramayanas. Sita, as an incarnation not of Lakshmi but of the
Shakta concept of Devi, is common to many Shakta versions of the story
and does not hesitate to kill the hundred-headed or the thousand-headed
Ravana. From the Shakta tradition such a change in the story is of course
predictable, given that the goddess is all-powerful. But it converts the
image and role of Sita into something completely different from that of
even the revised Valmiki Ramayana. The relationship between Rama and
Sita changes, as does the delineation of Sita as the ideal woman in the
earlier version. *> Some of these versions also retain the story of Sita being
the daughter of Ravana, a fact not known to him.

The increasing influence of the Ramanandin sect led to a physical focus
being located for the bhaktas of Rama in the city of Ayodhya, which had
over time become the centre for many different religions and sects. The
focus on Ayodhya was directed through the pilgrimage circuit and this in
turn required the demarcation of a sacred topography locating the events

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama / 155

of the Rama-katha. The Ayodhya-mahatmya was compiled in the early
part of the second millennium AD, one among a genre of such texts which
deal with the local history of a sacred site as part ofa remembered tradition
and which include myth, narrative about the cult and descriptions of the
places regarded as sacred and required to be visited by the pilgrim.
Pilgrimage to Ayodhya associated specifically with the Rama-katha,
seems to have begun only at this time.

In the sixteenth century Tulsidas composed the Ramacharitamanas in
Hindi, which became the most popular version in northern India. This was
not surprising as the Ramanandin sect, with which Tulsi was associated,
required a text which would be comprehensible to a larger audience than
the limited one of those who knew Sanskrit. For Tulsi, Rama was
essentially the divine being present among humans. We are continually
told that he is adored by all, even by ascetics who gaze on him like ‘a
bevy of partridges gazing at the autumn moon’. Tulsi’s view of the world
made such devotion imperative. He saw his contemporary times as a
period of declining morality, the fall from the initial golden age to the
present age of iron, the Kaliyuga (the age of Kali), accompanied by
inevitable decline in social and ethical norms. He states that caste rules
are now ignored, upstarts and low-caste people come into prominence and
succeed through fraud and cheating. It is indeed a world turned upside
down. The only consolation is the worship of Rama, which alone could
bring back the utopian society once ruled by Rama. 7

A section of popular opinion today maintains that this picture of decline
was Tulsi’s protest against the Mughal rulers who were Muslims and that
his Ramacharitamanas consolidated and saved the Hindu ethos. But the
text does not bear this out. The evils of the Kali age were conjured up
repeatedly by Brahmin authors whenever they felt that Brahmanical
authority was in crisis, and this had happened at various times even before
the coming of Islam to] ndia.*® Tulsi as a Brahmin was doubtless disturbed
by many of the current religious movements within the fold of what is
today called Hinduism, which denied the authority of the Brahmins and
the texts which they respected, which propagated alternative religious
ideologies and attracted large audiences of non-Brahmins. Sects deriving
from Puranic and Shakta worship were often opposed to the more con-
servative Brahmanical tradition. Thus, far from seeing the decline of °
Hinduism, India under Muslim rule witnessed the vibrancy of a large
number of Hindu sects. Some of these competed for patronage, a com-
petition which was at times to take violent turns as in the battles between
the Bairagis and the Sanyasis. Even among the Vaishnava sects there was

156 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

some competition for patronage. The Krishna cult at Vrindavana was
becoming increasingly important. The Ramacharitamanas is not only a
Vaishnava text but one which focuses more narrowly on Rama-bhakti.
Yet it is not just a Hindi rewrite of the Valmiki Ramayana as revised for
Bhagavata worship. It does carry differences of religious meaning. Tulsi’s
version also gains in importance today because of the status of Hindi in
relation to other regional languages.

The popularity of Tulsi’s text encouraged a new idiom, that of the
Ramalilas. These were in the nature of folk plays enacting the Rama-katha
and performed in the Hindi-speaking areas of north India. The time of
year coincided with the autumn harvest and the worship of the ancestors
(shraddhas), as well as the major seasonal worship of the mother goddes-
ses. Possibly the Rama-katha ousted the worship of the goddess in these
areas, for elsewhere the festival continues to be associated primarily with
the goddess.

Yet another very different use to which the story was put was the
mobilization of peasants in Uttar Pradesh by Baba Rama Chander in the
early part of this century. Its dual objective was to support the national
movement and to oppose the large-scale landlords of the area. Selected
verses of the Tulsi version were popularized as part of the resistance to
colonial rule. The virtuous characters in the story, Rama, Lakshmana and
Sita, were identified with the peasants. The rakshasas who were the
villains were identified with the landlords, capitalists and the British.*?
Baba Ram Chander does not speak of the return of the Rama-rajya or the
golden age of the reign of Rama, but since he identified Rama with the
peasants, the fulfillment of the dream of peasants in power would virtually
amount to a Rama-rajya.

Local versions of the story differing in narrative and symbolism from
the Valmiki and Tulsi versions have continued to be performed or even
read, sometimes as a parallel tradition and sometimes as the central
tradition in certain communities. Among these, by way of an example, is
the popular Tamil version which was earlier handed down orally, but since
the beginning of this century has been made available in printed form.
This is the Chatakantakatai or the Story of the Ten-Headed Ravana.
Here once again it is Sita who, with Rama as her charioteer, goes into
battle against Ravana and in single combat kills him. Clearly the imprint
of the powerful, assertive goddess overrides the more accommodating
and gentle image of the Valmiki or Tulsi versions and follows the narrative
of the Shakta versions. These are not marginal traditions for they are
central to the societies from which they emerge. In many of the folk

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 157

versions the role of Hanuman changes. He remains a devotee of Rama
but is in addition associated with popular humour and jokes, and speaks
in a more indigenous style suggesting indirectly that he represents the
local people.

The popular depictions in the Ramalilas found a place in the movie
industry and since the early 1900s, films have been made on the themes
of the Ramayana and advertised as ‘mythological’. The films being
largely in Hindi and propagating Rama-bhakti, it was almost inevitable
that they would rely on the Valmiki and Tulsi versions. The films in turn
have influenced the most recent form of the Rama-katha—as the most
successful soap opera on national television—again drawing on Valmiki
and Tulsi, now regarded as received versions.

Thus the Rama-katha in India has had a chequered history and has
performed many functions, not all of which were solely religious. There
are parallel traditions of the story which continue to this day and which
relate to diverse social perspectives. There was a floating, oral tradition
which probably began with ballads and epic fragments, narrating stories
which were finally woven together into epic poems or the Jataka stories
of the Buddhist tradition. Such forms continue to dominate folk traditions
which have on occasion been incorporated into the many manifestations
of the Rama-katha.

The Rama-katha as a story, important to religious sectarian positions,
comes into its own in the second millennium AD. This tradition of
Rama-bhakti becomes more focussed and powerful and the new versions
are treated fundamentally as the texts of Rama-bhakti. But the variations
among religious sects are also reflected in the treatment of the story. Thus
the Tulsi version is different from the Shakta version and if the Tulsi
version is popular in the Hindi-speaking areas, the Shakta version is
popular elsewhere.

There is therefore, no single authentic version of the Rama-katha, for
each version is authentic to the particular sect to which it is addressed or
to the local community from which a version may emanate. By and large,
and even when it is included in canonical or semi-canonical literature (as
in the case of the Buddhist and the Jaina versions), the story is imbued
with a sectarian perspective, but is not necessarily regarded as a sacred
text. Only a few versions have latterly been treated as sacred. The
multiplicity of folk versions in function go back to the epic tradition.
These obviously are not regarded as sacred texts but are a significant part
of the cultural idiom.

The Rama-katha has thus itself been through many incarnations and

158 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

has changed its function in society over time. So no particular version can
be treated as a specific sacred book, sacred to all Hindus whether of high
or low caste or whether conforming to elite or popular religious traditions
and irrespective of region and language. Nor is it possible to argue that
the topography of pilgrimage at Ayodhya goes back to the centuries BC
when, it is supposed, the events of the Rama-katha took place. What is of
interest in looking at the historical perspective on the Rama-katha, is the
role which the story has played in articulating a range of dialogue in the
context of Indian civilization. This is not to suggest that those who wish
to weat any of these many versions of the Rama-katha as a sacred book
should not do so: but it is to insist that those who wish to see the
Rama-katha tradition in its totality outside of areligious context, also have
the right to see it that way. The differentiation between a cultural idiom
and a religious, sectarian, sacred book should not be ignored. That this
distinction was not ignored in the past, also becomes fundamental to our
understanding of the role of the Rama-katha today.

The political exploitation of the worship of Rama has not only been
visible but has been forced to the forefront in recent months, culminating
in the fall of a government. This has added yet another dimension to the
ways in which the Rama-katha has been used. Its roots lie in the realization
that in the same way as once long ago the story was used to propagate a
new religious idea (Bhagavatism and the concept of Rama as the avatara
of Vishnu), the worship of that avatara could now be used to build up a
political base and political demands. This first required the annulling of
different versions and the projection of a single version as the authentic
one. In this the media was of considerable assistance.

Because the medium of television is becoming the most powerful in
the country, in places superseding even the entrenched oral tradition, its
use of this theme has to be seen in context. The versions selected, with no
attempt to suggest that there were other versions contradicting it, is a
Hindu Vaishnava text, centring on the worship of Rama, familiar to north
Indian Hindi speakers and broadly to the literate few elsewhere. The
choice of this version therefore makes a specific social and political
statement, becoming all the more significant given that television is part
of the Government-controlled media. With such powerful backing the
serial comes to be seen as the national culture of the mainstream. This
eliminates the range of folk and popular versions or alternative versions
even within the same religious tradition. There is a very deliberate choice
of one tradition and the elevation of this tradition (remoulded in accord-
ance with contemporary tastes and values) to national status. The differen-

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 159

ces, the debates, the discussions implicit in the interplay of variants are
thus nullified. It is made impossible in the present context even to discuss
on television, the specific variants in the Buddhist, the Jaina and the
Shakta versions or in folk motifs, leave alone show them as serials. The
richness of the themes in contradictory or alternate versions is suppressed
and the story is underlined as a sacred story, which therefore cannot be
questioned. This is a very different treatment from that given to the
Rama-katha by Indian civilization. The manifestation of diversity and its
accommodation was characteristic of Indian culture in the pre-colonial
period and enriched every tradition. To accept and conform to a single
version erodes cultural flexibility as well as the encouragement to in-
novate, So necessary to any cultural idiom.

Inevitably this is also part of the attempt to redefine Hinduism as an
ideology for modemization by the middle class. Modernization is seen as
linked to the growth of capitalism. In terms of its religious associations,
capitalism is often believed to thrive among Semitic religions such as
Christianity and Islam. The argument would then run that if capitalism is
to succeed in India, then Hinduism would also have to be moulded to a
Semitic form: although this desired change is often disguised in the theory
that what is actually happening in the new resurgence of Hinduism is a
retum to Hindu traditions.

Characteristic of the Semitic religions are features such as a historically
attested teacher or prophet, a sacred book, a geographically identifiable
location for its beginnings, an ecclesiastical infrastructure and the con-
version of large numbers of people to the religion—all characteristics
which are largely irrelevant to the various manifestations of Hinduism
until recent times. Thus instead of emphasizing the fact that the religious
experience of Indian civilization and of religious sects which are bunched
together under the label of ‘Hindu’ are distinctively different from that of
the Semitic, attempts are being made to find paralle!s with the Semitic
religions as if these parallels are necessary to the future of Hinduism.

The parallel can be seen for example in the recent resurgence of the
worship of Rama, where the control of this religious articulation is
politically motivated. The characteristics of the Semitic religions are
introduced into this tradition. The teacher or prophet is replaced by the
avatara of Vishnu, Rama; the sacred book is the Ramayana; the
geographical identity or the beginnings of the cult and the historicity of
Rama are being sought in the insistence that the precise birthplace of
Ramain Ayodhya was marked by atemple, which was destroyed by Babur
and replaced by the Babri Masjid; an ecclesiastical infrastructure is

160 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

implied by inducting into the movement the support of Mahants and the
Shankaracharyas or what the Vishwa Hindu Parishad calls a Dharma
Sansad; the support of large numbers of people, far surpassing the figures
of earlier followers of Rama-bhakti, was organized through the worship
of bricks destined for the building of a temple on the location of the
mosque. There has been an only too apparent exploitation of belief. The
current Babri Masjid dispute is therefore symbolic of an articulation of a
new form of Hinduism, militant, aggressive and crusading, which I have
elsewhere referred to as Syndicated Hinduism.

In earlier times a dispute over a location would not have arisen, since
the historicity of the deity being worshipped was not a matter of sig-
nificance. These are new strategies for mobilizing political power by
exploiting belief. The dialogue between culture and power is directed
towards political purposes although the front of a religious movement is
sought to be projected. The worship of bricks is new to Hinduism and has
been effectively demonstrated as a form of mobilization in the recent Shila
puja. Syndicated Hinduism has little in common with either the openness
of philosophical Hinduism or the catholicity of the rituals and beliefs of
innumerable sects and cults all labelled as Hindu. These latter groups may
eventually protest against a uniform religion imposed on them by those
who are in power, but if such a religion becomes essential to upward
mobility, then the protest will be muted.

Religious movements, by virtue of being social movements and there-
fore not limited to the salvation of the isclated individual, have at all times
had a social base. Some have been movements of intolerance, excluding
particular groups in society, whereas others have been movements of
accommodation and have assimilated groups thought to be alien. Some
have had a larger degree of religious concern, others have merely been a
mask for social and political concerns. The movement which has grown
around the demand for the replacement of the Babri Masjid by a temple
to Rama has been of the latter kind. It has not only politicized the worship
of Rama, but has equally unfortunately denied the validity of the variant
versions of the story of Rama.

Notes

1. This essay is drawn in part from a paper entitled, ‘Epic and History:
Tradition, Dissent and Politics in India’, published in Past and Present,
November 1989, 125, Oxford, pp. 1-26.

2. L.Renou, The Destiny of the Veda in India, Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi,
1965; J.F. Staal, Nambudri Vedic Recitation, Mouton: The Hague, 1961.

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 161

3. Seethediscussion in A.D. Pusalkar, Studies in the Epics and the Puranas,
Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan: Bombay, 1955.

4. B.B.Lal, ‘Historicity of the Mahabharata andthe Ramayana: What Has
Archaeology to Say in the Matter?’, Paper presented at the International
Seminar on ‘New Archaeology and India’, Indian Council for Historica}
Research, New Delhi, 1988.

5. Attempts to do this have been made and point to various periods of
composition and interpolation, as for example in H.D. Sankalia, Ramayana:
Myth or Reality, Munshiram Manoharlal: New Delhi, 1982.

6. Ramayana, 1.12 1-34; 13. 146, Critical Edition, Baroda.

7. H. Jacobi, The Ramayana, (trans.), MS University Press: Baroda, p.
59; for references also see J.L. Brockington, Righteous Rama, Oxford
University Press: New Delhi, p. 218-9. _

8. R.P. Goldman, The Ramayana of Valmiki, Volume I: Balakanda, Prin-
ceton University Press: New Jersey, 1984, p.43.

9. R.G. Bhandarkar, Vaishnavism, Shaivism and Minor Sects, Stassburg,
1913, p. 46 ff.

10. A recent discussion of these interpolated layers is to be found in J.L.
Brockington, Righteous Rama, Delhi, 1984. An earlier and pioneering
analysis of the text, is that of C. Bulcke, Ramakatha, Prayaga Vish-
vavidyalaya: Allahabad, 1950. See also A. Guruge, The Society of the
Ramayana, Maharagama: Colombo, 1960, and especially p. 32ff.

1i. N.J. Shende, ‘The Authorship of the Ramayana’, Journal of the Univer-
sity of Bombay, 1943, 12, pp. 19-24.

12. Ramayana 7. 9-34.

13. C. Lassen, Indisches Alterthumskunde, Leipzig 1847-62, I, p. 596 ff.
The Aryan is represented by the orderly and advanced society of Ayodhya
and the Dravidian by the uncouth wildness of the rakshasas. This dichotomy
was a direct transplant from European ideological obsessions with ‘the
Aryan’ and does not reflect indigenous identifications. This explanation had
a politically explosive effect on Tamil nationalism during this century.

14. Kautilya, Arthashastra, 1.12.9: 2.1.34; 2.27.7.

15. Fora discussion on the background to this early society, see Romila
Thapar, From Lineage to State, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1984.
16. Romila Thapar, Exile and Kingdom: Some Thoughts onthe Ramayana,
The Mythic Society: Bangalore, 1979; Romila Thapar, ‘Ramayana: theme
and variation’, in S.N. Mukherjee (ed.), India: History and Thought,
Subamarekha: Calcutta, 1982, pp.221-53.

17. Ramayana, 2.16.7ff.

18. ibid. 1.1.75; 2.13. 1-2; 5. 33. 11; 6. 115. 13.

19. ibid. 2.29.15; 32.6.

20. Devaraj Chanana, The Spread of Agriculture in North India, People’s
Publishing House: New Delhi, 1963, pp. 27-29.

21. Romila Thapar, ‘Origin Myths and Early Indian Historical Tradition’,
Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations, Orient Longman: New
Delhi, 1978, pp. 307 ff.

22. V. Fausboll, The Dasaratha Jataka, Being the Buddhist Story of King

162 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Rama, Copenhagen, 1981; Dasaratha Jataka, No. 461.

23. J. Przyluski, ‘Epic Studies’, /ndian Historical Quarterly, Trivandrum,
1939, 15, pp. 289-99. C. Bulcke, Rama-katha, pp. 84-105. D.C. Sircar,
‘The Ramayana and the Dasaratha Jataka’, Journal of the Oriental Institute,
Baroda, 1976, 26, pp. 50-5.

24. Romila Thapar, ‘Origin Myths and the Early Indian Historical
Tradition’, Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations, Orient
Longman: New Delhi, 1978, pp. 294ff.

25. The text has been edited by H. Jacobi, The Paumacariyam of
Vimalasuri, Prakrit Text Society, Varanasi, 1962, reprint. See also K.R.
Chandra, A Critical Study of Paumacariyam, Research Institute of Prakrit
Jainology and Ahimsa Vaishali, Bihar, Varanasi, 1970; V.M. Kulkarini,
Prakrit Text Society, Vimalasuri’s Paumacariyam, Kasi, 1962.

26. Paumachariya, 2.116; 4. 64¢f.

27. ibid., 5.16ff.

28. V.M. Kulkami, The Story of Rama in Jaina Literature, Saraswati Pustak
Bandhar: Ahmedabad, 1989.

29. Virtually every regional language had many versions of the story and
it is not possible to discuss them all in a short essay.

30. J.W.de Jong, The Story of Rama in Tibet, Franz Steiner: Stuttgart, 1989.
31. As in the Javanese version, Serat Kanda.

32. W. Stutterheim, Rama-Legends and Rama-Reliefs in Indonesia, Ab-
hinav Publications: New Delhi, 1989, p. 23 ff.

33. ibid.

34. D.C. Sircar, ‘The Guhila Claim of Solar Origin’, Journal of Indian
History, 1964, XLII, pp.381-7. Romila Thapar, ‘Genealogy as a Source of
Social History,’ in Thapar, Ancient Indian Social History, pp. 326-60

35. Romila Thapar, ‘Ramayana: Theme and Variation’, op. cit.

36. N.N. Misra, ‘Folk Elements in the Jagmohan Ramayana,’ in A.K.
Banerjee (ed.), The Ramayana in Eastern India, Calcutta, 1983, pp. 74ff.
37. N. Siddhantaratna, Adhyatmaramayana, Calcutta Sanskrit Series: Cal-
cutta, 1935; F. Whaling, The Rise of the Religious Significance of Rama,
Oxford University Press: Delhi, 1980. B.H. Kapadia, ‘The Adhyatma-
ramayana’, Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda), 1964—5,14, pp.
164-70.

38. Adhyatma-Ramayana, 1.2.54—55

39. ibid. 2. 6. 65ff. This idea catches on in folk versions, as forexample in
Maharashtra, where in one version he is a thief of the Koli caste to begin
with. G.D. Sontheimer, ‘The Ramayana in Contemporary Folk Traditions
of Maharashtra’, in M. Thiel-Holstmann (ed.), Contemporary Ramayana
Traditions (in press)

40. ibid. 3.7.1 ff.

41. ibid. 3.7.65.

42. ibid. 7.4.32ff.

43. ibid. 7.5.2ff.

44. Brockington, Righteous Rama, Oxford University Press: New Delhi,
1984, op. cit., p. 257ff.

A Historical Perspective on the Story of Rama | 163

45. WL. Smith, Ramayana Tradition in Eastern India, University of
Stockholm: Stockholm, 1988, p. 136ff.

46. A. Bakker, Ayodhya, Egbert Forsten: Groningen, 1984.

47, Ramacharitamanas, 7. 97-103.

48. Mahabharata, 3. 186-188; Matsya Purana, 273; Vishnu Purana 6.1,
Vayu Purana, 58; Brahmanda Purana, 2.3.74.; B.N.S. Yadav, ‘The Ac-
counts of the Kali Age and the Social Transition from the Antiquity to the
Middle Ages’, Indian Historical Review, 1978-79, 5, 1 and 2, 31-63.

49. Kapil Kumar, ‘The Ramacharitamanas as a radical text; Baba Ram
Chandra in Oudh 1920-1950’, in Sudhir Chandra (ed.), Social Transforma-
tion and Creative Imagination, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1984.
See also M.H. Siddiqi, Agrarian Unrest in Northern India, Vikas: New
Delhi, 1978.

50. D. Shulman, ‘Battle as Metaphor in Tamil Folkand Classical Tradition,’
in S.H. Blackburn and A.K. Ramanujam (eds.), Another Harmony, Oxford
University Press: New Delhi, 1988, pp. 105-30.

51. Romila Thapar, ‘Syndicated Moksha’, Seminar, New Dethi, September
1985, 313, pp. 14—22. See also, ‘Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient
History and the Modem Search for a Hindu Identity’, Modern Asian Studies,
Cambridge, 1989, 2, 23, pp. 209-39.

Colonialism and Communalism!

Aditya Mukherjee

Corimunalism is above all an ideology. It is a particular way of looking
at and mobilizing society which began to be promoted in India in the
second half of the nineteenth century. The communal view assumed that
Indian society was divided into homogeneous religious communities
which shared common secular interests, i.e. economic, political, social
and cultural interests, which were different from and antagonistic to the
interests of those belonging to other religions. In other words, it was
assumed that among the Indian people it was the religious identity which
dominated (their entire social existence being organized around this
identity), subsuming other identities such as class, linguistic, regional,
cultural and national identities. Perpetuating yet another orientalist
stereotype, it was made out that Indians were ‘unique’ in this regard, as
other societies, particularly advanced Western societies, were not seen to
be organized in this manner.

This was a view of Indian society which the British colonial rulers did
much to create and propagate. Their success is evident from the fact that
decades after independence many Indians, from academicians to ordi-
nary citizens, still tend to analyse their own society, from the ancient past
to the present, in religious, communal or casteist categories while using
secular categories of class, nation, etc., to analyse Western societies. For
_ years no one flinched at ancient, medieval and modern Indian history
being periodized, a /a James Mill (a major influence on British thinking
on India since the early nineteenth century), as the Hindu period, Muslim
period and British period (note the switching of categories, itis not called
the Christian period). This despite the existence of a substantial secular
current which has been critical of this irrational switching of categories
while dealing with similar phenomena in different societies. W.C. Smith
(1946) was among the first to brilliantly highlightthis aspect by repeatedly
demonstrating how communal categories, which were readily used for
describing aspects in Indian society, appeared absurd when used to

Colonialism and Communalism | 165

describe the same aspect in the West.

AS an aside it may be noted that ‘communalism’ is supposed to be so
‘peculiar’ to the Indian context that even the meaning of the word is not
understood in the West except among those closely familiar with India.
However, the easiest comparison with a phenomenon the West is familiar
with is racism. All one needs to do is substitute colour of skin for religion.
The ideological underpinnings of both the phenomena are very similar.
Anti-Semitism is another comparable phenomenon.

Without entering into debate on the historical roots of racism and
anti-Semitism in the West, it can be said with a considerable degree of
confidence that Indian society was not split since ‘time immemorial’ into
religious communal categories. Nor is it so divided today in areas where
communal ideology has not yet penetrated. In traditional Indian society
there weredifferent religious groups, with different ritual practices, social
customs and ritual taboos in relation to each other.” There was also
evidence of religious fanaticism and oppression. However, communalism
as it is understood today (where religion is used to mobilize all sections
and classes of areligious community basically for achieving political and
economic goals), is a modern phenomenon, which took root half way
through the British colonial presence in India—in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Communal ideology and politics emerged simul-
taneously with, and in distorted response to, the ermergence of modern
politics based on generating public opinion, popular participation and
mass mobilization.

The parallel with the rise of modem nationalism is instructive. Though
different religions and religious differences have existed for centuries,
communalism was a modem phenomenon, a product of moder historical
developments, in the same way as (despite the existence of empires and
large regional political entities since ancient times) nationalism as a
modem ideology emerged all over the world only in the modern period
with the development of a specific historical conjuncture. It would be as
absurd and anachronistic to call a medieval religious bigot like Aurangzeb
‘communal’ as it would be to call an ancient empire-builder like Chandra
Gupta a ‘nationalist’.

In this essay, I will address myself to the question of how communal
ideology, which made its appearance in the late nineteenth century,
became a mass force over the following decades, and will discuss the role
of colonialism and the policies of the colonial government that helped in
propagating communalism in India and encouraging it to take deep roots
in Indian society.

166 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

By the second half of the nineteenth century, certain objective conditions
emerged which created fertile ground for communal and communal-type
ideologies or movements to take root. Many of these conditions related
particularly to the potential of a Hindu-Muslim divide and partially
explain why it was this division, among so many others that were tried
(based on caste, region, language, class, etc.), which caught on and grew
so rapidly. Very briefly these conditions are discussed here.

First, due to a large number of factors, which were not designed to
produce this result, there was an uneven development among the Hindu
and Muslim middle and upper classes. The fact that colonial rule came
first to coastal areas like Bengal where the Muslims belonged largely to
the poorer classes, meant that they, unlike the well-to-do Hindus, were
unable to take advantage of ‘modern’ colonial education and thereby enter
government service (the main employment opportunity outside agricul-
ture in that period) or other middle-class occupations which required-such
education. British rule came only later to areas like the North-Western
Provinces (present UP) where a substantial section of the upper classes
were Muslims. By the time ‘modern’ education spread among the Mus-
lims, in the late nineteenth century, the limited opportunities in ad-
ministration, business and the professions had shrunk even further,
creating the potential for dissatisfaction among the ‘late-comers’.

There were some other factors which contributed to the share of the
Muslims in Indian middle class development being relatively weak. The
social and religious reform movements, the so-called ‘Renaissance’ that
India witnessed in the nineteenth century, which exposed the Indian
people to rationalism, western ideas and thought, etc., remained largely
confined to the Hindus. The Muslim masses continued for long (even after
the advent of Syed Ahmad Khan in the 1860s) to be led by conservative
and reactionary upper classes which were hostile to modern education
and other aspects of social change. The main impact of the forward-look-
ing, reformist, modern intelligentsia was among the Hindus.

To add to all this, the mistaken British understanding of the imperialist
government that it was the Muslims who were particularly seditious, and
that they were chiefly responsible for the Revolt of 1857, made them adopt
a policy of suppressing the Muslims. For nearly two decades after the
Revolt, the Muslims were subjected to political and administrative dis-
crimination. Consequently, the percentage of Muslims employed in the
administration fell steeply in many areas. The increasing shift from
Persian to English in conducting official business gave the English-edu-
cated Hindus a clear advantage over the Muslims, further accentuating

Colonialism and Communalism | 167

the imbalance.

Second, while the above factors created a situation tailor-made for
promoting a communal divide, particularly among the middle-class Mus-
lims and Hindus, there were certain other developments which en-
gendered divisions of this kind in general. For example, by the second
half of the nineteenth century, the colonial structuring of the Indian
economy, the thwarting of the potential of rapid economic development ,
and the structuring of backwardness, produced conditions of economic
stagnation if not decline. Scarcity, unemployment and even famines
became rampant. This created a situation conducive to aggressive com-
petitiveness among groups formed around narrow identities, where one
group’s gain was seen as the other’s loss. As W.C. Smith put it, ‘A
circumscribed capitalism produces the conditions under which com-
munalism, or some parallel form of group discord, flourishes.’ ¢

In effect, colonial intervention dislodged the traditiona! order in Indian
society without bringing in its place an adequate modem structure. The
traditional identities, the moral order as well as the economic support
system provided by the village communities and other traditional institu-
tions began to give way under the colonial impact. Hurled into a new
Situation of social and economic insecurity and finding the traditional
identities and moral order inadequate to deal with it, the Indian people
were faced with a situation where they had to look for and evolve new
identities (and ideologies based on those identities) which could encom-
pass, explain and enable them to handle the new, modern, colonial reality.
Communal ideologies now competed with the emergent modern secular
ideologies to provide precisely such a framework.

However, while the various objective conditions discussed above cer-
tainly provided the basis for the growth of communal-type ideologies it
cannot be argued deterministically that these conditions would inevitably
have led to their acceptance and spread on Indian soil. This was particular-
ly so because around the time that the divisive communal ideology began
to make its first forays into Indian society, there had already emerged a
powerful alternate current under the aegis of the Indian national move-
ment which attempted to weld India into a nation, and to give a fillip to
the process of the Indian ‘nation in the making’. This was a current which
attempted to explain the same ‘objective conditions’ not on the basis of
the competing indigenous groups, sections, religious communities, etc..,
but on the basis of an anti-colonial ideological discourse. It tried to meet
the identity crisis of a society in transition from the pre-capitalist,
medieval system to the ‘modern’ colonial one, not by rallying people

;, 168 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

around narrow caste or religious identities but by attempting to forge
broad secular identities like that of the nation—followed later by other
secular identities such as class, region, language, culture, etc., all
promoted as complementary and not antithetical to the national identity.

The fact that despite the best efforts of the varied secular currents in
the Indian national movement, the emergence and spread of the communal
virus could not be contained, has a lot to do with the critical role played
by the colonial government.

The role of government can be critical in spreading communalism or
communal-type movements in several ways; it can use state power to
rapidly communalize the state apparatuses—from the bureaucracy, the
police and the judiciary to the education system and the media. With
government backing and the state apparatuses communalized, the
promoters of communal politics find it infinitely easier to spread com-
munal consciousness in civil society.

There is another little-noticed aspect. The study of mass movements in
history in various parts of the world shows that itis extremely difficult to
make the masses accept a programme or demandand be willing to launch
a movement on that basis unless in their consciousness it was a morally
legitimate demand. This legitimacy could be derived from a traditional
notion of justice passed down the generations. In a situation where no
such clear sanction from the past was available, ‘legality’ or acceptance
by the state apparatuses of the faimess or correctness of such a demand,
went a long way towards lending it legitimacy.”

How was communalism, a new ideology, to find acceptance among the
masses and get them to move on that basis to the extent that they would
be willing to riot and loot, and in total contravention of the traditional
moral code, commit crimes like rape, murder and mutilation of their
fellow citizens, neighbours, business associates, co-workers, etc.? It was
difficult to find legitimacy for such a course from the past, from within
the historical memory or the existing sense of history of the people. Hence
the need felt by communalists to distort history and, through continuous
and repeated propaganda, attempt to introduce a false notion among the
people of their own history. This was however a slow and prolonged
process that would yield results only after the communal view had already
spread sufficiently. In this situation, the legality, the legitimacy and, to
use Francis Robinson’s term, the ‘prestige’, lent to communal ideology
and politics by the government and various other state apparatuses, played

Colonialism and Communalism | 169

a critical role in their acceptance and spread among the mass of people.
Interestingly, even in the communal falsification of history (which, in
turn, created a communal historical memory) the role played by the British
government and the government-conwrolled education system, media,
etc., was very important, even as early as the beginning of the nineteenth
century.

The potential of the colonial regime to push the forces of communalism
was great, a potential fully utilized by it. It did so for several reasons.

Most obviously the colonial government promoted communalism to
weaken the rising anti-imperialist movement in India inter alia, by pitting
loyalist communal forces as political adversaries of the nationalist
mainstream. It is not an accident that communal and communal-type
political forces in India have historically by and large ended up playing a
socially reactionary and politically loyalist role. This was because on the
one hand they hampered any mobilization based on secular categories like
class, or nation, which cut across religious categories, and on the other
hand they focussed their attack on the ‘other’ i.e., the other communities
and not imperialism.

It bears emphasis (as the contrary view is often projected) that it was
not only the minority communalists represented by the Muslim League,
asection of the Akalis, etc., but also the majority communailists, the Hindu
Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), who per-
formed this essentially loyalist role. Both the rival communalist forces
concentrated tneir attack on the Congress, the leading anti-imperialist
organization, as the secular assumptions of this organization threatened
to erode the very basis of the communal formations. The members of the
opposite community came a close second on the hate list. At the peak of
the nationalist agitation in 1942 it was not only the Muslim League which
stayed well away from the movement but the Hindu Mahasabha and the
RSS also advised their cadres to keep aloof and ‘conserve’ their energies
for the struggle against the real enemies and not fritter it away in
anti-imperialist agitations.

Second, the spread of communalism enabled colonialism to expand its
social base to classes and sections of Indian society which had nothing to
gain and everything to lose from colonialism. To begin with, the social
base of colonialism and communalism had been the same, consisting of
the landed gentry, the princes, the higher bureaucracy, etc., sections which
also benefited economically and otherwise from colonialism. However,

170 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

with the spread of communalism among large sections of the lower middle
class and even sections of the working class and the peasantry, these chief
victims of colonial exploitation were rendered objectively at ‘the com-
mand of colonialism’.” This was a major gain for colonialism. It would
not have been possible to secure the support of these classes through
concessions which would effectively end their exploitative relationship
with colonialism, as that would threaten the very raison d’étre of
colonialism.

Third, for a regime that was based not on coercion alone but also had
certain ideological or hegemonic foundations, a degree of moral
legitimacy both among the rulers and the ruled was necessary. It was the
spread of communalism that increasingly provided the most important
legitimation for the continuance of colonial rule.

The traditional arguments in favour of colonialism, ‘the civilizing
mission’ or the ‘white man’s burden’, were wearing thin. The modem
Indian intelligentsia, which in the early nineteenth century saw in British
rule a ‘gift of divine providence’ which would pull India out of the
backwardness of centuries and expose it to modem civilization, were by
the second half of the nineteenth century totally disillusioned. Now they
saw colonialism as the chief obstacle to modernization. In Britain itself
radical trends began to emerge which began to question the legitimacy of
imperialism.

In this context the argument of the necessity of maintaining the colonial
presence in ‘defence of the minorities’ proved very useful. The arguments
that Britain was staying on to prevent a communal civil war in which the
weak minorities would be suppressed and that they were unable to leave
because the warring groups could not come to a mutual agreement, were
used to legitimize British presence in India till the very end. Britain used
similar arguments (in Africa it was to prevent tribe from killing tribe) to
deny autonomy to the peoples of various other countries both before and
after Indian independence.

It must be clarified that the colonial government, though it claimed the
conwary, was never actually interested in a principled defence of the
minorities. It promoted only communal minority groupings and that too
when they served the purpose of weakening the forces of anti-imperialism
and did not in any way adversely affect other imperial interests.

For example, the so-called consistent pro-Muslim stance of the British
was a myth. As stated above, after the Revolt of 1857 till well into the
1870s, the Government was positively hostile to the Muslims. It was in
an effort to win Muslim support for the regime and following the emer-

Colonialism and Communalism | 171

gence of a loyalist communal stand among the Muslims that the Govern-
ment reversed its policy. It now began to profess special support to the
Muslims while basically patronizing the Muslim communal strand. How-
ever, the smallest sign of political opposition evoked threats of withdrawal
of patronage—as happened in UP at the turn of the century when sections
from within the Government-patronized Aligarh college began to adopt
anti-government postures on the language (Hindi vs. Urdu) issue. There
were other instances as well when anti-government agitation, even when
led by essentially loyalist communal forces (Muslim or Sikh or Hindu),
were firmly put down.

Further, the Government, after promoting, and using tothehilt, Muslim
communalism for well over half a century, ditched them in the end. Until
1945, i.e., till ‘the British had worked on the assumption that the empire
must survive’, Muslim communalism and its ultimate demand for a
separate state were ‘a useful counterpoise to the Congress demand for
independence’. However, once, in 1946, the decision to leave was clear,
the British ‘preferred to transfer power to a united India’, since that was
perceived to better Serve British economic and military strategic interests
in the post-war world. 7 Unable to actually prevent Partition, since Muslim
communalism had by now acquired the character of the proverbial
Frankenstein’s monster that no longer responded to the dictates of its
creator, the British nevertheless showed their unconcern for Muslim
communialists by leaving behind ‘a moth-eaten Pakistan’.®

The cynical use of the minorities and the absence of any genuine
interest in them was starkly evident in the manner in which alarge number
of British civil and military officials, on the eve of their departure,
adopted, at best, a laid-back attitude while one of the worst civil wars in
modern times was let loose in front of them in the form of the Partition
riots. Again, the British made no attempt to insist on safeguards for the
minorities in the newly-independent states which were to come up when
the empire wound up its interests in this region. It became clear that
communalism was promoted because it facilitated the maintenance of the
colonial regime, and not because of any inherent affinity to any com-
munity. .

Communalism was promoted by the colonial government in multifarious
ways. To begin with, the very viewing of Indian society communally, the
calculation by the Government of a proportion of jobs in the civil and
military services, seats in educational institutions, membership in the

172 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

legislature, even membership of political parties, etc., in terms purely of
religious (or caste) origins, itself promoted communalism (or casteism).
Colonial writing, both by administrators and historians, enquiries con-
ducted by the Government, statistical surveys, etc., consistently used
religious and caste categories to measure the distribution of people in jobs
and in general political andeconomic activity, even whenreligion or caste
clearly had nothing to do with it, and refused to take into account or adopt
more meaningful criteria in this context, such as income, ownership of
land or other means of production, possession of education or ‘intellectual
capital’, class position, regional cultural traditions, social status, influence
of competing ideologies, political beliefs, etc.

The government’s attitude and practice encouraged the people to view
themselves in these categories, to compete with each other, and try to
secure official support for the reservation of a larger share of the national
cake for members of their respective religious or caste groups as against
members belonging to other groups, rather than turn their attention to the
question of the role of the existing system and the colonial government
in keeping the size of the total cake stagnant, if not shrinking. This was a
Situation of obvious advantage to the Government. While sections or
groups would come to the Government with demands for reservations,
and the like, the Government, by offering or withdrawing concessions on
this basis, could arouse communal feelings and split Indian society down
the middle. In much the same way today attempts at casteist reservations
are arousing casteist passions, and caste wars are breaking out even in
areas where caste consciousness had greatly eroded.

The colonial regime also promoted and encouraged the notion that the
introduction of the democratic principle and elections on that basis, a
long-standing demand of Indian nationalists, would be injurious to
minority interests as it would lead to domination by the majority, the
Hindus. Instead, the pernicious principle of separate electorates was
pushed. Embedded in the idea of separate electorates was the notion that
members of one religious community could not represent even the politi-
cal, economic, and other secular interests of other religious communities,
and hence the notion of separate nations. As W.C. Smith pointed out, the
institution of separate electorates was the principal technique in the hands
of the government of spreading communalism by splitting the people into
separate constituencies so that they voted communally, thought com-
munally, listened only to communal election speeches, judged the
delegates communally, looked for constitutional and other reforms only
interms of more relative communal power and expressed their grievances

Colonialism and Communalism | 173

communally. It is not fortuitous that independent India, while reserving
seats in legislatures for certain categories like the Harijans or untouch-
ables, refused to have separate electorates, i.e., voters were not limited to
any one category. This meant the candidate had to appeal to members of
other castes and religions in order to be elected.

The cynically discriminating manner in which the Government used
the State apparatus to promotecommunalism while coming down heavily
on nationalism had a lot to do with the rapid growth of the former.
Flagrantly using double standards, the Governmentruthlessly suppressed
nationalist propaganda while refusing to take action, in the name of civil
liberties, against the most virulent communal propaganda. The police and
the legal and administrative machinery were quick to nip nationalist
agitation in the bud while communal agitation, including communal riots
were allowed to fester by a suddenly lax and inactive administration.
Concern for civil liberties was again pleaded by the officials to deny the
demand of Hindu and Muslim legislators for legislation to curb activity
that could lead to communal riots. There is evidence that sometimes the
administration even connived at instigating communal riots. Teachers,
Students, writers, and even government servants were allowed to
propagate communal ideas and participate in communal politics often
receiving honours and titles for such labours; but if they showed any
affinity to nationalism or nationalist activity, firm action was taken. ‘The
nationalist (historian) K.P. Jayswal. .. was made to resign his post in the
Calcutta University. . . Prem Chand was first compelled to destroy a
collection of his short stories and later dismissed from the Education
Department’. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, who was also a Deputy
Collector, was persuaded under threat to alter, in later editions of his
novels, the nationalist anti-British edge into a communal anti-Muslim
one.

Yet another major way in which the colonial authorities promoted
communalism was by giving recognition to and dealing with communal
elements (often exclusively so) as the representatives of the religious
community to which they belonged. They did this even when these
elements could possibly not make such a claim. For example, as noted by
Francis Robinson, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, after he entered his actively
loyalist phase (in the latter part of the 1880s), was ‘raised up as an
advocate of his community’, despite the fact that he had ‘little in common
with either the great Muslim peasant populations of Bengal and the Punjab
or with the Muslim artisan masses of the UP towns’. Nor did it matter that
‘the majority of his co-religionists branded him infidel’. ‘His views were

174 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

accepted by Government as Muslim views, and because they were ac-
cepted, they found currency among other Muslims who might otherwise
have thought differently. By building up the (Aligarh) College and Syed
Ahmed, Government assisted at the birth of a Muslim political party and
a Muslim political doctrine.’”” (italics mine.) Interestingly, roughly
around the same time, in the 1880s, the claim of the Indian National
Congress of representing the Indian people was summarily dismissed with
theremark that itrepresentedonly a ‘microscopic minority’ of upper-caste
Hindus.

The same pattern was repeated in the twentieth century. Now the
Muslim League was promoted by the Government as the voice of the
Muslims. This when, as late as 1937, the Muslim League got only 4.4 per
cent of the Muslim votes in the provincial elections, in spite of communal
electorates and the franchise being restricted to eleven per cent of the
population consisting largely of the upper and middle classes, among
whom the League had a greater following. The League, thus, did not have
the allegiance of more than a small proportion of the Muslim population
till the 1940s when the situation underwent a radical change. The Con-
gress could easily claim far greater support among them. Despite.this, the
Government branded a secular mass party like the Congress as merely a
Hindu organization. The narrow-minded, communal Muslim League was
projected as the real and sole representative of the Muslims and was on
that basis treated on par with the Congress! In the 1940s the Muslim
League was given a virtual veto on all Constitutional proposals, effective-
ly thwarting Congress moves. This attitude of the Government naturally
enhanced the prestige of the League among the Muslims, and demoralized
the nationalist forces among them.

The manner in which the British Government promoted communalism
had clearly undergone a substantial change. From the 1870s till about the
end of the nineteenth century, the effort, mainly through support to the
Aligarh movement, was to ‘woo the Muslims back to the fold of the
colonial regime’ by offering them special concessions and to “discourage
popular political agitation among Mahomedans’, “ and thus keep them
away from the Congress. At the turn of the century, when especially the
younger elements among the Muslims were getting restive and the na-
tional movernent had entered a more militant phase, the policy was
changed from that of trying to keep Muslims out of all politics to
promoting loyalist, constitutional, communal politics of the Muslim
League to neutralize the anti-imperialist agitational politics of the Con-
gress.

Colonialism and Communalism | 175

Though communal politics was now promoted actively, the Muslim
League was not yet given all out support. The overall policy remained
one of what Bipan Chandra has described as ‘controlled communalism’.
An anti-British Hindu backlash could result from too great an identifica-
tion with the League. Pushing Hindu communalists too far, on the other
hand, had the danger of welding the Hindus, splintered into castes and
sects, into one community, and also the threat of majority communalism
tuming anti-government could not be countenanced. Further, too much
communal disturbance could cause an administrative law and order
problem; though, if the choice was between the politically dangerous
unity of the Indian people and the administratively troublesome ‘diver-
gence of ideas and collision’, then British officialdom was quite clear that
‘of the two the latter (was) the least risky’.

It was with the commencement of the Second World War that the British
threw caution to the winds and gave all out support to the Muslim League.
The fact that the national movement had to be checkmated at any cost in
the critical war situation, and that the Hindus had in any case been largely
lost to the nationalist camp, may have contributed to this stance. This all
out government support to the Muslim League, the fact that the political
arena was now open to the League without challenge, with the Congress
’ banned and a large number of Congressmen including most of the leaders
in jail, and, very importantly, that the League now acquired limited access
to State power with the Government helping to dislodge non-League
Ministries and install League-dominated Ministries in all the provinces
of prospective Pakistan except Punjab, combined with the deliberate cry
of ‘Islam in danger’ raised by the League, helped the League to grow
rapidly and acquire a firm mass base for the first time.

With the rapid growth and ‘massization’ of Muslim communalism, and
it reaching an aggressive, separatist phase, Hindu communalism, which
had remained a relatively weak force, also began to acquire strength. The
stage was set for the dreadful holocaust of the Partition days—an event
whichcommunalized Indian society as never before. The wounds in some
regions were so deep that they are yet to heal. This was the legacy for
which the Indian people continue to pay a heavy price. :

Though the role of colonialism and particularly the colonial government
was critical in the growth of conununalism, the end of colonial rule did
not lead to the fading away of communalism as was hoped by many
nationalist leaders. (A hope which might have contributed to no major

176 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

sustained struggle being mounted against communalism after inde-
pendence.)

The approach towards communalism of the post-colonial regimes in
India (Pakistan followed a different path) was vastly different from that
of colonial regimes. Communalism was not the chief prop of these
regimes for staying in power. While communal parties, in various incar-
nations of the Hindu Mahasabha, Muslim League, Akali Dal etc., survived
the colonial era, their distance from political power, except for a brief
interregnum between 1977-79, and again since end-1989, has been a
saving grace.

However, even the secular forces after independence made certain
compromises with communalism though for reasons different from the
colonial regime. In a society already communalized to a considerable
extent, the logic of electoral politics led even secular parties of all hues,
including those of the Left, to resort, in varying degrees, to short cuts to
popular mobilization, by appealing to or allying with parties that appealed
to the existing communal consciousness rather than attempting the rela-
tively difficult and long-term task of altering it.

The ruling regimes, like the Congress, which has ruled for most of the
post-independence period, have tended to meet the challenge of com-
munalism inadequately. Often the problem was approached in economis-
tic terms—a tendency, which so committed an anti-communalist as
Jawaharlal Nehru, shared, with the rest of the Left. It was hoped that
economic development or growth of economistic class struggles would
by itself lead to the erosion of communalism (a hope which has been
repeatedly belied) and hence a sustained ideological battle against what
is above all an ideology was neglected.

Also, the technique of trying to meet the communal challenge by
accommodating or absorbing a section of the communalists within the
ranks of the secular parties (witness, for example, the repeated merger of
Akali factions into the Congress) or by trying to give concessions to and
dealing with moderate communalists in an effort to first neutralize the
extremists and then marginalize the moderates, have failed miserably. The
result has.been, in the first case, the dilution of the secularism of the
secular parties and in the second, the lending of legitimacy to communal
politics and the constant upping of the demands of the so-called moderate
communalists.

The secular forces outside the Congress, including the Left, which have
largely remained out of power have fared no better. In their desperation
to dislodge the Congress and come to power they have tended to line up

Colonialism and Communalism | 177

opportunistically with avowedly communal forces. In the process they
have let loose dangerous political forces.

The communal forces on whose backs these secular parties tried to
achieve petty political gains have now grown menacingly. The
‘untouchables’ in Indian politics for many years after independence, they
now occupy centrestage in the political arena. They have demanded their
share of state power—and to the extent they achieved it they have and are
using it effectively to communalize the State apparatuses and civil society
in a manner reminiscent of the colonial State. After all, for these forces,
their very survival, like that of the colonial State, depends on the growth
and maintenance of communalism.

Today, more than forty years after independence, after having success-
fully overcome many of the legacies of colonialism, India’s failureto deal
with what was one of the chief props of colonialism looms large. Com-
munalism and communal-type movements like casteism have emerged as
the main threat to the Indian nation and the unity of the Indian people.
Forces which split the country in two in 1947 threaten to fragment it into
many more pieces. The irony is that this is happening not under the aegis
of an alien colonial regime but under the direct patronage or indirect
acquiescence of indigenous political forces whose primary aim is sup-
posed to be nation-building.

Notes

1. The works listed below are among those which have made a basic
contribution to this subject. I have drawn on them heavily particularly the
first two. The references in the text to these works are however generally
restricted to occasions where direct quotations have been used. W.C. Smith,
Modern Islam in India, Victor Gollancz, London, 1946; Bipan Chandra,
Communalism in Modern India, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1987
(2nd edition); S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858-1905, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1965; K.B. Krishna, The Problem of
Minorities, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1939; Francis Robinson,
Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’
Muslims, 1860-1923, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1975; Romila
Thapar, Harbans Mukhia and Bipan Chandra, Communalism and the Writ-
ing of Indian History, People’s Publishing House: New Delhi, 1977, 2nd
edition; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936-1947,
Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 1987.

2. The reference here is to James Mill, History of British India, London,
1826, reprinted by Associated Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982. Also
seeRomila Thapar, et. al., Communalismand the Writing of Indian History,
pp. 4ff.

178 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

3. However, that did not necessarily lead to a communal divide. Indian
history and Indian society today is replete with examples of how despite
ritual differences among Hindus, Muslims, Christians, etc., no communal
developments occurred for centuries—until they were deliberately
promoted.

4. W.C. Smith, ModernIslam in India, p.177.

5. See, e.g., Rodney Hilton, “Peasant Society, Peasant Movements and
Feudalism in Medieval Europe” in H. Landsberger (ed.), Rural Protest:
Peasant Movement and Social Change, Macmillan, London, 1973; E.P.
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, 1968; James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant:
Rebellion and Subsistence in South East Asia, Yale University Press, New
Haven and London, 1976, and Mridula Mukher jee, “Peasant Resistance and
Peasant Consciousness in Colonial India: ‘Subalterns’ and Beyond”,
Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 8 and 15 Oct. 1988.

6. Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, p.289 and Ch.4.

7. Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, pp.244-SS.

8. A phrase used by Jinnah to describe a truncated Pakistan which would
be on the two extremities cf a hostile India. See Bipan Chandra, Com-
munalism in Modern India, p.260.

9. ibid., pp.282-83.

10. Ibid.

11. Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims, p. 131, and
S. Gopal, op. cit., pp. 158ff.

12. This was the objective of the Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental Defence
Association of Upper India, an association founded in 1893. The ‘chief
organiser’ behind it was Theodore Beck, the principal of Aligarh College.
See Robinson, op. cit., pp. 121-22.

13. S. Gopal, op. cit., p. 201.

Hindu—Muslim Relations
Before and After 1947

Asghar Ali Engineer

Modern industrial societies are becoming increasingly multi-religious in
structure thanks to the rapid means of transport and internationalization
of commerce and industry. There was a time when European society was
mono-religious. But from the beginning of the twentiethcentury it tended
to become multi-religious due to the migration of people from colonial to
the metropolitan countries in search of better prospects. After the Second
World War, this trend grew very fast with rapid industrialization. Today
hardly any European society can boast of being uni-religious. With the
emergence of multi-religious societies, racial and communal tensions are
growing in these countries.

However, in India, society was multi-religious from the earliest period
in history with different waves of migration from outside, beginning
perhaps with the first wave of Aryan migrants entering into India. Many
others came subsequently, the latest being the Muslims who came into the
south as traders and into the north as conquerors from the seventh century
AD onwards. There were far-reaching consequences, both positive as well
as negative, of the coming of Muslims into India. Complex processes
started with the coming of Islam into India at different levels. At one level
there was rejection of Islam while at another not only accommodation but
synthesis resulted. The Brahmins, by and large, refused to be drawn into
the process of synthesis, whereas the lower castes, mostly untouchables,
either embraced Islam or accommodated to it to lesser or greater degrees.

The sectarian writings on both sides often stress that Hinduism and
Islam are incompatible. Those belonging: to the privileged upper castes
maintained that Islam is a closed religion and could not be integrated with
Hinduism, though all other religions which entered into India could
become integral parts of Hinduism. Islam, a sectarian, doctrinaire
religion, refused to be assimilated. Though this view has some element
of truth, it is, nevertheless, an oversimplification. The Muslim

180 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

theologians, often part of the ruling establishment, also adopted a rigid
stance towards Hinduism and dubbed Hindus as kafirs (non-believers)
with whom there could be no accommodation at the religious level.

More sociological insights are needed to understand the relations
between Islam and Hinduism in India during the medieval ages. As
pointed out above, it was not always a confrontation between the two.
One cannot understand this relationship merely on a theological and
doctrinaire level. One has to take caste and class interests into account.
The upper-caste Hindus dominated the cultural and religious scene in
India; in fact they had a monopoly over it. Cultural hegemony often
ensures political hegemony or results from it. In other words they are
always interacting. The upper castes were, therefore, rather reluctant to
accept the legitimacy of Islam and Islamic culture by accommodating it
into the Brahmanic fold. The Muslims, therefore, remained yavanas
(foreigners, those with whom one should not mix) and had to be kept at
a distance. The Muslim ruling classes, on the other hand, had their own
reasons: they had to maintain ‘religious’ distance from the Hindus to keep
up their own political and cultural hegemony. The theologians, more often
than not of West Asian or Central Asian extract, were part of the ruling
establishment, and hence treated Hindus as kafirs.

However, it does not mean that there was no accommodation on social
and political levels between the upper-caste Hindus and the upper-class
Muslims. There was. Political exigencies have their own logic. The
Hindus had to collaborate with Muslims and Muslims with Hindus: Many
Brahmins and Rajputs held high administrative posts during Muslim rule.
The two ruling classes which collaborated with each other also evolved
acomposite culture of sorts. It can thus be seen thatthe social and political
processes were extremely complex, even contradictory. There were un-
compromising stances as well as opportunistic compromises with creative
synthesis, too, thrown in. Only a historian with a proper historical perspec-
tive and a firm grasp of the socio-political realities can comprehend the
complex nature of this mutual protagonist—antagonist relationship be-
tween Islam and Hinduism in the medieval ages.

So far we have been discussing the relationship between upper-caste
Hindus and upper-class Muslims. But the bulk of Hindus and Muslims
were from the lower castes and classes. Their relationship was of an
assimilative nature. Most of the conversions to Islam occurred atthe lower
levels of the social strata. At these levels not only was there no confron-
tation between Hindus and Muslims but, on the contrary, the lower-caste
Hindus found in Islam a liberating force and embraced it. One can debate

Hindu—Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 | 181

whether or not their social status improved by embracing Islam but there
is no doubt that they could freely enter mosques and pray standing in the
same line with the upper-class Muslims. For the untouchables it was no
mean achievement. It gave them a sense of pride. Deprived of Sanskritiza-
tion, they welcomed Islamization. The masses of untouchables who
embraced Islam did not take a scriptural view of religion, rather they took
a folk view of it.

Thus Islam was Indianized. The Sufis who became models of Islamic
virtues, adopted not only the local idiom but also local customs and rituals.
The urs (death anniversary) rituals had many similarities with the temple

‘rituals, for example, taking out a sandal procession to wash the grave of

a Sufi saint or the idol of the temple, with sandal paste. These temple
rituals were extremely popular among the Hindus at all levels and adopt-
ing these rituals, in the teeth of opposition from the Muslim theologians,
created a popular base for Islam in Indian society. There may have been
confrontations between Islam and Hinduism as far as the scriptural view
of religion was concerned but there was no confrontation (but assimila-
tion) as far as the folk view of Islam and Hinduism was concerned.

Thus we see that there were two models of Islam before the Indian
people: the theological model and the Sufi model. The theological model
of Islam tended to be, for the reasons enumerated above, confrontationist;
whereas the Sufi model of Islam was assimilationist. While upper-class
Muslims tended to adopt the theological model both for religious and
political reasons, the low-class and low-caste Muslims adopted the Sufi
model as it was close to their folk traditions and it provided them escape
from the harsh realities of life. One cannot understand Indian Islam
without understanding the Sufi model which was assimilationist and
avoided confrontation. However, what is most tragic is that upper-caste
Hindu historians often take a purely scriptural view of Indian Islam and
concentrate their whole attention on the Muslim ruling classes and often
draw the wrong conclusions.

The south presents another scene altogether. There Islam did not come
through political conquests as in the north but through Arab traders. There
were trade relations between Kerala and the Arab world even in pre-Is-
lamic days. When the Arabian peninsula was Islamized, these Arab traders
adopted Islam and brought it to Kerala along with them. Thus, in the south,
Islam spread in the most peaceful manner. It was assimilationist like the
Sufi model of Islam. In fact the south was not devoid of the Sufistic model.
So in Kerala, and likewise in Tamil Nadu, Islam was highly assimilationist
and hence non-confrontationist.

182 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

It was somewhat different in what is known as Andhra Pradesh today.
There Islam developed somewhat confrontationist postures as it became
the religion of the ruling class led by the Nizam dynasty. The Nizam’s
rule did not adopt the local language and culture. It was a part of the
Muslim rule of the north and it preserved Persian and later Urdu as the
language of the administration, whereas the local language was Telugu.
Theruling class culture was north Indian composite culture in orientation.
Thus we see that the south Indian scene was not uniform.

There is one more fundamental question to be considered before we
proceed further on the subject of the Hindu—Muslim relationship. Is the
nature of confrontation theological or political? Can there be a purely
theological confrontation, or confrontation on grounds of religion, as is
often made out? It is very difficult to find evidence for confrontation
purely on religious grounds. While the instrumentality of religion in
political matters cannot be denied, it is difficult to find historical evidence
for wars between Hindu and Muslim rulers solely on religious grounds.
The priests or theologians may denounce followers of other religions as
malecchg (unholy) or yavana and kafirs respectively, but they confine
their war to words, not to swords.

We also have to remember that a society is not constituted purely by
religion. There are other equally important constituents of society,
economic and political in nature, which motivate human behaviour. For
that matter human behaviour, be it towards one’s fellow religionists or
followers of other religions, has very complex motives; its determinant is
usually not one single factor. It has several determinants and more so if
one happens to be a politician and aruler. Neither Hinduism, nor Islam
can be the sole determinant of a ruler’s behaviour. It would be a gross
simplification of history if one sees religion as only the motivating force
of a ruler. Also, one should distinguish between consciousness and
behaviour. Consciousness may be determined by ideological factors alone
but not so human behaviour. Behaviour is much more complex and
interest-oriented whereas consciousness is often ideologically-oriented.
The communal problem cannot be judged purely from the ideological
viewpoint; one has to take into accountits interest-orientation too, as well
as other aspects.

It is in the light of the above discussion that we must try to understand the
communal problem and relations between Hindus and Muslims. It is
important to note that communalism is a modern phenomenon and is a

Hindu-Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 / 183

product of colonial society. Its seeds were sown after the failure of the
Revolt of 1857. At that time Hindus and Muslims made common cause
to throw the British out and united under Bahadurshah Zafar, the last
Mughal ruler. The revolt was crushed and the feudal structure of society
was replaced by the colonial system. It is this shift in social structure that
brought about the genesis of communalism. Communalism is not a feudal
phenomenon but as far as India is concerned, it is a product of colonial
society.

However, it does not mean that complete responsibility of the genesis
of communalism goes to the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British. All
rulers, including democratic ones, follow such a policy, and the contem-
porary democratic rulers of India have been no exception to this. We must
try to understand the genesis of communalism in a deeper sense. It is as
much a structural as a political problem. In the political sense it was the
divide and rule policy of the British which generated it, and in the
structural sense it was generated not only by the limited capacity of the
colonial economy to grow but also by keen competition for jobs and
political positions and sinecures between the two major communities of
India, i.e. Hindus and Muslims.

A feudal structure of society does not generate much competition
between different communities either in the sphere of economy or in that
of polity. Nor is there any competition for public offices in that society.
Public appointments are based on rewards for loyalty to the ruling
dynasty, ratherthan on competition. Also, thereis no political competition
in a feudal society as the ruler more often comes to power by force than
by contested elections. The colonial society established by the British in
India ushered inrestricted democratic competition as well as competition
for jobs. In an ideal situation the competition would be between in-
dividuals but in a backward society like India there was little competition
on merit between individuals and instead competition took place more on
the basis of community thus giving rise to Communal tensions.

The firstimportantevent which generated communal tensions in Indian
society was when the language of administration was changed from
Persian to Urdu at lower level courts. Some Hindus of Benares agitated
for replacing Urdu with Hindi written in the Devanagari. The implications
were obvious. If Urdu was replaced by Hindi written in the Devanagari,
many Muslims would lose their court jobs and Hindus would qualify more
for them. Sir Syed resented this as he considered Urdu ‘a memento of the
Muslim rule in this country’. Replying to a British official called
Shakespeare, who was his friend, Sir Syed wrote, ‘Now I am convinced that

184 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

both these communities will not join whole-heartedly in anything... . On
account of the so-called “educated” people, hostility between the two
communities will increase immensely in the future. He who lives will see.’

In a way Sir Syed’s words proved to be prophetic. He blames educated
people for developing communal hostility. The modern theorists of com-
munalism, including this author, consider communalism a product of the
educated middle-class, and not of the illiterate masses. Why does hostility
develop between educated people of different communities? Here it
developed on the question of language, as on language depends job
potentiality. Throughout the freedom struggle it can be observed that the
middle classes fought both for jobs as well as elective political positions.
Even in post-independence India, as we shall see in the next section,
political andeconomic competition generates powerful hostility between
the two communities. Sir Syed’s prophecy that ‘hostility between the two
communities will increase immensely in the future’ and that ‘he who lives
will see’ found fulfillment not only immediately after his death but even
in contemporary Indian society.

There is one more instance from Sir Syed’s life which illustrates well
the nature of communal conflict in colonial India. When Lord Ripon
introduced the Local Self-Government Bill inthe Council, Sir Syed made
a plea for separate nomination of Muslims to local boards and district
councils in January 1883. It is interesting to quote the speech at some
length as it throws important light on our thesis on communalism:

The system of representation by election, in countries
where the population is composed of one race and one
creed, is no doubt the best system that can be adopted.

But, my lord, in a country like India, where caste dis-
tinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the
various races, where religious distinctions are still violent,
where education in its modern sense has still not made an
equal or proportionate progress among all sections of the
population, I am convinced that the introduction of the
principle of election, pure and simple, (to) the local boards
and district councils would be attended with evils of great
significance. ...

The larger community would totally over-ride the inter-
ests of the smaller community. . . and the measures might
make, the differences of race and creed more violent than
ever.

Hindu-Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 / 185

Sir Syed’s words once again proved prophetic. He correctly diagnosed
the genesis of hostility between the two Indian communities. He knew
that it is not religion or the respective belief systems of Hindus and
Muslims which are the cause of this hostility. They lived in peace and
harmony otherwise—despite differing belief systems. It is only the com-
petition for elected posts which has generated tensions. He was right that
unless all the communities acquire education in the real modern sense in
equal measure (i.e., acquire equal merit in the search for jobs as well as
elected posts) democratic competitiveness would continue to generate
powerful hostility between these castes and communities.

The Muslim separatist movement which ultimately culminated in the
creation of Pakistan should not be seen as religious in orientation. Muslim
theologians like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Shibli N’umani, Maulana
Husain Ahmad Madani who were all towering religious personalities of
international fame, never approved of the Muslim League and its
separatist politics. They either remained independent or became allies of
the Congress or joined it. No theologian of any repute or standing
supported the League. The Jami’ at al’ Ulama-i-Hind, an organization of
theologians of the Deoband school, steadfastly supported the Indian
National Congress.

Maulana Shibli, a noted historian of Islam and a theologian, sharply
criticized the Muslim League and called it a strangecreation and ridiculed
it.” Shibli was also highly critical of the deputation of the League which
met the Viceroy at Shimla in 1906. In his words, ‘It (i.e., the deputation)
was a great tamasha enacted on the national stage.’ Shibli also says that
Muslims wanied to share the rights which the Hindus obtained (from the
British rulers) after twenty years of struggle, simply by joining the League
(without any struggle). The refrain of the League was that ‘the Hindus are
trying to suppress us and hence we should protect our interests’.

Shibli greatly admires the Congress and its demands. He feels that if
these demands are accepted the destiny of the country would change. In
comparison to that the Muslim League’s demands are, according to him,
much inferior. He also severely criticizes the feudal, slavish leadership of
the League pursuing its vested interests and the titles of the Raj.” He even
advises the League to give up communal politics and think in the context
of the whole country.

Another outstanding theologian, Maulana Azad, was also irreconcilab-
ly opposed to separatist politics. He was a greatchampion of Hindu—Mus-
lim unity and found legitimacy for this unity in the holy Koran. He came
up with the concept of wahdat-e-din, i.e. unity of religions. According to

186 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

this concept, laws and rituals might differ but the essence of religion is
one. Azad quotes profusely from the holy Koran to prove his point. Azad
believed in composite nationalism and a united struggle against the
British. He was highly critical of those who blindly supported British
policies. He wrote in one of his articles:

Indian Muslims followed blindly the policy of the British
government. .. (They) broke off ail relations with the
Hindus who were the real active group in the
country. . . .We were wamed that the Hindus were a
majority and if we went along with them they would crush
us... . The result was that the government which should
otherwise have become the target of the Muslims’ spears
was saved, and their own neighbours became their mark
instead.!

The noted Muslim theologians were not supportive of a separate
homeland for Indian Muslims. Instead, they upheld the concept of com-
posite nationalism. They took an example in this respect from the holy
Prophet of Islam who drew up aconvenant with the non-Muslim residents
of Medina where he migrated to from Mecca. The Prophet came to terms
with the Jews and Pagans of Medina and recognized their religious rights
and gave them equal rights of citizenship thus evolving a composite
political community. The ulama, therefore, drew inspiration from the
covenant and argued that Hindus and Muslims could evolve a composite
nationalism following inthe Prophet’s footsteps. They saw no theological
grounds for the creation of Pakistan or a separate homeland for the
Muslims.

Neither was Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan a theological one. He did not
envisage an Islamic state. He dreamt of a secular bourgeoisie state for the
Muslims. It clearly shows that those behind the Pakistan movement
represented either feudal or middle-class interests. Hamza Alavi, a Pakis-
tani sociologist maintains that Pakistan was created by the Muslim
salariat (salaried) class. No wonder then thatthe Pakistani movement did
not have a democratic and a mass base. The two-nation theory resolution
passed on 25 March 1940 in Lahore was opposed not only by the
theologians but also by the Muslim masses.

Jinnah, the champion of Pakistan after the late thirties, was neither a
theologian nor knew much about Islam. He was, until the late twenties,
opposed to mixing religion with politics. He was even cool towards the
Khilafat movement which was dominated by the Muslim divines. He was

Hindu-Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 | 187

very close to Gokhale and was described as the Muslim Gokhale. In a
speech at Ahmedabad in 1916, he said:

For a real New India to arise, all petty and small things
must be given up. To be redeemed, all Indians must offer
to sacrifice not only their good things, but all those evil
things they cling to blindly—their hates and their
divisions, their pride in what they should be thoroughly
ashamed of, their quarrels and misunderstandings. These
are a sacrifice God would love.!!

In fact in 1927 the prominent Muslim leaders under the presidentship
of Jinnah had formulated certain proposals whereby, if the terms were
accepted by the Indian National Congress, the Muslims would give up
separate electorates and accept joint electorates. These proposals were:
(1) Sind to be separated from the Bombay Presidency and constituted into
a Separate province; (2) Reforms to be introduced in the North-West
Frontier Province and in Baluchistan on the same footing as in any other
province in India; (3) In Punjab and Bengal, the proportion of repre-
sentation to be made in accordance with the population; (4) In the Central
Legislature Muslim representation not to be less than one-third. If all these
demands were accepted, the Muslims would accept joint electorates in all
the provinces.

If the separate electorates had been given up and these demands
formulated by the Muslim leaders accepted, it would have eroded the very
basis of vivisection of India. The Motilal Nehru report, which took these
demands into account but did not accept them all, was a watershed in the
history of the creation of Pakistan. Then a series of developments took
place, right from the implementation of the Constitution of 1935 to the
controversial Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, which ultimately sealed the
fate of the unity of India. It would thus be seen that no religious issue was
involved in all these controversies. One can easily conclude that Pakistan
was the creation of secular interests rather than of any religious concept
of a theocratic state or a concept of millat (nation) or Muslim umma(fol-
lowers). Prominent theologians and freedom fighters like Maulana
Husain Ahmad Madani and Maulana Azad had understood this well and
that is why they never accepted the demand for Pakistan. Islam was used
only as an instrument as Hinduism was used by the Hindu communalists.
Thus one can say that it is conflict of interests that leads to the conflict of
ideas and ideologies. The ideology of Pakistan was also aresult of conflict
of interests of the Muslim elite with the Hindu elite. There was no religious

188 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

confrontation involved between the two communities. Merriam Hayes is
closer to reality when she observes:

Muslim businessmen foresaw new markets free from
Hindu competition. Landlords hoped for a perpetuation of
the zamindari system. Intellectuals envisioned a cultural
rebirth free from the British and Hindus. To the orthodox,

Pakistan promised a religious state. . . . To officials and
bureaucrats a new nation offered a short-cut to
seniority. . .

Thus while trying to understand the Pakistan movement, no historian
can disregard the socio-economic interests of different classes and groups
of Muslims in India. This is the real key to its understanding.

Even after the creation of Pakistan, the Hindu—Muslim confrontation did
not finally end, as was expected by many. It has continued in independent
India and, recently, with the two major controversies about the Shah Bano
judgement and the Babri Masjid—Ramjanmabhumi controversy, it has
assumed dangerous proportions resulting in violence and death of several
hundred innocent people. However, we would miss the point if we make
these controversies central to the dispute. These are, rather, symptoms of
a much deeper malaise of political, economic and social developments
which have taken place in India since 1947.

We gave ourselves a secular and democractic Constitution in January
1950. This Constitution was quite radical in many respects. It accepted
universal franchise which was by any yardstick a radical step. This

enfranchisement brought tremendous political consciousness among the
masses. Also, over the years, since 1947, the democratic processes con-
tinued to deepen and widen, bringing more and more political conscious-
ness among the common people. Meanwhile economic development
under the five-year-plans was also underway. Within the capitalist
framework, economic development resulted in widening the gap between
the rich and the poor. What is worse, this widening of the gap was not on
an individual basis but on the basis of castes and communities. The upper
castes of the majority community notched up the greatest share of the
development while the lower castes and the minority communities had to
content themselves with much less. With the deepening of political
consciousness over the years, this sense of deprivation became increas-
ingly acute.

Hindu—Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 | 189

There is one more sociological factor inthis respectto be borne in mind.
Our social structure is such that caste and community consciousness often
has precedence over individual consciousness whereas our political struc-
ture is such as to make an individual supreme. This has resulted in yet
another malaise. One has to come to grips with this malaise to understand
the developing confrontation between various castes and communities in
our society today. Our political processes, in view of our given social
structure, tend to become caste nd community oriented rather than based
on individual rights alone, as ideally required. The political processes
cannot steer clear of the inherited social structure.

The Hindu—Muslim confrontation should not be oversimplified as a
religious confrontation alone, though it often manifests itself through this
channel. This channel is used only to legitimize this confrontation. If we
have to understand the real nature of the developing confrontation we will
haveto trace the social, economic and political roots ofthe Hindu—Muslim
relationship. Also, apart from this, there is an increasing tendency of
religious assertion among Hindus as well as Muslims popularly called
religious fundamentalism. Unfortunately, it is more condemned than
understood. What is needed is to understand the reasons of this religious
assertion.

Sectarianism, fanaticism. religious assertion or fundamentalism, by
whatever name we call it, is not a purely religious phenomenon either. It
is as much social, political and economic as religious in nature. If a
community is politically and economically on the ascendant, it would tend
to be liberal and less assertive of its religious beliefs. However, if a
community is faced with hostile circumstances and threats to its existence,
it tends to assert its religious zeal to strengthen its defences. The rise of
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh fundamentalism in recent years must be seen in
this perspective.

Hindu fundamentalism particularly has shown a great deal of aggres-
siveness in the last few years. It began with the incident of the conversion
of a few Dalits (low-caste Hindus) to Islam in the early eighties in
Meenakshipuram in Tamil Nadu and culminated in the Babri Masjid—
Ram janmabhumi controversy recently. What was the cause of the aggres-
sive assertion of religion by the Hindus? One can very well argue that
Hinduism is not only a liberal, much less rigid and non-doctrinaire
religion but that the Hindus are better off both politically as well as
economically. Why should there then be a manifestation of such
fanaticism on their part?

It is true Hinduism is liberal, less rigid and non-doctrinaire. But this is

190 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

the scriptural view of Hinduism. Hindu behaviour is not necessarily
governed by the scriptural view of religion; instead it is governed by the
realities of life and one’s own interests. In other words it is interests, and
not ideals which govern human behaviour (speaking in the general sense).
Secondly, it is true that Hindus, specially the upper and middle classes,
are better off both politically and economically; but, of late, they feel.
threatened by ‘aggressive minorities’ and have developed, through ag-
gressive propaganda, a sense of encirclement and of being besieged. Here
it should also be remembered that it is the perception of reality rather than
reality itself which is more important as far as human behaviour is
concerned.

A number of developments since the early eighties have reinforced this
Hindu upper caste perception of challenge to its social and political
hegemony. The first major challenge was, as pointed out earlier, from the
conversion of Dalits to Islam. In fact it came as a double threat to Hindu
hegemony. First, it was perceived as insolence on the part of untouchables
who had, for centuries, abjectly surrendered themselves to the upper-caste
Hindus. The untouchables were now raising their heads and challenging
upper-caste supremacy. Secondly, it was no ordinary insolence on their
part. They had challenged Hindu supremacy by adopting a faith which
was never viewed kindly by upper-caste Hindus. That faith itself was
perceived as a threat.

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) and other upper-caste Hindu organizations decided to meet
this challenge by asserting Hinduism. It should also be borne in mind that
this challenge from Dalits came at a time when the oil revolution in the
Arab world had brought about an assertion of Islamic fundamentalism. It
was being rumoured that petro-dollars were flowing into India to finance
Muslim organizations and with a view to making Muslims a political
challenge to the Hindus. In fact it was alleged that petro-dollars were the
main inducement for the conversion of the Dalits. The impact of the
conversions on the mind of the upper-caste Hindu must be assessed in this
context.

Also, for various reasons that need not be discussed here, the Punjab
problem assumed menacing proportions around 1983. The Sikhs who
were historically not considered different from the Hindus began to assert
their separate identity and even to object to being bracketed with the
Hindus in the Constitution. Thus the Sikh religious assertion created
another major challenge for tne Hindus. Sikhism was seen to be so much
an integral part of Hinduism that any assertion of separateness on the part

Hindu—Muslim Relations Before and After 1947 | 191

of the Sikhs was no less than a traumatic experience for the Hindus. Here
also it was perceived as not merely losing a friend but providing an ally
to the Muslims. Jamail Singh Bhindranwale had told a BBC correspon-
dent that the Sikhs should join hands with the Muslims and should
together challenge Hindu hegemony. !

The Shah Bano movement in 1986-87 also had an adverse effect on
the Hindu mind. The Muslims aggressively opposed and rejected the
Supreme Court judgement in the case of maintenance claimed by Shah
Bano of Indore beyond the period of iddah (the three-month period after
a divorce during which a divorcee is entitled to claim for maintenance,
according to the Muslim law). The Muslims kept on agitating until the
Government agreed to nullify the court judgement by enacting a separate
law for Muslim women. This was seen as a complete negation of
secularism by the Hindus and their perception that only Hindus are secular
and the minorities are ‘communal’ got reinforced.

The then Government, led by Rajiv Gandhi, appeased the Hindus by
throwing open the doors of the Babri mosque to the Hindus for worship
on 1 February 1986. This ‘balancing act’ had a very adverse effect on
Hindu—Muslim relations in the country. The Hindus led by the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the RSS now began to demand the construc-
tion of a Ramjanmabhumi Mandir on the site of the Babri mosque. In
order to broaden the movement the VHP, RSS and BJP devised a clever
move. They organized the worshipping and consecration of bricks in
every village and taking them out in processions. These bricks were to be
subsequently sent to Ayodhya for the construction of the temple. Basically
it was a clever political move. A large number of Hindus were politically
mobilized. But it communalized the whole situation and Hindus and
Muslims came dangerously close to confrontation. The processions were
organized in October-November 1989 just on the eve of the general
elections in the last week of November 1989. It is no wonder that many
major riots broke out in Indore (October 1989), Kota(September 1989),
Bhagalpur (October 1989), etc. in which hundreds of innocent Muslims
were killed.

Thus, it can be seen that the Hindu-Muslim relations are not merely
governed by the religious factor alone but, more often, by political and
economic developments. The political contour is determined by the social
changes brought about by economic development and technological
progress which in tum decides the pattern of behaviour and political
perceptions. And these perceptions ultimately determine the shape of the
relationship between Hindus and Muslims in society. Thus it is the process

192 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

of economic development, social change and political perceptions which
are far more important than the religious factor in determining intercom-
munal relationships.

Notes

1. Khwaja Hasan Nizami, Fatimi Da’wat-e-Islam, Delhi, 1338 A.H.

2. Letter of Sir Syed of 29 April 1870, quoted in Ikram Sheikh Muhammad,
Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, Lahore, n.d.

3. Hali, Hayat-i-Javed, quoted in Ikram, op.cit., p. 32.

4. Quoted by Symonds Richards, The Making of Pakistan, Faber and
Faber: London, 1950, pp. 34-38.

5. Magqalat-i-Shibli, vol. VIII, pp. 161. Quoted by Mehr Afroz Murad in
‘Shibli Nu’mani ke Siyasi Afkar’, /slam aur Asr-i-Jadid, vol. XX, issue 4,
October 1988, p. 17.

6. ibid., p. 18.

7. ibid.

8. ibid.

9. ibid., p. 19.

10. Maulana Azad , Al-Hilal, Calcutta, 11 September 1912.

11. Quoted by Rajmohan Gandhi, Eight Lives—A Study of the Hindu—Mus-
lim Encounter, Roli Publishers: Delhi, 1986, pp. 128-9.

12. Jamaluddin Ahmed, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Move-
ment, Lahore, 1970, pp. 86.

13. Merriam Allen Hayes, Gandhi vs Jinnah, Minerva: Calcutta, 1980,
pp. 91-2.

14. Thad heard the interview of Bhindranwale on the BBC Hindi service a
few days before he was killed in the Blue Star Operation in 1984.

Predatory Commercialization and
Communalism in India

Amiya Kumar Bagchi

The word ‘communalism’ can be interpreted in numerous ways. In one
sense it can mean any feeling of animosity that the members of any
community (a bhaichara biradari, a linguistic group living side by side
with other linguistic groups, a group claiming to belong to a particular
‘race’ as against other people belonging to other ‘races’, and so on)
entertains against members of any other community defined by criteria
which establish the distinctiveness of the latter. But in the Indian context,
it has come specifically to mean the feelings of animosity between people
who profess different religions. In particular, in post-independence India,
it has come to mean feelings of animosity between Hindus and Muslims,
and in the 1980s between Sikhs and Hindus in particular pockets of the
country. This does not mean that either the Hindus, or the Muslims, or the
Sikhs, present a monolithic front to the rest of the world. Apart from the
fact that there are many people nominally belonging to each of these
communities who do notdefine their own identities in terms of the religion
they actually or nominally profess, there are also divisions within each of
these communities. The most pervasive division is between the upper-
caste Hindus and the Harijans or Dalits—people who are legally defined
as the scheduled castes. The division between the Sunnis, who form a
majority of the Muslims in India, and the Shias has sometimes expressed
itself in acts of violence; so has the division between the orthodox Sikhs.
and the Nirankaris. The division between the upper-caste Hindus and the
Dalits in many parts of the country has led to a conversion of the latter to
Buddhism or Islam, and the older conflicts have then manifested them-
selves as communal conflicts defined in nominally religious terms.

We have already referred to acts of violence resulting from com-
munalism. How do we, in fact, detect the expression of communalism? I
may feel contemptuous or envious of a neighbour who flaunts his wealth
or his social standing too blatantly for my taste, but unless he or I have a

194 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

violent disposition, such a feeling may never come out overtly in public
action or behaviour. So it is necessary to gather evidence of public acts
as symptoms of feelings of animosity designated as ‘communalism’. It
might be thought that if we find a group of Hindus indulging in violence
against a group of Muslims, it is the clear sign of a communal clash. But
this is also not certain: the conflict may arise purely out of a private
quarrel, and the Hindus might simply be associates of the Hindu
protagonist, and the Muslims those of the Muslim protagonist. It is when
these immediate associates are joined by other people with the same
religious affiliation, and attack people belonging to another religious
community, whetherthey are associates of the antagonists or not, that the
private quarrel turns into a communal conflict.! There could also be
situations in which members of a particular community would be protest-
ing against the action of a particular individual or a group; when the
antagonist has a different religious affiliation, the conflict might appear
to be acommunal one. This is apparently what happened in the so-called
Talla riots of 1897 in Calcutta.” That was, properly speaking, a riot of a
group of Muslims against the police who had demolished a mosque on
disputed ground. In these cases, the specification and the explanation of
the so-called communal incident or communal riotare inextricably linked;
for, a wrong specification would at once litter the investigator's path with
red herrings and the answers would also be misleading.

Two communities may live side by side with feelings of their own
identity, and some disdain or contempt for members of other com-
munities, without there being any communal incident or acommiunal riot.
Such, afterall, has been the situation of most Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs
for most of the period they have lived side by side. There may also be
communal ‘incidents’ without there being communal riots. Very often
those who fish in troubled waters try to provoke communal incidents,
hoping that there would be a communal riot, or the assertion of the might
of one community in relation to the other. What we are concemed to
explore here are the conditions which permit mischief-making or politick-
ing by provoking communal incidents. In this exploration we shall confine
ourselves mainly to incidents of communalism involving Hindus and
Muslims.

Very baldly, the following alternative sets of conditions seem to be
necessary for communalist elements to be able to provoke communal
incidents and riots. First, the leaders of the community (political or
spiritual) perceive themselves and people belonging to their community
as losing out in relation to the people of another contiguous community.

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India! 195

Second, the ordinary people of one community suffer a major erosion of
their standard of living and identify some or all of the members of the
other community (through guilt by association or through personification
of a whole community) as being the cause of that erosion. Third, traders
or merchants belonging to two separate but contiguous communities
engage in competition, and suffer losses through competitive pressures
or through the working of exogenous forces and see themselves as
competing for the same economic and physical space, and try to use
communal solidarity and political instruments to serve their own ends.
Finally, there is the ubiquitous fact of politics—whether in a democratic
set-up or under a military regime as in Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq—where
some political leaders act as the champions of one community, some
others act as the protectors of a threatened community, and some others
pose as the champions of communal unity; all the while making sure that
the cauldron of communalism continues to simmer.

I take a quick look in this section at some of the ways in which the
communal conflict erupted under British colonialism. Under British-style
capitalist colonialism, predatory commercialization was let loose in an
almost unhindered fashion in most regions of India and it affected most
areas of life. The continued operation of a process of commercialization
under which the losers are simply proletarianized, or worse, pauperized,
is one of the basic continuities between pre-independence and post-inde-
pendence India. Pauperization is a process under which the property-less
losers do not even have access to employment; this can happen both when
the losers are willing to behave as ‘free’ labourers and when they cling to
an ascribed status in society and refuse to accept the employment open to
them. Ashrafs and Brahmins have often starved rather than accept jobs as
unskilled labourers; of course, social mores have also prevented their
employment in such capacities, at least within the immediate neighbour-
hood.

Capitalist colonialism and its inevitable partner, predatory commer-
cialization, did not start out to destroy all communities; they attacked all
communal or status attributes that stood in the way of tribute-extraction
or private profit-making. But they affected different communities dif-
ferently, depending on where they happened to be. Take the case of the
weavers, for example. Both the Hindu and the Muslim weaver com-
munities were affected by the decline of hand-spinning and hand-weaving
after the Indian market was flooded by machine-made yarn and cloth from

196 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Britain. However, in eastern Bengal there was a sizeable amount of forest
and swamp land which could be opened up for cultivation. Many peasants
moved to clear this land. Some displaced weavers also became cul-
tivators—more often as agricultural labourers than as landowning
peasants. Even when the peasants or weavers held land, it was on insecure
tenure. This also created problems which took acommunal turn when the
landlords happened to be predominantly Hindus, and the peasants Mus-
lims. However, the impact was partially absorbed by this kind of popula-
tion movement. In areas where such prospects of occupational changes
were bleak, or where the weavers were highly skilled, urban artisans used
to a very different lifestyle from that of the cultivators, they continued to
practise a diminishingly remunerative profession. Under Indian condi-
tions, this would mean that they would becomeeven more dependent than
before on traders and money-lenders for advances and loans, generally at
usurious rates of interest. If again many of the weavers were Muslims and
the traders and money-lenders were Hindus, tension between the weavers
and money-lenders in the area of commerce and finance would take on a
communal tur, especially if the only supervisory authority with which
the weavers were intouch happened to be religious leaders. Suchconflicts
which had a dual edge—an economic and a religious one—have been
recorded and analysed by many historians.

But British colonialism damaged the fortunes of many others besides
the weavers. The system of revenue extraction and the processes of
commercialization instituted under colonialism, affected all Indians. But
the effects were felt differentially by different groups. Under the Mughals,
revenue was collected only from the land that was cultivated. The effect
was that with a relatively sparse population, cattle, sheep and goats had
abundant pastures to feed on; the peasants, owning livestock, and the
shepherds, especially in northern and north-western India, did well out of
this differential treatment, and India perhaps had one of the highest ratios
of livestock to people in the world. Under the British, every piece of land
was supposed to be owned by a private person or the State. If any piece
of land was claimed by a private person, he had to pay rent on it, whether
he cultivated it or not. If the land was supposed to be government-owned,
the peasants or shepherds had to pay for the use of any of its produce—be
it timber or fodder. The relatively favourable treatment of pastures for
revenue purposes virtually ceased under this dispensation.

This meant that, over time, it became more and more difficult to keep
livestock. As a result, the ratio of livestock to people and of livestock per
acre of cultivated land came down.” This was because there was pressure

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India / 197

to cultivate every piece of land that could yield anything above the cost
of cultivation. Earlier on, in many areas, peasants on khudkasht (land to
which a person has a hereditary right and which he is supposed to cultivate
himself; or may designate land tenure incorporating such a right) tenure,
patidars (persons claiming to belong to the group which has a hereditary
right to the ownership of the land in a particular area; a term that was used
in Gujarat), or otherwise privileged peasants, could often claim the right
to cultivate a piece of land, even if they had not cultivated it for a long
time or had not paid revenue on it, provided they could establish an
ancestral claim to that piece of land. Under the British, landownership
became conditional on prompt payment of the land revenue not just every
year, but every kisht (instalment of payment of land revenue in British
India). Thus even if a particular piece of land gave no certain promise of
yielding a surplus above the cost of cultivation, the peasant dare not let it
lie fallow. For, he hoped that it would yield some surplus at some future
date, and if he failed to meet his revenue demand for a single year, he
would lose that land forever, and with that his chance of survival would
also decline by a significant margin. The peasants’ proverbial attachment
to their land was reinforced by the insecurity created by the revenue
system.

More livestock for most Indians meant more milk and more butter or
ghee, and these were major sources of protein and fat. More livestock also
meant more manure for the peasants’ fields in areas where tillage and
pasture were combined. But for shepherd communities—goalas,
yadavs—livestock was also the source of livelihood. When the govern-
ment took over common pastures as its own property, or when pastures
or forest lands were parcelled out as private domain, the grazers found it
increasingly difficult to feed their livestock without encroaching on land
claimed by others. Traditional usage, such as keeping the stubble on the
fields and keeping the fields open after harvest, provided some relief, but
it was not enough. With the low level of monetization in the village
economy, the grazers often could not grow foddercrops and make a living
after paying forthe cost of cultivation and for the state’s revenue demand
on the land put to fodder. The grazers moved from one area to another in
search of empty fields on which they could feed their herds. Often there
were no social conventions or regular policing to keep them from letting
loose their herds in fields under crop. This led to clashes between peasants
and grazers. When the peasants happened to be Muslims and the grazers
Hindus, the clashes took on a communal complexion.

However, the ‘cow protection movement”® in the late nineteenth cen-

198 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

tury which gave rise to anumber of communal incidents and helped spread
communalism in many parts of northern and eastern India, should not be
seen simply as a reflection of the sectional conflict between semi-nomadic
grazersand sedentary peasants. The cow, of course, was forages a symbol
of prosperity in Hindu India—both as the source of milk (hence as
surrogate mother) and as the mother of oxen, the chief source of power
for cultivation. (It is interesting to speculate as to why the buffalo never
occupied that space. Was it because Aryan colonizers had already domes-
ticated kine, whereas they had met the buffalo first in their wild state and
because the domesticated buffalo was the chief wealth of people who were
for long beyond the pale of Brahmanical dominance?) Hence when the
peasants and grazers saw one of the main sources of their wealth
threatened by alien rule, in a tragic mode of transference of anger to a
visible imagined enemy from an invisible system, they took the cow-
eaters as their target of attack. Of course, the white rulers also ate cows,
but the whites were few and scattered, and in any case, were mostly
beyond the threat of violence by the means at the peasants’ command. So
the Muslim neighbour became the chief target of attack as the cow-protec-
tion movement lost its focus.

Neither the anti-Muslim attacks on the cow-protectors nor the anti-
Hindu jehad (holy war waged in the defense of Islam) of the julahas and
other poor Muslims, were ‘spontaneous’. For anger to express itself in
communal violence, some organization and planning are almost always
necessary. The Brahmanical hierarchy of the Hindus, strongly supported
by the upper-caste landlords (the Maharaja of Darbhanga and his kin were
Brahmins, and, along with the Rajputs and the Bhumihars, constituted the
dominant landlord element in Bihar and eastern Uttar Pradesh—the chief
trouble spot of the anti-cow slaughter riots), provided the ideological
underpinnings and the muscle-power of the communal riots triggered by
the derailed cow-protection movement. Similarly, the u/amas (plural of
alim: person learned in Muslim scriptures and other traditional Islamic
studies) took up the jehad—initially against the British who, in their eyes,
had converted India froma land favourable to Islam to acountry favouring
the infidels. But they found it easier to imbue the faithful with a hatred of
the infidel next door rather than with a determination to fight the infidel
occupying (symbolically speaking first, and literally, from 1911) the
masnad of Delhi. Moreover, the ulamas’ movement was soon supple-
mented by the Anglo—Orientalist movement of Sir Syed Ahmad. The
Anglo--Orientalist movement. and the rise of an Anglicized but separatist
politics among the upper-class Muslims of Uttar Pradesh illustrate the

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India/ 199

point that communalism may arise not from processes of absolute
deprivation but from perceptions of relative deprivation. According io
Paul Brass, the Muslim gentry and the landlords of Uttar Pradesh in the
latter half of the nineteenth conte, were not doing badly at all as
compared to their Hindu counterparts. But it is their perception of having
felt degraded since at the time a Nawab ruled in Lucknow or a Mughal
emperor ruled from Delhi, and this was the ma jorcause of their anti-Hindu
sentiments. Of course, not all Muslim gentry or landlords behaved in the
same way: there were many who joined the nationalist struggle, just as
on the other side many Hindu landlords and professionals remained loyal
to the British Government till the very end. Moreover, much of the
majority ‘nationalism’ remained implicated in religious symbolism,
vocabulary and sentiment. But among the Muslim masses in most parts
of India, it is the communalist ideology of the ulama or the Anglo—Orien-
talist perception of the upper-class Muslims of Uttar Pradesh that came
to prevail.

After Independence, there was a large-scale migration of the profes-
sionals among the Muslims to Pakistan. Along with that, zamindari rights
and the rule of Indian chiefs over their territories ended in the Republic
of India, These particular changes hit hard some sections of the Muslims
in Uttar Pradesh, the province in which the Muslim landed aristocracy
and the professionals had first spearheaded: the demand for separate
privileges for Muslims and then for Pakistan.® Those institutions which
had depended on the patronage of the Muslim landlords were im-
poverished by the changes. Similar changes occurred, though to a lesser
extent, in other parts of India also. This meant that, even if there were no
concealed processes of discrimination against Muslims working under
the surface, with the normal rules of competition in an increasingly
commercialized society, the percentage of Muslims making it to the
professional classes would decline. Combined with such processes of
social discrimination as were operating in predominantly Hindu-ad-
ministered institutions, the proportion of Muslims in the professional
classes could also be expected to be lower than their proportion in the
general population. This meant that the average Muslim perceived his
advancement being barred in this society, which professed to be secular,
but which practised systemic, if not systematic, discrimination against an
underprivileged minority.

In this section we turn to an examination of some aspects of the economic

200 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

and demographic setting in post-independence India, which will help us
perceive the operation of predatory commercialization in its true mag-
nitude. If we look at the distribution of the Muslims and Hindus in India
as between rural and urban areas (table 1), it becomes obvious that
Muslims are a far more urbanized community than the Hindus. In some
States (such as Maharashtra), there are more Muslims living in urban areas
than in villages (table 1). It is not accidental that most of ine communal
riots in India have beenurban. However, the Bhagalpur riots” demonstrate
that we should not harbour the illusion that if we understand the predispos-
ing conditions of the urban riots, we will understand the pathology of
communal riots in general. Where so many people are dispossessed or
threatened with dispossession by processes or predatory commercializa-
tion, and where society and the state take little note of the need to succour
the victims of such commercialization, the material conditions facilitating
communal riots are present all the time.

As we have pointed out earlier, capitalist colonialism under the British
already affected the people’s livelihood in numerous ways. It led to the
erosion of the protection given to members of many communities in
precolonial days—however inadequate and unequally distributed such
protection might have been in practice—without putting any new protec-
tive structures in place. New patronage linkages grew around the zamin-
dari structures and the structures revolving around the more important
native princes. But in most cases, the zamindars’ economic position
deteriorated over time. Moreover, threatened with relative impoverish-
ment, the zamindars increased their demands ferociously—until they
were Stalled by the resistance of the suffering peasants.

British rule produced landlord domination. This domination was not,
however, automatic, and contradictory pulls acted on it: when the zamin-
dars were threatened too extensively with bankruptcy because of their
extravagance and because of the newly-instituted right of the money-
lender to take over mortgaged properties, the British rulers rushed with
Courts of Wards and with special legislation to try and save them as a
class. In Punjab the British brought in special measures to protect land
from being taken over by non-agriculturists. The imperatives of imperial
rule led to authority structures and measures that mainly subserved the
colonial regime but could, on occasion, be used to defend some particular
rights of members of the patronage network latticing those structures.
However, predatory commercialization acted as a corrosive acid on most
existing structures, throwing handicraft workers out of work, dispossess-
ing peasants, ruining petty landlords, and enriching traders and money-

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India/ 201

lenders and leading to new alignments of power under the overarching
framework of colonial rule and landlord domination.

After independence, predatory commercialization coutinued to work
through the new structures of a post-colonial, mimetic state apparatus,
thrusting forward nodes of industrialization, a countryside dominated by
landlords and rich peasants, and urban centres with numerous, jostling,
petty merchants and monopoly capitalists. It is a characteristic of
predatory commercialization that, acting by itself, it tends to convert
people into paupers rather than proletarians. As we have noted already,
pauperization is a process under which owners of means of production—
whether artisans, peasants or petty landlords—are dispossessed but are
not absorbed in alternative gainful occupations, even in the long run. This
can happen because the potential employment in alternative occupations
does not grow at a sufficiently high rate. This can also happen because
the losers refuse to accept the employment open to them, because it does
not satisfy the requirements of their ascribed status in the old society.
Ashrafs and upper-caste Hindus have often starved (literally to death, in
times of famines in colonial India) rather than accept jobs as unskilled
labourers, or in menial occupations—at least in the same neighbourhood.
One of the motives of migration of such threatened groups has been tc
achieve a relative freedom from ascriptive status away from prying eyes.

We must not, of course, exaggerate the importance of such barriers. If
the searches for jobs have failed, in most cases it is because there are not
enough new jobs when old ones are destroyed by shifts in market
conditions. Capitalist colonialism and predatory commercialization.ad-
versely affected the fortunes of millions of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs
Christians, Buddhists and people outside the reach of the major religions.

Let us try to see whether we can say something more about the
predisposing conditions for communal riots by using the data on the
urban-rural distribution of populations by community ascription. If we
look carefully at tables 1 and 2 we will see that, with the sole exceptions
of Assam and West Bengal among the more populous states of India,
Muslims are a more urbanized community, in the sense that their propor-
tion in urban population is higher than their proportion in total population.
In the more urbanized states such as Gujarat and Maharashtra, the urban
Muslims constitute the majority of the Muslim population. The degree of
urbanization of the Indians is increasing over time, but in some states the
degree of urbanization of Muslims is increasing at a faster rate.

In the jargon of economists, both push and pull factors are acting to
affect the process of urbanization. In many states, the proportion of

Table 1 Total population of Hindus and Muslims in different states and their urban areas 1961-81 (in ’000)
Total population Urban population
GOT OB GE TORT
Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

India (a) 366,527 46,941 453,437 61,418 541,779 75,512 60,336 12,698 83,195 17,685 120,653 25,678
Andhra Pradesh 31,814 2,715 38,791 3,520 47,526 4,534 4,759 1,219 6,328 1,667 9,623 2,393
Assam ©) 7,885 2,166 9,490 3,592 — ~—~ 719 14 15 145 ioe ae
Bihar 39,346 5,786 42,589 7,594 58,011 9,875 3,095 691 4,442 986 6,953 1,504
Gujarat 18,356 1,745 17,949 2,249 30,519 2,908 4,108 905 5,887 1,218 8,512 1,647
Haryana © = — 17,341 405 11,548 524 = — 1,615 16 2,586 40
Himachal Pradesh _ — 3,113 50 4,100 70 _— — 21 6 290 9
Jammu & Kashmir 1,013 2,432 1,404 3,040 1,930 3,843 197 370 298 519 420 784
Kerala 10,283 3,028 12,683 4,163 14,801 5,410 1,521 527 2,018 765 2,779 1,048
Kamataka (d) 20,583 2,328 25,332 3,113 31,907 4,105 3,952 1,014 5,227 1,496 7,936 2,198
Madhya Pradesh 30,426 1,318 39,024 1,816 48505 2,502 3,649 708 5,372 1,009 8,520 1,496
Maharashtra 32,531 3,034 41,307 4,233 51,109 5,806 8,064 1,671 11,195 2,497 15,675 3,552
Manipur — _— 633 71 853 99 —_ —_ 120 2 296 23
Meghalaya _— _ 187 26 241 41 — — 71 4 99 7
Nagaland _ — 59 3 ill 12 — — 28 2 44 5
Orissa 17,123 215 21,121 327 25,162 422 994 81 1,678 100 2,849 159
Punjab 12,930 393 5,087 114 6,200 168 3,117 45 2,135 42 2,982 60
Rajasthan 18,133 1,315 23,094 1,778 30,604 2,492 2,543 518 3,489 757 5,639 1,169
Sikkim _ —_— 145 * 213 3 _ _ 13 * 33 2
Tamil Nadu (e) 30,297 1,559 36,674 2,104 43,017 2,520 7,485 900 = 10,323 1,256 13,246 1,579
Tripura —_— —_ 1,394 104 1,834 139 —_— _ 157 5 218 6
Uttar Pradesh 62,437 10,788 73,998 13,677 92,366 17,658 6,451 2,765 8,408 3,657 13,856 5,667
West Bengal 27,523 6,985 31,612 9,064 42,007 11,743 7,388 986 9,564 1,243 12,458 1,768

* Less than a thousand

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India | 203

Notes

(a) The population of India includes that of all the component states and
union territories, except in 1981, when no census operation could be
conducted in Assam.

(b) No census operation could be conducted in Assam in 1981.

(c) Haryana was included in Punjabin 1961.

(d) Karnataka was named ‘Mysore’ in the census of 1961.

(e) Tamil Nadu was named ‘Madras’ in the census of 1961.

Sources:

(a) Census of India 1961, vol.1, part Il, C(i); Social and Cultural Tables
(Delhi, Manager of Publications, 196 ), Table CII, Religion, pp. 488-90;
Census of India 1971, series I, India Part II, C (i); Social and Cultural
Tables (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 197 ), Union Table C VII, Reiigion
pp. 92-5; Census of India 1981, seriesI, India, Paper 3 of 1984, Household
Publication by Religion by Household (Delhi, Manager of Publication,
1984), Table H H, 15, pp. 6-9.

landless labour to the total rural working force has increased. There is also
evidence that in Haryana, Punjab, and western Uttar Pradesh the employ-
ment of labour per hectare has tended to decline over time. The rate of
growth of employment in agriculture has tended to decline drastically in
recent years. Along with these developments, unemployment has tended
to increase in both urban and rural areas.

On the basis of the data gathered by the forty-tnird round of the National
Sample Survey (NSS), itis found that in 1987-88, the total unemployment
was 12.43 million person year, according to the Usual Principal Status
(UPS) criterion, 15.3 million according to the Weekly Status (WS), and
18.95 million according to the Daily Status (DS). The proportion of the
labour force unemployed was higher in urban than in rural areas, and
interestingly enough, higher among females than among males, both in
tural and urban areas. A more alarming fact is that the number of
unemployed, especially by the UPS criterion, have beenrising all through
the 1970s and 1980s as table 3 demonstrates. The only break in the series
is for unemployed females between 1977-78 and 1983, but it is not clear
as to how much this decline in their numbers is a statistical artefact and
how much it reflects a real improvement. The rates of unemployment as
a proportion of the work force have risen between 1983 and 1987-88,
except for unemployment by the DS criterion. This seems to indicate a
greater degree of casualization, of the work force. (We have other
evidence of such casualization, such as the growth in the numbers of
registered and unregistered non-factory enterprises and growth in
employment in such enterprises even while employment growth in the
private factory sector has become negative.)

Table 2 Percentage of Hindus and Muslims in total population and urban population of India 1961-81

Percentage of total population Percentage of urban population
1961 1971 1981 1961 1971 1981

Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims Hindus Muslims

India ® 83.4 107 827 12 826 113 764 161 722 16.2 765 163
Andhra Pradesh 884 7.5 876 81 887 85 758 194 753 198 22 191
Assam 664 233 725 246 — — 77 125 85 N2 — =
Bihar 847 125 834 135 830 141 791 17.6 788 17.5 79.7 17.2
Gujarat 890 84 893 84 895 85 773 17.0 785 162 803 15.5
Haryana _ —_— 89.2 40 89.3 4.0 — — 91.1 08 91.4 14
Himachal Pradesh _— _— 96.1 1.4 95.7 1.6 _— _— 87.2 2.1 88.9 2.8
Jammu & Kashmir 28.4 683 304 658 322 642 332 624 347 305 332 622
Kamataka 873 99 865 106 859 110 750 19.2 73.4 210 739 205
Kerala 608 179 594 195 581 21.2 596 206 58.2 220 582 220
Madhya Pradesh 940 41 936 44 930 48 789 15.3 792 149 805 141
Maharashtra 822 7.7 819 84 814 92 722 #150 712 159 712 161
Manipur — — 509 66 60 70 — — 851 14 789 61
Meghalaya — — 18.5 2.6 18.0 3.1 _— — 483 27 #86411 2.9
Nagaland — — 11.4 06 14.3 1.5 — — 54.9 3.9 36.7 3.3
Orissa 4 976 12 962 15 954 #16 895 72 909 #54 916 51
Punjab 637 19 375 O8 369 10 762 11 664 «2413 «641 13
Rajasthan 90.0 65 896 69 893 73 77.5 158 768 16.5 782 162
Sikkim — — 66 O02 674 O09 — — 650 102 647 39
Tamil Nadu © 899 46 890 51 889 52 832 100 828 101 830 99
Tripura — — 896 67 893 67 — — 93 31 965 26
Uttar Pradesh 847 146 838 155 833 159 680 292 679 295 696 28.5
West Bengal 788 200 713 204 770 215 865 4215 872 113 862 122

Sources and notes : As for Table T-

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India / 205

Table 3 Number of unemployed by the usual status criterion (exclud-
ing subsidiary occupations) from 1972-73 to 1987-88 (in

million)
Rural Urban
Male Female Male Female

1972-73

(27th round of NSS) 1.5 0.3 1.6 0.5
1977-78

(32nd round of NSS) 1.8 1.8 2.0 13
1983

(38th round of NSS) 2.2 0.5 2.5 0.6
1987-88

(43rd round of NSS) 3.0 2.3 3.0 1.0

Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO): Key Results of
Employment and Unemployment Survey, All-India (Part-I), NSS 43rd
Round (July 1987—June 1988, Department of Statistics, Ministry of
Planning, Government of India, January 1990, Statement 39, (p.113).

Of course, unemployment in rural and urban areas is not spread evenly
across the states. Nor does the rate of unemployment by itself indicate the
degree of insecurity of the poor. It can be argued that in regions where the
proportions of the poor are low, various informal social mechanisms, and
the prospect of a relatively high-wage casual work may sustain the morale
of the poor. But such a general statement cannot be fully trusted without
further investigation. What I am doing here is to pull in certain kinds of
data relating to the living conditions of the poor to see whether the degree
of insecurity as such provides an approximate index of the proneness of
the region to communal violence.

In table 4 we have reproduced the percentages of persons in the lowest
three expenditure classes (in terms of per capital expenditure) inrural and
urban areas in the major states of India during the forty-third round of the
NSS (1987-88). (The population is divided into twelve expenditure
classes in both rural and urban areas; but since prices and money incomes
tend to be higher in the urban areas, the lowest expenditure class and the
highest one (open-ended) both have higher cut-off points for urban areas.
For rural areas, the outer limit of the lowest three expenditure classes is
Rs 95 per capita, and for urban areas it is Rs 135 per capita.)

206 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Table 4 Percentage of population in the lowest three expenditure
classes (in terms of monthly per capita expenditure) in
rural and urban areas of major states of India in 1987-88

States Rural: monthly per Urban: monthly per
capita expenditure capita expenditure
less than Rs 95 less than Rs 135

Andhra Pradesh 23.4 31.7
Assam 12.2 16.4
Bihar 29.3 40.5
Gujarat 13.8 16.0
Haryana 7.8 15.0
Himachal Pradesh 5.4 5.4
Jammu and Kashmir 8.7 12.0
Karnataka 25.8 20.2
Kerala 9.8 14.0
Madhya Pradesh 32.9 28.0
Maharashtra 24.0 21.0
Orissa 25.4 27.4
Punjab 5.1 12.2
Rajasthan 19.1 22.5
Tamil Nadu 29.2 27.0
Uttar Pradesh 26.4 35.3
West Bengal 19.0 25.9

Source: National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO): Key Results of
Employment and Unemployment, All-India, NSS 43rd Round, Statement

One inference follows directly from table 4. In both relatively ur-
banized and non-urbanized states, there is a large proportion of people
who can be regarded as desperately poor by any standard. (Here, I am not
entering into a technical discussion of the comparison of degrees of
poverty in real terms as between different states: relative price structures,
absolute price levels, and differences in the consumption baskets of the
poor all enter into the picture.) The only major states in which the
proportion of the very poor as defined above is less than ten per cent of
the rural population are Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir
and Punjab in the North and Kerala in the South. Some of the populous

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India | 207

- States, such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh in
northem and central India, and Karnataka and Tamil Nadu in the south
have more than twenty-five per cent of the rural people in the three lowest
expenditure classes. Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh have their cor-
responding figures lying between twenty and twenty-five per cent. Low
figures of population in the lowest expenditure classes of Assam are more
in line with those of the north-eastem states than with those of the other
eastem states. (This largely explains the attraction of immigrants to Assam
from Bangladesh and from other neighbouring states within India.)

If we look at the figures of the population in the lowest expenditure
classes in urban areas, we find that they vary largely, though not wholly,
with the corresponding figures for the rural areas of the respective states.
The figures for the proportion of the poor in the urban areas tend to be
higher—in some cases, for example, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh considerably higher—than for the corresponding figures of the
rural areas. The exceptions to this are Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. But since in the case of
Madhya Pradesh the proportion of the urban poor exceeds twenty-five per
cent of the total urban population, this is little comfort. It does seem,
however, that the above-average industrial growth of Kamataka, Gujarat
and Maharashtra has helped keep the numbers of the urban poor lower
than they would otherwise have been.

We will add another table of figures to illustrate the asymmetries of the
grid against which the deadly politics of communalism and casteism is
being played and then begin to draw out some of the social, political and
ideological implications. Table 5 reproduces the statewise figures of the
urban unemployment rate and the total numbers of unemployed in urban
areas as estimated by the forty-third round of the NSS (1987-88). For this
purpose, we took the usual (principal) status criterion of unemployment.
One of the most striking features of the array of figures in table 5 is that
urban unemployment rates among males are the highest in the two states
govemed by the Left parties, namely, Kerala and West Bengal. These two
states also have the two largest masses of unemployed females in the
country. The number of unemployed women is low in most of the north
Indian states, not because women face alluring prospects of employment,
but because female participation rate in the work force outside the
households is low.

Let us now look at the rough grid of communal and casteist violence in

208 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Table 5 Usual status unemployment rates (as percentages of the
workforce) and numbers of persons unemployed (in 000s) by
sex in urban areas of major Indian states in 1987-88

States Unemployment No. of Persons
Rates (%) Unemployed
Males Females Males Females
Andhra Pradesh 6.4 9.0 269 134
Assam 5.3 28.4 41 25
Bihar 6.4 3.3 190 11
Gujarat 4.7 2.2 169 12
Haryana 46 9.6 55 13
Himachal Pradesh 6.9 10.5 7 3
Jammu & Kashmir 47 15.5 22 10
Karnataka 5.6 4.1 209 47
Kerala 14.1 33.8 239 211
Madhya Pradesh 4.3 5.6 158 47
Maharashtra 6.5 5.0 496 88
Orissa 7A 14.0 87 27
Punjab 4.8 14.7 84 28
Rajasthan 4.7 1.4 119 9
Tamil Nadu 73 9.1 413 175
Uttar Pradesh 3.4 2.9 250 25
West Bengal 9.0 21.4 492 188

Source: NSSO: Key Results of Employment and Unemployment Survey,
All-India (Part-1), NSS 43rd Round (July 1987—June 1988) Statement 40.

recent years against the information about insecurity and poverty culled
so far. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar would seem to fit a hypothesis that links
the potential for communal violence to the incidence of poverty.
Moreover, the massive numbers of unemployed men confined in over-
crowded urban slums also provide frequent occasions for the flaring up
of tempers or for deliberate mobilization of ignitable materials required
for such flare-ups. But Gujarat does not conform to this stereotype at
all. The state has witnessed some of the worst communal riots in recent
years. ~ Yet, the incidence of poverty and the incidence of urban
unemployment among males in Gujarat are below the average for the
major Indian states (the all-India average computed by the NSSO and

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India | 209

reproduced in table 3 seems to be biased downward because of a large
weight accorded to the north-eastern states—out of proportion to their
population). One clue to all this is to be found in the general climate of
opinion among the upper classes (and castes) of Gujarat, which have
practised a policy of social Darwinism over a number of years, !* ‘If the
existing local population cannot be exploited at low wages, and if labour
can be obtained from elsewhere at lower wages, the local exploitable
population might as well die off.’ This is the implicit ideology of the
thrusting, predatory commercialization process almost everywhere in
India. But its ideology can be seen nakedly in operation in Gujarat, in
the consistent and open violation of most of the minimum wage and
social security regulations, by local capitalists with the deliberate con-
nivance and collusion of the state apparatus. !> This is also the state that
witnessed one of the worst carnages instigated by members of the upper
castes protesting against reservation of some jobs for the backward
castes; this casteist carnage later turned into communal violence in
which again the poor suffered most of the casualties and loss of belong-
ings.

Is there any way of countering this ideology? Activists in Gujarat have
tried public interest litigation. The Government of Gujarat was the first
state government (apart from Tamil Nadu) to try and reserve jobs for
backward castes other than scheduled castes and tribes, and there has
been a proliferation of non-governmental organizations taking up the
cause of the women, the poor and the tribals. But most of these moves
have again and again been swamped by casteist riots and communal riots
engulfing major cities and towns of Gujarat and have even spread to the
rural areas.

Let us look at neighbouring Maharashtra. There, in spite of a high rate
of industrial growth and burgeoning of trade related to West Asia, massive
urban unemployment continues to persist. Rural male unemployment
rates in Maharashtra however, are pretty low according to the forty-third
round, much lower, say, than in Kerala and West Bengal. In the wake of
a major drought in Maharashtra, the Government of Maharashtra
launched the Employment Guarantee Scheme, which has been hailed as
‘perhaps the first programme which guarantees the right to work as a basic
right in a developing country’. © Yet rural wages in Maharashtra often
remain far below the minimum legal level, workers wait vainly for the
employment guaranteed to them, and the proportion of the people in the
lowest three expenditure brackets was twenty-four per cent (see table
4)—much higher than in Kerala and West Bengal, both states that have

210 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

done far worse in terms of industrial and commercial growth than
Maharashtra. Maharashtra has Been repeatedly embroiled in massive
communal riots, mostly inand around Bombay, but these have also spread
to other areas from time to time. Admittedly, the number of urban
unemployed males (UUM) in Maharashtra is the largest among all the
major states. But Maharashtra with 496,000 UUM is closely followed by
West Bengal with 492,000 UUM and we have to remember that the latter’s
population is considerably less than that of Maharashtra. The ideological
and political aspects of communal violence acquire significance when we
see that despite the poor record of urban unemployment, at least since the
middle of the 1970s, West Bengal can claim the best record in terms of
keeping communal peace.

Let me now put forward several propositions without claiming more
than that the picture presented above provides only a suggestive support
for them. The first proposition is that in most states of India, the insecurity
of the poor, as indicated by their meagre daily earnings when they are
lucky enough to find a job, the threat of unemployment to which they are
continually exposed because of predatory commercialization, 7 and the
continual threat of disease and death under which they spend their daily
lives maintain a fertile ground for agents provocateurs to prod them into
divisive conflicts of all kinds.

The second proposition is that the overcrowded conditions of most
cities and the competition for valuable urban space which can be monop-
olized, speculated with, divided and redivided to profit the greedy, made
them powder-kegs for generating various petty conflicts. Adroitly ex-
ploited, such petty conflicts can be made to snowball into a major
communal conflagration.

The third proposition is that any measures that improve the chances of
upward socia! mobility for the poor and accord them increased bargaining
power against the rest will help to make the environment less congenial
to fomenting communal violence. These measures include pro-peasant
land reforms that effectively eradicate landlordism, a continuous cam-
paign for universalizing literacy, removing the special position of women
as both the victims and hostages of communal violence and hostility and
making them fully equal citizens with men, and providing everybody with
a guarantee for the basicnecessities of life. The first three sets of measures
will themselves reduce poverty and insecurity of life by giving more land
to the small peasants who will cultivate it more intensively by raising
productivity through the spread of literacy among workers and by releas-
ing the productive powers of women, a large number of whom are

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India / 21]

immured within walls as the ultimate victims of exploitation, and the
residuary legatees of the all-oppressive systems. A uniform civil law
which abolishes the special pre-bourgeoise privileges enjoyed by proper-
tied Hindus (under the Mitakshara system) in most parts of India, and
render their positions of vantage relatively immune to competition from
other groups which are not similarly placed will increase the chances of
upward mobility of disadvantaged groups. A civil law that makes women
equal sharers in property and the fruits of work with men will also liberate
the energies of fully half of the population. (India shares with West Asia
the dubious distinction of having one of the worst records of treatment of
women in terms of work, health services and literacy.)

But this package of social and economic reforms must be accompanied
by a basic but comprehensive social security system which will guarantee
that nobody need starve to death or die of exposure to cold and heat, or
from easily preventable diseases. This system will be necessary because
unemployment will not go away soon, landlessness or propertylessness
will continue to increase, and we cannot depend on market forces alone
to raise wages to the minimum standards laid down, as we saw from the
examples of Gujarat and Maharashtra.

The importance of a civil law which distances itself from arbitrary
religious criteria needs to be emphasized again. The landlord lineages and
trader lineages of northern and central India have effectively used non-
market power and the power of restrictive organizations and practices to
keep their vantage positions. Intermediary rights were abolished in many
states. But landlordism survived wherever land ceiling laws and tenancy
legislation were weak or were badly implemented. But that landlordism
now required the exercise of political power, including local administra-
tive and police authority, and in tum shored up the political power of
landlord lineages in a nominally democratic society. Muslim landlords in
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh lost their pre-eminent positions. Many
migrated to Pakistan, and those who remained found it difficult to main-
tain their position through lineage ties or links to the local administration
and the police. The migration of their co-religionists in erstwhile strategic
positions in administration and their weakening ability to maintain
patronage networks for their dependents sapped their muscle power and
their shouting prowess, both of which counted in an imperfect democracy.

With declining fortunes of Muslim landlords, the continued erosion of
the livelihood of Muslim artisans and the diminished opportunities for
public employment for a community which suffered renewed educational
backwardness in states such as Hyderabad and Uttar Pradesh, areas where

212 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

the Muslim elite had been earlier the dominant section, the major avenue
of upward mobility for Muslims could have been trade. Here the dominant
position maintained by particular groups of Hindu traders with the help
of their early start and the special advantages conferred on them by the
Mitakshara law of property inheritance and partition erected strong bar-
riers against the entry of not only non-trading Muslim groups (that is, all
except Bohras, Khojas and Memons) but also against Hindu castes or
ethnic groups which had not acquired a major position of vantage. In states
in which trade was not already monopolized by all-India lineages of
Hindu traders, new trading (and industrial) groups came up by using the
resources of local politics and various government subsidies and con-
tracts. Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh would provide many examples of
such upward mobility. This avenue was not and is not generally open to
Muslim groups, although some particular groups or individuals may be
cited as exceptions. This means that, without conscious public action to
counter the trend, the vast majority of Muslims in urban areas can only
hope to hold on to what they have, or worse, expect to come down in the
world. This pauperized mass, along with their Hindu brethren in similar
situations, then become available as the frontline operators in smuggling,
drug-peddling, protection rackets and other illegal or semi-legal activities
that thrive in a regime of predatory commercialization. They also, of
course, become available for manipulation by politicians who use com-
munalism for their own ends.

Using impoverished Muslims and Hindus as the infantry of contraband
trade is the most obvious aspect of predatory commercialization that I
referred to earlier. The point about the process of commercialization that
is Occurring in India today is that there is no social institution or
mechanism to ensure the minimal needs of the losers in the game.
Although commercialization as a process is fairly blind, there are various
institutional structures that different groups use in order to find footholds
for advance on the slippery terrain. The use of intra-caste and intra-clan
networks, the use of trade unionism with close-shop policies by
employees in many public and private organizations, the wielding of
political and muscle power by lineages of big landlords and rich |
peasants—all these permit particular sections of the community to keep
their existing positions and allow other members to get into the protected
riches. In this situation of prevailing insecurity, especially for the poor of
the minority communities, it is easy for communalist organizations and
politicians to pose as the champions of the minorities. They can launch
schools, colleges, hospitals to cater especially to members of minoriiy

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India | 213

communities. However marginal these gains may be, they still loom large
in relation to the efforts of a government which does little to succour the
poor. Many religious institutions also, besides seeking to provide a
psychotogical solace, dole out alms and medicines and provide other real
or illusory services and thus strengthen their hold on the consciousness
of the poor.

The greatest threat to communal peace in India today is the com-
munalization of politics. The state of West Bengal in recent years provides
one clear case where an ideological battle supported by the state ad-
ministration has been able to stem the tide of communal violence. How-
ever, the ideological base of such struggles needs to be strengthened by
a massive effort to secularize people’s consciousness; and this ideological
deepening needs to be sustained by changes in the legal apparatus, the
social structure and the political arrangements that will make the whole
society attuned to the needs of the poor, and the requirements of sustained
economic growth whose effects are diffused through all the layers of the
social system. No state can be an island in an all-India context; nor can
pure ideological work be sustained in the long run without changes in the
material conditions of living.

I will end this paper by making concrete some of the implications of
the propositions just put forward. The major ideological influence on the
consciousness of the poor in our country still stems from religion. How-
ever, such ideological influences were not immutable. Hinduism has been
at best a congeries of faith and practices, with intermittent attempts to
reassert the authority of some ancient text, or to invent a new tradition in
the name of either reform, devotion or orthodoxy, while popular practice
has again and again strayed beyond all those carefully constructed boun-
daries. Brahminical Hinduism has also had one of the most unegalitarian
ideologies and social hierarchies associated with it, viz., the caste system,
including the practice of characterizing a vast number of people as
untouchables (or, even ‘unseeables’ as in the case of the Nayadis of south
India). As a result, religions whose ideologies preach equality before God,
at least for men, has claimed adherents away from this amorphous mass
of Hindus: this has certainly been one factor responsible for the steady
increase in the number of Muslims in South Asia. For very similar reasons,
vast numbers of Dalits converted to Buddhism in the 1950s.

The Arya Samaj, and the modern political movements such as the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have tried to create a militant
Hinduism in the mirror image of a militant Islam. Hinduism is not a

214 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

religion with a single creed or with a single focus of authority. Not only
are there multiple interpretations of sacred texts but new sacred texts have
been created within the fold of the religion every few centuries. The
disputes between Shaktas and Vaishnavas in Bengal or between the Veera
Shaivas and traditional Brahminical Hindus in the South have been on
occasion no less acrimonious than between Muslims and Hindus.
Moreover, a Hindu often harbours beliefs and traditions whichare mutual-
ly contradictory with one another. The attempt to impose a single belief-
system or a single authority structure on the people belonging to such a
religion (or rather such a congeries of religion) is likely only to produce
a new sectarian division at a tremendous cost to the society and polity.
The onslaught on the fabric of the Indian polity mounted by the RSS, the
VHP and the BJP in their attempt to impose a single ideology on Indian
Hindus and by extension on the rest of the population has been a prime
cause behind the flaring up of communal violence in recent years. Their
ideological onslaught is bound to fail for at least two reasons. In spite of
Swami Dayanand Saraswati’s preaching against caste, the insignia of
caste are treasured highly for both narrow materialistic reasons and for
reasons of status by members of higher castes, as the recent anti-reserva-
tion movement has demonstrated with gruesome vividness. The second
reason is that a majority of the Hindus would be unwilling and perhaps
even unable to convert themselves into monocredal people of the book or
with a single historical tradition, especially when most of that tradition is
based on myth—some of it concocted before their very eyes.!

Itis necessary, ideologically, to confront the ventures of both militant
Hinduism and militant Islam. That confrontation is not achieved by
writing leamed essays in English or even in the vernacular. Perhaps the
liberal and radical propagandists of secularism can take a leaf out of the
practices of the Faraizi and Taiyuni movements in Bengal in the
nineteenth century. The preachers affiliated to these movements literally
became ‘fish in the water’ (as Mao Tse-tung advised his followers to
become in a later and much bigger movement), lived at the level of the
common people and tried to spread Islam by using vast numbers of
vernacular tracts (as well as ill-understood texts of the Koran in Arabic)
and frequent formal and informal meetings. o

Militant and reformist Islam preached equality before God, and gave
the poor a collective identity as an umma, but unfortunately left the
women in a permanently inferior position even in terms of religion and,
of course, in terms of rights to property and income. In other respects, the
practice of societies dominated by a theocratic Islamic ideology has

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India / 215

remained as unequal and as undemocratic as ever. If militant Hinduism
succeeds in its endeavour, it will produce at best the same results as
reformist Islam attained, and at worst, will also perpetuate caste-based
inequalities in the bargain.

A militantly secular ideology has to be diffused into the people’s
consciousness, and the defaults of the religion-oriented ideologies which
promise paradise to the poor after death, but nothing at all on earth, have
to be clearly pointed out. The political activities of most of the left-
oriented parties have studiously avoided such substantive issues of ideol-
ogy. The cadres have also tended most of the time to distance themselves
however marginally from most of the poor villagers and the town-
dwellers. Secularism has meant for most of them allowing all religious
claimants to acquire more and more public space at the cost of other
citizens. This sort of tolerance cannot be extended indefinitely without
the claims over public spaces of different religions coming into conflict
as they have already done with tragic consequences. (Associated with
many of the so-called religious activities are very narrow private interests
such as claims over prime land occupied by temples or mosques or the
right to raise protection money in the name of subscriptions—but I am
leaving such issues aside.) Are these cadres ready to take up the cause of
secularizing people’s consciousness with the same zeal and commitment
as the sadhus and the fakirs have done in the past?

Finally, in all the states including those such as Kerala and West Bengal,
which have had some success in resisting communalism, we need a strong
positive growth of employment and of the incomes of poor people for
secularism to gain any ground. Pro-peasant land reforms and universal
literacy will go a long way towards creating the conditions for such
growth. Such social changes will also directly hit at the conditions that
allow communal violence to be provoked.

Notes

1. This is apparently how the communal conflict originated in the walled
city of Delhi in 1974.

See Gopal Krishna, ‘Communal Violence in India: a Study of Communal

Disturbance’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 20, nos.2 and 3, 12 and
19 January, 1985.
2. R. Dasgupta, ‘Poverty and Protest: a Study of Calcutta’s Working Class
and Labouring Poor (1875-1900)’, in A.N. Das, V. Nilakanth and PS.
Dubey (eds.), The Worker and the Working Class, Public Enterprises Centre
for Continuing Education: New Delhi, 1984.

216 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

3. According to official data during the ten years, from 1954 to 1963, an
average of sixty-two riots took place annually and the number of those killed
in these riots was forty on an average. From 1964 to 1970 the number of
communal riots rose to an annual average of 425 and the number killed
increased even faster, to a figure of 467 persons killed annually. With some
improvements from 1971 to 1978, the situation again deteriorated drasti-
cally from 1979. If we take the killing of Sikhs in the wake of the
assassination of Indira Gandhi into account, the figure in the 1980s must
have averaged more than 600 a year.

See P.R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, The New
Cambridge History of India, IV. 1, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1990, Table 6.3; N.S. Saksena: ‘Anatomy of Communal Riots’,
Indian Express, New Delhi, 31 March 1990. With increasing politicization
of communal issues, the figures of communal incidents and deaths from
communal riots have become far more unreliable in recent years. But our
discussion in the text suggests that earlier also, a purely personal, sectional
or economic conflict was often presented as a communal incident. Such
mistaken identification can be the source of further communal conflicts.
4. Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947, vol. 1, The Land Question,
Calcutta, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, and K.P. Bagchi
& Co., 1984; P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972; J.R. McLane, Indian Nationalism and
Early Congress, N.J. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1977; G.
Pandey, ‘Rallying Round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in the Bhojpuri Region,
1888-1917’, in R. Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies, vol. 11, Oxford University
Press: New Delhi, 1982; idem. ‘The Bigoted Julaha’, Economic and Politi-
cal Weekly, vol. 20, no. 5, Review of Political Economy, 29 January 1983;
Parimal Ghosh, Emergence of an Industrial Labour Force in Bengal: a
Study of the Conflicts of the Jute Mill Workers with the State 1880-1930
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Calcutta, 1984), Suranjan Das, ‘Com-
munal Violence in Twentieth Century Colonian Bengal: an Analytical
Framework’, Social Scientist, vol.18, nos.6-7, June-July 1990; Tanika
Sarkar, Bengal 1928-1934: The Politics of Protest, Oxford University
Press: New Delhi, 1987.

5. For more detailed discussion and some references, see A.K. Bagchi,
‘Reflections on Patterns of Regional Growth in India Under British Rule’,
Bengal Past and Present, vol. 95, part I, no. 180, January-June 1976.

6. This apparently originated as a movement among the Kuka Sikhs of
Punjab in 1870 or so. But it was taken upas a slogan by Dayanand Saraswati
and his followers. It then assumed the character of a movement in virtually
all parts of North India in the 1880s and 1890s. It thrived often on the
patronage of the Hindu zamindars and Maharajas. A major part of the early
Congress leadership was imbued with an ideology of Hindu revivalism of
which cow-protection was a part. See, in this connection, Mushirul Hasan,
Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, Manohar: New Delhi, 1979,
ch. II.

7. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Vikas:
Delhi, 1975, ch. 3. See also F.S. Robinson, Separatism Among Indian

Predatory Commercialization & Communalism in India! 217

Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923, Vikas:
Delhi, 1975. According to Brass, Muslims in the United Provinces before
1900 held more than a disproportionate share of the government jobs open
to the Indians, and they were also better educated in terms of western
leaming than the Hindus. According to Robinson, they also formed a
disproportionate share of the landholding aristocracy of the province,
especially in its western part.

8. For an account of the demographic changes and changes in the position
of Muslims in Uttar Pradesh, see Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in
North India, ch. 3 and 4.

9. For a graphic description and analysis of the Bhagalpur riots, see
People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Bhagalpur Riots, Delhi, April 1990.
10. Usual Principal Status: a person is considered according to this concept
is he/she was available for but without work for a major part of the year.
Weekly Status: a person is considered unemployed according to this concept
if he/she, though being available for work, did not have work even for one
hour during the reference week. Daily Status: it is a measure of unemploy-
ment in terms of person days of unemployment of all the persons in the
labour force during the reference week. Planning Commission, Employ-
ment: Past Trends and Prospects for the 1990s, Working paper, Planning
Commission, New Delhi, May 1990, p. 14.

11. These findings are based on the 32nd, 38th and 43rd Rounds of the
National Sample Survey and have been summarized in Employment: Past
Trends and Prospects for the 1990s, Planning Commission. The only
exception to the increasing trend is the measure of unemployment by Daily
Status, that is, measured in terms of person days of unemployment of all
the persons in the labour force during the reference week.

12. See Appendix table 3.2, in Government of India, Economic Survey
1989-90, Ministry of Finance (Economic Division), New Delhi, 1990.

13. For descriptions and analysis of communal riots in Gujarat, see A.A.
Engineer, (a) ‘Ahmedabad: From Caste to Communal Violence’, Economic
and Political Weekly, vol. 20, no. 15, 13 April 1985; and (b) ‘Communal
Fire Engulfs Ahmedabad Once Again’, Economic and Political Weekly,
vol. 20, no. 27, 6 July 1985; and Sudarshan Iyengar and Sujata Patel,
‘Gujarat: Violence with a Difference’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol.
20, no. 28, 13 July 1985.

14. See, for example, J. Breman, ‘Even Dogs are Better Off ; The On-going
Battle Between Capital and Labour in the Cane Fields of Gujarat (mimeo),
Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi and Institute for
Social Science Research in Developing Countries, The Hague, April 1990;
Sujata Patel, ‘Gujarat: Contract Labour and Public Interest Litigation’,
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 18, no. 51, 17 December 1983; and
Mathew Kalathil, ‘Gujarat: Everyday Discrimination Against Tribals’,
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 18, no. 47, 19 November 1990.

15. For a discussion of the linkages between caste, class and dominance in
Gujarat, see I.P. Desai. ‘Should “Caste” be the Basis for Recognising
Backwardness’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 19, no. 28, 14 July

218 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

1984; Ghanshyam Shah, ‘Caste, Class and Reservation’, Economic and
Political Weekly, vol. 20, no. 3, 19 January 1985; and Upendra Baxi, ‘Caste,
Class and Reservations (In memoriam I.P. Desai)’, Economic and Political
Weekly, vol. 20, no. 10, 9 March 1985.

16. Sarthi Acharya, The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme: a
Study of Labour Market Intervention (mimeo), New Delhi, (LO (ARTEP),
May 1990, preface.

17. Degrees of poverty and infant mortality rates both in urban and rural
areas are closely related. See World Development Report, 1990, Oxford
University Press for the World Bank, 1990, p. 30. When talking about
unemployment, we have to remember that most of the poor face a positive
threat of unemployment and starvation practically all the time. The threat
may be caused by drought, floods, disabling disease, sudden loss of assets
through seizure by money-lenders and so on. Thus while some people stay
desperately poor all the time, there are others who may move out of poverty
in one year to find themselves again pushed below subsistence levels of
living the next year.Fora study of this kind of instability around the poverty
line, see ibid., p. 35, which summarizes the findings of a study of 211
agricultural households in drought-prone areas of central India between
1975 and 1983 carried out by the International Crops Research Institute for
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) based in Hyderabad.

18. I cannot here resist reproducing a story (in free translation) from
Charuchandra Datta’s Purano Katha (1343 B.S. or AD 1936, reprinted,
Vishva-Bharati: Calcutta, 1962, p. 24) which illustrates the contradictions
and the amorphousness of popular Hinduism: ‘Ona rainy and stormy night
a (Muslim) fakir took shelter in a dilapidated temple, which still housed a
Shiva-linga. The fakir did not know the linga from any ordinary stone. He
sat down on it, and ate some kababs he was carrying. The rain and the storm
continued to rage. A Hindu peasant also ran into the temple to get some
relief from the inclement weather. He was flabbergasted by the sight of the
fakir with his white beard, and became transfixed in the doorway from
fright. The fakir did not open his mouth, but the god was less kind. In a
dreadful accent the linga spoke thus, “My dear fakir, move your feet a bit.
Let me go and break the neck of the Hindu. How dare he, a low-bom fellow,
enter my temple with muddy feet and dirty clothes?”

19. For accounts of this mode of preaching and reform, see Rafiuddin
Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 187]-1906: a Quest for Identity, Oxford
University Press: New Delhi, 1981; Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha
Rajnitir Panchash Bachhar (Bengali), Nowroz Kitabistan: Dhaka,1970,
ch. 1.

Notes on the Contributors

S. Gopal is Emeritus Professor of Contemporary History at the Jawahar-
lal Nehru University, New Delhi.

K.N. Panikkar is Professor of Cultural and Intellectual History at the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Sushil Srivastava is in the Department of Medieval and Modern History
of the University of Allahabad.

A.G. Noorani is a lawyer and well-known writer on public affairs.

Mushirul Hasan is Professor of History at the Jamia Millia Islamia in
New Delhi.

Neeladri Bhattacharya is at the Centre for Historical Studies in the
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Romila Thapar is Professor of Ancient History at the Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.

Aditya Mukherjee is at the Centre for Historical Studies in the Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi.

Asghar Ali Engineer is the director of the Institute of Islamic Studies in
Bombay.

Amiya Kumar Bagchi is the director of the Centre for Studies in Social
Sciences in Calcutta.

Chronology

1528 The Babri Masjid built by Mir Baqi, a nobleman of Babur’s court.

1855 The Hanumangarhi episode. Hindu—Muslim conflict as a conse-
quence of an attempt by Muslims under the leadership of Shah Gulam
Hussain to oust the Hindu Bairagis from the Hanumangarhi temple on the
grounds that the temple had supplanted the mosque. The Muslims were
defeated. The dispute was not over the Babri Masjid.

1857 Soon after the Revolt, the Mahant of Hanumangarhi takes over a
part of the Babri Masjid compound and constructs a chabutra.

30 November: Maulvi Muhammad Asghar of the Masjid submits a peti-
tion to the magistrate complaining that the Bairagis have built a chabutra
close to the mosque. (Similar complaints are made in 1860, 1877, 1883
and 1884.)

1859 The British Government erects a fence to separate the places of
worship of the Hindus andthe Muslims. The Hindus are to enter from the
East gate and the Muslims from the North.

1885

29 January: The Mahant files a suit to gain legal title to the land in the
mosque and for permission to construct a temple on the chabutra.

24 December: The Mahant’s suit and appeals are dismissed. His claim for
the proprietorship of the land in the compound of the Masjid is also
dismissed by the Judicial Commissioner.

1886
25 May: The Mahant appeals again to the highest court in the province.

1 November: The Judicial Commissioner dismisses the Mahant’s appeal
again.

1936 Aninquiry conducted by the then Commissioner of Waqfs under
the UP Muslims Waqf Act, and it is held that the Babri Masjid was built
by Babur who was a Sunni Muslim.

Chronology | 221

1949

22-23 December 1949 : In the night an idol of Rama was installed by the
Hindus inside the mosque. The Government proclaims the premises as
disputed area and locks the gates.

1950

16 January: A suit is filed by Gopal Singh Visharad in the Court of the
Civil Judge, Faizabad, praying for a declaration that he is entitled to
worship in the Ramjanmabhumi.

24 April: The District Collector of Faizabad, J.N. Ugra, files a statement
in court that the property in suit has been in use as a mosque and not as a
temple.

1951

3 March: The Civil Judge orders that the idols should remain. The High
Court confirms this order on 26 April 1955.

1961

18 December: The first civil suit by Muslims is filed by the Sunni Central
Waaf Board for the delivery of the possession of the mosque by the
removal of the idols and other articles of Hindu worship.

1984

7 and 8 April: The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) sponsored Dharma
Sansad in a session at Vigyan Bhavan, New Delhi gives a call to liberate
the Ram janmabhumi.

To create national awareness in support of the liberation of the Bhumi
the VHP organizes a rath-yatra of Sri Rama Janaki Virajman on a
motorized chariot from Bihar on 25 Sept 1984 to reach Ayodhya on 6
October 1984. But Indira Gandhi’s assassination later that month leads to
a suspension of the yatra. .
1986 Umesh Chandra Pandey files an application in the court of the
munsif seeking the removal of the restrictions on the puja. The application
is turned down.

1 February: K.M. Pandey, District Judge, Faizabad, orders the opening
of the locks to the Hindus for worship. The Muslim community is not
allowed to offer any prayers.

March: The Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) is formed. This is
followed by a countrywide Muslim ‘mourning’.

222 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

12 May: The Sunni Central Waaf Board files a writ petition against the
District Judge’s order.

1987

1] December: The State of Uttar Pradesh applies to the Allahabad High
Court that the hearing of the two writ petitions be deferred and the four
civil suits be withdrawn from the court of munsif sadar and tried by the
High Court.

March: At New Delhi’s Boat Club three lakh Muslims gather to demand
handing over the Babri Masjid.

April: The Hindus gather at Ayodhya to pledge the liberation of the shrine.
1988

December: The Babri Masjid Action Committee splits to form Babri
Masjid Movement and the BMAC.

1989

November: The Shilanyas is held at Ayodhya on 9 November and the
foundation of the temple is laid the next day. The plinth is dug 192 feet
away from the mosque.

On 11 November the VHP leaders declare that the construction of the
temple is being deferred and it would be decided in January 1990.

December: A coalition of the Janata Dal, the Bharatiya Janata Party and
the Communist Party of India forms the Government at the Centre after
the general elections.

1990

15 February: The new government constitutes a committee to talk to the
various groups and find an amicable solution.

October: A rath-yatra, from Somnath to Ayodhya led by the BJP leaders
starts.

The BJP withdraws support to the Janata Dal Government.

In the Shilanyas procession and the kar seva on 30 October performed
amidst tight security, several people are killed and injured in the police
action.

November: The BJP and the VHP decide to resume the kar seva on 6
December.

APPENDIX

The Archaeological Evidence

In November 1990, the newspapers reported a talk by Prof. B.B.Lal in
which he is said to have revealed that during excavations, fifteen years
ago in 1975, in the area adjoining the Babri Masjid the excavators had
found some pillar-bases. Earlier, in October 1990, Prof. B.B.Lal had made
a Similar statement in the RSS magazine, Manthan. This information
together with interpretations of the carved stone pillars used in the Babri
Masjid were then claimed as ‘conclusive evidence’ of the existence of a
Hindu temple at the site of the present Babri Masjid (supposedly located
at the birthplace of Rama). It was further claimed that this temple was
deliberately destroyed and replaced by the mosque in 1528. It was argued
that the pillar-bases were foundational to rows of pillars some of which
can now be seen in the mosque. The temple was dated to the eleventh
century, using the stratigraphy of the excavated pillar-bases and the
decorative motifs sculpted on the stone pillars in the mosque and else-
where. ~~
These claims of ‘conclusive evidence’ have been made repeatedly by
Dr S.P.Gupta (who however was not a member of the excavating team),
in a number of newspaper articles. One was published in the /ndian
Express of 2 December 1990. Reactions to these claims by historians and
archaeologists were carried in the /ndian Express of 5,6 and 13 December.
The debate has been extended and carried in other newspapers as well.
Apart from the question of the acceptability of the evidence and its
interpretation by Dr S.P.Gupta (on which there are two detailed comments
given below), the issue also raises a question of archaeological method
and procedure which archaeologists feel has been violated in the publicity
sought by theclaims. It is normal that in archaeology, as in most branches
of learning, significant findings are mentioned in a preliminary report but
are discussed in full in a detailed report which is published. Any claims
to major new evidence would have to depend on the availability of a
detailed report. It is only when other archaeologists have seen the full
report and judged the method of excavation and interpretation of the data,
_that a claim can be assessed. In the case of this excavation at the Babri

224 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

%
:
*
Ps
Os
F
i

Pillar at the foot of the
grave of the local saint
Musa Aashikan.

(Photograph by
S. Srivastava)

Pillar at Faizabad similar
to pillars used inside the
Babri Masjid.

(Photograph by
S. Srivastava)

Appendix | 225

Masjid, the excavator Prof. B.B.Lal, has not so far published a detailed
report. Furthermore, in his preliminary report (Indian Archaeology—-A
Review 1976-77), he states, ‘After the early historic deposit there is a
break in occupation, with considerable debris and pit formations before
the site was again occupied around the eleventh century AD. Several
later-medieval brick-and-kankar lime floors have been met with, but the
entire late period was devoid of any special interest.’ This is the period in
which it is now claimed that a Hindu temple of the eleventh century was
destroyed in the sixteenth century. There is no mention of the pillar-bases
even in his later preliminary report in 1979-80.

The debate in the media has touched on many points. The following
comments aremore specifically addressed to the archaeological, architec-
tural and iconographic evidence referred to in the debate.

A Comment by Dr Suraj Bhan
Department of Archaeology, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra

The trenches dug outside the compound wall of the Babri Masjid to the
south by Prof. B.B.Lal have yielded two rows of squarish pillars made of
bricks standing toa height of 2 feet less than half ametre below the surface
of the mound. The northernmost pillars found in the trench are not fully
excavated. This pillared structure was constructed in the eleventh century
as inferred from the association of the typical pottery of the period. The
Muslim glazed ware pottery pieces generally ascribed to a period between
the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries were also found from the upper levels
of the above trenches marking the end of the brick-pillared structure.

Fourteen black stone pillars, dated on stylistic grounds to the eleventh
century are used in the Babri Masjid. This was constructed according to
a Persian inscription located in the mosque in AD 1528. Besides this
evidence, reference has also been made to two pillars and a doorjamb of
this stone, which have also been found at different places on the Ayodhya
mound far away from the Babri Masiid site. The stone pillars are carved
with figures of yakshas, salabhanjikas, dvarapalas, creepers, purna
ghata, etc.

The argument in support of a temple considers all these stratigraphi-
cally unassociated structural pieces—brick pillars in trenches, black stone
pillars used in the Babri Masjid and black stone pillars and a doorjamb
found at two different parts of the mound—as an integral part of one and

226 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

the same structure, namely, a ‘Hindu Temple’.

On the basis of this disparate archaeological evidence it is asserted that
a ‘Hindu Temple was built at the controversial site in the eleventh century
which continued to be used till the very end of the fifteenth century. Then
suddenly, in the early sixteenth century, it was demolished and its debris
was partially used in the Babri Masjid.’

It must be stated emphatically that these assertions are not tenable and
the conclusions which follow are wrong because the assumptions are
faulty.

(i) It has been assumed that the brick pillars in the trenches excavated
outside the compound wall of the Babri Masjid in the south and dated to
the eleventh century, belonged to a ‘Hindu Temple’ on the ground that
these served as ‘bases’ of the black stone pillars (re-used in the Babri
Masjid) carved with figures of semi-divine beings related to the ‘Hindu’
pantheon. The conjecture that the stone pillars (of the Babri Masjid, etc.)
originally formed an integral part of the brick-pillared structure excavated
in the trenches, is absolutely unfounded because no stone pillars, broken
or unbroken, were found stratigraphically associated with the brick pillars
(supposed to belong to a Hindu Temple) in the trench. Nor was any
evidence found of Hindu ritual objects or sculptures stratigraphically
associated with the brick-pillared structure supposed to be a ‘Hindu
Temple’. Besides, the carvings on the stone pillars reused in the Babri
Masjid, or found elsewhere, do not specifically relate to Rama or to
Vaishnava temples. Such figures are found carved on Buddhist, Jaina or
Shaiva architecture as well. The brick-pillared structure by itself reveals
no architectural features of a temple, nor do the brick pillars, supposed to
be the bases of the stone pillars, have any sockets in which the stone pillars
could be fitted.

(ii) That the brick-pillared structure extended underneath the Babri
Masjid further north is neither proved nor relevant because the structure
cannot be identified as a Hindu temple.

It is evident from the above, that the brick pillars found in the trenches
and the stone pillars used in the Babri Masjid had nothing in common and
belonged to two different structures of the eleventh century. There is no
evidence to identify the brick-pillared structure in the trenches with a
‘Hindu Temple’. The black stone pillars found in the Babri Masjid and
elsewhere may not belong to a single structure or a temple as indicated
by the differences in the carvings of the pillars.

(iii) Although the brick-pillared structure in the trenches as well as the
black stone-pillared temple structures seem to have been constructed in

Appendix | 227

theeleventhcentury AD, these may not have come to anend simultaneous-
ly. The introduction of Muslim glazed ware pottery dating from the
thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, in the hurriedly excavated upper
levels of the trenches, may suggest the end of the brick-pillared structures
anywhere between these centuries but does not suggest that the so-called
temple existed inthe sixteenth century until it was ‘destroyed’ in AD 1528.

There is absolutely no evidence in the form of tell-tale marks of the use
of tools inthe demolition of the brick-pillared structure by ahuman hand.
In all probability the structure seems to have collapsed on its own and was
not demolished.

The black stone-pillared temple structures, whose location and
Stratigraphical context are as yet unknown, could have ended any time
between the eleventh century and AD 1528 when these pillars were
re-used for constructing the Babri Masjid. It cannot be said with any
definiteness that the stone pillared temple structure was demolished by
human hands in the absence of any marks that suggest the battering of the
pillars with iron tools.

(iv) Lastly, it may be pointed out that it is not within the scope of
archaeology to give calendrical dates for a structure. Nor can it tell us
anything about who ‘destroyed the temple’ or whether it was the same
persons who constructed the Babri Masjid. Such questions can only be
answered with the help of a written record.

To conclude, the excavations at Ayodhya both by A.K. Narain of the
B.H.U. (1969-70) and by B.B. Lal (1975-80) have yielded the Muslim
Glazed Ware pottery dating between thirteenth and fifteenth centuries in
the last period. In fact the excavations at the Jain Ghat have revealed six
structural periods associated with the medieval times dating from the
thirteenth century onwards. The digging in the south of the Babri Masjid
outside its compound wall also yielded a thick deposit associated with
Muslim Glazed Ware pottery pieces immediately below what is supposed
to be the general floor of the Babri Masjid. This deposit of Muslim Glazed
Ware overlies the floors associated with the brick-pillared structure and
dating back to the eleventh century AD. These evidences have established
beyond doubt that the introduction of the Muslim Glazed Ware marks the '
occupation of parts of Ayodhya mound called Rama Kota locally and in
the revenue records and in the Babri Masjid area at least two centuries
before the construction of the Babri Masjid. As such any possibility of the
brick-pillared structure supposed to be a Hindu Temple being demolished
in the early sixteenth century and the mosque being constructed at the
same site in 1528 is ruled out. Such an inference will be in contradiction

228 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

of the evidenc 2 procured by the archaeologists through their excavations.

A Comment by Professor R. Champakalakshmi
Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

There are fourteen pillars, vhich are at present found built into various
parts of the Babri Masjid. Of these, two are found built into either side of
the entrance. These pillars do not represent a pair as they normally should,
for the pattern of the carvings or decorative sculptures on them is dis-
similar, i.e. not identical.

In the interior of the mosque twelve pillars are found. Of these, two
each are built into either side of the arched openings or entrances into the
three chambers of the mosque. Eight of them are dissimilar, the pattern
of carvings or decorative sculptures being quite different from each other.
The other four have similar carvings but they do not necessarily occur in
a particular grouping.

Thus these pillars show that they are an assorted lot and hence cannot
be described as in situ or in a row which may indicate their structural
alignment. They seem to belong to some other structure, and to have been
later used by the builders of the mosque. This has given rise to the
assumption that they must have been part of a temple at the very same
site and that it was a Rama (Vaishnava) temple which was destroyed to
make way for the mosque. An attempt is also being made to link these
pillars with the ‘brick pillar bases’ supposed to have been revealed dur‘ng
the excavations of 1975--76 near the mosque at Ayodhya, vut reported in
a newspaper article only in December 1990. It is claimed thatthese pillars
were originally supported by the ‘brick pillar bases’ and removed and used
in the building of the mosque. Curiously, it is also pointed out that the
alignment of the ‘brick pillar bases’ can be shown to continue into the
present mosque where the pillars are now found, meaning that the pillars
now in the mosque are in situ. These statements are quite clearly con-
tradictory to each other and hence questionable. There are also other
pillars or parts of pillars found scattered in the vicinity of the mosque,
some as far as half a kilometre or one kilometre away. They carry similar -
carvings.

The dominant motifs in the carvings are floral, conventionalized or
stylized lotuses, palmettes and other patterns woven out of foliage. The
second important motif is the female figure, generally in the form of a
vrikshadevata or salabhanjika, often shown standing on a lotus, itself

Appendix | 229

stylized and issuing out of a vase or what is called a kumbha or purna-
ghata, i.e. a pot. There are thus no iconic representations in any of the
pillars, with the single exception of a figure holding a trishula in its left
hand, which is found on the lower part of what may be described as a
door jamb now located not in the Masjid but in a structure at the site called
Sita-ki-Rasoi at a little distance from the mosque. This will be taken up
later for a detailed description and identification.

The predominant motifs thus would be the floral and conventional lotus
carvings and the female figure. The latter, in particular, is prominent in
some pillars, including the one lying some distance away from the
mosque. The female figure is standing on a lotus issuing from a vase
(purna ghata). This motif may be traced back to early Buddhist art as
represented in Sanchi, Bharhut and other places (first century BC and first
century AD), where it symbolizes Maya, the mother of the Buddha and
also stands for life and prosperity. The lotus is associated with early
Buddhist and Jaina art and iconography from the early historic period
(third century BC to third century AD). In Buddhist art it was a part of the
‘tree of life and prosperity’ and this is illustrated by the occurrence of
stylized lotuses as decorative motifs and in the tree of life issuing froma
pot or purna ghata. The tree, apart from the lotuses, also consisted of a
stem with the figures of birds, animals and human beings (often as couples
or mithuna and sometimes only as female figures) issuing from it on either
side. Garlands and jewels are often found hanging on either side of the
stem. Significantly, some of these ‘trees’ issue from the footprints of the
Buddha and end up at the top with the triratna and shrivatsa symbols
(standing for the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha). Occurring in a period
when the Buddha was not yet represented in anthropomorphic form, this
tree of life is often described as the earliest conceptualization and
visualization of the Buddha (footprints: Buddha’s feet, the stem with
motifs: his body, and the triratna: his head). This motif undergoes
interesting variations in the decorative sculptures of all periods and of
various religious sects. As we see it in these pillars, it is a decorative
female figure often in the tribhanga posture or a dancing pose standing
on a lotus issuing from a pot, which also has other foliage issuing out of
it and flowing all over. It is a motif common to all religious art and may
well have been even a part of pillar decorations in secular structures.

The vrikshadevata or salabhanjika often holding the branch of a tree
may also be traced back to early Buddhist art in Sanchi, Bharhut and
Mathura.” Later this figure also becomes a common decorative motif in
all structures, Jaina, Shaiva and Vaishnava, sometimes figuring

230 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

prominently as bracket figures as seen at Khajuraho (Shaiva), Halebid
(Shaiva), Belur (Vaishnava) and the Jaina temples of Gujarat.

The only pillar (doorjamb?) which has anything that may be called a
religious motif is the one found in the Sita-ki-Rasoi. On its lower part it
has a figure with a trishu/a in its lefthand. The figure may be a dvarapala
and the trishula would indicate a Shaiva association. However, two other
features which this figure shows have been claimed as typical Vaishnava
features: its crown which is described as kKarandamukuta and the garland
which decorates it and which has been described as a vanamala as it is a
long one reaching down to the knee.

It is incorrect to attribute the karandamukuta to Vaishnava images
alone, for it is not characteristic of or peculiar to Vaishnava images. In
fact, it hardly occurs in the Vishnu icons which have a characteristic
kiritamukuta. The karandamukuta is prescribed for female deities (god-
desses) and minor deities and attendants’ including dvarapalas of all
religious affiliations. It occurs on Ganesha icons also as well as on
non-religious figures like royal figures.

As for the garland, while the vanamala or vaijayantimala is associated
with Vishnu icons, the long garland as a decorative element occurs in most
of the Pala, Sena sculptures of the tenth to twelfth centuries AD, be it
Vaishnava, Shaiva or of any other pantheon. In the medieval sculptures
of Bengal, Khajuraho, Rajasthan and in south Karnataka (Halebid, etc.,
of the Hoysala period) this element is a prominent decorative motif in all
sculptures. It is also worn by dancers and musicians and by the river
goddess Ganga in medieval art.

In the case of the present figure, it may aso be identified as a garland-
like yajnopavita or sacred thread, worm over the left shoulder and coming
under the right arm. Such yajnopavitas reaching down to the knee or even
below the knee are found in Shaiva images, in flower garland form as
seen in dvarapalas of the Shaiva temples” and even on Shiva as Natesa
and Gangadhara.” Apart from a garland-like sacred thread, whatare called
vastra-yajnopavita are also worn by such figures.” Surya images ate
often decorated with such long garlands or yajnopavita in garland form.
The figures of Avalokiteshvara (Buddhist-Bodhisattva) are also shown
with the jewel form of the motif worn in the yajnopavita fashion.

It is also noteworthy that the lower garment with its katisutra (a
sash-like cloth tied around the waist) sometimes appears like the garland
reaching the knee. The katisutra is worn around the waist with loops and
knots, the loops flowing down to the knee. This is a common feature of
both the Shaiva and Vaishnava figures.

Appendix / 231

Hence the figure on the lower part of the pillar is not necessarily a
Vaishnava dvarapala. Above all the presence of the trishula is the main
factor in establishing the figure to be anything but Vaishnava. For no
Vaishnava dvarapala can be and has ever been shown with the trishula
as an attribute.

Above the figure of the dvarapala, the pillar/door jamb has a vertical
row of male and female figures and some decorative foliage. Again the
female figures are of the dancing female or vrikshadevata type and are
both decorative as well as symbolic of life and prosperity like the early
‘tree of life’ design. Their occurrence on doorjambs is common to all
Structures, including secular ones.

Another motif found in many of these pillars is the schematic garlands
hanging around the pillars on their upper part well below the capital. This
again is a feature common to all structures, religious and secular. Such
decorations are found in kirti-toranas (gateways commemorating fame
or victory) and in Jaina (Dilwara) and Shaiva temples (Khajuraho and
Bhubaneshwar). In Bhubaneshwar it is a part of the entrance torana of
the Mukteshvara temple.

The pillars in the mosque can thus be seen to be an assorted lot and can
on no account be described as in situ. Firstly, they are not found inidentical
pairs at the entrances or with identical decorative features in a particular
alignment. Secondly, they are of a height of not more than 5.6-or’6 feet.
Thirdly, one of the pillars has the palmette motif upside down and may
have been built into the wall upside down. Fourthly, in two of the pillars
in the mosque, there is clear evidence of their upper parts—the portion
representing the capital—being unfinished as this part shows no clear
hammer dressing or chiselling, not to speak of carvings. The capital
portion in the other pillars show some carvings, which include a stylized
neck in the form of a ribbed element and an abacus carved with petals.

The unevenness of the upper parts of some pillars also raises the
question whether they are complete pillars as they stand now. As they are
found at present, they also seem to have no specific load-bearing function.
Hence to assign to them a specific function and alignment would be highly
unscientific. It could even be suggested that they were ruins of a structure
in the vicinity of the mosque or at some other site in Ayodhya, which the
builders of the mosque found convenient to use in their structure. Such a
structure could have been a mandapa (a pillared pavilion), but considering
the height of the pillars, it could also have been a veranda or balcony of
a structure, which was non-religious (secular) for given the nature of the
decorative features on these pillars, they could occur in both religious and

232 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

secular structures.

Thus the evidence for the existence of a Hindu temple and more
particularly a Vaishnava temple dedicated to Rama at the very same site
as the present mosque is far from conclusive. Any attempt to use the
available evidence as conclusive is questionable.

Notes

(References to well-known centres and their monuments are too many to he
listed here. Hence the following are to more specific instances.)

1. John Marshall, Guide to Sanchi, Reprint, Delhi, 1955; Ludwig Bach-
hofer, Early Indian Sculpture, 2 vols., Paris, 1923.

2. John Marshall, A. Foucher and N.G. Majumdar, Monuments of Sanchi
vol II and III, Delhi, 1940.

3. ibid.; Bachhofer, op.cit.; Nihar Ranjan Ray, Maurya and Post-Maurya
Art, Calcutta, 1975, figs. 45 & 46.

4. C.Sivaramamurti, ‘Geographical and Chronological factors in Indian
Iconography’, Ancient India, no. 6, January 1950, p. 30; See also C.
Sivaramamurti, South Indian Bronzes, figs. 26, 30, 49(b), 68(a), 72(b),
80(a), 86; Also R.Champakalakshmi, Vaishnava Iconography in the Tamil
Country, New Delhi, 1981.

5. C.Sivaramamurti, op. cit., 1950, fig.15 (2c); fig. 81(a)

6. The Struggle for Empire, History and Culture of the Indian People, vol.
V, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Series, K.M.Munshi (ed.), fig. 112 (Dancers
and Musicians from Harshagiri).

7. C.Sivaramamutti, op.cit., (Ancient India, no. 6) pl. II, fig.C.

8. ibid., fig. 21(a) and (b), pl. XXV, (c) and (d). (Gwalior and Dacca) (pl.
IV(c) for Ganesa).

9. ibid., pl. XXVII

10. ibid., fig. 7.

11. ibid., pLII: C andE

12. The Struggle for Empire, the figure of Avalokiteshvara from Nalanda.
13. C.Sivaramamurti, South Indian Bronzes, Lalit Kala Akademi, New
Delhi, 1963, pl.

14. The Struggle for Empire, fig. 51 from Vadnagar and fig. 33 from
Khajuraho.

Adbhuta Ramayana 154
Adam 150

Adhyatma Ramayana 153
Advani, L.K. 19, 77, 89, 90,
100, 115

Africa 170

Agarwal, Justice Deoki Nandan
22, 58, 68, 78, 124

Agni 153

Ahmedabad 187, 192

Ahmed, Sir Syed 174, 184, 185,
198

Ahsan, S.A. 67

Ain-i-Akbari 27, 34, 111
Akali Dal 176

Akalis 169

akash-Marg 148

Akbar 28, 42, 136, 137
Alandi 130

Alavi, Hamza 186

Aligarh 171

Ali, Maulvi Amir 31, 42, 44,
50, 111

Ali, Mansoor 59

Ali, Sadiq 75

Aligarh 104, 105, 171, 173,
174

All India Mustim League 106
Allahabad 38, 48, 51, 60, 87
Allahabad High Court 58, 77,
82, 84, 87

Allahabadi, Akbar 105

Amethi 42, 43

Ananada Ramayana 154
Andhavenhuputtas 24
Andhra Pradesh 188, 206, 207,
212

Anglo-Orientilist movement
198

Anis, Mukhtar 87

Anjumans 106

Apabhramsha 149
Archaeological Survey of India

Index

34

Arthur, T.C. 116

Arya Samaj 103, 213
Asaf-ud-daula, Nawab 39, 112
Asghar, Mohammed 64
Asghar, Maulvi Muhammad
33

Ashrafs 195, 201

Aurangzeb 35, 39, 44, 47, 48,
49, 53, 54, 136, 137, 165
Avadh 27, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41,
43, 45, 49, 50, 59, 63, 105, 110,
112

avatara 33, 45

Ayodhya Guide 134

Ayodhya ka Prachin Itihas 124,
134

Ayodhya Mahatmya 29, 155
Azad, Maulana Abdul Kalam
185, 186, 187

Azamgarh 111

Baangi-i-Dara 105

Baba Rama Chander 156

Babri Masjid Action Commit-
tee (BMAC) 101

Babri Masjid Movement Coor-
dination Committee 22

Babur 11, 12, 27, 89, 135, 159
Baburnama 27,84, 89
Badauni, Qadir Abdul 28
Badrir-ud-daulah 43

Bagchi, A.K. 216

Bahraich 40, 110, 112, 114
Bairagi 30, 31, 42, 44, 45, 52,
69, 113

Bajrang Dal 115

Bakker, Hans 26, 30, 33, 35
Baksh, Mohammad Faiz 40,
41, 49, 50, 52

Balakanda 145

Bali,Rai Abhairam 44

Bali, Rai Mahadeo 42, 129

234 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Baluchistan 187, 193
Banerjea, Surendranath 105
Bangladesh 101, 207

Bansa 43, 44

Baqi, Mir 27, 30, 63, 67, 78,
110

Bara Banki 43, 50

Barlow, Colonel 44

BBC 19, 191, 196

Benares 38, 48

Benet, W.C. 39, 41, 42, 45, 48,
49, 53

Bengal 103, 105, 107, 109,
166, 173, 182, 193, 195, 213,
214

Beveridge, A.S. 29, 30, 33, 47,
53

Bhadarsa 110

Bhagalpur 18, 19, 197, 200
Bhagavata Purana 154
Bhagavata 145

Bhagvatism 158

bhakta 15

bhakti 46

Bhakti tradition 150

Bharat Kisan Union (BKU) 88
Bharat Milap 104

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
19, 22, 61, 63, 123, 125, 100,
130, 191

Bhargava Brahmins 145
Bhasa 149

Bhattacharya, Neeladri 15, 32,
122

Bhavabhuti 149

Bhavartha Ramayana 150
Bhawani 52, 110
Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh
191, 196

Bhushundi 29

Bhushundi Ramayana 154
Bihar 46, 108, 110, 111, 198,
207

Bilaur tahsil 109

Boas, H.J. 42, 50

Bohras 108, 212

Bombay Presidency 187
Brahmachari, Akshay 68

Brahmalok 134

Brahmanical Hinduism 213
Brahmins 51, 109, 152, 179,
185, 195, 198

Brass, Paul 199, 216

Braudel, Fernand 13, 20
Brihatsamhita 26

British Government 45, 64,
101

Brown, Judith 12

Brussels 60

Buddha 24, 25, 26, 148
Buddhism 25, 38, 130, 147,
213

Buland Darwaza 129

Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946
187

Calcutta 15, 35, 42, 58, 103,
105, 194

Carnegy, Patrick 29, 35,39, 41,
49, 50, 139

Ceylon 152

chabutra 33, 44, 59, 61, 64, 65
Chadha, N.N. 76

Chamier, Col F.E.A. 65
Champanagar 18

Chander, Baba Rama 156
Chandi 129

Chandra, Bipan 118, 175, 177,
178, 181, 183

Chandragupta 165

Chand, Raja Jai 48
Chandravamsha 152
Chatakantakatai 156
Chinmayananda, Swami 77
Chittagong 105

Chowdhury, Neerja 78
Christian, Lassen 146
Christianity 159

Christians 35, 201

Cole, J.R.I. 32, 112
Communist Party of India (CPI)
59, 86, 113

Congress 102, 106, 107, 114,
115, 169, 171, 174, 184, 216
Constituent Assembly 16, 17
Constitution of 1935 187

Cotton, Henry 106, 117

Cow protection movement 198
Cracknell, Frederick Graham
109

Cunningham, A. 38, 48, 51, 53
Cutting, A.G. 75

Dadri 38

Dalits 130, 190, 193, 196, 213
Dandavate, Madhu 87

Dang, Satyapal 60, 84
Darbhanga 198

Dardara Kshatra 38

dargah 108

darukkhandha 24

Daryabad 44

Das, Baba Raghava 114

Das, Raghubar 64

Dasharatha Bhawan 59
Dasaratha Jataka 147
Dasharatha 24, 144, 149
Datta, Pandit Uma 46

Delhi 35, 40, 49, 130
Deoband school 185, 191
Deoband seminary 107
Deogadh 151

Deoras, Babasaheb 89

Deva, Acharya Narendra 114
Devanagari 183, 189

Dharma Sansad 160
Digambara 45

Dube, Ram 70

DurgaPuja 104

Dvaravati 24

Dwaraka 134

East Bengal 15

East India Company 38, 49
Ekanatha 150

Ekatmata Yatras 130

Elliot, H.M. 45, 46, 47, 50
Elliot, Henry 102
Employment Guarantee
Scheme 209

Engineer, Asghar Ali 12
Erskine, William 46

Faraizi 103, 214
Farhat Baksh 46
Fazal, Abul 28, 34, 111

Fernandes, George 87, 88
Finch, William 45, 112
Fisher, Michael 32, 112, 118
Frederick the Great 60
Frietag, Sandria 104

Front Government 18
Fuhrer, A. 48, 88

Gaffar, Maulana Haji Abdul 67
Gahadvala 28

Gandhi, Indira 78, 215
Gandhi, Mahatma 14, 17, 106,
107, 115

Gandhi, Rajiv 89, 90, 114, 115
Ganges 108, 144
Ganj-e-Shaheedan Qabrastan
67, 77

Germany 60

Ghagra 38

Ghori, Shahab-ud-din 41
Ghosh, Parimal 216

goalas 197

Goebbels 19

Gokhale 187, 192

Golok 134

Gopratara Tirtha 29
Gorakhpur 38, 106

Gould, Harold 114
Greco—Turkish War of 1897
103

Gujarat 197, 201, 207, 209, 211
Gupta period 24

Gur-Khattri 28

Gwalior 28

Hamilton, Lord George 12, 20
Hanuman 144, 147, 148, 157
Hanumangarhi 30, 31, 32, 35,
43, 49, 50, 59, 111, 136
Haridwar 38, 39, 134
Harijans 172, 193

Hasan, Mohibbul 33

Hasan, Mushirul 12, 116, 117,
119, 216

Hashim, Mohammed 78, 79
Haveli 110

Hayatbaksh 46

Hayatagar 43

Hayes, Merriam 188, 193

236 / Anatomy of a Confrontation

Himala 105

Hinayana 25

Hindu almanacs 104

Hindu Jagriti Ekta Sammelan
130

Hindu Mahasabha 80, 169, 176
Hindu Samajotsav (Hindu
Unity Conference) 130
Hinduism 102, 179

Hindus 101, 103, 105, 108,
111, 115, 125, 134, 172, 180,
188, 189, 194, 196, 201
Hindustani Bachhon ka Qaumi
Geet 104

Hindutva 129, 130, 131
History of British India, The 49
Hsien, Fa 25

Humayun 137

Hussain, Shah Gulam 30, 31,
32

Ibrahim, Muhammad 70
iddah 191

Ikshvaku 134, 148

Imam of the Shahi Jama Masjid
101

Indian Constitution 62, 100,
137

Indian National Congress 174,
185, 187, 191, 193

Indore 54, 191, 196, 197
Indralok 134

Iqbal, Mohammad 99, 104
Tramavataram 150

Irwin, H.C. 40,49

Islam, Maulvi Sirajul 105

Iyer, V.R. Krishna 86

Jaggannath 39

Jaina 20, 25, 27, 45, 148, 157
Jainism 38, 130, 147

Jamia Nagar 35

Jammu 130

Jan Sangh 19

Jana Jagarani Abhiyans 130
Janaka 144

Janata Dal 86, 115

Jarrett, H.S. 34

Jataka stories 157

Jawaharlal Nehru University
110, 118, 125, 137
Jayrajkumari 136

Jayswal, K.P. 173, 182

jaziya 103

jehad 43, 198

Jews 18, 192

Jinaprabhasuri 29

Jinnah, M.A. 107, 108, 186
julaha 198

Kachwa 28

kajir 180, 182

Kali Yuga 23, 155

Kalidasa 24,149

Kamban 150

Kamiar 44

Kanpur 108, 109
Kanyakumari 130
Kamataka 130, 206, 207
Kartika Purnima 61

Kashi 134

Kashi Vishwanath Mandir 58
Kashmir 15

Kaushalya Bhawan 59
Kayasthas 30, 40, 113
Kerala 187, 206, 209

Khan, Hamid Ali 106

Khan, Sayed Ahmad 105, 111,
166

Khandansa 110

Khilafat movement 101, 106,
107, 186, 187

Khojas 108, 212

khudkash 197

Khwaja, Faqir 30

kisht 197

Koenraad, Elst 20

Komali 53

Koran 13, 185, 186, 191, 214
Koranic 108

Kosalapur 52

Koshala 24, 144

Kot, Mohalla Ram 74

Kota 18, 191, 197

Kothari, Rajini 88
Krishna-bhakti 154

Krishna Janmasthan 58

Krittibasa Ramayan 150
Kshatriya 129, 145
Kumar, Nita 104, 117
Kunzm, Ajudhia Nath 105
Kusha 146

kushilava 146

Lahari, V.N. 72

Lahore Resolution of 1940 111
Lakshmana 51, 144, 148, 149,
156

Lakshmi 153

Lakshmidhara 29

Lal, B.B. 23, 160

Lal, K.S. 35

Lassen, Christian 146, 161
Lava 146

Law, B.C. 33

Legge, J. 33

Leyden, John 47, 52

Lok Sabha 19

London 34,49, 51, 52
Lucknow 35, 39, 42, 43, 48, 50,
58, 101, 113, 199

Macaulay 60

Madaar, Shah 109

Madani, HusainAhmad 185
Madhya Pradesh 206, 207, 211
Madina 192

Madras 18

Mahabharata 16, 143, 145
Mahants 45, 113

Maharaja of Darbhanga 198
Maharajadhiraja 151
Maharashtra 103, 119, 130,
199, 201, 206, 207, 209, 211
Mahavira 26

Mahayana 25
Maheshwaranand 136
Mahmud of Ghazni 18
Mahmudabad 111
Makanpur 109

Malabar 108

Malalasekera, GP. 33
Malaviya, Satya Prakash 88
Malayan 150

maleccha 182

Malkani, K.R. 125

Manan Ekta Edyan 85
Manasa 104

Mandal Commission 19
Mangalsi 110

Manthan 34

Manu 134

Mappilas 108

Marathas 39

Martin, Montgomery 34, 38,
44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54
Martin, O.M. 107, 117
Masud, Syed Salar 40
Mathura 16, 58, 61, 101, 134
Mecca 32, 192
Meenakshipuram 189, 195
Meghavahana 148
Memons 108, 212

Meos 108

Meston, James 111

Mian, Sheikh Bandagi 42
millat 187

Mill, James 164, 177

Mill, James Stuart 49
Mirat-i-Masudi 40
Mishra, Mitra 29
Mitakshara 211

Mitra, Chandan 72, 115
Mitta, Manoj 78
Mohammedan 35

moksha 153

Mountbatten, Lord 108
Mughals 28, 35, 118, 196
Muhammad, Prophet 109
Muharram 109

Mujeeb, Mohammad 109
Mukherjee, Aditya 12, 164
Mukerji, Hiren 61

Mukhia, Harbans 32,177
Muslim League 107, 108, 114,
169, 174, 175, 176, 185, 191
Muzzaffarnagar 107

Nachna Kuthara 151

Nadiyas 213
Nadwat-al-ulama 101

Nagri agitation 104

Nagri resolution of 1900 105,
106

238 i Anatomy of a Confrontation

Narain, A.K. 23

Nathnagar 18

National Front 19, 84
Naurang Shah 48

Naya Shiwala 105

Nayadis 213

Nayar, K.K. 70, 72

Nazi Germany 18

nazul 46

Nehru, Jawaharlal 15, 17, 18,
72, 115, 176

Nehru, Motilal 107

Neville, H.R. 29, 41, 45, 111
Nirankaris 193

Nirmohi Akhara 77

Nizam dynasty 182
Non-cooperation movement
106, 107

Noorani, A.G. 15, 58

Northern Black Polished Ware
23, 24

Oak, P.N. 129, 138
Oudh 33, 40, 48, 49

Pakistan 13, 15, 101, 107, 171,
175, 184, 191, 193, 195, 199,
211

Pampa Ramayana 150
Pandey, I.K. 78

Pandey, K.M. 78, 79

Pandey, Ramgopal 124
Pandey, Umesh Chandra 78
Panikkar, K.N. 11, 137

Pant, Pandit Govind Ballabh
15, 70, 72, 114

Parshvanatha 26

Partition 108, 114, 171, 175
Parvati 153

Paswan, Ram Vilas 88

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 15,
72, 90

patidars 197

Pawmacharyam 148

People’s Unit for Democratic
Rights 115

Persian 35, 110, 166, 188, 189
Peshawar 28

pheana 24

Phugauli 44

Pirpur 110

Prakrit 149

Prasad, Mata 70
Pratimamataka 149

Prayag 38, 134

Prayaga 25

Punjab 35, 103, 108, 173, 182,
184, 193, 200, 206, 216

Raghuvamsham 149

Rai, Raja Naval 39, 40, 46, 112
Ramabhakta 153

Ramabhakti 150, 153, 156, 157
Ramacharitam 149
Ramacharitamanas 28, 46, 68,
141, 155, 156

Rama-gita 154

Ramalila 156, 157
Ramanandi 26, 39, 46, 112,
153, 154

Ramapala 149

Rama-katha 23, 141, 144, 146,
147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152,
154, 158

Rama Ratha Yatra 130
Rama-rajya 144, 149, 156,
157, 158

Ramayan 150

Ramayana 16, 23, 24, 25, 46,
130, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,
146, 148, 152, 154, 156, 157,
158

Ram, Balak 113

Ram, Priya Dutt 75
Ramopakhyana 145

Rampur 44
Ranganatharamayana 150
rath-yatra 19, 78

Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS) 22, 100, 113, 115, 169,
190, 191

Ravana 145, 146, 147, 148,
149, 150, 152, 153

Ray, B.C. 85

Ray, Tikayat 112

Renou, L. 160

Revolt of 1857 33,45, 46, 48,

49, 166, 170

Robinson, Francis 168, 173,
177, 178, 181, 182

Roy Asim 116

Rudauli 44

Saadat Khan, Nawab 39
Safdarjung, Nawab 39, 112
Sahay, Bhagwan 72

Sahay Mohan 82

Saketa 24, 25, 132

Sandal procession 181
Sandhyakaranandi 149
Saraswati, Dayanand 214
Saryu, river 24, 38, 134
Sayeed, Mufti Mohamined 84
Sindia, Rajmata 126, 135
Second World War 175, 179
Shah, Nawab Wajid Ali 35, 43,
111,112

Shahabuddin, S. 88

Shah Bano Case 101, 115
Shahjahanpur 67

Shankar 129

Shankaracharya 160

Shariat 103

Sharma, Acharya Gudunji 124
Sharma, Dr Ram Sharan 60
Shastri, Lal Bahadur 16, 21, 67
Shelley 14

Shia Muslims 39

Shilanyas ceremony/puja 107,
113,160

Shimoga 130

Shimla 106

Shiva 153

Shiva Sena 113, 115
Shravasti 24

Shujagunj 44

Sind 187

Singhal, Ashok 84

Singh, Buta 70, 84, 85, 86
Singh, Karan 85, 88

Singh, Kesari 46

Singh, Markanday 74

Singh, Pandit Hari Kishan 64,
65

Singh, Rajendra 89

Singh, Sher Bahadur 44
Singh, Thakur 44

Singh, Vir Bahadur 78

Sita 145, 147, 150, 154, 156
Sita-ki-Rasoi 59

Sithala 104

Skanda Gupta 25

Sleeman, W.H. 41, 42, 49
Smith, W.C. 164, 167, 172,
177, 181

Sri Lanka 152

Sri Ramjanmabhoomi ka
Raktaranjit Itihas 124, 135
Srivastava, Sushil 11, 65
Story of the Ten-Headed
Ravana 156

Sufi 109, 181

Sunni muslims 39

Suri, Sanjay 61
Suryavamsha 152
Svargadwar 40, 48
Syndicated Hinduism 160

Taj Mahal 129

Talla riots of 1897 194

Tamil Nadu 187, 195, 206, 207,
209, 212

Tarana-i-Hindi 105

Tarikh Farah Baksh 40,49
Tarkunde, V.M. 85
Tashkandi, Baqi Bag 63
Thapar, Romila 12, 16
Tieffenthaler 11, 35

Tikait, Mahendra Singh 88
Tirthankars 45

tirthas 24

tirtharaj. 134

Tirupati 130

Treta Yuga /Age 23, 24, 25, 28,
134, 135

Treta-ke-Thakur 48, 53
Tripathi, S.K. 67, 72

Tripathi, Kamalapati 87
Trivedi, R.N. 84

Tsang, Hsuan 26

Tse-tung, Mao 214

Tulsidas, Goswami 28,29 111,
141, 156

240 | Anatomy of a Confrontation

Turko-Italian War of 1911 106

Ugra, J.N. 76, 80
Ujjain 44, 46, 51, 134
ulama 106, 186, 198
wnma 187
Upanishads 15

Urdu 35, 105, 189
urs 181

Urwa Valley 28
Uttarakanda 145
Uttararamacharita 149
Uttar Pradesh 58, 59, 74, 101,
198, 199, 206, 207

Vaishnava 39, 45, 213
Vajpayee, Atal Behari 61, 62,
86, 89, 90

Valmiki 23, 24, 25, 141, 143,
144, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153,
154, 156, 157

Van der Veer, Peter 30, 112
Varahamihira 26

Varanasi 35, 38, 61, 101
Vedic hymns 101

VHP-Buta Singh Accord 84
Vigyan Bhavan 76

Vikrama 44, 46

Vikramaditya 22, 24, 25, 45,
59, 132, 134, 135

Vikramaditya Chandragupta 48
Vimalasuri 148, 149

Virat Hindu Sammelan 130
Vishal HinduSammelan 130
Visharad, Gopal Singh 75, 79
Vishnu 25, 26, 45, 52, 53, 133,
142, 145

Vishnulok 134

Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
19, 22, 23, 61, 63, 77, 78, 80,
100, 101, 113, 115, 122, 123,
124, 125, 130, 160, 190, 191,
196

Vishwanath temple 104
Vritra 145

Wahabi Muslims 39
wahdat-e-din 185
Waliullah, Shah 103
Walters, T. 33
Wavell, Lord 13, 20

yadavs 197
yavanas 180, 182

Younghusband, Francis 20
Young, W. 66

Zia-ul-Haq 195

A brilliant analysis of the rise of communal politics
in India, centering on Ayodhya.

It contains a clear and coherent analysis of the
intellectual, historical and legal background and the
evolution of the issues involved as well as some
signposts and prescriptions for the future.

— Sunday
A forthright book on an issue which has become basic
to the very existence of a democratic and secular India.
— Frontline
An incisive critique of the ideologies, myths, politics
and social mobilisation strategies involved in the
biggest religious communal campaign this pam
has witnessed since Partition.

— The Economic Times
Sarvepalli Gopal and his fellow authors deserve our
thanks for their very important contribution at a

sensitive moment.
— The Telegraph
Contributors
(4 Sarvepalli Gopal (4 Neeladri Bhattacharya
(1 K.N. Panikkar _J Romila Thapar
(4 Sushil Srivastava LI Aditya Mukherjee -
(J A.G, Noorani “J Asghar Ali Engineer
{J Mushirul Hasan (J Amiya Kumar Bagchi

Cover illustration by Bimal Das
Cover design by Sunil Sil

®

A PENGUIN ORIGINAL ISBN 0-14-016980-6
Non Fiction/Current Events

9
India Rs 75 |

9 6

010

| |

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